JUDGMENT Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal. The plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal, for recovery of possession, on the 4th July, 1955. The facts disclosed by the plaintiff are that, on 24th July 1929 plaintiff had mortgaged with possession the plots in suit in favour of defendant under a registered deed of mortgage. The plots in suit were the sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor at the time of mortgage and as such the defendant ceased to have any right to retain possession after Act I of 1951 came into force and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession from him. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that the mortgage deed was invalid on account of fraud on registration. It was alleged that it was not intended to mortgage the share in the house situate in the town of Gorakhpur and that to give jurisdiction to the Sub-Registrar at Gorakhpur, the said property had been fradulently included in the document. It was then alleged that the plots in suit were not sir and khudkasht of the plaintiff at the time of the mortgage; the plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession over property given in schedule "B" without paying the mortgage money; and that the defendant was in possession over the plots in suit under the deed dated 19th September 1929. The plaintiff could recover only joint possession along with the defendant. 3. Necessary issues arising from the pleadings in the case were framed by the learned Munsif. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that no fraud had been practised with regard to the registration of the mortgage deed at Gorakhpur; that the plots in suit with the exception of eight plots numerated by the learned Munsif in his judgment were sir and khudkasht of the plaintiff on the date of the mortgage. The plaintiff consequently had become bhumidhar of the said sir and khudkasht plots and was entitled to get into possession over them. So far as the properties given in list B is concerned, the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff could not obtain possession over the same in this proceeding inasmuch as those properties were not covered by Sec. 14 of Act of 1951. So far as the properties given in list B is concerned, the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff could not obtain possession over the same in this proceeding inasmuch as those properties were not covered by Sec. 14 of Act of 1951. It was also held that the defendants possession was not protected under the mortgage dated 19th September 1929. 4. Plea of limitation was also repelled by the learned Munsif. By way of result, the learned Munsif decreed the suit in respect of the plots of list A except the eight plots mentioned above and he dismissed the suit in respect of the other properties in suit. 5. Defendant went in appeal before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court after hearing the parties partly allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit in respect of plot No. 1116/1 also. The rest of the decree of the trial court was confirmed. It appears that there was a cross-objection but that also was dismissed. The lower appellate court posed three questions which according to it arose in the appeal. The first question so posed was whether fraud had been practised on the law of registration and the mortgage deed in suit was invalid. The view taken by the lower appellate court was that it could not be said that the parties did not intend to give the house property in security for the loan that was being advanced. It also noticed the subsequent event that the house property was actually sold by the mortgagor and the mortgagee by a sale deed dated 9th March 1934 to a third person, namely, Kamla Tewari for a sum of Rs. 200/-. The lower appellate court took the view that it was not show that the said property was non-existent or was fictitious. On such ground, the lower appellate court took the view that the defendant had failed to establish that the registration of the document at Gorakhpur was fraudulent. I am in complete agreement, with he view taken by the lower appellate. court on this question. 6. The second question answered by the lower appellate court was whether the plots in suit were sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor at the 'time of the mortgage. I am in complete agreement, with he view taken by the lower appellate. court on this question. 6. The second question answered by the lower appellate court was whether the plots in suit were sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor at the 'time of the mortgage. The lower appellate court confirmed the finding of the trial court that with the exception of the eight plots mentioned in the judgment, rest of the plots were sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgagee. Learned counsel for the appellant acceded that the finding relating to this question was a finding of fact and it could not be assailed in second appeal. 7. The third and the last question answered by the lower appellate court was whether the suit was cognizable by the civil court. On this part of the case, the view taken by the lower appellate court was that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit and that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred either by Sec. 330 or 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. So far as Sec. 330 of the aforesaid Act is concerned, the lower appellate court rightly took the view that the present suit which was a suit for possession against the person who had ceased to have right to remain in possession, and is not a suit to which that section could be made applicable. Sec. 330 reads thus: - "Save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, no suit or other proceeding shall lie in any civil court in respect of any entry in or omission from a Compensation Assessment Roll or in respect of any order passed under Part I of this Court." 8. A bare perusal of Sec. 330 makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been taken away in respect of such suits which are in respect of any order passed under Part I of this Act. No order under Part I of this Act has been passed in this case. This being so, this section is wholly inapplicable. 9. Attention of the lower appellate court was invited to the case of Bhikkhi Singh v. Lakhpat, 1958 ALJ 302. No order under Part I of this Act has been passed in this case. This being so, this section is wholly inapplicable. 9. Attention of the lower appellate court was invited to the case of Bhikkhi Singh v. Lakhpat, 1958 ALJ 302. It was contended before the lower appellate court that the observation in that case would go to indicate that a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by a mortgagor for recovery of possession against the mortgagee is also affected by the provisions of Sec. 330 of the Act. 10. The lower appellate court has very correctly drawn the distinctions between the facts of that case and the present case and has rightly come to the conclusion that the observation relied upon was only by way of obiter and was made in relation to the facts of the particular case, that was being decided by their Lordships. Even in that decision, it has been recognised that Sec. 330 affects a suit which is in respect of an order made under Part I of the aforesaid Act. In that case, the mortgagee had obtained an order in his favour under Sec. 14(2) (b) of the Act. The suit was actually based on a cause of action, which according to the plaintiff had arisen finally on account of the passing of the aforesaid order. That being so, undoubtedly that suit was in respect of an order passed under Sec. 14(2) (b), and consequently, effected by the provisions of Sec. 330. 11. In a later case Kodai v. Ajodhia Singh, 1960 ALJ 308 it has been pointed out that the aforesaid observation made in the earlier case was made by way of obiter and did not apply to a case where no order under Sec. 14(2) (b) of the Act had been made. 12. In Shrimati Prem Raji v. Jhungi Nath, 1964 ALJ 1109 it was said that the view taken in Kodai's case, 1960 ALJ 308 that the observation made in Bhikkhi, 1958 ALJ 302 case was only an obiter was perfectly a correct view. 13. I am, therefore, of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had not been taken away so far as this case is concerned by virtue of Sec. 330 of the Act. 14. 13. I am, therefore, of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had not been taken away so far as this case is concerned by virtue of Sec. 330 of the Act. 14. So far as Sec. 331 of the Act is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant again has agreed that that provision does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court so far as the present suit is concerned. In the absence of any entry in column No. 4 of Schedule II, it could not be said that the residuary jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of the present suit did not exist. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the lower appellate court on this point also. 15. No other question arises in this second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed but under the circumstances, I make no order as to costs.