Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1966 DIGILAW 24 (ALL)

Bimla Nand Bhattacharya v. Dakshina Pado Banerji

1966-01-17

S.S.DHAVAN

body1966
JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is an application under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure directed against an order of the Munsif, Mirzapur rejecting the applicants objection against the landlord's application under Sec. 7-B (1) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The applicant Dakshina Pado Banerji is the tenant of a room of which the respondent Bimla Nand Bhattacharya is the owner and landlord. The respondent filed an application under Sec. 7-B (1) of the aforesaid Act praying for the ejectment of the applicant on the ground that he did not pay the rent for more than three months. After service of notice the applicant filed his objection on 14-5-1965, and on the next day (15.5. 1965) he deposited in Court the entire amount of rent claimed by the landlord. It is common ground that both the objection and the deposit were made within 15 days of the service of notice. The respondent took a preliminary objection that the applicants objection was incompetent as it had been filed before he had deposited in Court the amount of rent mentioned in the notice issued by the Court. This objection was upheld by the learned Munsif who refused to entertain the applicants objection and ordered his ejectment from the accommodation. He has come to this Court in revision. 2. Mr. S.N. Singh for the applicant contended that the learned Munsif could not have rejected the applicants objection merely because it was filed before making the deposit as required by sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 7-B. He contended that the Munsif had misinterpreted the legal effect of the Proviso to sub-Sec. (7) of Sec. 7-B. 3. On behalf of the respondent it was argued by Mr. Amitav Banerji that the aforesaid proviso is mandatory and its language perfectly clear; it enjoins that the tenant shall not be permitted to file an objection unless he has deposited in Court the amount mentioned in the notice or furnished security to the satisfaction of the Court. Counsel contended that the Court is bound to reject an objection unless the tenant has already deposited the rent of furnished security. 4. After hearing learned counsel on both sides I am of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Munsif is erroneous. Counsel contended that the Court is bound to reject an objection unless the tenant has already deposited the rent of furnished security. 4. After hearing learned counsel on both sides I am of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Munsif is erroneous. The filing of an objection by the tenant against the landlords application for ejectment under Sec. 7-B(l) is governed by sub-Secs. (3) and (7). They run as follows : "(3) - On the making of the application under sub-Sec. (1) the Munsif shall, without unnecessary delay, serve by registered post or otherwise a notice on the tenant asking him to pay the amount of arrears within 15 days of the service thereof, or to show cause within the said period why an order directing him to be evicted from the accommodation be not passed against him". "(7) - If the tenant appears in reply to the notice under sub-Sec. (3) and files an objection other than an objection as to costs of these proceedings, the Munsif informs the applicant that he may, subject to the payment of court fee within such time, as may be specified, have the application treated as a plaint in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent above;- Provided that the tenant shall not be permitted to file any objection, unless he had deposited in Court the amount mentioned in the notice, or furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Court." 5. The combined effect of these two sub-sections is that an objection by the tenant must be filed within 15 days of the service of the notice of the application for ejectment, and the tenant must deposit in Court the amount mentioned in the notice or furnish security before he can be permitted to file any objection. Both the provisions are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction either to extend the period for filing the objection or entertain it unless and until the tenant has made the deposit or furnished security. 6. But what is the position if the tenant files an objection within the prescribed period of 15 days and subsequently makes the deposit, also within that period. Mr. Banerji contended that the proviso to sub-Sec. (7) must be interpreted literally, which means that an objection must be rejected outright if the tenant has not already deposited the rent or furnished security. Mr. Banerji contended that the proviso to sub-Sec. (7) must be interpreted literally, which means that an objection must be rejected outright if the tenant has not already deposited the rent or furnished security. Counsel argued that the making of the deposit or furnishing of security is a condition precedent which must be fulfilled before the tenant can be permitted to file his objection and if it is not so fulfilled the Court is bound to reject the objection as incompetent. 7. I cannot agree. The words "the tenant shall not be permitted to file any objection unless he has deposited in Court the amount mentioned in the notice or furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Court" really mean that the tenants objection shall not be treated by the Court as filed unless and until he has deposited the amount of rent or furnished security. But they do not prevent the Court from performing the physical act of accepting the application and keeping it in its custody. If the tenant subsequently deposits the amount or furnishes security within the prescribed period of 15 days the Court shall entertain the application and treat it as having been filed on the date when the deposit was made or the security furnished. On the other hand, if the tenant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security within this period the application will be treated as incompetent and rejected. 8. In my view, the Court by its physical act of accepting the application does not permit the tenant to file it but waits till the rent is deposited or security furnished. The alternative interpretation suggested by Mr. Banerji is against the spirit of the Proviso and is likely to cause inconvenience all round. Learned counsel conceded that if the Court on the subsequent date when the tenant makes the deposit or furnishes security returns the objection to the tenant and he formally gives it back to the Court, the condition will be fulfilled. But I do not see what useful purpose is served if the Court in stead of treating the application lying with it as having been filed returns it jo the tenant for the purpose of giving it back. This formality will be a farce. But I do not see what useful purpose is served if the Court in stead of treating the application lying with it as having been filed returns it jo the tenant for the purpose of giving it back. This formality will be a farce. In my view, the Proviso to sub-Sec. (7) means that the objection by the tenant shall not be deemed to have been filed unless and until he has deposited the rent or furnished security, and if he does file it without complying with this condition the Court may keep it but shall not entertain or consider it till the condition is fulfilled. 9. The analogy of Sec. 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is a useful guide. The sub-section confers on a judgment-debtor the right to apply for setting aside an ex parte decree or for a review of the judgment made against him. But there is a proviso which requires that he must, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in Court the amount due from him or give security. It runs as follows :- "17(1). The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of suit/suits : Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application, made by him in this behalf, have directed." 10. Thus the Proviso lays down a condition precedent which must be fulfilled by the judgment-debtor at the time of filing his application to set aside the ex parte decree or for review of the judgment against him. The limitation for such an application is 30 days under Article 164 of the Limitation Act. Thus the Proviso lays down a condition precedent which must be fulfilled by the judgment-debtor at the time of filing his application to set aside the ex parte decree or for review of the judgment against him. The limitation for such an application is 30 days under Article 164 of the Limitation Act. But what is the legal position if the judgment-debtor files his application within time but without making the deposit or furnishing the security, and subsequently fulfils the condition within the prescribed period of 30 days. All the High Courts in India have held that such an application will be competent. Bhola v. Mst. Ram Rati, A.I.R. 1946 Alld. 425 (D.B.) ; Kapur Singh v. Jai Prakash, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 503 : 1939 A. L. J. 293 ; Motilal Ramchander v. Durga Pd., A.I.R. 1930 Alld. 830 ; Tara Chand Hira Chand Porwal v. Dorappa Tawanappa Patravali, A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 237 ; Mrityunjoy Ganguly v. Bholanath Ganguly AIR 1951 Calcutta 455 and Mantilla Varma v. Khushlal Mali, A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 102. It may be noted that in the Bombay and Nagpur case the judgment-debtor made a deposit after making the application under Sec. 17(1). In the Bombay case, Be amount, C.J. held that it is not essential that the deposit should be made at the time of making the application to set aside the decree, and it is sufficient if the deposit is made within the time allowed for setting aside the decree. In the Nagpur case it was held that the Proviso to Sec. 17(1) should be interpreted to mean that the application should be deemed to have been presented on the date when the deposit is made or the security is furnished. 11. Mr. Banerji relied on two decisions of this Court - (1) Jagannath Prasad v. Fatehuddin, 1965 ALJ 283 and Ram Lal v. Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 498 (L.B.). But in the first case the application as well as the deposit were made beyond the prescribed period of 15 days and the Court held that the Munsif has no jurisdiction to extend the limitation. In the present case the application as well as the deposit were made well within the prescribed period. This decision has no application. In the second case the tenant made no deposit at all nor did he furnish any security. This case too has no application. In the present case the application as well as the deposit were made well within the prescribed period. This decision has no application. In the second case the tenant made no deposit at all nor did he furnish any security. This case too has no application. But the following observation of the Division Bench is noteworthy : ". . . .The payment of the said amount in Court is a condition precedent to the determination of any objection by the tenant. . ." 12. According to this observation, the Munsif cannot determine the objection by the tenant if he has not made the deposit or furnished security, but he is not presented from physically accepting an application made within time and afterwards treating as having been filed when the tenant fulfils the condition, also within time. 13. I allow this application with costs throughout and set aside the order of the learned Munsif rejecting the applicant's objection. The case shall be sent back to the lower court with a direction that the applicant's objection should be heard and disposed of according to law. Application allowed.