JUDGMENT 1. THOUGH, normally, upon an application for vacating an interim injunction the Court uses as little words as are indispensable, in the instant case, the Court has to give its reasons in full inasmuch as the learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the applicants, namely, the State of West Bengal and the superior Police officials who are respondents in the main Rule, made some comments which would suggest that the interim injunction which was issued on the 29th July, 1966, had been issued wantonly or, at least, indifferently. Since the Court acts by the method of persuasion and not by flat, it has to give its reasons, particularly when the order of injunction which the applicants challenge had been issued ex parte. 2. IN order to explain why the interim order was made, we have to start with the issue of the Rule nisi, since the former is dependent upon the latter. It is now settled by the Supreme Court that a petition under article 226 of the Constitution should not be dismissed in limine but a Rule nisi should be issued calling for a return upon the allegations made by the petitioner where the petition discloses a prima jade case or raises some arguable issue or makes allegations of mala fides or the like which needs be controverted (1) B. I. Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 354 (356), (2) Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725 , (3) Himanshu v. Jyoti Prakash, AIR 1964 SC 1636 (1641), (4) Ghasiram Oil Mills v. L. A. Tribunal, (1963) 2 SCR 845, (5) Bishnu Narain v. I. T. O., 1965 SC (CA 493 of 1964), and for this purpose, the Court would even allow the petitioner to amend his petition where it discloses a prima facie case but is technically defective (6) Dwarka v. I. T. O., (1965) II SCA 868 (879 ). 3. 3. THE impugned order in this case is an order of compulsory retirement passed against the petitioner on the June 10, 1966 in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to rule 75 (a)of the West Bengal Service Rules, part I, under clause (a) of this Rule, the normal age of retirement or 'superannuation' is 58 years, but under the proviso, the appropriate authority may, "without assigning any reason", require the Government servant to retire at any time after he attains the age of 55 years. The petitioner has been asked to retire on his attaining the age of 55. Certain procedural requirements are, however, laid down in clauses (i) to (vi) of that Rule and an exception to the power is laid down in rule 77, with a non-obstante clause. 4. THOUGH the petition in the instant case, is not well drafted, it is clear that the petitioner challenges the above impugned order at Ann. 'n' to the petition (p. 70) on the following main grounds : (i) That it is mala fide (para. 41) ; (ii) That it is ultra vires the provisions of the Rules, such as 75 or 77 (para. 42) ; (iii) That it is unconstitutional, being in violation of article 311 (2) of the Constitution (Grounds XVIV ; xx ). In view of the principles referred to earlier, the instant case was thus a fit one for the issue of a Rule nisi to hear the other party on the allegations made by the petitioner before dismissing his petition. There is no doubt that the Court's interference in service matters causes inconvenience to the administration. But where allegations of ultra vires or unconstitutional action are brought before the Court, the Court has a duty to give the suitor a hearing on the merits because of the oath taken by each Judge "to uphold the Constitution and the laws. " To refuse to entertain petitions containing such allegations might constitute a transgression of the oath by virtue of which he is installed in office, thereby courting impeachment on this side of his mortal existence, and eternal damnation in the life beyond. It is certainly natural for the administration to smart, but the fault, if any, was of the fathers of the Constitution who adopted article 311 (2) and article 226 to enforce the safeguards provided to protect a delinquent public servant from arbitrary action. It is certainly natural for the administration to smart, but the fault, if any, was of the fathers of the Constitution who adopted article 311 (2) and article 226 to enforce the safeguards provided to protect a delinquent public servant from arbitrary action. 5. IT is well-known that under the Imperialistic regime until the Government of India Act, 1935. there was no protection to a public servant, however arbitrarily he might be deprived of his employment and his only consolation was a representation to that very authority or his superiors in the departmental hierarchy, which had awarded the penalty. The inequity of this situation led even the British Government to introduce clauses (2) and (3) in section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to give certain procedural rights to the delinquent public servant, which were justiciable. But since there was no writ jurisdiction under that Act, the only forum in which the aggrieved public servant could enforce his justiciable rights under section 240 was a civil suit which, obviously, was not a speedy remedy in such cases. Though article 311 (2) of the constitution reiterates the provisions of section 240 of the Act of 1935, in the main, it makes the procedural safeguards of article 311 more realistic and effective by providing the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under article 226 and legion are the cases where the highest tribunals of the land have given relief to aggrieved public servants in cases where violation of the procedural safeguards was established. The right of the Government to dispense with the services on any ground whatever still remains unimpaired and if any court interferes with it on the ground that the cause for which the order of dismissal has been made is inadequate or even frivolous, it would tread beyond its jurisdiction. The scope of the Court is a very limited one, namely, to see whether the procedural safeguards of article 311 (2) have been violated. In a case where there has been such violation it is the duty of the Court to interfere because the Constitution has been enacted by the people themselves and the Judge has taken the oath to defend it against the heaviest gale or tempest and without "fear or favour". In a case where there has been such violation it is the duty of the Court to interfere because the Constitution has been enacted by the people themselves and the Judge has taken the oath to defend it against the heaviest gale or tempest and without "fear or favour". It is not for a Judge to sit with the microscope to scan whether there is anything wrong with any of the provisions of the Constitution but to give effect to those of its provisions which are justiciable and mandatory, so long as they are not removed from the text of the Constitution by the process of valid amendment. By holding up the constitutional Bible by the one hand and by applying it by the other to the facts and circumstances of a particular case before him, the humble votary on the altar of Justice offers a silent homage to the Nation itself, because the Constitution is the creature of the Nation and forms the foundation of all the power that be in this land. If, in such a situation, the administration is intolerant of the Court, it would bring forth an observation such as that of a former Chief Justice of India in the case of (7) State of Madras v. V. G. Row, 1952 SCR 597 (605) : "if then, the Courts in this country face up to such important and none too easy task, it is not out of any desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader's spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly laid upon them by the Constitution. " 6. THE different organs of the State set up by the Constitution cannot feel like rivals except perhaps by way of vying with each other in making their respective contributions to the national welfare within the sphere allotted to each by the organic law of the land. Of course, the mere uttering of the words 'article 311' would not entitle a petitioner to a Rule nisi. In the instant case, the petitioner has alleged various acts of mala fides having been committed against him by the respondents including several departmental proceedings and it was during the pendency of one such disciplinary proceedings on several charges that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was made against him. In the instant case, the petitioner has alleged various acts of mala fides having been committed against him by the respondents including several departmental proceedings and it was during the pendency of one such disciplinary proceedings on several charges that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was made against him. Though compulsory retirement per se does not attract article 311 (2) of the Constitution, it has been held in some cases e. g. (8) Ramanugrah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 Pat. 97 (108); (9) Sivacharan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 232, that even in cases of compulsory retirement before the age of superannuation, it is open to the Government servant to establish that it was resorted to mala fide or by way of penalty for some alleged misconduct, as took place in the case before the Supreme Court in (10) State of Madras v. Srinivasan, AIR 1965 SC 1827 (1831). Whether that principle would be available to the petitioner in the instant case is a question on the merits to be decided at the hearing of the Rule, but the allegations in the petition suffice to make out a prima facie case for the issue of a Rule nisi. Be it added, nothing herein observed will affect the decision on the merits in the Rule. Coming now to the alleged violation of Service Rules in making the impugned order, it may be pointed out that notwithstanding the introduction of articles 311 (2) and 226 in the Constitution, judicial inertia led some High Courts to hold, following the outmoded doctrine laid down by the Privy Council in (11) Venkata v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 31, that mere breach of service rules, even though they have a. statutory origin and are mandatory in nature, did not give rise to a cause of action at law and that the only remedy was by way of departmental representation. This view has been put an end to by the Supreme Court in (12) State of U. P. v. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751 . by laying down that any statutory rule relating to services which is otherwise enforceable can be enforced in a Court of law, including a proceeding under article 226, (13) State of Bombay v. Maharashtra, 1965 SC (CA 1040 of 1963); (14) State of U. P. v. Jogendra, AIR 1963 SC 1618 . by laying down that any statutory rule relating to services which is otherwise enforceable can be enforced in a Court of law, including a proceeding under article 226, (13) State of Bombay v. Maharashtra, 1965 SC (CA 1040 of 1963); (14) State of U. P. v. Jogendra, AIR 1963 SC 1618 . That principle is applicable with greater force in the instant case inasmuch as the West Bengal Service Rules purport to have been made in exercise of the power conferred upon the Governor by the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution. In the instant case, my attention has been drawn to the fact that rule 77 of these Rules contains an express prohibition against the application of the power of compulsory retirement when a disciplinary proceeding on a charge of misconduct is pending against a Government servant. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the disciplinary proceeding has been dropped subsequent to the making of the impugned order. Whether that would take out the case out of rule 77 is a matter to be determined at the hearing. But there is no doubt that there is a prima jade case in the petition on this point. It is also urged in the petition that the procedure laid down in rule 75 (ii) has not been followed in making the impugned order. 7. IF, therefore, the issue of the rule nisi was justified, we are brought to the question of issue of interim injunction. 8. THOUGH there is no express provision in article 226 of the Constitution empowering the Court to make an interim order in the nature of injunction, it is now settled (15)Amarsarjit v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1305 (1314); (16) Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, (1965) 1 SCR 413 (498) ; (17) State of Bihar v. Ram Balak, (1966) SC Cr. A. 200 of 1965, that the Court, exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution, has the power to give directions in the nature of interim relief to maintain status quo during the pendency of the application and in aid of the relief claimed in the writ petition which means the maintenance of subject-matter of litigation in tact until the right asserted is decided on the merits. There is no codified law as to when interim relief to maintain the status quo should be issued. There is no codified law as to when interim relief to maintain the status quo should be issued. As explained by the Supreme Court in (18)Manohar Lal v. Hiralal, AIR 1982 SC 527, it is one of the inherent powers of the Court to be exercised in the interests of justice, and, as explained in cases under order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, it would be exercised in cases of 'irreparable injury', where to refuse it would render the litigation of the suitor ineffective or infructuous vide (19) Harman v. Jones, Cr. and Ph. 299 (301), (20) Jones v. Pacaya Rubber Co., (1911) 1 KB 457. 'irreparable', in this context, has no absolute implication but only signifies an injury which cannot be compensated by pecuniary damages, vide (21) Pinchin v. L. and B. Rly., 5 De G. M. and G. 860 ; (22)Litchfield v. Queen Anne's Gale Syndicate, (1919) 1 Ch. 411. I was struck by the vehemence with which it was argued by Mr. Dutt that the Court should allow the Government to remove the petitioner from the date mentioned in the impugned order and if eventually the decision in the instant case is against the Government, the petitioner would be reinstated. If the loss of one's job does not mean an 'irreparable injury', I do not know what greater injury can be contemplated in the material world. As pointed out by the House of Lords in (23) Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66, and by our Supreme Court in the (24) Calcutta Dock Labour Board case. (1965) II SCA 226, an employment is a means of livelihood and constitutes 'property' to a mass of the people when feudal property has disappeared. The case would certainly have been otherwise if the order had been enforced against the petitioner before he could reach the Court so that the status quo when the Court took seisin of the case was that the petitioner was out of his office. But in the instant case, the petitioner was still in office at the date of the Rule, and that was the status quo which the Court was called upon to maintain by the issue of the interim order. It would be a poor consolation to the petitioner if he is reinstated after having suffered the travails of starvation pendente lite. But in the instant case, the petitioner was still in office at the date of the Rule, and that was the status quo which the Court was called upon to maintain by the issue of the interim order. It would be a poor consolation to the petitioner if he is reinstated after having suffered the travails of starvation pendente lite. If I may be permitted to say so, it would be like hanging a man and then placing a wrath on his grave. If he has made out a prima facie case, the petitioner is entitled to the interim injunction which has been issued on July 9, 1966, to continue till the disposal of the Rule. Mr. Dutt invoked the doctrine of 'balance of convenience' by urging that the Administration would be under great in convenience unless a substitute is appointed in place of the petitioner immediately, by vacating the interim injunction. But no question of appointing a substitute arises until the petitioner is not validly removed, and that is the question pending decision of this Court. 9. THE only change in the circumstances pointed out on behalf of the respondents in support of their claim to vacate the interim injunction is that the disciplinary proceeding, refered to earlier, had been dropped with effect from the 1st December, 1966, i.e., subsequent to the issue of the Rule and the interim order. Suffice it to say that change in the circumstances caused by such unilateral action on the part of the respondents does not, prima facie, affect either the Rule or the interim injunction, which must subsist until the hearing of the Rule, which, of course, has to be expedited. 10. COSTS are not usually awarded against the State in this Court, exercising the writ jurisdiction, whenever there is any debatable question of law involved, inasmuch as the State, being the custodian of public rights, has the duty to obtain a decision from a court of law on such debatable question, in defence of public interests. The case becomes otherwise where the litigation. is prima facie unsubstantial or mal-advised. Even in the British regime, the State would seldom pursue apparently fruitless litigation or raise technical pleas as against private individuals, i.e., its own subjects. The case becomes otherwise where the litigation. is prima facie unsubstantial or mal-advised. Even in the British regime, the State would seldom pursue apparently fruitless litigation or raise technical pleas as against private individuals, i.e., its own subjects. Since the State has a band of retained lawyers it may be said that legal advice is almost invariably taken before instituting or contesting a cause ; where, therefore, the cause or plea is unsubstantial, the culpability of the State as a litigant, becomes more obvious than in the case of a private litigant. The court cannot but discourage the pursuit of furitless litigation by the State to the detriment of public money, by awarding substantial costs. Having regard to the nature of the contest, I would award a cost of seven gold mohurs against the applicant, State of West Bengal, which is opposite party No. 1 in the Rule. The application, is accordingly, disallowed with a cost of seven gold mohurs payable by the State of W. Bengal. In fine, I would overlook some provocative expressions used by the learned Additional Government Pleader in course of his arguments out of my personal regard for age and maturity in general. Leave to either party to mention for an early date of hearing of the Rule as soon as it is ready.