Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has been charged "under S.24 (3) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, r/w R.3 and 12 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order, 1961" and convicted by the District Magistrate "of the offence of contravention of R.9 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order, 1961"; and that has been affirmed by the Sessions Judge in appeal. Counsel for petitioner contends that the offences under R.3 and 12 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order hereafter 'the Order' for short are absolutely independent of an offence under R.9 of the same Order and as there was no charge under R.9 the. conviction is bad in law. 2. That the offences under R.3 and 12 of the Order are distinct from an offence under R.9 of the Order cannot be disputed. R.2 (vii) of the Order defined 'stockist' as a person who deals in cement involving the purchase, sale and storage for the sale of cement. The finding is that "he had been in possession of 59 bags of cement for his personal use", and that clearly takes him out of the definition of a stockist. R.3 of the Order, which prohibits carrying on business as a stockist except under a proper licence, could not be attracted to the petitioner. R.12 read: "No stockist shall sell or offer for sale and no person shall buy cement at a price higher than that fixed under any order made under S.18G of the Industries (Development Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951)." There is no case that the accused sold or attempted to sell or purchased cement at a price above that fixed by authority. R.9 of the Order read: "No person requiring cement for his personal use shall acquire cement except under and in accordance with a permit in Form E issued by the State Cement Controller or such other officer as the State Government may authorise in this behalf". Obviously this relates to a different kind of transaction than those covered by R.3 and 12 of the Order. The complaint against the accused is under "Sec. 24 (iii) of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act 1951 r/w R.3 and 12of Kerala Cement Control 0.1961." Evidently he is charged as a trader in cement, i. e., as a stockist only. Obviously this relates to a different kind of transaction than those covered by R.3 and 12 of the Order. The complaint against the accused is under "Sec. 24 (iii) of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act 1951 r/w R.3 and 12of Kerala Cement Control 0.1961." Evidently he is charged as a trader in cement, i. e., as a stockist only. The averments in the complaint and the provisions of law cited therein put the matter beyond any doubt in my view. 3. In Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1955 S. C. 274) S. R. Das, Bhagwati and Imam JJ., have held unanimously that a charge for a substantive offence under S.302 IPC. is for a distinct and separate offence from that under under S.302 read with S.149 and that a person charged with an offence read with S.149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge therefor and further that a conviction for a charge not framed is an illegality and not an irregularity curable by the provisions of S.535 and 537, Crl. P. C. -vide head note (h) of AIR. report. Their Lordships observed: "By framing a charge under S.302, read with S.149, I. P. C. against the appellant, the court indicated that it was not charging the appellant with the offence of murder and to convict him for murder and sentence him under S.302,1. P. C. was to convict him of an offence with which he had not been charged. In defending himself the appellant was not called upon to meet such a charge and in his defence he may well have considered it unnecessary to concentrate on that part of the prosecution case". In Suraj Pal v. State of U. P. (AIR. 1955 S. C. 419) another Bench of the Supreme Court constituted by Bose, Jagannadhadas and sinha JJ. unanimously reiterated the above-said proposition (vide head note (a) of the AIR. report) observing: "It appears to us quite clear that a charge against a person as a member of an unlawful assembly in respect of an offence committed by one or other of the members of that assembly in prosecution of its common object is a substantially different one from a charge against any individual for an offence directly committed by him while being a member of such assembly. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the direct individual liability of a person can only be fixed upon him with reference to a specific charge in respect of the particular offence. Such a case is not covered by S.236 and 237, Crl. P. C. The framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability constituting an offence, is the foundation for a conviction and sentence therefor." The above principles laid in respect of a charge in a warrant case must, in my opinion, apply to the contents of a complaint in a summons case too, as they form the essential pre-requisities of a judicial act that is likely to affect the personal liberty of a citizen in this democrats republic. As there is no charge here under R.9, nor a trial for contravention of R.9 of the Order, the conviction as now entered is unsustainable in law. 4. As the Kerala State Cement Control Order, which was only a temporary statutory measure, has been repealed, no useful purpose would be served if the matter is remitted now for framing a proper complaint under R.9 and trial thereon. The Criminal Revision Petition is therefore allowed and the conviction set aside. The fine, if paid, must he refunded. Allowed.