Judgment Sahai, J. 1. This appeal by defendant Nos. 14, 15, 17 and 18, who are some of the defendants third party, arises out of a suit for declaration of title to and recovery of possession in respect of 13 bighas, 8 kathas and 4 dhurs of land described in Schedules 2. 3, and 4. 2. A genealogical table of the family in question is given in Schedule I attached to the plaint. All parties admit this table to be correct. According to it, Jaga Ojha had four sons, Jaigopal Ojha, Rambhaju Ojha, Dhaju Ojha and Beni Ojha. Ramrap Ojha (Plinfiff No. 1) is a descendant of Jaigopal Ojha, Rambhaju Ojhas branch appears to have become extinct. Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are the descendants of Beni Ojha. The dispute between the parties relates to the properties of Dhaju Ojhas branch of the family. Dhaju had four sons including Banwari and Lila. Raja was Banwaris son and he had four daughters, namely, Bampati, (defendant No. 2), Bilasbati (who is dead), Nirsi (who is dead) and Sonabati (defendant No. 11). Badri (defendant No. 1) is the husband of Bampati (defendant No. 2) and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are their sons. The other surviving daughter Sonabati and her husband and son as well as the husbands and sons of Bilasbati and Nirsi are defendant Nos. 5 to 12, the defendants second party. It is said that Raja gifted a substantial part of the proper-lies belonging to the joint family consisting of himself and Lila to his daughters and their sons and they subsequently sold the properties so gifted, to other persons, who are defendant Nos. 13 to 21, defendants third party. 3. Some facts are not in dispute. They may now be stated. Raja and Lila were the last surviving coparceners of the joint family which consisted of Lila and his brothers. Raja executed some deeds of gift in 1942 in favour of his daughters or their sons. Those properties are described in Schedule 2 attached to the plaint. He also sold some lands to the defendants third party. These lands are described in Schedule 3. After the sales, an area of only 19 kathas and 16 dhurs was left in possession of the joint family. This land is described in Schedule 4 attached to the plaint Shortly afterwards. Raja died. He also sold some lands to the defendants third party. These lands are described in Schedule 3. After the sales, an area of only 19 kathas and 16 dhurs was left in possession of the joint family. This land is described in Schedule 4 attached to the plaint Shortly afterwards. Raja died. Lila got the properties of the joint family as the last surviving coparcener. He died in 1947. The plaintiffs are the nearest Sapindas of Lila and they are admittedly entitled to properties left by him. 4. The plaintiffs case in paragraph 4 of their plaint is that the donees, in whose favour Raja executed deeds of gift, did not enter into possession of the properties covered by those deeds but those properties continued to be in joint possession and occupation of Raja and Lila as before, and, after the death of Raja, all of them passed into the possession of Lila. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, they have said that so far as they have learnt on enquiry, the donees executed a few farzi and nominal sale deeds in favour of the defendants third party but those sales were not given effect to and the transferees did not get possession of the lands covered by their sale deeds. Their further case is that they came into possession of the properties left by Lila but they were dispossessed by the defendants in Baisakh 1359 Fasli. 5. The case of Badri (defendant No. 1), his wife and sons (defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4) is that Badri purchased some lands from Lila under a sale deed and also under an oral sale and that ultimately Lila adopted him in Kritrim form. He came in possession of the properties left by Lila and he has all along been in possession. 6. The case of the defendants third party is that the donees came into possession and MI transfers made by them the transferees came into possession . Their case further is that Lila committed civil death by giving up his entire interest in the properties of the joint family which he held jointly with Raja as coparceners. 7. The plaintiffs instituted their suit originally in the court of the Munsif of Motihari valuing the suit at Rs. 1062. Subsequently the valuation was raised to Rs. 1800. Their case further is that Lila committed civil death by giving up his entire interest in the properties of the joint family which he held jointly with Raja as coparceners. 7. The plaintiffs instituted their suit originally in the court of the Munsif of Motihari valuing the suit at Rs. 1062. Subsequently the valuation was raised to Rs. 1800. The defendants alleged that value of the properties in suit was not less than Bs. 20,000. The issue relating to valuation was first tried and the Munsif held that the suit had been correctly valued. The defendants then filed Civil Revision No. 387 of 1955 in this court. That was placed before Choudhary, J., who, by his order dated the 4th September. 1957, held that the valuation of the suit lands was above Rs. 4,000, which was the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. His Lordship, therefore, sent back the case to the Munsif for returning the plaint to the plaintiffs for being filed in proper court. An order for return of the plaint was accordingly passed on the 22nd November, 1957, and it appears from the endorsement at the back of the plaint that it was actually returned to the plaintiffs on that date. On the 2nd December, 1957, the plaintiffs filed the suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Motihari. They then valued the suit at altogether Rupees 4,500 8. The second Additional Subordinate Judge of Molihari tried the suit. He held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover only 19 kathas and 16 dhurs of land described in Schedule No. 4 He, therefore, decreed the suit in part. The plaintiffs then filed Title Appeal No. 97/14 of 1959/60 in the district Court. That appeal was actually heard by the Additional District Judge of Motihari who by his judgment and decree, dated the 12th September. 1963, allowed the appeal, declaring the plaintiffs title to the properties included in Schedules 2 and 3 of the plaint In so far as defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are concerned, he declared that they were the owners of properties mentioned in Exhibit D. whereunder 2 bighas. 10 kathas and 17 dhurs of lands were conveyed to them by Lila Ojha. He negatived the claim of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 to other properties but decreed the suit in full against all the other defendants. 1 to 4 are concerned, he declared that they were the owners of properties mentioned in Exhibit D. whereunder 2 bighas. 10 kathas and 17 dhurs of lands were conveyed to them by Lila Ojha. He negatived the claim of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 to other properties but decreed the suit in full against all the other defendants. He further dismissed the cross-objection filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 4 relating to all with the exception of 2 bighas. 10 kathas and 17 dhurs which I have just mentioned. 9. The first point which Mr. J.C. Sinha, who has appeared on behalf of the appellants has urged is that the suit is barred by limitation. The court of appeal below has held that the plaintiffs are entitled under Sec.14 of the Limitation Act to the exclusion of time which they took over prosecuting the suit before the Munsif i. e. from 3rd October. 1953, to the 22nd November. 1957. Learned counsel has argued that the plaintiffs are not entitled to exclusion of that time. (10) Sec.14 (1) reads:- - "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it". It is manifest that this section would apply if it is held that the plaintiffs were prosecuting their suit before the Munsif with due diligence and in good faith, Good faith has been defined in Sec.2 (7) as follows: "good faith nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention." Mr. Sinha has urged that as the plaintiffs learned about the sales to the defendants third party, they must have also learnt the amounts for which the sales were made. Since the consideration for the sale-deeds executed by the donees was above Rs. 4,000, the plaintiffs valuation of the suit as Rs. 1800 was a gross and deliberate under-valuation. Sinha has urged that as the plaintiffs learned about the sales to the defendants third party, they must have also learnt the amounts for which the sales were made. Since the consideration for the sale-deeds executed by the donees was above Rs. 4,000, the plaintiffs valuation of the suit as Rs. 1800 was a gross and deliberate under-valuation. In support of the contention that the plaintiffs are not entitled to exclusion of time under Sec.14 (1) of the Limitation Act if they grossly undervalued the suit when they filed it in a court which later on returned the plaint, he has relied upon the case of Ramchandra Singh V/s. Mt. Khudaijatul Kubra. AIR 1945 Pat 369, and the case of Madhavrao Narayanrao V/s. Ram Krishna, AIR 1958 SC 767 . It is certainly true that it has been held in Ram Chander Singhs case that a plaintiff is not entitled to exclusion of time under Sec.14 if he grossly and deliberately under-valued his suit. The case of Madhavrao is distinguishable on facts, but the principle which their Lordships have laid down has certainly to be taken into consideration. B. P. Sinha, J. (as he then was), who has delivered the judgment of the court, has observed; "Both the courts below have viewed the controversy under Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, as if it was for the defendant to show mala fides on the part of the plaintiff when he instituted the previous suit and was carrying on the proceedings in that court. In our opinion, both the courts below have misdirected themselves on this question. Though they do not say so in terms, they appear to have applied the definition of good faith as contained in the General Clauses Act, to the effect that A Thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not, But the Indian Limitation Act contains its own definition of good faith to the effect that nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention Sec.2 (7)3. We have, therefore, to see if the institution and prosecution of the suit in the Munsifs court at Miraj was done with due care and attention. We have, therefore, to see if the institution and prosecution of the suit in the Munsifs court at Miraj was done with due care and attention. We know that the plaint in the Tikoni suit filed by the same plaintiff in the same court did contain a statement as to the value of the subject matter, but it was conspicuous by its absence in the plaint in the suit as originally filed in the Munsifs court a Miraj." Their Lordships held on the facts and circumstances of that case that the plaintiff had not prosecuted the suit in the Munsifs court with due care and attention. 10. If, therefore, the plaintiffs in this case did not prosecute their suit in the Munsifs court with due care and attention, they are certainly not entitled to exclusion of time under Sec.14. In this connection, I may refer to some facts. The valuation of the property sold by Raja to defendant No. 16 under the sale deed Exhibit A-1-1 dated the 3rd February, 1942 was Rs. 72 for 15 kathas and 15 dhurs. Raja made a gift of 3 bighas and 5 kathas of land under exhibit B-1-1 dated 6th April, 1942, and he valued the entire property so gifted at Rs. 200. Lila Ojha executed a sale deed (exhibit D) dated the 6th August, 1946, in favour of Badri Ojha (defendant No. 1) and he valued the area of 2 bighas, 10 kathas and 17 dhurs conveyed under that deed at Rs. 400. These are the lands which the learned Additional District Judge has held to have been legally conveyed to defendant Nos. 1 to 4. In the sale-deed, Exhibit A-1, dated the 25th January, 1946, in favour of defendant Nos. 11 to 14, an area of 1 bigha, 8 kathas and 14 dhurs is valued at Rs. 300. Under Exhibit A-4-1 and exhibit and A-5-1 dated the 28th March, 1951, and exhibit 2-1 D/- 8th January, 1953, the proper-lies conveyed appear to have been valued at about Rs. 900 and odd per bigha and at about Rs. 450 and odd per bigha. The plaintiffs valued the properties at about Rs. 150 per bigha, which appears to be in consonance with the valuation given in Exhibit A-1-1, D and A-1. Indeed, the Munsif came to a finding in their favour [hat the valuation of Rs. 1800 given by them was correct. 450 and odd per bigha. The plaintiffs valued the properties at about Rs. 150 per bigha, which appears to be in consonance with the valuation given in Exhibit A-1-1, D and A-1. Indeed, the Munsif came to a finding in their favour [hat the valuation of Rs. 1800 given by them was correct. It was the High Court which upset that finding. In view of the High Courts order, it must be held that there was an under-valuation. It is difficult, however, to hold that this was a case of gross or deliberate under-valuation, specially in view of the fact that one court did accept the valuation given by the plaintiffs. As this is not a case of gross and deliberate under-valuation, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs were prosecuting their suit with due care and attention in the Munsifs court. That being so, they are entitled to exclusion of the time taken by them in prosecuting their suit in that court. 11. The second point which Mr. Sinha has urged is that the Additional District Judges finding of fact that the donees of Raja and their transferees did not come into possession of the disputed lands is vitiated because it has been arrived at after ignoring the reasons given by the trial court for coming to a contrary finding. In the first place, this point becomes immaterial in view of the conclusion which I have reached on the first point because even if the donees came into possession in 1942, the suit filed before the Subordinate Judge would be well within twelve years after excluding the time taken in the Munsifs court. In the second place, the ground on the basis of which Mr. Sinha has argued that the Additional District Judges finding is vitiated cannot be accepted as correct. Reference may be made in this connection to the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 . 12. No other point has been raised. No reason for interference having been made out the appeal is dismissed with costs.