JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - These two appeals involve common questions of law and, barring a few unimportant details, almost the same set of facts. Parties also, at least now after the death of the original Plaintiff in S.A. 437 of 1963 are the same. Therefore they have been heard together and are disposed of in this common judgment. 2. The land in dispute in S.A. 437 of 1963 is 3 decimals in area appertaining to Khata. No. 292 bearing Jemabandhi No. 2, plot No. 853/1 of Mouza Chouliaganj with pucca structures standing thereon, as described in Schedule B of its plaint which forms part of the schedule. In S.A. 438 of 1963 the subject matter of the dispute is 9.006 acre and 1 kadi of land appertaining to Jemabandhi No. 5 Khata No. 292, bearing plots Nos. 901 and 903 with pucca structures thereon as described in schedule B of its plaint which forms part of Schedule A thereof. In the order of rights of the Current Settlement which were published on 17-2-193l schedule A lands of the plaint in the former appeal are recorded as: Khata No. 1, Bharat Samrat, Khata No. 292, Tenant's name-Roads and Buildings Department, Plot No. 863, Gharbari, area 0.09 with an entry in the Remarks column which reads 'Jagannath Road Fund, Pakle Jabar Dakhal Banchanidhi Sahu"; while schedule A lands of the plaint in the latter appeal are recorded as: "Khewat-Bharat Samrat, Tenant-Roads and Buildings Department-Khata No. 292, Plot No. 901 Gharbari, area 0.008 with an entry in the Remarks Column which reads: Jagannath Road Fund, Pakhe Jabar Dakhal, Giridhari Sahu, plot No. 903 (Sarak area 0.017) plot No. 906.8 dec. Jagannath Road Fund, Pakhe Jabar Dekhal Chintamoni Sahu, plot No. 907.3 decimals, Jagannath Road Fund, Pakhe Jabal' Dakhal Sanei Saku 3. The suits giving rise to these appeals are directed against the validity of the orders passed against the Plaintiffs under Sections 7 and 6 of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1953 (Orissa Act 15 of 1954) hereafter called the Land Encroachments Act of 1953 in Encroachment case No 40/54.55 and Encroachment Case No. 12/54-55 respectively. In both the cases the orders u/s are said to have been passed on the same date, viz 2-7-1955, while those u/s 7 appear to have been made on two different dates, namely,-8-12-1 1954 and 2-2-1951 respectively. In both the cases the orders u/s are said to have been passed on the same date, viz 2-7-1955, while those u/s 7 appear to have been made on two different dates, namely,-8-12-1 1954 and 2-2-1951 respectively. Thereby the Plaintiffs in both the cases have been evicted from the suit lands and the buildings and other constructions standing thereon have been forfeited, on the ground that they are in unauthorised occupation of these lands. 4. Therefore they have brought the present suits for the common relief amongst others that the aforesaid orders and all other orders passed by the Collector of Cuttack in the aforesaid encroachment cases be declared illegal and void and inoperative and not binding on the Plaintiffs. Their claim is that in respect of these lands they are the successors in-interest of the persons in possession, as recorded in the aforesaid record of rights and as such have been in possession thereof since a long time. 5. At the trial, therefore, one of the common issues raised was: Are the orders passed by the Collector under the, Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act illegal and ultra vires and liable to be set aside?. And the discussion in this Court in support of these appeals has mainly centred round this issue alone. Therefore, the other facts raised in the plaint, which have no bearing on this issue, need, not be stated here. 6. In answering this issue, the trial Court on bearing the parties held that the suit lands constitute a house site have a pucca building and a shop, being recorded as Gharbari in the' Survey of Record of Rights and therefore they do not come within the provisions of the land Encroachment Act, 1953 and as such the orders passed by the Collector on 8-12-1951 are not valid. Accordingly, both the suits at the trial were decreed. On appeal, the Judgments have been reversed and the lower appellate Court has held that: As the proceedings commenced under the old Net and legally continued by virtue of Section 17(2) of 'Act 17 of 1954' I would differ from the learned Munsif and hold that the suit lands' 'come within the chief of Section 2 of Act 33 of 1947 Accordingly the appeals were allowed and the suit dismissed. The Plaintiffs therefore have now come in second appeal t this Court. 7. The Plaintiffs therefore have now come in second appeal t this Court. 7. Before I go into the controversy as raised here, it is I think necessary to state first as to how the relevant legislation on the subject of land encroachment has undergone change from time to time. Originally this field was occupied and governed by the Orissa Land Encroachment Act 1947 (Orissa Act. 33, of 1947). This Act was repealed by the aforesaid Land Encroachment Act, 1953 which came into force on 29-10-1954. Thereafter, the Land Encroachment Act 1953 was amended by the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Amendment Act, 1962 (hereinafter called the Land Encroachment Amendment Act or 1962). Both under the Land Encroachment Act of 1947 and the Land Encroachment At, of 1953, it is obligatory u/s 7 that before any proceedings are taken under either of them a notice to persons in unauthorised occupation should, be given, as contemplated thereunder. It is the common case of the parties, that though notices u/s 7 to the Plaintiffs in both cases were given on 5-6-1954, i. e., at a time when the Land Encroachment Act was still in the field and the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 was not yet in force, the proceedings themselves for eviction from and forfeiture of the structures standing on the lands in dispute were initiated and disposed of much thereafter and admittedly at a time when the Land Encroachment Act, 1917 was already repealed and the Land Encroachment Act of 1953 had taken its place. 8. On these admitted facts the submission made on, behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants is that in such a case the validity of the proceedings has to be weighed and assessed in the light of the law as it stands in the Land Encroachment Act of 1953 and not as it was provided in the Land Encroachment Act of 1947. So far as the Land Encroachment Amendment Act, 1962 is concerned that is admittedly not retrospective. Therefore, it has a bearing on the facts of the present case, the proceedings for eviction and forfeiture having already been completed and disposed of much before this Act came into force as is evident from the very fact that the suits giving rise to these appeals were filed on 25-7-1958. Therefore, it has a bearing on the facts of the present case, the proceedings for eviction and forfeiture having already been completed and disposed of much before this Act came into force as is evident from the very fact that the suits giving rise to these appeals were filed on 25-7-1958. Therefore, the main question that arises for consideration in, these appeals is whether the view taken by the lower appellate Court is correct, namely that these proceeding though initiated and disposed of at a time when the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 was in force are, under the terms of its Section 17(2) to be deemed to have been disposed of under the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 though it was, by then already repealed. In my opinion both on principle and on the terms of the law as laid down in Section 17(2) of the Land Encroachment Act, 153, the answer to this question has to be given in the negative and the validity of these proceedings has to be judged in the light of the law as laid down in the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 and not in the Land Encroachment Act, 1947. It is true that despite the repeal of the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 by Section 17(1) of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 there is a saving clause provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 17 which says: All things done, liabilities incurred, amounts assessed, or penalty or fine imposed, enquiries held, notices served, warrants issued, eviction ordered, forfeiture adjudged and rules made under any of the enactments hereby repealed shall, so far as may be, deemed to have been retrospectively done, incurred, assessed, imposed, held, served, issued, ordered, adjudged and made under this Act. But the eviction and forfeiture that are saved and protected hereunder are only those evictions and forfeitures which were already ordered and adjudged under the Land Encroachment Act, 1947. That being so, the eviction that were ordered and forfeitures that were adjudged subsequent to the repeal of the Lad Encroachment Act, 147, namely, at a time when the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 had already come into force are not protected and saved by the terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953, as erroneously held by the lower appellate Court. No doubt the notices u/s 7 which laid the foundation for those proceedings were themselves issued and served at a time when the field was Still occupied by the Land Encroachment-Act., 1947 and its place had not yet been taken by the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 and as Such they may be deemed, as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 17, to have been served u/s 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. But for that reason it cannot follow that the proceedings which followed thereafter on the basis of those notices should also necessarily be deemed to have been taken and disposed of under the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 though they were actually taken and disposed much thereafter, at a time when the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 was already repealed and its place taken by the Land Encroachment Act 1953. There is no provision made in Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 in support of such a view. On the contrary it is well established in law that once an enactment is repealed all rights and obligations arising therefrom also lose their validity unless they are expressly, or by necessary implication, saved and protected by any subsequent enactment or by the provisions made in the General Clauses Act. In the present case, admittedly the evictions were ordered and the forfeitures adjudged at a time when the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 was already repealed. Therefore there can be no question of these orders for eviction and forfeiture being saved or protected by the terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Land Encroachment Act of 1953. In other words, their validity has to be judged on the terms of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 and not on the terms of the Land Encroachment Act, 1947, as wrongly held by the lower appellate Court. 9. Now in judging the validity of these orders in the light of the law as laid down in the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 it has to be noted that though under both these Acts their operation is confined to the unauthorised occupation of the lands which are, as defined in both of them, "property of Government" the definitions given of "property of Government" in the, two Acts are not exactly the same, but are different in many respects. In the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 the definition of this expression "property of Government is given in Section 2. That section has got a number of clauses. But before us in support of these appeals reliance has been placed by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Respondents, only on the terms of the main body of Sub-sections (a) and (b). They read as follows: 2. Subject to the provision of any law for the time being in force, the flowing classes of lands are hereby declared to be the property of Government for the purposes of this Act, namely: (a) all public roads, streets, lanes, and paths, bridges, dutiful, dikes and fences Or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creek below high water mark, and of rivers streams, nalas, lakes and tanks, and all canals and watercourses and all standing and flowing water and all lands other than temple sites, houses sites or backyards wherever situated save in so far as the same are the property. (i) ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... (iv) ... ... ... (v) ... ... ... (vi) ... ... ... (b) Land belonging to or vesting in any local authority which is used or intended to be used for any public purposes such as a road, canal, embankment, tank or ghat or for the repair of maintenance of such road, canal, embankment, tank or ghat. The submission made by learned Standing Counsel is that the lands in dispute in the present appeals are the lands as defined in the aforesaid Sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 2. In my opinion there is no substance in this contention. No doubt Sub-section (a) includes all lands wherever situated; but in that case there is an exception land therein in respect of temple sites, house sites and backyard. It is not controverted that the lands in dispute in both these appeals are house sites. As far back as on 17-3-1931 when the records of right in respect of these lands were prepared and published in the course of the Current Settlement proceedings they were both described therein as "Gharbari lands", that is to say house sites of homesteads. It is not controverted that the lands in dispute in both these appeals are house sites. As far back as on 17-3-1931 when the records of right in respect of these lands were prepared and published in the course of the Current Settlement proceedings they were both described therein as "Gharbari lands", that is to say house sites of homesteads. Further it is also not disputed that since then all these lands have been continuously in possession of the present Plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest, and that there have always been standing thereon pucca structures and other structures wherein the Plaintiffs or their predecessors - in-interest have been living. This is so is also apparent from the description given in the sale deed (Ext. 1) dated 4-10-1929 and the lease documents (Exts. A and B) both dated 7-2-1953 which were executed on one side by the Plaintiffs or their predecessors-in interest and on the other by the officer-in-charge of the Jagannath Road Fund. In all these documents it is specifically stated that at the time of the transactions embodied therein there had been standing on them pucca structures. In fact this part of the claim made by the Plaintiff" is not, as already stated, denied on behalf of the Respondents. Therefore, there can be no doubt, as found by the trial Court, and not held otherwise by the lower appellate Court, that the lands in dispute are house sites and as such they are not attracted by the definition of the phrase "property of Government" as given in Section 2(a) of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953.. 10. The same again is the position when judged in the light of the definition as provided in Section (b) of that Act. Therein, any land, in order to be the "property of Government" has to belong to or vest in the local authority. In the present case the lands in dispute neither belong to nor vest in any local authority. The expression 'local authority' is not defined in the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. But in Section 2(23) of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 197, it is provided that local authority shall mean a Municipal Committee, District Hoard, or any other authority, entrusted by any Government with, or legally entitled to, the control and management of the Municipal or local fund. The expression 'local authority' is not defined in the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. But in Section 2(23) of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 197, it is provided that local authority shall mean a Municipal Committee, District Hoard, or any other authority, entrusted by any Government with, or legally entitled to, the control and management of the Municipal or local fund. This definition cannot obviously attract the Roads and Buildings Department of the Government of Orissa who are recorded as tenants of the holdings in dispute in the survey of record of rights. But the learned Standings Counsel has contended that Jagannath Road Fund is a local fund and the lands In dispute having been purchased out of that fund and their control and management having been entrusted by the Roads and Building Department of the Government with the Collector, it should be held that the lands in dispute are attracted by the definition of the "property of Government" as given in Section 2(b) of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on paragraph 73 of the Final report on the Revision Settlement of Orissa (122-1932) prepared W.W. Dalziel, I.C.S. Settlement Officer, Orissa, at page 25. There, under the heading "Jagannath Roadside Lands" it is, inter alia stated "The Orissa Trunk Road" commonly known as Jagannath Road is in the charge of the Public Works Department. But some of the roadside lands are administered by the Collectors on behalf of the Jagannath Road Fund, the profits of which ale utilized for the benefits of the pilgrims. These lands have been recorded in the Khatians of the Public Works Department along with other lands of the road, but an entry of 'Jagannath Road Fund' has been made against every plot that is under the fund and the names of the occupants are also noted". These facts by themselves do not lend support to the view that the Jagannath Road Fund is a local fund or that the Collector is entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control and management of the Jagannath Road Fund. It is true that local fund is not defined under the General Clauses Act, but in its common sense it must mean any fund under the control and management of any local authority. It is true that local fund is not defined under the General Clauses Act, but in its common sense it must mean any fund under the control and management of any local authority. Therefore even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the Collector is a local authority as contemplated by the aforesaid definition given in the General Clauses Act, there is no evidence on the record to prove that he has been entrusted by Government not only with the management of these lands but also with the management of the entire Jagannath road Fund. Therefore, though it may be as claimed on behalf of the Defendants -Respondents that these lands are intended to be used for a public purpose such as road expansion, that by itself cannot bring the lands in dispute within the terms of Section 2(b) of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. In that view of the matter the trial Court, in my opinion, rightly held that the lands in dispute being homestead lauds are not attracted by the chief of the provisions made in the Land Encroachment Act, 1933 and as such the aforesaid orders passed by the Collector in regard to the eviction of the Plaintiffs and the forfeiture of the structures standing thereon are not valid. This therefore disposes of the main submissions made in these appeals on behalf of the parties. 11. But it appears that the Court below in reversing the judgment of the trial Court has also been influenced by the findings given by it that the suits, as constituted, are barred by time and are not maintainable. The decision on the question of limitation given by the Court below is based on the provision of law as laid down in Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 or in the alternative in Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act 1953. In my opinion neither Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 nor Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 is attracted to the facts of the present case The limitation, as provided in Section 14 of both these Acts applies only to those proceedings which are validly taken under those Acts. In my opinion neither Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 nor Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 is attracted to the facts of the present case The limitation, as provided in Section 14 of both these Acts applies only to those proceedings which are validly taken under those Acts. Here, as already held, the proceedings for eviction and forfeiture which are the subject matter of dispute in the present appeals were not at all taken under the Land Encroachment Act, 1947 much less validly. And so far as the Land Encroachment Act, 1953 is concerned that is, as already stated, not attracted to these proceedings. In other words, the aforesaid proceedings, even if supposed to have been taken under the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act, 1953, are void and without jurisdiction, and as such the orders of eviction and forfeiture and other orders passed there under are nullity and not binding on the Plaintiff. As such in the field of limitation what will apply to the facts of the present cases is the general law of limitation and not the special law of limitation as provided either in the Land Encroachment Act, 147 or in the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. It is not denied that the Plaintiffs are still in possession of the property. Therefore, the suits filed by them for the declaration that the aforesaid orders of eviction and forfeiture are void and illegal are within time. 12. As to the maintainability the view taken by the lower appellate Court is that the Plaintiff has neither any title to the property, nor any right to occupy the same much less any subsisting title or interest excepting that she is continuing as an unauthorised occupant. She therefore cannot maintain this action for an injunction without any legal right for possession in her or any title vested in her". This observation is based on an assumption that the Plaintiffs-Appellants have been in possession of the lands in dispute and unauthorised occupants as contemplated by the Land Encroachment Act, 1953. But their view as already discussed above, is not correct. Therefore, this part of the finding also as given by the Court below has to be set aside. 13. In the result therefore, the appeals are allowed, the judgments and decree of the lower appellate Court are, set aside, and those of the trial Court are restored. But their view as already discussed above, is not correct. Therefore, this part of the finding also as given by the Court below has to be set aside. 13. In the result therefore, the appeals are allowed, the judgments and decree of the lower appellate Court are, set aside, and those of the trial Court are restored. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. Misra, J. - I agree. Final Result : Allowed