Judgment :- 1. The father of the revision petitioners filed an application for the settlement of the only debt which he owed, and which was to the respondent herein, under S.15 of Act 31 of 1958, referred to as the Act. He died pending the application and the revision petitioners sought to be impleaded as legal representatives of I. A. 1469 of 1964. This application was dismissed and hence this revision petition. 2. It has been held by a full bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Swaragiri Krishnan Ramaswami v. Rangaswami Subbayyan Lala, 1953 KLT. 98 that a proceeding under the analogous provision, S.16 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, did not abate on the death of the applicant on whose application the proceeding was initiated, but that his legal representatives were entitled to continue the same. In two other cases, Chidambara Iyer Azhagappa Iyer v. Nallathayammal Sivakami Ammal (1947 TLR. 1) decided by the Travancore High Court under S.16 of the Travancore Act, and Mary v. Govindan (1963 KLT. 590) decided by a bench of this court under S.15 of the Act, it was held, that the legal representatives of a deceased debtor cannot by themselves initiate such a proceeding for the settlement of his debts* That is not the case here. The question here is similar to what has been answered by the full bench in the case cited under S.16 of the Travancore Act. Under that Act also as under the Act, there is provision for the allotment of a share of his properties to the debtor, including his homestead, freed from liability to a certain extent. The full bench observed, that "there is no reason to hold that this ascertained asset could not be inherited by his legal representatives". The full bench also relied on the distinctive use of the terms "individual" in S.16 and "debtor", as including his legal representatives in the later Sections which relate to proceedings for settlement of debts, as supporting its view, that once a proceeding is initiated by a debtor, upon bis death his legal representatives can continue it to its logical termination. The full bench also relied on the distinctive use of the terms "individual" in S.16 and "debtor", as including his legal representatives in the later Sections which relate to proceedings for settlement of debts, as supporting its view, that once a proceeding is initiated by a debtor, upon bis death his legal representatives can continue it to its logical termination. Learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to the definition in S.2 (fff) of the Act which reads: " 'melpattamdar', 'mortgagee', 'debtor' and 'creditor' shall include the heirs, legal representatives and assigns of the melpattamdar, mortgagee, debtor and creditor respectively: Provided that in the case of a debtor such hairs, legal representatives and assigns are also agriculturists." This has been introduced by the amending Act 2 of 1961. Unlike the term "debtor" as defined in the Travancore Act, which includes all his heirs and legal representatives, the term as defined in the Act includes only such of them as are agriculturists. So the latter part of the reasoning of the full bench based on the distinctive use of the terms "individual" and "debtor" in the Travancore Act, is not available to the petitioner in this case. But the result of the reasoning of the full bench applies with equal force to the present case. In our opinion, the right to continue the proceeding under S.15 of the Act after the death of the debtor who initiated it, is not in any way affected or controlled by the definition of the term "debtor", for if the right h of such nature as can survive the debtor, it does so to all his legal representatives, whether agriculturists or not. So to the decision of the present question, the definition of the term "debtor" in S.2 (fff) is hardly relevant, however useful it may be to learned counsel for the respondent to get over one line of reasoning of the full bench, as indicated. In the final analysis, the question to determine is whether in a proceeding under S.15 of the Act upon the death of the applicant debtor, "the right to sue", if it may be so called as in Order XXII, R.1,C. P. C., survives. In the final analysis, the question to determine is whether in a proceeding under S.15 of the Act upon the death of the applicant debtor, "the right to sue", if it may be so called as in Order XXII, R.1,C. P. C., survives. If it does survive, then the procedure prescribed by Order XXII, R.3 can be applied mutatis mutandis, by virtue of S.141,-C. P. C. which reads: "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction". Judged from the stand-point of S.141, C. P. C. we feel no doubt that a proceeding under S.15 of the Act is an original proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. It was held so by a learned judge of this Court in Abdul Kadir v. Hassan Rowther (1962 KLT. 385). S.146, C. P. C. also is pertinent and it reads: "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." This Section enables the proceeding to be carried on, if the legal representatives may be said to claim under the debtor-applicant. 3. In Mary v. Govindan (1963 KLT. 590) it was held, that the right to apply under S.15 is of an agriculturist who is unable to pay his debts and no of his legal representatives after his death; we entertain no doubt as to this. But this is not to say, that having made the application, the right to the reliefs obtainable pursuant to it, cannot pass to his legal representatives. What is the relief that can so pass, has to be understood in the light of S.18 of the Act. That Section provides how the liabilities of the debtor have to be settled. Under it, one-fourth of the entire assets of the debtor-applicant, including his homestead, not exceeding Rs. 6500/- in value, has to be allotted and given over to him subject to certain liabilities only. This right is statutorily conferred on him and is vested, once an application is filed in accordance with law. Under it, one-fourth of the entire assets of the debtor-applicant, including his homestead, not exceeding Rs. 6500/- in value, has to be allotted and given over to him subject to certain liabilities only. This right is statutorily conferred on him and is vested, once an application is filed in accordance with law. There can be no doubt, that the share when allotted, would pass on his death to his legal representatives. It must equally follow, that as a vested right, the right to the allotment of one-fourth share would also, in the event contemplated, pass to them. The conditions necessary for the application of S.141 and 146 of the Civil Procedure Code are therefore fulfilled and by virtue thereof, the legal representatives are entitled to prosecute the application under S.15 after the death of the applicant, though they had no right to make such application. We see no anomaly in this. It only remains to add that the term "debtor" in the context of S.18 has reference to the applicant whose debts are sought to be settled, the term including his legal representatives when he is no more, and that the definition in S.2 (fff) has no application, as "the context otherwise requires." We see nothing in Mary v. Govindan (1963 KLT. 590) which is opposed to the view we are taking. 4. As a result of the foregoing discussion we hold, that the application of the petitioners for impleadment in the proceeding under S.15 was wrongly rejected. The order of the lower court is set aside and the revision petition is allowed with costs in both the courts. Allowed.