ORDER C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this Civil Revision Petition on behalf of the landlord petitioners, Mr. Balakrishna Eradi learned counsel challenges the order passed by the learned Munsiff of Palghat on an application filed by the respondents herein seeking relief [ under S.73 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Act I of 1964. 2. The application filed by the respondents before the lower court under S.73 of the said Act, was accompanied by a deposit of a sum of Rs. 2946-60, According to the respondents, the deposit of that amount will enable them to have a complete discharge of the arrears of rent for the period 1128 to 1136 (M.E.) inclusive. This claim made by the respondents was opposed by the petitioners on several grounds. But all the grounds of objection centred round one aspect, namely that the deposit made by the respondents was not sufficient and in accordance with the provisions contained in S.73(1) of the Act, so as to enable them to claim com­plete discharge of the arrears of rent. Details regarding the calculation made by the respondents have been controverted by the petitioners, who themselves, in turn, appear to have filed a statement giving particulars of what according to them will be the proper amount that should have been deposited by the respondents so as to enable them to get the benefit of S.73 of the Act. At this stage it may be mentioned that the period taken in by 1128 to 1131 is covered by a decree passed in a suit, namely O. S. No. 42/1956. And so far as the subsequent period is concerned, there is no suit or other proceeding pending. In respect of the period covered by the decree, it is also seen that the landlord has filed an execution petition for realising the amounts, and was taking active steps to execute his decree. It was at this stage that for all the periods referred to above that the respondents filed O. P. 128/64 before the learned Munsiff. 3. The learned Munsiff has held that in respect of the years 1132 and 1133 there has been a short deposit and that the calculation of the quantum of rent payable by the respondents is not correct. 3. The learned Munsiff has held that in respect of the years 1132 and 1133 there has been a short deposit and that the calculation of the quantum of rent payable by the respondents is not correct. Apart from finding that there has been a short deposit in respect of the quantum of rent for those periods, the learned Munsiff has also found, in respect of that period as well as various other years in question, that the deposit of the value of paddy is not in accordance with the market rate, namely the rate published in the State Gazette. These are the findings which have been recorded by the learned Munsiff as against the respondents. That is, the objections raised by the petitioners in respect of these deposits regarding the quantum of deposit to be made for 1132 and 1133 as well as the rate at which it has to be deposited, have been accepted by the learned Munsiff. 4. There was one further objection raised by the petitioners, namely that the period for which interest has been calculated in making the deposit by the respondents, is not also proper. That is, according to the petitioners, in respect of the arrears which became due at the end of every year, the landlord is entitled to get interest. And after so calculating the entire amount of rent that was due, as well as the interest that accrued due on the same, and calculating the total amount as on 11-4-1957 and 15-2-1961, the claim of the petitioners was, that the respondents should have deposited, on the said total amount, interest on the quantum that has to be deposited up to the date of the deposit. So far as that is concerned, the claim of the respondents appears to be that they are not bound to deposit any interest in respect of the arrears of rent that became due; but, on the other hand, their claim was that after calculating the total amount of arrears of rent alone, either as on 11-4-1957 or as on 15-2-1961, as the case may be, it is enough if they deposit the interest on the quantum mentioned in column(3) of S.73(i) up to the date of the deposit. So far as this aspect is concerned, the learned Munsiff has accepted the contention of the respondents; and ultimately the learned Munsiff held that the claim of the petitioners that interest on the arrears, as and from the dates when the arrears accrued due, should also have been deposited by the respondents, cannot be accepted. But that is a point which is no doubt taken before me by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. That is, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the interpretation placed by the trial court regarding the right of the petitioners to claim interest in the manner urged by them is erroneous. No doubt the learned counsel for the petitioners in this connection drew my attention to the provisions contained in S.41 and 43 of Act I of 1964, and urged that the interpretation that has to be placed on S.73(I) of the Act is the one that was urged on behalf of his clients in the trial court and that is being urged before this court also. 5. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners is no doubt controverted by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar, learned counsel appearing for the respon­dent tenants. According to the learned counsel, the interpretation placed by the trial court on S.73(I)of the Act regarding the calculation of interest is perfectly justified, and the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on S.41 is not justified. The learned counsel for the respondents in this connection drew my attention to the fact that S.41 no doubt provides that arrears of rent shall bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum or at the contract rate, whichever is less. The learned counsel pointed out that the statute itself makes it very clear that arrears of rent is something different from the interest payable on such arrears of rent. For this purpose the learned counsel drew my attention to the provisions contained in S.42 of the Act, wherein it has been specifically provided that arrears of rent due to the landlord, together with interest thereon, shall be a charge on the interest of the tenant. For this purpose the learned counsel drew my attention to the provisions contained in S.42 of the Act, wherein it has been specifically provided that arrears of rent due to the landlord, together with interest thereon, shall be a charge on the interest of the tenant. That is, according to the learned counsel, if the expression 'arrears of rent' takes in not only the actual amount of rent in arrears but also interest on such arrears, then it is absolutely unnecessary that a different expression should have been used in S.42 giving a charge to the landlord on the interest of the tenant. Therefore, having due regard to all these circum­stances, the learned counsel pointed out that the expression used in S.73(I) of the Act also makes it clear that what is contemplated is that arrears of rent alone have to be calculated as on 11-4-1957 if the matter comes under item 1, and as on 15-2-1961 if the matter comes under item 2; and interest has to be calculated on that amount in respect of the quantum provided for in column (3) as against items 1 and 2 in S.73(1). No doubt this is a very interesting contention raised on behalf of the respondents. But, in my opinion, in the view that I take regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the jurisdiction of the lower court in granting extension of time under S.73(i) in the matter of deposit, it is unnecessary to adjudicate on that aspect at any rate in these proceedings. 6. As I have already pointed out, the trial court, though it rejected the contention of the petitioners as to how exactly the interest is to be calculated, has ultimately accepted their contention that substantially there have been two short deposits in the amounts deposited by the petitioners, namely (I) in respect of the years 1132 and 1133, as against the value of 120 paras of paddy for each of those years to be deposited by the respondents, the respondents have deposited only the value of 70 paras, which according to them is the excess that has to be deposited by them. No doubt, even in respect of such deposit, the trial court has found that the value of paddy is not in accordance with the Gazette rate. No doubt, even in respect of such deposit, the trial court has found that the value of paddy is not in accordance with the Gazette rate. (2) The second ground on which the trial court has held in favour of the petitioners that there is a short deposit by the respondents, is in respect of the quantum of market rate of the commodity as mentioned in S.73(4). So far as that is concerned, the trial court has accepted the contention of the petitioners that the value deposited by the respondents is not in accordance with the market rate, that is, the rate published in the State Gazette. Ultimately the trial court, after a fairly elaborate calculation made in its order itself, held that the respondents, in order to get the benefit of the provisions contained in S.73 of the Act, should have deposited a total sum of Rs. 4453-79. It also found that as against the sum of Rs. 4453-79, which the res­pondents had to deposit, what was actually deposited by them was only a sum of Rs. 2946-60. But the trial court, having found this short deposit in favour of the petitioners, takes the view that the difference in the amount computed by the respondent has arisen only due to the fact that the correct price of paddy was not taken into account and also due to the fact that the petitioners appear to have been misguided by the incorrect recitals made in certain applications filed by the petitioners in O.S. 42/56. And on this line of reasoning, the trial court ultimately held that it is inclined to accept the contention of the respondents that the difference in the computation has been due only to a bona fide error on the part of the respondents, and therefore it gave further time up to 18-12-1964 to the respondents to deposit the balance amount as found above. It is this order of the trial court that is being challenged in this Civil Revision Petition by Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. It is this order of the trial court that is being challenged in this Civil Revision Petition by Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. Apart from raising an attack regarding the construction placed by the lower court as to how exactly interest is to be calculated in making the deposit under S.73(1), the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that on the findings arrived at by the trial court, upholding the objections raised by the petitioners that there has been short deposit under two heads at any rate, the trial court has no jurisdiction at all to grant any extension of time for making good the deficit in the deposit made by the respondents. The learned counsel also pointed out in this connection that the trial court itself has ultimately held that in respect of the years 1132 and 1133, though in one application the petitioners have stated that they have given credit for 1000 paras of paddy, in all the other proceedings connected with the suit in the various other affidavits filed in the same proceedings it is categorically mentioned by them that there is still balance amount to be deposited for 1132 M.E. The learned counsel points out that it is having due regard to these circumstances that the trial court was not prepared to accept the claim of the respondents that for these two years they are bound to deposit only the value of 70 paras of paddy. Over­ruling this claim made on behalf of the respondents, the learned counsel points out, the trial court has chosen to accept the claim of the petitioners that for these two years the respondents should have really deposited the value of 120 paras of paddy for each of the said years; and that has not been admittedly done. If that is so, the learned counsel urges that there is no jurisdiction conferred on the court exercising jurisdiction under S.73 of the Act to grant any extension of time whatsoever. 8. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the provisions contained in S.73 sub-ss.(4) and (5) of the Act. If that is so, the learned counsel urges that there is no jurisdiction conferred on the court exercising jurisdiction under S.73 of the Act to grant any extension of time whatsoever. 8. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the provisions contained in S.73 sub-ss.(4) and (5) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, it is only under very limited circumstances that the court has been given the power to permit deficit deposit to be made good, and those circumstances indicated in these sub-sections do not justify grant of extension of time in this case. That is, according to the learned counsel, on the findings recorded by the trial court that for the years 1132 and 1133 the respondents are bound to deposit the value of 120 paras for each year, there is no question of any error in the computation of the market rate of the commodity prevailing on the date on which the rent became payable; nor can it be stated that there is a bona fide error in the computation. Even in the matter of granting of time for making good the deposit at the correct Gazette rate, the learned counsel points out that the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The contention of the learned counsel is that there is absolutely no jurisdiction in the trial court to grant time on the findings recorded by it in favour of the petitioners. Here again, the learned counsel points out that the respondents have categorically stated in Para.8 of their application made to the lower court that they are making the deposit in accordance with the rate specified in the Gazette. No doubt the petitioners have also stated that if there is any deficiency in the rate adopted by them for making the deposit, they are prepared to make good such deficit. In the absence of any further clarification or the circum­stances under which the respondents have been mislead by any statement made by any party or as to how exactly they committed a mistake, the learned counsel points out that the view of the trial court that the short deposit made by the respondents was due to a bona fide mistake, is absolutely unjustified. The learned counsel also in this connection pointed out that the finding of the trial court is that the amount deposited by the respondents is not in accordance with the provisions contained in S.73(4). The learned counsel also relied on the recent decision rendered by me in C.R.P. 1153/1964 wherein the interpretation of S.73(4) and (5) of the Act came up for consideration and was dealt with by me rather exhaustively. In that decision I have held that before the court can grant extension of time, two conditions must be satisfied, viz; (a) that there was an error in the computation of the market rate, and (b) that the said error was a bona fide one in the computation. In this case the learned counsel points out there is absolutely no scope for any error in the computation, or a bona fide error for the matter of that, because, even according to the respondents, they have deposited the amount in accordance with the Gazette rate; and that shows that the respondents were well aware of the rate specified in the Gazette and satisfied themselves that the amount deposited was in accordance with the Gazette rate. No other evidence was adduced by the respondents, and from the statement contained in the affidavit filed by the respondents it is clear that they have proceeded on the basis that they have deposited the correct amount. That there was an error, much less a bona fide error, in the computation, has not been attempted to be established by the respondents independently of the bald statement made by them in the affidavit filed by them. Therefore the learned counsel for the petitioners points out that the exercise of jurisdiction by the lower court in granting extension of time to the respondents is not warranted by S.73(4) read with S.73(5) of the Act. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the recent decision of my learned brother Raman Nayar, J., which is still unreported, rendered in S.A. 813/1966.Reported subsequently. 1966 KLJ 963 . If I may say so with respect, the learned Judge agreed with the view expressed by me in C.R.P. 1153/64. The learned Judge has also clearly indicated that there is only a limited jurisdiction for extension of time conferred on the court under; S.73 sub-ss.(4) and (5) of the Act. 1966 KLJ 963 . If I may say so with respect, the learned Judge agreed with the view expressed by me in C.R.P. 1153/64. The learned Judge has also clearly indicated that there is only a limited jurisdiction for extension of time conferred on the court under; S.73 sub-ss.(4) and (5) of the Act. Therefore, based upon these decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioners, very strenuously urged that the exercise by the lower court in granting time to the respondents to make good the deficit in the deposit is not justified and is also without jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Achuthan Nambiar, learned counsel for the respondents strenuously controverts the stand taken on behalf of the petitioners. The learned counsel pointed out that the lower court has held that at any rate in certain affidavits filed by the petitioners in O.S.42/56 they have stated that his clients have deposited the value of 1000 paras of paddy, and therefore what was necessary for his clients to deposit was only the balance amount for the two years, namely 1132 and 1133. The learned counsel points out that when the landlords, namely the petitioners, have themselves made a representation in documents filed before the court that their claim for 1000 paras of paddy has been satisfied, the respondents were perfectly justified in pro­ceeding on the basis that it was only the balance rent, namely the value of 70 paras of paddy for each of those two years, that need be deposited in court. It is on that basis, the learned counsel points out that his clients have made the deposit. But for the subsequent years, the learned counsel points out that inasmuch as there was no such representation by the landlords, the respondents have deposited the value calculating the rent at 1070 paras, and not at 1000 paras. Therefore the learned counsel points out that the lower court was perfectly justified in accepting the ex­planation offered by his clients and holding that the short deposit was really due to the representation made by the petitioners before court. Therefore the learned counsel points out that the lower court was perfectly justified in accepting the ex­planation offered by his clients and holding that the short deposit was really due to the representation made by the petitioners before court. That finding, the learned counsel points out, is really a finding of fact by the lower court recorded in favour of his clients, which need not be disturbed by this Court exercising jurisdiction under S.115 C. P. C. Regarding the short deposit calculated at the correct Gazette rate, the learned counsel again points out that his clients were under the impression that the amount deposited by them was in accordance with the Gazette rate. The learned counsel points out that even in the application filed by his clients, they have stated that if there is any deficit in the amount deposited, they are prepared to deposit the same. That, according to the" learned counsel, clearly shows the bona fide conduct of his clients; and the moment the court held that the rate at which the respondents made the deposit was not strictly or accurately in accordance with the rate specified in the Gazette, the court had ample jurisdiction to grant extension of time under sub-ss.(4) and (5) of S.73 to make good the short deposit. And it is really in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the court the learned counsel points out that the discretion in the matter of granting time was exercised by the lower court in this case in favour of his clients. The learned counsel also points out that the lower court has categorically found that his clients have committed a bona fide error in not depositing the correct Gazette rate; and therefore, in order to make good the short deposit the lower court was perfectly justified in granting time to the respondents. 10. Before I advert to the contentions raised by learned counsel on both sides and express my views, it is necessary to refer to two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents by Mr. 10. Before I advert to the contentions raised by learned counsel on both sides and express my views, it is necessary to refer to two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar regarding the maintainability of this revision petition under S.115 C. P. C. The first objection raised by the learned counsel is that the question that arose for consideration at the hands of the lower court in an application filed under S.73 of Act 1 of 1964, and the expression of an opinion made by that court in the order under attack, are really matters relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. In this connection the learned counsel points out that at any rate so far as the years 1128 to 1131 are concerned, it is covered by a decree, viz., O. S. 42/56; and any adjudication made by the court holding that there is a discharge of arrears of rent by a deposit being made Under S.73 of Act 1 of 1964, will necessarily have the result of a decision being given in the execution proceedings which have been initiated by the petitioners in the said suit. The learned counsel points out that inasmuch as a decision is given by the lower court that the claim of the petitioner, will stand discharged, it is really a decision on question arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Therefore according to the learned counsel for the respondents, that is a matter coming under S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which case, the proper remedy to be adopted by the petitioners will be not to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this court under S.115 C.P.C. but really to challenge the said order by way of an appeal. The second ground of preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that having due regard to the provisions contained in S.103 of Act I of 1964, which confers a special and, limited revisional jurisdiction on this Court in respect of certain matters, it must be presumed that no other exercise of jurisdiction by this Court can be made as against orders passed under the said Act. 11. Both the stands taken by the learned counsel for the respondents are again controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 11. Both the stands taken by the learned counsel for the respondents are again controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. So far as the objection based upon S.47, C.P.C. is concerned, Mr. Balakrishna Eradi pointed out that there is no question of any adjudication being made by the court under S.73 of the Act. The learned counsel in this Connection drew my attention to the decision of my learned brother Raman Nayar, J., in S.A 813/66 already referred to above. The learned counsel points out that having due regard to the scheme of S.73 of the Act, it is not necessary at all for the court to adjudicate upon any aspect excep­ting to record the deposit that has been made by the party. The learned counsel also pointed out that the controversy regarding satisfaction of a decree having been recorded by virtue of a deposit, is quite foreign to the scope of a decision rendered under the provisions of S.73 of the Act. Therefore the learned counsel points out that there is no question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arising for consideration at all in considering a deposit made under S.73 of the Act. The learned counsel also pointed out that even if the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents has got any merit, that contention has no applica­tion at all to the years subsequent to 1131, because, the learned counsel points out that so far as the period 1132 to 1136 is concerned it is not covered by a decree, nor even by a suit. Therefore under these circumstances the learned counsel urged that there is absolutely no justification in invoking the provisions of S.47 C.P.C. 12. In my opinion, the contentions of Mr. Balakrishna Eradi in this regard will have to be accepted. S.47, C.P.C. in my view, has absolutely no application in the matter of considering a deposit made under S.73 of Act I of 1964. As pointed out by me in C.R.P. 1153/64 and by my learned brother Raman Nayar, J.. in S.A. 813/66, S.73 of Act I of 1964 does not contemplate any order being passed by the court or for the matter of that, any adjudication being made by the court at all. As pointed out by me in C.R.P. 1153/64 and by my learned brother Raman Nayar, J.. in S.A. 813/66, S.73 of Act I of 1964 does not contemplate any order being passed by the court or for the matter of that, any adjudication being made by the court at all. On the other hand, this aspect has been adverted to and considered by me in the decision in C.R.P. 1153/64 wherein I have held that S.73 does not contemplate the filing of any application by the party when he is making the deposit under S.73. The question as to whether there is a proper deposit, or the question whether by virtue of the deposit the party making the deposit gets complete discharge of all arrears of rent, are matters which can certainly be raised again when the landlord may institute a suit for recovery of arrears for a particular period, or for the matter of that, even in execution proceedings if really the claim has resulted in a decree and the decree is being executed. No such question regarding the execu­tion, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arises for consideration under S.73 of Act I of 1964; and if that is so, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Achuthan Nambiar learned counsel for the respondents that the order passed by the lower court which is under attack in these proceedings is one really coming under S.47 of the Code. Therefore, the preliminary objection by him based upon Section. 47 of the Code will have to be overruled. 13. The second preliminary objection raised by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar regarding the maintainability of this civil revision is, as pointed out already, based upon S.103 of Act 1 of 1964. S.103 confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court in respect of 3 types of proceedings under the Act, namely (a) as against any final order passed in an appeal against the order of the Land Tribunal, (b) as against any final order passed by the Land Board under the Act and (c) against an order by the Land Tribunal under S.26. Based upon these provisions the contention of Mr. Based upon these provisions the contention of Mr. Achuthan Nambiar is that inasmuch as the statute has conferred only a limited jurisdiction on this Court to consider the correctness or otherwise of orders passed by the 3 authorities constituted under the statute itself, it must follow necessarily that no other power of revision has been conferred on this Court, in respect of any other orders passed by the authorities functioning under the statute, Even here I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. The order that is now under attack is one passed on a proceeding initiated under S.73 of Act I of 1964. It will be seen, as I have already indicated, that there is no question of any party filing any application under S.73, and S.73 deals only with a matter regarding payment to the landlord or deposit in court. It will also be seen that under S.73(3) what the court has to do is to issue notice of the deposit made under sub-s.(1) of S.73, to the landlord. Certainly it is not a notice of any application that is contemplated under S.73(3). But the point to be noted in S.73(1) is that the deposit is to be made in the court for payment to the landlord, and the amount to be so deposited is referred to in the corresponding entry in column (3) of S.73(1). The expression 'Court' has been defined in S.2(6) of the Act as meaning "where a particular court is not specifically mentioned, the court having jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to entertain a suit for the possession of the holding or part thereof to which any legal proceeding under this Act relates". Therefore it will be seen that the deposit has to be made in the 'court'; and in this case the deposit has been made in the court of the Munsiff of Palghat. It does not require much of an argument that the court, whose jurisdiction was invoked under S.73 of the Act and which is vested with jurisdiction under S.73, is certainly a "civil court" subordinate to this Court. If that is so, S.115, C.P.C. squarely applies if any order has been passed by that court. It does not require much of an argument that the court, whose jurisdiction was invoked under S.73 of the Act and which is vested with jurisdiction under S.73, is certainly a "civil court" subordinate to this Court. If that is so, S.115, C.P.C. squarely applies if any order has been passed by that court. S.103 of the Act was necessary; because, but for that provision this Court cannot exercise any powers of revision over orders passed by an appellate authority as against an order of the Land Tribunal, nor can this Court exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of an order passed by the Land Board and Land Tribunal functioning under the said statute. The appellate authority contemplated under S.102 of the Act is no doubt the Subordinate Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the holding or part thereof is situate. But it has been made clear by S.102(1) that he shall hear the appeal as a persona designata. If the Subordinate Judge functions as a persona designata, he is certainly not "a court subordinate to this Court", in that capacity; and this Court cannot exercise any revisional jurisdiction, under S.115 over orders passed by him. It is really for the purpose of enabling a party aggrieved by a decision rendered by such authority, that a specific power of revision has been given to this Court under S.103 of the Act. Similarly, this Court normally cannot exercise any revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by the Land Board .or Tribunal constituted under the Act. The Land Board or Tribunal is certainly, not a "court subordinate to this Court", and S.115 C. P. C. cannot apply. But the Legislature has considered it expedient to confer revisional jurisdiction on this Court under S.103, to enable it to consider the correctness or otherwise of orders passed by the Land Tribunal, and Land Board also. The mere fact that a special power of revision has been conferred on this Court under S.103 of the Act as against orders passed by the three authorities referred to therein, is no indication in my opinion that this Court's jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. to sit in revision over orders passed by the court under this Act is impliedly or expressly taken away. S.103, or for the matter of that, any other provision in the statute, does not expressly take away such jurisdiction of this Court; nor am I satisfied that by making the provision under S.103 of the Act, the Legislature has impliedly intended to take away the jurisdiction of this Court under S.115, C. P. C. In fact the State Legislature has no such power. Therefore the second preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent has also to be overruled. 14. Then the question is whether the order of the lower court, which is under attack, on the findings recorded in favour of the petitioners regarding the short deposit and also regarding grant of time to the respondents to make good the deficit in the deposit, is warranted by the provisions contained in S.73 sub-s.(4), read with sub-s.5 of the same Section. It is not necessary for this Court to consider over again the scope of S.73 Sub-ss.(4) and (5), because that question has been very elaborately considered by me in C.R.P. No. 1153/64; and, as already indicated, my learned brother Raman Nayar, J., in the decision rendered by him in S. A. 813/66, has also taken the same view. 15. Then the question is as to whether on the findings recorded by it the lower court had jurisdiction to grant extension of time to the respondents to make good the deficit in the deposit made by them. Notwithstanding the very strenuous contention urged on behalf of the respondents, I am not satisfied that the lower court had jurisdiction to extend the time. I will first take up the question as to whether the lower court had jurisdiction to extend the time in respect of making the deposit of the balance amount for the years 1132 and 1133. So far as that is concerned, the finding of the lower court itself is against the respondent; that is, the lower court has categorically found that the claim of respondents that they have deposited the value of 1000 paras of paddy for those years and that they are not bound to deposit the value of additional 70 paras for each of those years, cannot be accepted. No doubt the lower court has taken the view that in one application filed by the petitioners in O.S. 42/56 they have stated that they have given credit to 1000 paras of paddy instead of showing the correct figure, namely 950 paras. But the lower court itself has also referred to various other proceedings connected with O.S. 42/56 for upholding the plea of the petitioners that what the respondents are bound to deposit is on the basis that the total rent for the years in question is 1070 paras of paddy. That aspect has been discussed by the lower court. But the reason which prompted the lower court to give extension of time to respondents is on the basis that it must be presumed that the respondents must be considered to have been misled by the representation made by the petitioners in LA. 2565/58. I am not inclined to accept this reasoning of the lower court for justifying grant of extension of time. Even on that basis, the lower court, in my opinion, had no jurisdiction to grant extension of time under sub-ss.(4) and (5) of S.73; because the circumstances under which the court has got jurisdiction to grant extension of time, as pointed out in the order in C.R.P. 1153/64 referred to above, is very limited. In my opinion the reasoning of the lower court that the respondents must be considered to have been misled is quite inconsistent with the earlier findings recorded by the lower court itself, wherein it has accepted the claim made by the petitioners that in all other proceedings connected with O.S. 42/56 they have made it very clear that more amounts are payable by the respondents for discharging the claim of the petitioners. Under these circumstances, there cannot be any question of the respondents being misled by any statement made by the petitioners in the solitary application I.A. 2565/58. Therefore the lower court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for making the deposit under this head. 16. The deficit in the deposit under the second head relates to the difference in the amount computed by the respondents. Here again, I have already pointed out that the respondents have categorically stated in their application that they are making the deposit in accordance with the Gazette rate. 16. The deficit in the deposit under the second head relates to the difference in the amount computed by the respondents. Here again, I have already pointed out that the respondents have categorically stated in their application that they are making the deposit in accordance with the Gazette rate. That they are bound to deposit the amount computed in accordance with the provisions contained in S.73(4), in order to get a discharge, is not in controversy. But in this case, when the respondents themselves have stated that they are depositing the amount according to the Gazette rate, the court is certainly entitled to presume that they have satisfied themselves that the amount that is deposited is strictly correct in accordance with the Gazette rate. No other materials were placed before the lower court by the respon­dents to show that they have committed an error in computation, much less a bona fide error. If any such materials had been placed before the lower court, and that court, after considering all those materials, had accepted the contention of the respondents and held that there is a bona fide error in the computation, then naturally this Court will be very reluctant to interfere with such finding. But, as I have already mentioned, no other materials have been placed before the lower court to establish that the respondents have committed in the first instance an error, and secondly a bona fide error, in making the computation. The lower court has, as already indicated, categorically held and found against the respondents that the deposit made by them is not in accordance with the correct Gazette rate. On the other hand, the finding of the lower court is that the correct Gazette rates, as contem­plated under S.73(4) for the various years in question, have been properly shown in the statement filed before court on behalf of the petitioners; and those rates have also been accepted as correct by the lower court. It is really on that basis that the lower court has held in favour of the petitioners that the deposit made by the respondents falls short of the amount that they have to deposit, if a correct calculation is made. It is really on that basis that the lower court has held in favour of the petitioners that the deposit made by the respondents falls short of the amount that they have to deposit, if a correct calculation is made. Here again, no doubt, the lower court has taken the view that it must be considered that the respondents have committed a bona fide error in making the calculation, and it is on that basis that it was prepared to grant extension of time to the respondents to make good the short deposit. Here again I am not inclined to accept the reasoning of the lower court for coming to the conclusion that there is an error committed by the respondents, much less a bona fide error committed by them, under which circumstance alone the court will have jurisdiction to grant further time under S.73 sub-s.(4) read with sub-s.(5). There if absolutely no plea raised on behalf of the respondents, much less made out, that they have made any error, or a bona fide error for the matter of that, in making the compu­tation. On the other hand, the stand taken by them appears to be that they have made the deposit in accordance with the Gazette rate; and that claim has not been accepted by the lower court. Therefore it follows that the order of the lower court granting further time to the respondents for making good the short deposit, under this head cannot be justified, under S.73 sub-ss.(4) and (5). But 1 make it very clear that I do not express any opinion on the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the manner in which interest has to be calculated when a deposit is to be made under S.73 of the Act; because, in the view that 1 have taken, as indicated above, that question does not arise for consideration in these proceedings. 17. in the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above, and parties will bear their costs.