Judgment :- Ramakrishnan, J. These appeals are directed respectively against the judgments of Jagadisan, J., in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1959 and Veeraswami, J., in Writ Petition No. 619 of 1959, petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. They were heard together since common questions have arisen in them for decision. In the first case, the petitioner-firm ran a factory, from 1942, for manufacturing tapes, lampwicks, etc., with more than fifty persons in its employ. At an anterior stage, the firm disputed the fact that the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (Act 19 of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the Act, would apply to the firm, and the question was settled only when the Central Government passed an order on 29 September 1958, under S.19A of the Act, holding that the Act applied. This decision was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1959, but Jagadisan, J., held the point against the petitioner. It is now not in dispute that the petitioner's concern is covered by the Act. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras, by an order dated 1 September 1959, called upon the petitioner to pay (1) the employer's share of the contribution to the provident fund from 1 November 1952 (the date on which the Provident Fund Scheme framed under the Act became applicable to the firm) up to 30 April 1957, the date when the petitioner was called upon the to pay the contribution by a notice); (2) administrative charges in full, calculated on both the employee's and employer's share of the contribution to the provident fund (under Cl. 39 of the Provident Fund Scheme read with the notification of the Government dated 31 October, 1952 - the percentage of administrative charges payable by the employer was fixed at 3 per cent of the total employer's and employees' contribution); and(3) damages for default calculated at 64 per cent per annum from the date on which the arrears fell due, up to the date of remittance (under S.14B of the Act, a maximum of 25 per cent of the amount of arrears was fixed for damages). The petitioner urged in the writ petition that these claims for a back-period were unsustainable, and that a careful examination of the Act and the scheme would show that the provident fund contribution and administrative charges cannot be levied retrospectively, because such levy would be oppressive and illegal. Jagadisan, J., following the decision of the Calcutta High Court of a single Judge, Mukharji, J., in Aluminium Corporation of India, Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner upheld the contentions of the petitioner, and directed the issue of a writ of mandamus against the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the respondent before the learned Judge, to forbear from making collections from the petitioner, by levy of contributions and management expense for the period 1 November 1952 to 30 April 1957. In regard to the claim for damages, the learned Judge accepted the contention of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, that the claim for damages had not yet been settled but was under investigation and, therefore, did not grant any relief in regard to it. Against this decision, the respondent before the learned Judge, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, has filed this appeal (Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1963). In Writ Petition No. 619 of 1959, East India Industries (Private), Ltd., Madras, a firm engaged in manufacturing waterproof packing paper, tarpaulins, etc., has been called upon by the Provident Fund Commissioner, to remit the arrears of employer's contribution for the period from 1 March 1954 (the date when the scheme framed under the Act became applicable to the factory) to 31 March 1958, besides the administrative charges for the said period at 3 per cent on both the employee's and employer's contribution, and damages at 61/4 per cent per annum. There was an initial dispute before Veeraswami, J., as to whether the firm in question was a factory to which the Act would apply. That question was answered in the affirmative by the learned Judge, and there is now no dispute about it. The petitioner before the learned Judge, at the time of the hearing, conceded the validity of the claim for the employer's share of the provident fund contribution, during the aforesaid back-period, but disputed the claim for arrears of administrative charges, calculated on double the employer's contribution, and for damages. The petitioner before the learned Judge, at the time of the hearing, conceded the validity of the claim for the employer's share of the provident fund contribution, during the aforesaid back-period, but disputed the claim for arrears of administrative charges, calculated on double the employer's contribution, and for damages. Veeraswami, J., held that these two claims were unsustainable, and, by a writ of certiorari, quashed the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner in regard to the two items mentioned above, and maintained the claim for the arrears of employer's contribution to the provident fund. The learned Judge also followed the decision in Aluminium Corporation of India. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to which we have made reference. Against this decision, the present appeal (Writ Appeal No. 81 of 1963) is filed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.It is common ground in both these cases that, before the enactment of the Provident Funds Act, there was no provident fund scheme in existence in the two firms concerned in these appeals.Clause 26(1) of the scheme framed under the Act provides : "26. (1)(a) Every employee employed in or in connexion with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this scheme applies, other than an excluded employee, shall be entitled and required to become a member of the fund from the beginning of the month following that in which this paragraph comes into force in such factory or other establishment, if on the date of such coming into force he has completed one year's continuous service or has actually worked for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months or less in that factory or other establishment or in any other factory or other establishment to which the Act applies under the same employer, or partly in one and partly in the other. (b) Every employee employed in or in connexion with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this scheme applies, other than an excluded employee, shall also be entitled and required to become a member of the fund from the beginning of the month following that in which this paragraph comes into force in such factory or other establishment if, on the date of such coming into force, such employee is a subscriber to a provident fund maintained in respect of the factory or other establishment or in respect of any other factory or establishment to which the Act applies under the same employer : Provided that where the scheme applies to a factory or other establishment on the expiry or cancellation of an order of exemption under S.17 of the Act, every employee, who but for the exemption would have become and continued as a member of the fund, shall become a member of the fund forthwith." * Clause 26 was recast by an amendment in 1959, and before that amendment, it was couched in a simpler form, providing that all employees employed in a factory, except excluded employees, shall be required to become members of the fund from the date the scheme is applied to the factory if they have completed one year's continuous service on that date. But, for the purpose of discussion in the present appeals, there is not much difference between the clause before the amendment and that after the amendment. Clause 29 states that the contributions payable by the employer under the scheme shall be at the rate of 61/4 per cent of the basic wages and dearness allowance payable to each employee to whom the scheme applies. Clause 30(1) provides that in the first instance the employer shall pay both the contribution payable by himself and also on behalf of the member employed by him directly or by or through a contractor, the contribution payable by such member. Clause 30(3) says that it shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the employees employed by or through a contractor and also administrative charges. Clause 30(3) says that it shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the employees employed by or through a contractor and also administrative charges. There follows an explanation which states that the administrative charges shall be fixed by the Central Government in consultation with the Central Board at a certain percentage of the pay (basic wages, dearness allowance, retaining allowance, if any, and cash value of food concessions admissible thereon) and having regard to the resources of the fund for meeting its normal administrative expenses. Clause 32 gives power to the employer to recover the employees' contribution by deduction from the wages of the member. The proviso to this clause says that no such deduction may be made from any wage other than that which is paid in respect of the period or part of the period in respect of which the contribution is payable. The effect of this proviso is that if the employer fails to make a deduction of the employees' contribution from the pay paid for a particular period, he is precluded from deducting it subsequently, except in the case of an accidental mistake or a clerical error or where the employee has given a false declaration that he was not already a member of the fund. Section14B of the Act states that where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the fund or any payment of any charges payable under any other provisions of the Act or the scheme, the appropriate Government may recover from the employer such damages, not exceeding 25 per cent of the amount of arrears, as it may think fit to impose. These amounts are recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act.Section19A of the Act gives power to the Central Government to remove any difficulty which arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act by an order passed for the purposes. Such order will be final. Before concluding the reference to the relevant provisions, we may also refer to S.7A of the Act inserted by an amendment (Act 28 of 1963). Such order will be final. Before concluding the reference to the relevant provisions, we may also refer to S.7A of the Act inserted by an amendment (Act 28 of 1963). It provides that the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of the Act or of the scheme, and, for this purpose, may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary, Section 7A(2) provides that the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case before an order determining the amount due from his is passed. Section 7A(4) states that an order made under this section shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court of law. The initial question for consideration is whether Cl. 26 referred to above read with Cl. 30 would entitle the Provident Fund Commissioner, to recover from the employer, arrears of contribution for a back-period or what is called in one of the decisions cited at the Bar, Kapur Bhimber Union v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, and another 1966 (1) LLJ 870 ], the "pre-discovery period." Section5(1) of the Act empowers the Central Government by notification, to frame a scheme called the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, for the establishment of provident funds under the Act, and S. 5(2) indicates that a scheme framed under Sub-sec. (1) may provide that any of its provisions shall take effect either prospectively or retrospectively on such date as may be specified in this behalf in the scheme. Clause 1 of the scheme provides that Chaps. I to III shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions shall come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may prescribe by a notification, Clause 26 is found in Chap. IV and Cl. 30 is found in Chap. V. It is common ground that the relevant date for enforcing these clauses in the scheme, was 1 November 1952 in Writ appeal No. 80 of 1963 and 1 March 1954 in Writ Appeal No. 81 of 1963. Jagadisan, J., held in the former case, that the pre-discovery period must be the period between 1 November 1952 and 30 April 1957, when the employer received a notice from the Provident Fund Inspector making a demand for the contribution. Jagadisan, J., held in the former case, that the pre-discovery period must be the period between 1 November 1952 and 30 April 1957, when the employer received a notice from the Provident Fund Inspector making a demand for the contribution. The order of the Central Government under S. 19A negativing the objections of the employer was passed only on 29 September 1958. But the back-period was not reckoned from 29 September 1958; the date of the notice was selected instead, for the purpose. This question did not arise before Veeraswami, J., in the latter case, because of a concession by the employer that he was liable to pay the arrears of contribution claimed from 1 March 1954 to 31 March 1958.In regard to the validity of the claim for the pre-discovery period, there have been conflicting views of several Courts. One view is that from the date of the coming into force of the scheme, Cl. 26 makes it obligatory for all employees who are not exempted, and who have put in 240 days of service, to become members of the fund, that thereafter, automatically the liability of the employer to pay both his contribution as well as the employees' contribution, under Cl. 30, will arise, and that the employer cannot plead either delay on the part of the Provident Fund Commissioner in issuing the notice to him to make the contribution, or any delay arising out of the time taken by the Central Government to pass an order under S. 19A, for shirking this liability. The other view is that if the above interpretation is given to the provisions, it will lead to unjust and oppressive consequences, and even to a state of affairs where the provisions themselves will become unworkable, and, therefore, retrospective operation (in the sense mentioned above) should be ruled out. This latter view has been upheld in the judgment of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, Mukharji, J., in Aluminium Corporation of India, Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (vide supra), a decision which was followed by Jagadisan, J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1959, now under appeal in Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1963. We will briefly refer to the facts in the Calcutta case. The firm in that case had a provident fund scheme already in existence. We will briefly refer to the facts in the Calcutta case. The firm in that case had a provident fund scheme already in existence. The firm objected to the applicability of the Act, and this led to an order, dated 23 October 1957, by the Government of India under S. 19A, which directed the firm to pay the employer's share of the contribution from 1 November 1952 to 31 October 1956, administrative charges on both the employer's and employees' shares, damages and also the employees' share of the contribution from 1 November 1956, with administrative charges thereon, leaving it to the employees to pay their share of the contribution for the former period if they so desired. The learned Judge, Mukharji, J., catalogued as many as seven objections to the validity of the directions for payment of the demands under the various heads mentioned above for the back-period. He stressed, in particular, that it was impossible to make the required payment in respect of employees who had left the service during the five years that elapsed between 1 November 1952 and the date of the Government's order, that such persons would have drawn the accumulations in the existing provident fund and left and employment, and that no purpose would be served by asking the employer to pay again their contributions to a provident fund. Equally, it would be impossible to apply Cl. 32 of the scheme for recovering the employees' contribution from such persons who had left the employment. The retrospective application of several other provisions of the scheme relating to the contribution cards and the submission of returns would be quite impossible. The claim for the employer's share of the administrative charges would be clearly illegal and inconsistent with the Act, because the administrative charges were intended to meet the cost of administering the fund, and for five years retrospectively there was no fund, and, therefore, no cost of administration incurred therefor. Coming to the damages, the learned Judge observed that at earlier stages the Government had told the employer that the Act did not apply, that only after 23 October, 1957, was the difficulty whether the establishment was a factory or not removed, and that, consequently, there could be difficulty in the payment of contributions prior to that date. Coming to the damages, the learned Judge observed that at earlier stages the Government had told the employer that the Act did not apply, that only after 23 October, 1957, was the difficulty whether the establishment was a factory or not removed, and that, consequently, there could be difficulty in the payment of contributions prior to that date. Similar reasons were relied on by Jagadisan, J., for holding that the retrospective operations of the Act and the scheme would be not merely illogical and oppressive, but inconsistent with the terms of the enactment which were manifestly prospective in their operation. He pointed out that there was no duty laid on the Court to yield to absurd construction of statutes and referred to the views of Maxwell : "An argument drawn from inconvenience, it has been said, is forcible in law; and no less, but rather more, force is due to any drawn from an absurdity or injustice" * [Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 183]. It appears to us, on the other hand, with due respect to the learned Judges, that there is considerable force in the contrary view which holds that the main purport of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder is to bring into existence a compulsory provident fund applicable to all industries to which the Act applies, with effect from the date when the scheme has been declared applicable to them. The principal duty is laid upon the employer to put the scheme into operation forthwith, and to make the contributions of both the employer's and employees' share to the fund then and there, and deduct the latter share from the salary of the employees for the purpose of adjusting it against the amount which they had paid to the fund in advance. In Cl. 26 of the scheme extracted earlier, the words used are "every employee shall be entitled and required to become a member of the fund."In the context of the Act, the word" entitled" * means that the employee has got an absolute right to get the benefits of the Act. In Cl. 26 of the scheme extracted earlier, the words used are "every employee shall be entitled and required to become a member of the fund."In the context of the Act, the word" entitled" * means that the employee has got an absolute right to get the benefits of the Act. The word "required" implies an obligation on the employer to treat all the employees who are qualified and who are not exempted, as members of the fund, and to pay the contribution to the fund (both the employer's and the employees') from the date of the coming into force of the scheme without allowing any interval to lapse either for the awaiting of a notice of demand from the Provident Fund Commissioner or for clearing a point of doubt or difficulty by getting an order from the Central Government under S. 19A. The word "required" as used by legal draftsman in statutory enactments, or by parties to formal contracts, has come in repeatedly for judicial interpretation. A reference to any well-known textbook dealing with the meaning of words and phrases in judicial usage, will show the wide range and variety of the meaning of the word. Referring to the Law Lexicon of British India by Ramanatha Ayyar, the word "required" has the meaning of "to make necessary; to demand, to ask as of right; to claim, to render necessary as a duty," * etc. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, one use of the word is referred to in the following terms : "Oliver Cromwell required, both of the soldiers and others, the oath of fidelity." * Obviously, Oliver Cromwell, after supplanting the Royalist Regime, would not have given an opportunity to his soldiers of making a choice in the matter of allegiance. It is clear that "require" in the above usage, meant a mandate or a command. In contractual obligations the word has been given the meaning of need. In some cases the Courts had looked to principles of justice and equity for giving the word a directory rather than a mandatory import. In Cole v. Green [Law Journal Reports (C.P.) 1844, p. 30] Tindal, C.J., has followed an earlier decision in King v. Birmingham [7 B. & C. 29; S.C. 6 Law J. Rep. In some cases the Courts had looked to principles of justice and equity for giving the word a directory rather than a mandatory import. In Cole v. Green [Law Journal Reports (C.P.) 1844, p. 30] Tindal, C.J., has followed an earlier decision in King v. Birmingham [7 B. & C. 29; S.C. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 67] for giving preference to the directory meaning of the word, in interpreting a provision in the Marriage Act that the consent of the father or guardian is required for the marriage of a minor. It was held by Lord Tenterden in King v. Birmingham [7 B. & C. 29; S.C. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 67] (vide supra) that the absence of such consent would not make the marriage void if solemnized without consent, and hence the word (require) must be interpreted to take a directory significance. But, on the other hand, in Queen v. Justices of Worcestershire [(1900) 2 Q.B. 576], the Court of Appeal in England had to apply S.29 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, which required the Court of quarter sessions in every case where a notice of appeal against the judgment of any justices in or concerning the execution of the Act shall have been given and such appeal shall have been dismissed, to adjudge and order the appellant to pay to the justices to whom such notice of appeal shall have been given, or to whomsoever he shall have appoint, such sum by way of costs as shall in the opinion of the Court of quarter sessions be sufficient to indemnify the justices from all costs of and charge whatsoever to which he may have been put in consequence of his having had notice of appeal served upon him. A. L. Smith, L.J., expressing the view of the Court, observed that the section made it imperative on the Court of quarter sessions, upon the event therein specified happening, namely, the dismissal of the appeal, to adjudge, and order the appellant to pay to the justices the indemnity costs therein mentioned. A. L. Smith, L.J., expressing the view of the Court, observed that the section made it imperative on the Court of quarter sessions, upon the event therein specified happening, namely, the dismissal of the appeal, to adjudge, and order the appellant to pay to the justices the indemnity costs therein mentioned. Bose, J., in K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India while interpreting a rule, which ran : "where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, no such declaration shall be issued except after consultation with the Commission" * held that the word "required" should be given only a directory and not a mandatory meaning, because an obvious injustice would result otherwise. In view of the obligatory nature of the provisions of the Provident Funds Act and the scheme framed thereunder, giving no choice to the employer to postpone the application of its provisions, it appears to us that the word "required" in Cl. 26 of the scheme, has to be given a mandatory and not a directory meaning, and that it implies an obligation whose effect is that every employee who is not exempted, and who satisfies the required qualification of service, automatically becomes a member of the fund, from the date of the coming into force of the scheme. Nor does the argument of hardship or injustice, on which stress was laid by Mukharji, J., as well as Jagadisan, J., have much substance subsequent to the amendment which incorporated S.7A into the Act in 1963. That section gives an opportunity to the employer to press his objections before the authorities mentioned therein, to any claim for payment made against him, and this will include the ground that it is oppressive or unjust in nature. After this amendment, the authority is now obliged to decide the matter judicially after giving the employer a proper hearing. In our opinion, it is in the course of such an enquiry that individual cases of hardship should be pleaded, and relief obtained, for example, regarding employees who have left the services during the pre-discovery period, employees who have been dismissed, employees who are dead, and employees in whose cases the employer did not have an adequate opportunity to recover their contributions if necessary even for reasons other than those mentioned specifically in the proviso to Cl. 30. 30. It will be also open to the employer to press at such an enquiry, for the waiver of the employees' share of the contribution for the pre-discovery period (a relief which the respondent has already given to the petitioners in these cases), or even for a period anterior to the order under S.19A of the Act, in a proper case. In fact, if we view the problems in the abstract, there is no logical reason why, if the claim for the period anterior to the notice is held to be oppressive, it could not be extended in a proper case, to the period anterior to the order under S. 19A. A decision cited before us of Rajagopalan, J., in Annamalai Mudaliar & Bros. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras 1955 (1) LLJ 674] lays down that the provisions of the Act should not be applied to a factory in the event of a dispute, till a decision under S. 19A is given to settle the dispute. But this decision is not authority for the view that if and when the decision given, under S. 19A, is in favour of the department, a demand for contribution made thereafter for the back-period, cannot be legally enforced. If there is a rule which casts automatically upon the employer as the Act does, the obligation to make the contribution, there is no logic in fixing the date of the notice by the Provident Fund Commissioner as the starting point, for making a valid claim. On the other hand, the Provident Fund Commissioner might have had more than one reason for the delay in the issue of notice. He might not have an adequate staff to make a speedy investigation in respect of every factory in his jurisdiction, or the investigation might have taken a long time. In such circumstances, an indifferent or recalcitrant employer, who deliberately ignores the provisions of the Act, cannot urge that he was awaiting the issue of a notice from the Provident Fund Commissioner, for the purpose of implementing the Act and the scheme in his establishment, and should, therefore, be given relief for the period prior to the issue of the notice.There is a considerable volume of authority in support of the view which we have just now stated. Srinivasan, J., in Sri Andal & Co. Srinivasan, J., in Sri Andal & Co. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner - Writ Petition No. 205 of 1962 1965 (2) ILR(Mad) 302], held that the Act takes effect at once and the provisions of the Act become enforceable against the employer of a factory or an establishment with effect from the date on which the relevant clause of the scheme comes into force, and that it does not depend upon the discovery made by the authorities of the department and the issue of the notice calling upon the employer to make the contributions according to the Act. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Bhimber Union v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, and another [ 1964 (29) FJR 232], a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nazeena Traders (Private), Ltd., v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and others (Chandra Reddi, C.J., and Chandrasekhara Sastri, J.), a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kokkalai Rice and Oil Mill foundry v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (where, on facts, the Provident Fund Commissioner had given a notice even before 1 November 1952), and the Allahabad High Court in N.K. Industries (Private), Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh (followed in the above Kerala High Court Full Bench decision) have all held the view which we adopt in this case for the reasons stated above. There is one the decision of the Bombay High Court in Nagpur Glass Works v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner by Mudholkar and Naik, JJ., who had to consider Cl. 27 of the scheme, and they held that it was mandatory. While referring to Cl. 26 of the scheme they made a passing observation that the word "require" used in that clause, could be distinguished from the words "shall become" in Cl. 27 and that the former would not have a mandatory effect. 27 of the scheme, and they held that it was mandatory. While referring to Cl. 26 of the scheme they made a passing observation that the word "require" used in that clause, could be distinguished from the words "shall become" in Cl. 27 and that the former would not have a mandatory effect. But there has been no discussion in that judgment of the significance of the word "require" in the context of the Act and the scheme, by reference to authorities.We may also refer to the supreme Courts decision in Orissa Cement, Ltd. v. Union of India and others where they struck down a provision in the scheme which made it obligatory on the employer to pay the employees' contribution for employees under contractors, as there was no provision in the scheme (as it then stood) for the employer to recover from the contractor such contributions. The Supreme Court held that the provision operated unfairly and harshly on persons who employed contract labour and was also discriminatory, thereby contravening Art. 19(6) of the Constitution of India. But here the facts are different. We have already referred to the fact that if any hardship results, it may also be due to the employer's indifference or recalcitrancy, and that in genuine cases of hardship he has a remedy for relief under S.7A of the Act. In regard to the question of administrative charges, following Mukharji, J.'s. view, Veeraswami, J., held that it could not be recovered because during the pre-discovery period there was no fund to administer, and, therefore, the demand for administrative charges was improper. But this argument overlooks one important point. The administrative charges are not based upon the time factor, in the sense of being calculated at so much per year. They are fixed at a percentage of the amount of the contribution levied and are, therefore, intended to meet the expenditure involved in investment, the keeping of accounts and so on, which can all arise, only subsequent to the actual collection of the fund and will also have reference to the amount actually collected. They are fixed at a percentage of the amount of the contribution levied and are, therefore, intended to meet the expenditure involved in investment, the keeping of accounts and so on, which can all arise, only subsequent to the actual collection of the fund and will also have reference to the amount actually collected. From this point of view, the claim for administrative charges calculated as a percentage on the amount which the employer has been asked to pay by way of contribution for the back-period, is clearly admissible, though it might not be admissible in respect of employees' contribution, when it has neither been demanded nor paid.As regards the third item, damages for default, it is clear that the damages cannot be claimed in the absence of proof of default, Mukharji, J., in Aluminium Corporation of India, Ltd., v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and others has observed at p. 255 : "... The question of liability for damages of the employer only arises when the employer makes default. I do not think that on the facts of this case the employer can be said to have committed a default. The employer wrote to the Government. The government writes to the in answer that the Act will not apply ... An employer cannot make a default when there is a difficulty or doubt and when the Central Government has to remove that difficulty or doubt by an express order. It is only from the date of the order removing such difficulty or doubt that the default can operate. In other words, there can be no retrospective or constructive default in the present context of facts and law." * What transpires from the above is, that it will not be legitimate to infer a default, merely because there was no payment by the employer of the contribution during the pre-discovery period. Each case must be examined carefully with respect to its own facts for an inference about the default. Section7A of the Act has provided for such an examination in disputed cases. The amendment introducing S. 7A came after the passing of the present orders now in appeal. Therefore, we will remit the claim for damages to a fresh consideration by the appropriate authority under S.7A of the Act. Section7A of the Act has provided for such an examination in disputed cases. The amendment introducing S. 7A came after the passing of the present orders now in appeal. Therefore, we will remit the claim for damages to a fresh consideration by the appropriate authority under S.7A of the Act. Likewise, other difficulties in the enforcement of the demand, for example, claims in respect of persons who have left the employment or persons who have died or whose whereabouts are not known and persons who have been dismissed, should all be the subject-matter of a detailed claim and consideration by the authority under S. 7A on application made to it for that purpose, and a fresh opportunity will have to be given to the petitioner for obtaining such a relief, in view of the enactment of S. 7A after the orders now in dispute had been passed.We will finally deal with the argument of Sri K. K. Venugopal, appearing for the respondent in Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1962, that the present proceedings involved a violation of Art. 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India which deals with the right to acquire, hold and dispose of properties. But he has not referred to any particular rule or provision which offends the aforesaid provision of the constitution. Learned counsel urged that, under the provisions of the scheme as they stand, an employer would be liable to be prosecuted for any omission to file a return or any other contravention of the scheme which has occurred during the back-period at a time when he had no opportunity or occasion to submit the return or maintain a register and the like. The short answer to this argument is that it will be open to the petitioner to put forward such a defence where a question of prosecution arises, but that is not the case here. Another argument of the learned counsel is based upon the argument which was accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of contributions for contractor's employees in the decision cited above. But the circumstances were quite different in the case before the Supreme Court. The scheme, as it stood, at that time gave no opportunity to the employer to recover contributions in respect of employees under a contractor. But the circumstances were quite different in the case before the Supreme Court. The scheme, as it stood, at that time gave no opportunity to the employer to recover contributions in respect of employees under a contractor. But the scheme does give the employer an opportunity to recover contributions of the employees employed under him (which is the case here) subject to the restrictions mentioned in Cl. 32. He did not, of course, have that opportunity in the case of contribution demanded for the pre-discovery period, but that will be a matter for which relief will have to be claimed, on proper grounds, in an application under S.7A of the Act. There are, therefore, no grounds for inferring a discriminatory operation of the provisions of the Act.We, therefore, allow the appeals in part as indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. In the case of Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1963, the order of Jagadisan, J., issuing a writ of mandamus will be set aside but with the observation that it will be open to the petitioner to urge a claim for necessary reliefs, including claims in respect of damages, and also in respect of contribution relating to individuals, like those who have left the employment, and so on, during the period 1 November 1952 to 30 April 1957, in an application to be filed before the appropriate authority under S. 7A. In the case of Writ Appeal No. 81 of 1963, while allowing the appeal from the decision of Veeraswami, J. we also make a similar observation. No costs.