JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Aladad Khan has filed this petition under Article 226 Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated November 28, 1963, copy being annexure 1. 2. In the petition I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for opposite parties No. 1 to 4. Opposite party No. 5 is absent. 3. The petitioner states that he and opposite party No. 5 are brothers. In the course of consolidation operations in village Bhawanipur, Pergana Inhauna, Tahsil Maharajganj, District Rae Bareli, the petitioner and opposite party No. 5 were allotted chak No. 6. Opposite Party No. 3 was allotted chak No. 103. Opposite party No. 3 preferred an objection and thereupon the Consolidation Officer made an alteration in his chak. Thereafter opposite party No. 3 preferred no further appeal and the order dated February 10, 1962 became final. Delivery of possession took place. 4. On November 15, 1962 opposite party No. 3 moved a miscellaneous application to the Deputy Commissioner, Rae Bareli (ex officio District Deputy Director of Consolidation) and on May 24, 1963 moved a similar application to the Director of Consolidation. On December 1, 1962 the Consolidation Officer submitted to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that the application was barred by time and was not maintainable. On June 16, 1963 opposite party No. 1, the District Deputy Director of Consolidation (as well as the District Magistrate) wrote to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that the case of opposite party No. 3 who was on hunger strike in connection with his grievances about the allotment of his chak be given a sympathetic consideration without regard to the technicalities. Thereupon the Consolidation Officer submitted a report proposing alterations. On August 28, 1963 the petitioner appeared before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation ) and opposed the changes. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) submitted his report on October 17, 1963 and on November 28, 1963 opposite party No. 1, who agreed with the report of the Settlement Officer(Consolidation), passed the impugned order, copy annexure 1. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that opposite party No. 1 purported to exercise his powers under Section 48(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stands after amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. There was a similar provision in the previous Act in Section 21 (6) but the phraseology used was different. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that opposite party No. 1 purported to exercise his powers under Section 48(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stands after amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. There was a similar provision in the previous Act in Section 21 (6) but the phraseology used was different. Section 48(3) reads : "Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1)." This sub-section, therefore, allows any subordinate authority to initiate the proposal. The previous Section 21 (6), on the other hand, reads :- "The Deputy Director Consolidation may, also where he is of the opinion ... that material injustice is likely to be caused to a tenure-holder in giving effect to the statement of Proposals as revised by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, under sub-section (4) or as subsequently confirmed by him under Section 23, as the case may be, but not later than the date of notification issued under Section 52, for reasons to be recorded in writing, take cognizance of the case as if it were an appeal filed under sub-section (5) and decide it accordingly." Thus it would be clear that Section 21 (6) allows the Deputy Director Consolidation to initiate the proceedings. But before initiating these proceedings he has to record his reasons in writing. This recording of reasons is not required by the provisions of Section 48 (3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stands after the amending Act (U.P. Act VIII of 1963). Further, the Deputy Director, Consolidation has to be of opinion that material injustice is likely to be caused to a tenure-holder. 6. The argument before me is that though the Deputy Director, Consolidation purported to proceed under Section 48(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, that action should not be struck down as he had similar powers under the provisions of Section 21 (6) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963. I am unable to consider the two provisions of law as being on the same footing. I am unable to consider the two provisions of law as being on the same footing. As indicated earlier, in one case action has to be taken by a subordinate authority and in the other case, action could be taken by the Deputy Director, Consolidation alone. Further, there is no restriction as regards the formation of a particular opinion and the recording of reasons under the new provisions of Section 48(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has been at pains to point out that as the original plot of the petitioner has been re-allotted to him, no injustice has been done to him. But that is not the question before me. The question is whether in the particular circumstances of the case the Deputy Director, Consolidation could have reasonably come to the conclusion that material injustice is likely to be caused to opposite party No. 3 in giving effect to the statement of proposals. The learned counsel for the parties, despite my invitation, did not attend to that part of the matter. It has not been suggested to me that any material injustice was likely to result to opposite party No. 3 by giving effect to the original proposals. That, in my opinion, is a material point. However, I do not wish to give any definite finding on the point as the matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Deputy Director, Consolidation and further as the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has not as yet been issued, it is even now possible for the Deputy Director, Consolidation to take action under Section 21 (6) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963 if he is of the opinion that material injustice is likely to result if the original proposals are given effect to in respect of Shyam Lal. As yet the matter has not been approached in the proper manner. 7. It was urged by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that as substantial justice has been done and as the question of jurisdiction was not raised before the Tribunal, and further as the petitioner has not stated that he was not aware of the facts giving rise to the lack of jurisdiction, I should not interfere with the impugned order. In my opinion another material consideration is that the Deputy Director can still proceed under Section 21(6). Further, I would like to point out that the chaks had become final inasmuch as after the decision by the Consolidation Officer dated February 10, 1962 the opposite party did not avail of the statutory remedies provided. The question is one of jurisdiction and it appears to me that as the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director, Consolidation depended on the formation of a particular opinion and the recording of the reasons, the jurisdiction was assumed without the conditions precedent being satisfied. As it is possible that action may even now, if necessary, be taken, it does not appear to me necessary to sustain the order which is admittedly without jurisdiction even though the objection as regards jurisdiction was not taken before the Deputy Director, Consolidation. 8. No other point has been pressed before me. 9. I, therefore, accept this writ petition and quash the impugned order, copy of which is annexure 1. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.