A. N. Grover ( 1 ) THIS petition for revision arises out of execution proceedings taken by the landlord against his tenant. ( 2 ) THE facts lie within a narrow compass. The petitioner, who is the landlord, filed a suit for eviction under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1952 in the Civil Courts at Delhi in October 1956 on the grounds of personal necessity and non-payment of rent. On 31st March 1958 a compromise was effected between the parties. The respondent admitted the claim of the petitioner and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise. It was agreed between the parties that the decree would not be executed till 31st March 1960. The Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 was enacted in February 1959. After the expiry of the period of two years, the petitioner filed an execution application on 7th October 1960 in the Civil Court. The respondent filed objections under sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 50 of the Act of 1958 saying inier alia that the decree was not executable. With regard to the main objections the of respondent that since the premises in dispute had been constructed after 1st June 1951 but before 9th June 1955 the execution of the decree was barred by the provisions of section 50 of the Act of 1958 it was held that the decree had become inexecutable and the Court had no jurisdiction to order eviction of the respondent. It appears that the learned Judge took that view with reference to the provisions of section 50 (3) of the Act 1958. The learned Additional District Judge considered that section 50 (3) was not applicable but that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 50. In his view execution proceedings for the eviction of a tenant could not be entertained by a Civil Court after enactment of the Act of 1958 even if the decree had been passed under the Act of 1932. The present petition has been preferred against the orders of the Courts below. ( 3 ) NOW, section 50 of the Act of 1958 appears in Chapter VIII, which is entitled "miscellaneous". The present petition has been preferred against the orders of the Courts below. ( 3 ) NOW, section 50 of the Act of 1958 appears in Chapter VIII, which is entitled "miscellaneous". The section itself contains four subsections the first being :- " (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in so far as it relates to the fixation of the standard rent in relation to any premises to which this Act applies or to eviction of any tenant there from or to any matter which Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of / any action taken or to be taken by the Controller under this Act shall be granted by any civil court / or other authority. "the second and the third sub-sections relate to proceedings in respect of premises, the construction of which has been completed after the 1st day of June 1951 but before the 9th day of June 1955. These may also be reproduced in extenso :- " (2) If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is any suit or proceedings pending in any civil court for the eviction of any tenant from any premises to which this Act applies and the construction of which has been completed after the 1st day of June, 1951, but before the 9th day of June,l955, such suit or proceeding shall on such commencement, abate. (3) If, in pursuance of any decree or order made by a court, tenant has been evicted after the 16th day of August 1958 from any premises to which this act applies and the construction of which has been completed after the 1st day of June, 1951, but before the 9th day of June, 1955, then notwithstanding anything contained in any other law the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such e icted tenant within six months from the date of eviction direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit. "it is unnecessary to refer to the fourth sub-section. The learned Additional District Judge applied sub-section (1)to the present case but it appears that he was dearly in error in doing so. "it is unnecessary to refer to the fourth sub-section. The learned Additional District Judge applied sub-section (1)to the present case but it appears that he was dearly in error in doing so. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred with regard to any proceedings relating to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any premises or to eviction of any tenant therefrom or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered under the Act of 68 to decide. Where a decree for eviction has been passed, as in the present case, priar to the enforcement of the Act of 1958, its execution by the Civil Court cannot be barred because the judgment-debtor is no longer atenant and it cannot be said that any proceedings are being taken for the eviction of a tenant as defined by section a (1) of the aforesaid Act. According to that defination, "tenant" means any person. . . . . . . . . . . but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. In Shrimati Kauran Devi v. Lal Chand , and Bench of this Court had occasion to refer to section 50 (1) though in a slightly different. let of circumstances, it was said that the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil ; Court contained in section 50 was confined to eviction to tenants and the definition of "tenant" expressly excluded persons against whom an order or decree for eviction had been made. It was further observed that the exclusion of Civil Court s jurisdiction was not to be readily iiiferried and it could be excluded only when the language expressly so declared or the necessary intendment was irresistible or undoubted. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court by Special leave against the judgment and decree of this Court in the above case Lakhmi Chand Kheinani v. Kauran Devi (Civil Appeal No. 641 of 1965), which was decided on 5th November 1965. Sarkar J. delivering the judgment of the Court made it quite clear that the Act of 1958 excluded from the definition of "tenant" a person against whom an order or decree for eviction had been made, that is to say, under it a tenant who had suffered a decree in ejectment was no more a tenant. It has been held that section 50. It has been held that section 50. pars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try a suit for the eviction of a tenant, that is to say, a tenant as defined in the Act and it would not bar a suit for eviction against a person who is not a tenant as so defined. It has further been said that under the ordinary law applicable to landlords and tenants, a tenant, who has suffered an ejectment decree, is not considered tenant any more; he has after the decree none of the rights which as tenant he earlier possessed. Section 50 (1), therefore, cannot create any bar in the way of execution of the decree of eviction passed against the Respondent 1n the present case by the Civil Court. ( 4 ) "the next question is the effect of sub-sections (2) and 3) of section 50 on the present case. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was no suit proceedings pending in any Civilcourt for the eviction of any tenant immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1968 which would attract the applicability of sub-section (2) although admittedly the construction of the premises had been completed between 1st June 1951 and 9th June 1955 nor can sub-section (3) be invoked as the respondent has not been evicted so far. It has also been pointed out that even sub-sections (2) and (. 3) would apply only to the case of a tenant as defined by section (1) and since a decree for eviction had been nude agninst therespondent he cannot fall within the meaning of the word "tenant" as used in these sub-sections. Mr. D. K. . Kapur has, however, very strenuously urged that the whole object of enacting sub-sections (21 and (3) of section 59 was to give protection to a person occupying promises as a tenant which had been completed between 1st June 1951 and 9th June 1955. He has re:erred to section 39 of the Act of 1952 which exomted all premises, the construction of which had been completed after the 1st day of June 1951 but before the expiry of three years from the commencement of that Act, the exemption being operative for a period of seven years from the date of such completion. He has re:erred to section 39 of the Act of 1952 which exomted all premises, the construction of which had been completed after the 1st day of June 1951 but before the expiry of three years from the commencement of that Act, the exemption being operative for a period of seven years from the date of such completion. He says that it was because of this exemption that the said provisions came to be made in sub-sections (2) and (2) of section 50 of the Act of 1958 and the intention clearly we to give complete protection to a tenant in any such premises whether a decree for eviction had been passed or not. According to him, it is for this reason that subsection (2) goes to the length of striking down any suit or proceeding which would include an execution proceeding which might b; pending against such a person in a Civil Court on the commencement of the Act of 1958 and of further empowering the Controller to even restore possession on eviction. It is submitted that if the definition of "tenant" is applied in a ccordance with the meaning given to it by section 2 (i), the whole object for which sub-sections (2) and (3) were enacted, would be defeated and these provisions would be rendered nugatory. He says that at the very commencement of section 2 it is provided "unless the context otherwise requires" which necessarily means that one should look to the context in which the word "tenant" is used in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 50. There is good deal of force in the submissions of Mr. Kapur but the difficulties in his way are two fold. The first is that after it has been finally held by their Lordships affirming the decision of this Court, as mentioned before with reference to section 50 (1) that the word "tenant" would not include a person against whom a decree for eviction has been made it is difficult to give a different meaning to the word "tenant" is sub sections (2) and (3) of the same section namely section 50. Secondly, even if Mr. Secondly, even if Mr. Kapur s suggestion is acceded to and with reference to the context the word "tenant" in sub-sections (2) and (3) be taken not to exclude person against whom an order for eviction had been made, the respondent cannot still derive any benefit from the aforesaid provisions because -his case does not fall either within sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 50. ( 5 ) MR. Kapur has next forcefully attempted to read into the meaning of the word pending" in sub-section (2) of section 50, amatter which even though not instituted in the Court may be ripe for being instituted. He has relied on Fordham v Clagetf for what is said at page 653. Jessel, M. R" who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal, was considering the meaning of the 15th section of the Insolvent Court Repeal Act of 1869, which ran as follows :- "for the purpose of winding up and terminating all matters, which at the commencement of this Act may be pending in the late Insolvent Debtors Court etc. , the following provisions shall have effect;"the learned Master of Rolls proceeded to observe that in his opinion, the word "pending" included every insolvency in which any proceedings could by any possibillity be taken. Where the insolvent was dead and all the estate was gone it was not pending, but as long as he was alive the matter was pending in that sense. It was further observed- "a cause s said to b. ; pending in a Court of justice when any proceeding can bs taken in it. That is the test. If you can take any proceeding it is pending. " ( 6 ) THE rules laid down in the well-known case of Heydon, which are to be found at page 90 of Craies on Statute Law (6th Adition), are that four things must be discerned and considered for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general ; (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act (2.) What was the mischief and defect for which the common did not provide 3) What remedy the Parliamant hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth (4) The true reason of the remedy. And it is said that then the office of all the Judges is always to mike such construction as shall suppress the mischief and. advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and Pro private commodo. In Hutchinson v. . Jauncey Sir Raymond Evershed, M. R. , delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, has laid dowi that if the necessary intendment of the Act is to affect pending causes of action, the Court will give effect to the. . . intention of the legislature even though there is no express reference to pending actions. In that case it was held that the effect of sections 9 and 10 of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) A:t, 1949), was to make a tenant retrospectively a protected tenant although at the date of the issue of the proceedings he was not entitled to remain in possession. ( 7 ) AFTER giving careful consideration to the question of the meaning of the word "pending" in sub-section (2) of section 50 in the light of the principles laid down in the above cases, I cannot persuade myself to accept that the legislature intended to mean that even those proceedings which had not been instituted in the Civil Court would bedeemed to be pending for the purpose of sub-section ( 2 ). The language, which has been employed leaves no room for doubt that what was intended to be struck down by sub-section (2) was a suit or proceeding which was actually pending in any Civil Court for eviction and not any suit or proceeding had in fact not been filed. In the present case there is still a further difficulty which Mr. Kapur has to meet. It relates to the inexecutability of the decree with reference to its terms before 31st March 1960. It Could not, there fore, be said that before the commencement of Act of 1958 the decree was capable of execution and, therefore, it should be deemed that an execution- proceeding was pending at that time. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons given above, this petition is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are hereby set aside and the objections of the respondent to the execution of the decree are dismissed, The matter shall now go back to the executing court for further proceedings in accordance with law. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons given above, this petition is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are hereby set aside and the objections of the respondent to the execution of the decree are dismissed, The matter shall now go back to the executing court for further proceedings in accordance with law. ( 9 ) THE parties are directed to appear in the executing Court on 28th February, 1966 ( 10 ) IN view of the nature of the points involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs. If the tenant pays the arrears of rent or damages upto 31-1-1966 within one month, he shall not be evicted for a period of three months from today. If he fails to do so, the execution shall proceed after one month.