( 1 ) THE petitioner was the Assistant Head Mistress of the Nasra Girls' High School a Government-aided institution, who was appointed in September, 1958. On the 29th September, 1963, respondent No. 1, the Administrator of the School, served upon her the notice at Ann. 'b' to the petition, giving three months' notice for termination of her services with effect from the 1st January, 1964, and the petitioner has not been paid her salary since that date. ( 2 ) THE petitioner brought this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on April 16, 1964, challenging the validity of that notice, on the ground, inter alia, that no such notice could be served without the approval of the Board of Secondary Education. When the petitioner's application for ad interim injunction was moved, Sinha, J. (as he then was), gave certain directions. Thereafter, the President of the Board of Secondary Education gave its approval to the termination order passed by the Administrator on the 29th September, 1963, by his order communicated by a letter of the Secretary of the Board, dated 18. 9. 64. Hence, the petitioner amended her petition, taking additional grounds. ( 3 ) TWO grounds only have been pressed on behalf of the petitioner at the hearing : (i) That the impugned notice of termination by the Administrator is bad inasmuch as it was made and given effect to without obtaining the previous approval of the Board of Secondary Education, as required by Rule 25 of the Rules made in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 62 of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1950. (ii) That the impugned approval order passed by the President is ultra vires the Rule just cited inasmuch as it is the Board and not its President who is required by the Rule to give its approval to the order of the Managing Committee of the School, whose powers have admittedly been exercised by the Administrator, - respondent No. 1. ( 4 ) (I) The first question involves the interpretation of the word, 'approval' in Rule 25 of the Rules referred to. ( 4 ) (I) The first question involves the interpretation of the word, 'approval' in Rule 25 of the Rules referred to. ( 5 ) IT is to be noted that though the West Bengal Secondary Education Act of 1950 was repealed by the present Act of 1963, (Section 46), no Rules have yet been framed in exercise of the rule-making power vested in the State Government by Section 45 of the new Act. As a result, the Rules framed under the repealed Act are continuing in operation by virtue of Section 25 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. In this context, the Court cannot help observing that it is high time that new Rules are framed by the Government inasmuch as trouble is bound to arise if old wine is kept in a new bottle indefinitely, and, as a matter of fact, a number of cases have already been filled in this Court, taking advantage of this anomaly. ( 6 ) BE that as it may, Rule 25 of the existing Rules is the only provision relating to the termination of services of the teaches of a Secondary School which has been presented to me at this hearing. It says :"the Committee shall have the power of appointing and removing teachers and other members of the staff, granting promotion and increments, leave and free-studentships, managing school funds, framing the annual report, dealing with all schemes of Development and such other matters, as are brought before it for consideration. Free studentships shall ordinarily be given with the consent of the Head Master. In the case of aided schools, the power of the Committee of appointing and removing teachers, granting promotion and increment shall be exercised subject to the approval of the Board of Secondary Education who will consider the recommendation of the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, before granting approval in the matter. The power under this clause to grant leave and award free-studentships shall also be exercised in accordance with the rules framed by the Board of Secondary Education in this behalf. "the School in question being an aided School, the second paragraph of Rule 25 is admittedly applicable to this case. The power under this clause to grant leave and award free-studentships shall also be exercised in accordance with the rules framed by the Board of Secondary Education in this behalf. "the School in question being an aided School, the second paragraph of Rule 25 is admittedly applicable to this case. ( 7 ) THE petitioner's contention is that the Managing Committee has no power to remove a teacher until the approval of the Board of Secondary Education to the proposal or resolution made by the Committee is received. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the respondents it has been urged that the word 'approval' in this paragraph means subsequent approval or ratification by the Board, so that as soon as the Committee takes action to remove a teacher, the latter shall be removed forthwith, but that if the Board subsequently refuses to approve the action of the Committee the termination will be nullified forthwith and the teacher will be automatically reinstated; that in the instant case, the Board having given its approval, the approval will relate back to the termination ordered by the Committee. ( 9 ) IN support of this contention of the respondents much reliance has been placed on the observation of Sulaiman, A. C. J. of the Allahabad High Court in Sakir Hussain v. Chandde Lal, AIR 1931 All 567, which has been followed by a Division Bench of that High Court in Mohammad Ali v. State, AIR 1958 All 681 . That observation is -"ordinarily the difference between the approval and permission is that in the first the act holds good until disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. " ( 10 ) BUT the several Dictionaries presented before me do not indicate that 'approval' always means subsequent approval and can never be construed as meaning previous approval of permission. In fact the very word 'ordinarily' in the cited observation makes it clear that the word may be used in either sense, and has to be construed in the light of the context. This is clear from the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, AIR 162 SC 1500 (1504), which also has been relied upon on behalf of the respondents. This is clear from the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, AIR 162 SC 1500 (1504), which also has been relied upon on behalf of the respondents. The Court, in interpreting the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, said -"the use of the word 'approval' also suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place though sometimes approval may also be sought of a proposed action. " ( 11 ) THE statutory texts to which the preceding cases as well as the English decision in Firth v. Staines, (1897) 2 QB 70, which also is cited on behalf of the respondents, relate, will show that 'approval' was interpreted to mean 'subsequent approval' because of the context in which that word had been used by the Legislature. In this English case, the statutory provision was in Section 58 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1885, as follows :-"it shall be lawful for. . . . . . any (metropolitan) vestry to appoint a committee. . . . . . for any purposes. . Provided always that the acts of every such committee shall be submitted to the general body of the. . . verstry appointing such committee for their approval. " ( 12 ) THE question arose whether a notice issued according to the resolution of the Committee for abatement of a nuisance under Section 85 of the Act was invalid on the ground that approval of the general body of the vestry was not taken before issue of the notice. The Court answered in the negative. The observation of Hawkes, J. makes it amply clear that the answer was influenced by the use of the word 'acts' in the proviso to Section 58, which were required to be submitted for approval :"moreover, what the vestry are, under the proviso, required to approve is the 'acts' of the Committee; and until the Committee have acted there is nothing for the vestry to approve. What I think the proviso means is that, if the Committee are called upon to justify their acts, they will be unable to do so unless they shew an approval of the vestry given at some time or other. " ( 13 ) SIMILARLY, in the Straw Board Mfg. Co. What I think the proviso means is that, if the Committee are called upon to justify their acts, they will be unable to do so unless they shew an approval of the vestry given at some time or other. " ( 13 ) SIMILARLY, in the Straw Board Mfg. Co. case, (ibid), our Supreme Court was influenced by the use of the words 'action taken', along with other factors, in the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which runs thus :" (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding. . . . . . . . , the employer may. . . . . . . . (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish. . . . . that workman; provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. " ( 14 ) THE Court, in coming to the conclusion that the word 'approval' did not mean previous permission, relied upon a number of reasons (p. 1504 of AIR), e. g. , - (i) Use of the words 'action taken' in the proviso : "but it seems to us in the context that the approval here is of something done, as otherwise it would have been quite easy for the Legislature to use the words 'for approval' of the action proposed to be taken. " (ii) Repetition of the words 'action taken' in sub-section (5) (III) Contrasted with the words of the proviso - 'approval of the action taken', use of the words "express permission in writing before carrying out the proposal" in sub-section (1) of the same section. ( 15 ) THE decision in the recent case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Modak, (1965) II SCA 680, merely reiterates the law laid down in the (3) Straw Board Mfg. Co. , (ibid), case, and does not carry it further. ( 16 ) THE Allahabad case of Mohammad Ali v. State, (supra), too, has its special features. It was on Section 68 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. v. Modak, (1965) II SCA 680, merely reiterates the law laid down in the (3) Straw Board Mfg. Co. , (ibid), case, and does not carry it further. ( 16 ) THE Allahabad case of Mohammad Ali v. State, (supra), too, has its special features. It was on Section 68 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Sub-section (1) of that Section provided that a Municipal Board may appoint the principal officers of its technical departments and sub-section (2) then provided that -"each such appointment and the salary and other conditions attached thereto shall be subject to the approval of the State Government. " ( 17 ) THE question for determination in this case was not whether the word 'approval' meant previous permission of ratification, but whether the termination by the Board of an appointment made by it on receipt of the refusal of the Government to approve it constituted a dismissal within the purview of Section 69 of that Act. This question was answered in the negative, on this reasoning :"the appointment though valid till it is disapproved is nebulous and cannot be deemed to be perfect and binding. In the case of such appointment the appointing authority must ordinarily have the power of rescisding the appointment before it has been approved by the higher authority. "what is to be noted in respect of this case is that what the State Government was to approve was an 'appointment' made by the Board and not 'the exercise of the power' to appoint or dismiss, as in the case before me, which we shall presently see. ( 18 ) IN construing a clause like this, the proper mode of approach is to consider all the words taken together. First, in the provision before us, the words 'subject to' cannot be overlooked. These words, as held in a number of English decisions, referred to in Re : Chance, (1962) 1 All ER 942 (947), mean that it X is 'subject to' Y, then Y must be given a priority over X. For instance, if a Will bequeaths an income to the wife subject to the payment of annuity to a daughter, the annuity must be paid before making any payment to the wife. Similarly, if a contract of sale is 'subject to an export licence' the grant of the licence is a condition precedent to the finality and enforceability of the contract, as held by the Court of Appeal in Brauer v. James Clark, (1952) 2 All ER 497 (499-501 ). In this case, Denning, L. J. said that these words meant that "the contract only binds if. . . . . an export licence can be obtained. " likewise, if there is a sale 'subject to contract', there is no binding contract between the parties until a formal document is executed, even though the term had itself been incorporated in a written instrument between the parties Chillingworth v. Esche, (1924) 1 Ch. D. 97. It follows that if the word 'approval' simpliciter may mean either previous approval (in the form of approval to a proposal) or subsequent approval (of an action already taken), the meaning of the word 'approval' in the clause before me has to be deciphered with reference to the words 'subject to', and, consequently, it can only mean that the approval of the Board must be taken before the power of appointment or dismissal can be exercised by the Managing Committee at all. Thus, where an agreement of lease or sale is entered into 'subject to approval' of a party's solicitor, there is no concluded contract until such approval is available Caney v. Leith, (1937) 2 All ER 532; Hudson v. Buck, (1877) 7 Ch. D. 683. Secondly, it cannot be overlooked that what is made subject to the approval of the Board is not an 'appointment' or 'removal' made by the Committee, as has been pointed out by me earlier, in connection with the statutory provision before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mohammad Ali v. State (supra), but "the exercise of the power of the Committee of appointing and removing teachers, granting promotion and increment", which is conferred by paragraph 1 of the same rule. ( 19 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Dutt, the learned Additional Government Pleader, that the power is already conferred by the rule upon the Committee by the first paragraph and that there is no fetter upon this absolute power in the case of non-aided schools. It is only in the case of aided schools that there is a limitation imposed by the second paragraph of rule 25. Dutt, the learned Additional Government Pleader, that the power is already conferred by the rule upon the Committee by the first paragraph and that there is no fetter upon this absolute power in the case of non-aided schools. It is only in the case of aided schools that there is a limitation imposed by the second paragraph of rule 25. According to the learned Government Pleader, the Committee of an aided school is also free to exercise the power conferred by the Board, but that such exercise by the Committee shall be nullified if the Board subsequently disapproves of the exercise of the power by the Committee. This argument cannot, however, be accepted in view of the meaning of the words 'subject to' as already explained by me. What is subjected to the approval of the Board is an exercise of the power to appoint, remove etc. Hence, the Committee cannot exercise the power at all unless and until the approval of the Board is received. In the Committee appoints a man and installs him in office and goes on paying his salary and then either the Committee delays (in the instant case, the Committee referred the matter to the Board some 3 months after its notice of termination, vide paragraph 6 of the Supplementary Affidavit-in-record dated 16. 11. 64) or defaults in seeking the approval of the Board indefinitely, or the Board goes slow in the matter, it cannot be said that the 'exercise' of the power has been subject to the approval of the Board; because the exercise of the power of appointment has been completed as soon as the Committee has been effect to its decision to appoint the teacher in question. Similarly, the exercise of the power of removal is completed as soon as the man is thrown out on the streets by the order or notice issued by the Committee. In such a case, it is immaterial at what point of futurity the Board's approval is sought for or is available. In short, the 'exercise of a power' must be held to be completed as soon as it is given effect to, and nothing is left thereafter for approval. ( 20 ) THE 'approval', which is required by the second paragraph of Rule 25 must, therefore, be a previous approval to the action proposed by the Committee. In short, the 'exercise of a power' must be held to be completed as soon as it is given effect to, and nothing is left thereafter for approval. ( 20 ) THE 'approval', which is required by the second paragraph of Rule 25 must, therefore, be a previous approval to the action proposed by the Committee. This appears to have been the view taken by P. B. Mukherjea, J. in the case of B. Bose v. Sudha Roy, 70 CWN 571 (578), when his Lordship observed: "here in the facts the approval not having yet been obtained the removal cannot in law be complete unless such approval is given. " ( 21 ) ANY way, I have given my reasons in full for coming to the conclusion that, 'in the context', approval cannot mean ratification of an action already taken by the Committee. ( 22 ) IN the instant case, the petitioner's allegation that she has not been paid her salary since the 1st January, 1964 is not contradicted. Paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit of B. N. Mandal dated 11. 7. 64 also states that the notice of termination was given effect to on the 1st January, 1964. That action of the Administrator was, therefore, ultra vires inasmuch as he did not take the approval of the Board before that. ( 23 ) A question has been raised as to why the Rule should be so stringent in the case of aided schools. The reason is not far to seek. The object of the Act is to promote secondary education in the State and the function of the Board set up under the Act is to advise the State Government on all matters relating to secondary education [section 27 (1)]. An aided school, it is commonplace, is a school which receives financial grant-in-aid from Government, on its fulfilling the conditions prescribed for the purpose. In the case of an aided school, therefore, the Government is more particularly interested tan non-aided school because of its financial stake. The appointment, promotion, increment and removal of teachers are matters which involve financial commitments. It is therefore, prescribed by rule 25 that in the case of an aided School, such matters must be done with the approval of the Board which has been constituted by the Act as the adviser of the Government. The Rule does not even stop there. The appointment, promotion, increment and removal of teachers are matters which involve financial commitments. It is therefore, prescribed by rule 25 that in the case of an aided School, such matters must be done with the approval of the Board which has been constituted by the Act as the adviser of the Government. The Rule does not even stop there. Inasmuch as the Board is a statutory corporation and not a Department of the Government [section 3 (2)], the Rule provides an additional safeguard, namely, that the Board's power of giving approval is itself made subject to another condition precedent, namely that before granting its approval in the aforesaid matters, the Board must "consider the recommendation of the Director of Public Instruction" who being a direct subordinate of the Government is expected to represent the financial interests of the Government better than the Board. If the Board itself is to consider the recommendations of another authority in giving its approval to the exercise of the power of the Committee of an aided school, it would be defeating the purpose of the safeguard imposed by the second paragraph of the rule to hold that the Committee can exercise the power and give effect to that power before receiving the approval of the Board. ( 24 ) IN this context, the last part of the second paragraph of the Rule has also to be considered. It says that the power of the Committee to grant leave to teachers and free-studentships "shall be exercised in accordance with the rule framed by the Board of Secondary Education in this behalf. " It is to be noted that though the expression "exercise of the power" is common to both parts of the 2nd paragraph, while in the first part such exercise is made "subject to approval", in the latter part it is required to be made "in accordance with the Rules. " This use of different phraseology cannot but be held to be deliberate, and it is evident that in relation to the minor matters of leave and free-studentship, the Rule does not intend to impose a limitation as rigorous as the first part which deals with more important matters like appointment, promotion, removal etc. " This use of different phraseology cannot but be held to be deliberate, and it is evident that in relation to the minor matters of leave and free-studentship, the Rule does not intend to impose a limitation as rigorous as the first part which deals with more important matters like appointment, promotion, removal etc. It is not that the Board has no part to play as regards the minor matters at all; it will have to make rules to guide the Committee in these matters and then to see, if it has to discharge its function of "supervising and controlling secondary education" [section 27 (2)], that the rules so prescribed by it have been observed by the Committee of an aided school, and, if not, to nullify such action by subsequent disapproval. In this case, the Committee is free to exercise the power without seeking any prior approval and if, eventually, in the opinion of the Board it has transgressed any such rule, the Board has the power to set aside the action taken by the Committee. The latter part of the second paragraph in my opinion, envisages a situation as urged by the learned Additional Government Pleader, and it would be ignoring the difference in phraseology if the same conclusion is arrived at as regards the earlier part, where the exercise of the power by the Committee is made subject to the approval of the Board. ( 25 ) WE have got intrinsic evidence in the provisions of the Act of 1950 itself as to whether previous or subsequent approval was meant by the Legislature by the word 'approval' and the Government when it framed r. 25 can be presumed to have been guided by the same meaning as was imputed to that word by the Legislature as held by the House of Lords in 912) Petts v. Reid, 1943 AC 1. For instance, in the Act of 1950 - (1) Sub-section (1) of Section 31 empowers the Board to constitute 'such other Committees as it thinks fit', "subject to the approval of the State Government". Can a Committee set up by the Board function before the approval of the State Government. The very existence of any such Committee will depend upon the previous sanction of the Government. Can a Committee set up by the Board function before the approval of the State Government. The very existence of any such Committee will depend upon the previous sanction of the Government. (2) Sub-section (2) of the same section empowers the Board to delegate to any such Committee any of the functions conferred upon the Board by the Act, "with the approval of the State Government". It is obvious that no such delegation can be valid and no Committee can exercise any such delegated power before the approval of the Government is received. ( 26 ) THE meaning of previous approval is adhered to by the Legislature also in the Act of 1963, in the following provisions, inter alia - (i) Section 24 (1) empowers the Board to set up other Committees "with the approval of the State Government". This corresponds to Section 31 (1) to which we have already referred. (ii) Section 27 (2) (d) empowers the Board to undertake the preparation and publication of text-books "with the approval of the State Government". Will not the action of the statutory Board be ultra vires if it does not obtain the approval of the Government before undertaking any such function? (iii) In Section 27 (4), the Act is more explicit by using the words "no regulation shall be valid unless it is approved by the State Government. " In my opinion, the same result is desired by using the words "subject to approval" in the second paragraph of Rule 25, because the Government wants to protect itself from illegitimate or unnecessary burdens in the case of aided schools, through the agency of the Board, acting on the previous recommendation of the Director of Public Instruction. ( 27 ) THE impugned notice served upon the petitioner and its enforcement is, accordingly, ultra vires, Rule 25. ( 28 ) (II) It has, however, been urged that since the Board has eventually given its approval to the removal of the petitioner, the removal should be upheld as valid at least from the date of the approval granted by the Board. It is, however, not necessary to enter into the merits of the contention inasmuch as I find that the second objection raised on behalf of the petitioner goes to the root of the approval relied upon by the respondents. It is, however, not necessary to enter into the merits of the contention inasmuch as I find that the second objection raised on behalf of the petitioner goes to the root of the approval relied upon by the respondents. ( 29 ) IT appears from paragraphs 7 and 8 of the counter-affidavit filed by Amalendu Sen Gupta on 4. 1. 65 and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the same gentleman's counter-affidavit filed on the 1st March 1965 that it was not the Board but the President of the Board who gave its approval to the termination order passed by the Administrator. From the Letter No. 19274/g addressed by the Secretary of the Board to the petitioner, it is presumed that the order of the President was made sometime before 18. 9. 64. On 18. 11. 64, the petitioner filed an affidavit sworn by S. P. Roy, a member of the Board that the matter had not been placed before the Board at all by that date. In the affidavit of Amalendu Sen Gupta of the 1st March 1965 [paragraph 10 (c)], it was stated that the matter could not be placed before the Board earlier because - (i) no meeting of the Board was held at the relevant time, - meaning the time fixed by Sinha, J. (as he then was), to which I shall advert presently; (ii) the record was not available to the Board on account of the pending case. ( 30 ) I am constrained to say that neither of these excuses are acceptable. If the record was not available because of the pending case, how could the President make the order of approval; the Board could do it in the same manner. As to the ground that "no meeting of the Board was held at the relevant time", this has to be read with paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit dated 4. 1. 64 where it is stated that the President was obliged to pass the order, without calling a meeting of the Board, because the time given by the Court was very short, and the President considered the matter as 'urgent'. This ground of urgency is pressed at the hearing on behalf of the respondents. 1. 64 where it is stated that the President was obliged to pass the order, without calling a meeting of the Board, because the time given by the Court was very short, and the President considered the matter as 'urgent'. This ground of urgency is pressed at the hearing on behalf of the respondents. ( 31 ) THE Board, it is to be noted, as a body corporate [section 3 (2)] and when Rule 25 speaks of approval of the Board, it means that the approval must be given by the Board, at a meeting held in the manner referred to in Section 14. The President cannot exercise the powers of the Board unless there is a provision in the statute empowering him to that effect. It is sub-section (2) of section 28 which is relied upon by the respondents in support of the contention that the President can exercise the powers of the Board in an 'emergency'. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 28 are as follows :" (1) The President shall be responsible for carrying out and giving effect to the decisions of the Board and of any Committee or Council constituted under this Act. (2) The President may, in any emergency, exercise any of the powers of the Board provided however that he shall not act contrary to any decision of the Board, and shall, as soon thereafter as may be, report to the Board the action taken by him together with reasons therefor. " ( 32 ) IT is evident that the normal power of the President, under sub-section (1) is only to give effect to the decisions of the Board. To give 'approval', within the meaning of Rule 25 is, certainly, a decision. That decision must therefore, be of the Board. Sub-section (2) engrafts an exception, but the scope of this exception is limited by the word 'emergency'. Whatever be the meaning of the word 'emergency' it is to be noted that the order of the President which was forwarded by the Secretary to the petitioner did not recite that he was exercising the powers of the Board in view of an emergency. In fact, there was no reference to the Court's order at all or to sub-section (2) of Section 28. In fact, there was no reference to the Court's order at all or to sub-section (2) of Section 28. ( 33 ) IT was contended that the membership of the Board being unwieldy (Section 4); it requires a long time to convene a meeting of the Board. But Section 29 (3) of the Act says :"the President shall, except in the case of emergency meeting referred to in sub-section (6), give to each member not less than seven days' notice of each meeting. . . . . "sub-section (6) and (7) of the section then says :" (6) In case of an emergency, the President may call a meeting, after giving not less than clear two days' notice thereof. " (7) No business shall be transacted at any meeting of the Board unless a quorum of ten members is present". So, a meeting of the Board can be convened by 7 days' notice and if 10 out of over 27 members are present, the approval of the Board can be obtained. In an emergency, two days' notice is sufficient. Hence, even if the order of a Court may be said to cause an 'emergency', let us see, whether the Court gave time enough to call an emergency meeting of the Board, as envisaged by the aforesaid provisions. The matter came up before Sinha, J. , (as he then was) in the following manner : it appears that, after coming to know of the impugned notice of termination, the Board, by its letter of the 26th December 1963 directed the Administrator to maintain the status quo, saying that the notice could not be issued without drawing up a charge-sheet against the petitioner (vide paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit of Amalendu Sen Gupta of 4. 1. 65) and the Board wrote to the D. P. I. to give his report. When the petitioner made her application for an interim injunction and other reliefs, and that application was opposed by the Administrator, on 20. 7. 66, the Court (Sinha, J.) made the following order : ". . . . The Board should decide the matter in terms of the letter dated the 26th December within one month from date. . . . . . " it further appears that on the prayer of the Board, the time was extended by another two weeks from 24. 8. 64. . . . The Board should decide the matter in terms of the letter dated the 26th December within one month from date. . . . . . " it further appears that on the prayer of the Board, the time was extended by another two weeks from 24. 8. 64. The order was made in the presence of all the respondents. If two weeks were insufficient to call an 'emergent' meeting by giving two days' notice, the respondents might draw the attention of the Court to that fact. On the other hand, it appears from the counter-affidavit referred to that the D. P. I. 's report was received by the President before he made the order. The date of this receipt is not stated in the counter-affidavit. It appears from the same counter-affidavit that up to the 4th January, 1965, no meeting of the Board had been convened by the President, even though sub-section (2) of Section 28 expressly requires him "as soon thereafter as may be, report to the Board the action taken by him together with reasons therefor". So, even if Section 28 (2) were applicable to the facts of this case, the President has not acted in accordance with its terms, - nor even professed to do so. The resort to Section 28 (2) must therefore be held to be an afterthought and the President's approval must be held to be ultra vires Section 28 and Rule 25. ( 34 ) IN the result, the Rule must be made absolute but without any order as to costs in view of the questions of law involved. Let the respondents be restrained, by an order in the nature of mandamus from giving effect to the impugned notice of termination made by respondent No. 1 and the order of approval given thereto by respondent No. 4. Respondents shall, however, be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in any manner open to them under and in accordance with the law; and nothing herein stated will operate as a pronouncement on the merits of the termination in question. ( 35 ) ON the prayer of Mr. Dutt, the operation of this order shall remain in abeyance for a period of three weeks from this date, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall be paid arrears of her salary for a month within seven days from this date. ( 35 ) ON the prayer of Mr. Dutt, the operation of this order shall remain in abeyance for a period of three weeks from this date, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall be paid arrears of her salary for a month within seven days from this date. Rule made absolute.