JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This order shall govern Second Appeals Nos. 1567 and 1616 of 1966, both arising out of suits for ejectment of the appellants, who were occupying the accommodation as tenant. The courts below have decreed the suits because the appellants were in arrears of rent of a period exceeding three months and had failed to pay the arrears within the prescribed period of the service of the notice of demand. 2. It has been strongly contended on behalf of the appellants that the bar imposed by Sec. 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to be referred hereinafter as the Act) does not stand removed unless both the conditions detailed therein are satisfied, namely, the permission contemplated by Sec. 3 is granted by the District Magistrate or by a competent authority, before the institution of the suit and secondly, the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 3(1) is established. In the instant cases, no permission as contemplated by Sec. 3(1) was obtained. Consequently, if the fulfilment of both the conditions prior to the institution of a suit for ejectment is necessary, the present suits shall not be maintainable. Reliance was placed upon certain observations made in Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand, 1966 ALJ 360 (S.C.) 3. It is true that the following two observations made in the above Supreme Court case are general and can suggest that fulfilment of both the conditions, and not only, one, is a condition precedent to the entertainment of a suit for ejectment of a tenant from an accommodation governed by the Act; but if the observations are read along with the final order passed in the case, no two opinions are possible and these observations cannot be given a wide meaning as suggested by the learned Advocate for the appellants. The observations relied upon are: - (1) "Broadly stated, the effect of the provisions contained in Sec. 3 (1) is that a landlord can evict his tenant if he satisfies two conditions. The observations relied upon are: - (1) "Broadly stated, the effect of the provisions contained in Sec. 3 (1) is that a landlord can evict his tenant if he satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that he must obtain tire permission of the District Magistrate to file such a suit; and the second condition is that he must prove the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 3(1)." (2) "That is how the appellants, claimed to have satisfied both the conditions prescribed by Sec. 3(1)." Observations of the Supreme Court are as much binding on the Courts in India as a formal decision by that Court, but this Rule cannot be made applicable to a case where it is apparent on the face of the Supreme Court decision that the observations, though worded generally, cannot on literal construction be reconciled with the final order passed in the case. 4. The facts of this case as reproduced in 1966 A. L. J. 360 are as below:- "In their plaint, the appellants, pleaded that they needed the premises in suit to carry on their own business in the shop, and they alleged that they had applied for permission to the District Magistrate, Moradabad, under Sec. 3(1) of the Act; that the said permission had been refused by him, whereupon they had moved the Commissioner in his revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 3(2) of the Act; and that the Commissioner had given them permission to file the suit. That is how the appellants claimed to have satisfied both the conditions prescribed by Sec. 3(1)." 5. The case of the landlords, was that they had obtained the permission contemplated by Sec. 3 of the Act and not that one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 3(1) also existed. In other words, only one of the two conditions detailed in the above-quoted observations of the Supreme Court was satisfied. In case the satisfaction of both the conditions and not only one, was necessary before a suit for ejectment of the tenant could be taken cognizance of the above suit being not maintainable could not be decreed for ejectment. On the other hand, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the District Court, whereby the decree for ejectment of the defendant-tenant passed by the trial Court was confirmed. 6. On the other hand, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the District Court, whereby the decree for ejectment of the defendant-tenant passed by the trial Court was confirmed. 6. To exclude the possibility of facts not being correctly or fully reported in 1966 A.L.J. 360, I had the record of Second Appeal No. 212 of 1956 summoned from the record-room. Fortunately, a copy of the paper book prepared for purposes of the Supreme Court Appeal was on the record of the Second Appeal. The paper book contained a copy of the plaint, and also the judgments of various Courts. All these papers confirmed that it was not the plaintiffs case that one of the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 3(1) of the Act existed. The only assertion made was that the plaintiffs had obtained the permission as contemplated by Sec. 3 thereof. 7. When on the satisfaction of one of the two conditions detailed in Sec. 3(1) of the Act, and not of both, the bar imposed by Sec. 3(1) stands removed and the suit for ejectment of the tenant is maintainable, the observations quoted above, though worded generally, must be given a narrow interpretation in consonance with the decision, i.e. the law laid down by the Supreme Court in that case. 8. Keeping in mind the facts of 1966 A.L.J. 360 it must be held that what the Supreme Court meant was that one of the two conditions, and not both, must be fulfilled before a suit for ejectment of a tenant can be entertained by the Civil Court. Consequently, a suit for ejectment of a tenant from an accommodation governed by the Act shall be maintainable if the permission as contemplated by Sec. 3 has been granted, or the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 3 (1) established. 9. In the instant cases the appellants had failed to pay the arrears of rent of a period exceeding three months within one month of the service of the notice of demand. Hence the ground detailed in Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) existed, and on this condition alone being fulfilled the bar imposed by Sec. 3(1) was removed and the suit for ejectment could be taken cognizance of and a decree for ejectment passed. 10. Hence the ground detailed in Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) existed, and on this condition alone being fulfilled the bar imposed by Sec. 3(1) was removed and the suit for ejectment could be taken cognizance of and a decree for ejectment passed. 10. Both (he Second Appeals have thus no, force and are hereby dismissed summarily. Appeals dismissed.