Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been referred to a Bench for decision, as it raises a question of importance under S.78B of the Indian Rail ways Act, 1830. On the 15th March 1962, the respondent consigned goods for carriage by railway from Cannanore Railway Station for delivery to self at Bilimora Railway Station. They were not taken delivery of at the destination, and were, at the request of the respondent, rebooked at Bilimora on the 25th June 1962, for carriage by Railway and delivery at Cannanore. The consignment never reached Cannanore. The respondent preferred a claim under S.78B by forwarding it by registered post on the 26th December, 1962. The claim not being met, the respondent sued the revision petitioner, the Union of India, represented by the General Managers of the concerned railways, for compensation for non-delivery of goods. The petitioner contended, that no claim was preferred within the period prescribed by S.78B. The Munsiff overruled the contention and gave judgment to the respondent which is now sought to be revised. 2. The only question is whether the claim preferred was in compliance with S.78B. The relevant part of that section is as follows: "A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf (a) to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by railway, or (b) to the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred, within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway." According to the revision petitioner, the claim had not been preferred within six months from the 25th June 1962, the date on which the goods were delivered at Bilimora Railway Station for carriage by railway to Cannanore. Applying S.9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the period of "six months from the date of delivery" has to be reckoned, excluding the 25th June 1962; so excluding, the period of sin months expired on the 25th December 1962. Applying S.9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the period of "six months from the date of delivery" has to be reckoned, excluding the 25th June 1962; so excluding, the period of sin months expired on the 25th December 1962. It may be assumed, that the 25th December being Christmas day was a holiday for the post office and it may further be assumed without deciding, that by virtue of S.10 of the General Clauses Act, the claim may be made on the next day, the 26th. That was the date on which the claim was forwarded by registered post. It is not necessary to pronounce on these points, for even so, we are of the view that the respondent has to fail. 3. To appreciate the contention of the revision petitioners S.78B has to be read with S.140 and 142 of the Act. S.141, though not applicable, has a bearing on the discussion. S.140 provides for three modes of service of a notice or other document required to be served on a railway administration, S.141 provides for such service on any person by a railway administration and S.142 raises a presumption as to the point of time when such notice or document shall be deemed to have been served by post. These three sections may be quoted: S. 140. "Any notice or other document required or authorised by this Act to be served on a railway administration may be served, in the case of a railway administered by the Government on the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent, and in the case of a railway administered by a railway company, on the Agent in India of the railway company (a) by delivering the notice or other document to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent; or (b) by leaving it at his office; or (c) by forwarding it by post in a pre-paid letter addressed to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent at his office and registered under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898)." S. 141. "Any notice or other document required or authorised by this Act to be served on any person by a railway administration may be served (a) by delivering it to the person, or (b) by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode of the person; or (c) by forwarding it by post in a pre-paid letter addressed to the person at his usual or last known place of abode and registered under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898(6 of 1898)." S.142. "Where a notice or other document is served by post, it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, and in proving such service it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter containing the notice or other document was properly addressed and registered." According to learned counsel for the petitioner, a claim under S.78B when forwarded by post, has to be in accordance with clause (c) of S.140 and when so forwarded, the presumption under S.142 is attracted. Ostensibly, the claim was forwarded by post by the respondent in compliance with clause (c) of S.140. This is neither more nor less than service by post within the meaning of S.142. According to this section, when the claim is served by post, it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when it would be delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course of post. In the case of service by post under clause (c) of S.140, three dates may be considered, (1) the date of posting of the notice or other document, (2) the date of actual delivery of it to the addressee and (3) the date when it would be delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course of post, whether it was actually delivered or not, or if delivered whatever be the date of delivery, the loss of such letter or other document, or incidental delay in the transmission thereof to the addressee, being of no consequence. S.142 ordains, that the last of such dates shall be taken as the date of service, provided however that the letter containing the notice or document was properly addressed or registered. There is no dispute here that the letter containing the claim was properly addressed and registered. S.142 ordains, that the last of such dates shall be taken as the date of service, provided however that the letter containing the notice or document was properly addressed or registered. There is no dispute here that the letter containing the claim was properly addressed and registered. The claim having been posted on the last day of the period of six months, could not have reached the addressee in the ordinary course of post on the same day. According to S.142, it could be deemed to have been served only after an interval. This is sufficient for holding that the claim was not preferred or served within the prescribed period. The argument that the above construction would virtually reduce the period of six months prescribed by the section, or would destroy the definiteness of the period by making it dependent upon the ordinary course of post which may vary between different places, cannot prevail over the express provision in S.142. Even the rule of liberal construction of S.78B would not permit of S.142 being overlooked or bypassed. 4. In Secretary of State v. Firm Imperial Metal Works AIR. 1926 Allahabad 214 a similar view was taken of S.77 of the Indian Railways Act before amendment which corresponded to S.78B, read with S.142. It was observed: "The law requires that the notice should not merely be preferred, but preferred to the railway administration, within six months. What this means in the case of a notice sent by post is made clear by S.141 and 142 of the Indian Railways Act. If the notice was so posted that in the ordinary course of post it should have been delivered to the Railway Company within six months, this would have been a sufficient compliance with the law." This decision was not followed in two cases, Ram Gopal Marwari v. Bengal and North-Western Railway Co., AIR. 1927 Patna 241 and Union of India v. Asharfi Devi AIR. 1957 Madhya Pradesh 114. In the former it was held to be sufficient, if the claim was preferred in accordance with S.140 clause (c) by posting it within the prescribed period. This decision was followed in the latter. Though in both of them it was noted, that the claim was preferred according to S.140 (e), the effect of S.142 was not considered. In the former it was held to be sufficient, if the claim was preferred in accordance with S.140 clause (c) by posting it within the prescribed period. This decision was followed in the latter. Though in both of them it was noted, that the claim was preferred according to S.140 (e), the effect of S.142 was not considered. In the former that section was not adverted to, and in the latter it was not applied. 5. But learned counsel for the respondent argued, that whereas S.78B uses the term "preferred", S.140 to 142 use the term "served". Such a distinction was not maintained in any of the cases relied on by him, not even in the two cases just cited. Even the term "served" according to clause (c) of S.140 and 141, contemplates no more than forwarding by post and not actual or constructive delivery by post. According to the dictionary too, the distinction does not seem tenable. It is useful to note, that there is no provision in the Act, which expressly and in terms uses the term "serve" or "service by post" on or by the railway administration except S.140 to 142. S.59(2) speaks of "giving" notice to a railway servant, and S.78B appears to be the only provision in the Act for a notice of claim being given to the railway administration. Similarly S.56(1) appears to be the only provision in the Act for a notice being served by the railway administration upon any person. It seems to follow, that S.140 and 141 were intended to govern the manner of service of claims or notices under S.78B and S.56 (1) respectively; to hold otherwise would be to render both S.140 and 141, otiose. According to S.27 of the General Clauses Act, the term "serve" has the same meaning as the terms "give", "send" etc., if so, the term "prefer" cannot mean anything different. Apparently, the respondent himself adopted the mode prescribed by S.140 (c) for preferring the claim under S.78B. On these considerations, it is not possible to hold that S.142 has no application to a claim under S.78B. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent advanced a third argument, based on the interpretation of the word "the date of the delivery", occurring in the clause "within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway" in S.78B. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent advanced a third argument, based on the interpretation of the word "the date of the delivery", occurring in the clause "within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway" in S.78B. According to him, the words "for carriage by railway" qualify the word "goods" and not the date of delivery of the goods, and therefore the period of six months should be counted from the date the goods were to be delivered at Cannanore and not from the date on which the goods were consigned at Bilimora. The interpretation is opposed to the plain grammatical meaning of the clause. S.78 B uses the words "delivery for carriage" in more than one place and have to be read and understood consistently and not differently; if so, the interpretation of the clause suggested is impossible or far-fetched. The decision of the Assam High Court in Amarchand Pannalal v. Union of India AIR. 1955 Assam, 221 does support the respondent. It was dissented from in Union of India v. Asharfi Devi AIR. 1957 Madhya Pradesh 114 by a division bench and later in Union of India, New Delhi v. Haji Jiwakhan AIR. 1962 Madhya Pradesh 374 by a single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. There are decided cases of other High Courts also, taking a similar view as the Madhya Pradesh High Court. We are accordingly of the opinion, that the period of six months under S.78B has to be computed in the present case from the date of delivery of the goods at Bilimora for carriage to Cannanore, that is, from the 25th June, 1962. 7. It follows, that the claim preferred was out of time and was not valid. The revision petition has to be allowed and the suit has to be dismissed; we do so, but as the revision petitioner succeeds on a technical point, we direct the parties to bear their costs throughout. Allowed.