Judgment :- 1. On March 12,1966, the Sub Inspector of Police at Chengannur found the petitioner in Crl. R. P. No. 211 of 1966 travelling in a taxi with Rs. 25,000 odd in currency notes and certain documents of strange contents. As he could not account for his possessions, the Sub Inspector suspected some sharp practice and therefore seized the documents the term documents in this judgment includes currency notes and arrested the accused. On information obtained from him, the Circle Inspector, Chengannur, went to the house of the petitioner in Crl. R. P. 236 of 1966 and recovered another sum of Rs. 11, 000 in currency cotes the same day. All the documents thus seized were sent to the Court of the Sub Magistrate, Chengannur. After investigation, the Police reported to the Magistrate that no crime cognizable by them could be detected and that they suspected the accused to be a member of an international gang engaged in violations of the Foreign Exchange laws. The petitioners herein moved for return of the documents seized from them respectively. On information passed by the Police, the Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Cochin, intervened in the proceedings before the Sub Magistrate, Chengannur, and moved for delivery to him of some of the documents (inclusive of all the currency notes) kept in the custody of the Court; and the Sub Magistrate has allowed the same, repelling the counter motions by the petitioners. The petitioners challenge those orders in these petitions for revision thereof. 2. In his application, the Enforcement Officer made clear that the documents sought were "to facilitate investigation under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947." Along with the application he produced in Court a letter dated April 7,1966, of the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Government of India, Madras, which reads thus: "The Central Government hereby authorise Sri. M. P. Gopinathan, Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and Insurance, Government of India, Cochin, to make a representation to the Sub Magistrate, Chengannur, and to receive certain documents relevant to the enquiry in respect of Crime No. 46 of 1966 of Chengannur Police Station for further investigation under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (VII of 1947)". 3. 3. S.19D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947-1964 hereinafter 'the Act', for short reads: "If an officer of Enforcement, not below the rank of Assistant Director of Enforcement has reason to believe that any documents which in his opinion will be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under this Act, are secreted in any place, he may authorise any officer of Enforcement to search for and seize .... such documents." Sub-section (7) of S.19A of the Act defines that "in S.19C to 19G, the expression 'document' includes Indian currency, foreign exchange and books of account". 4. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the Enforcement Officer, submitted that the above said letter of the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, is an authority issued to the Enforcement Officer, Cochin, to search for and seize the documents in question under S.19D of the Act. That the Deputy Director is above the rank of an Assistant Director of Enforcement mentioned in S.19D is conceded on all hands. Contention of counsel for petitioners is that the said letter is invalid in law because it is not in conformity with S.19D of the Act. What is contemplated by S.19D is an empowerment by the Officer himself; but the letter in question purports to be an authorisation by the Central Government, acting through the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Madras. I am afraid that this formal defect would not invalidate, much less nullify, the authority conferred by the letter. In Hukum Chd Malhotra v. Union of India AIR. 1959 S. C. 536 it has been observed: "Mr. Chatterjee referred to certain mistakes of reference in the order of the President dated October 1. 1954. Instead of referring to R.15 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, R.13 was referred to. There was also a reference to para 5 of a particular Government order which prohibited Government servants from taking up commercial employment within two years of retirement. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that this particular order did not apply to Government servants in Class II. We do not think that the inaccurate references were of any vital importance. In effect and substance the order of removal dated October 1, 1954, was based on the ground that the appellant violated R.15 of the Government Servants' conduct Rules and R.11 of the Fundamental Rules; he accepted private employment without sanction of the Government while he was still in Government service. In effect and substance the order of removal dated October 1, 1954, was based on the ground that the appellant violated R.15 of the Government Servants' conduct Rules and R.11 of the Fundamental Rules; he accepted private employment without sanction of the Government while he was still in Government service. That was the basis for the enquiry against the appellant and that was the basis for the order of removal passed against him. For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in the appeal " And recently in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian cum Managing Officer, Bombay AIR. 1966 S. C. 334 the Supreme Court has held: "It is true that the order Exts. P-13 and P-16 is signed by Mr. Mathur as 'the Managing Officer-cum-Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property' but the order of removal of the appellant from the management is valid because Mr. Mathur had the legal competence to make the order under the 1950 Act, though he has also described himself in that order as 'Mangaging Officer'. It is well established that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its power under any other rule, and the validity of the impugned order should be judged on a consideration of its substance and not of its form. The principle is that we must ascribe the act of a public servant to an actual existing authority under which it would have validity rather than to one under which it would be void." The Deputy Director of the Enforcement Directorate is competent to authorise seizure of documents under S.19D of the Act for purposes of a probable proceeding under the Act and the letter in question appears to be such an authorisation by the. Deputy Director. Though the statutory provision under which the letter is issued is not indicated therein, the Deputy Director must be deemed to have acted under S.19D of the Act; and his describing himself therein as a representative of the Central Government is immaterial and may as such be ignored. I hold that the Enforcement Officer has been lawfully empowered by the Deputy Director to seize the documents in question from any person concerned. 5. I hold that the Enforcement Officer has been lawfully empowered by the Deputy Director to seize the documents in question from any person concerned. 5. The next question is whether he can, by virtue of that authority, move the Sub Magistrate, who has the custody of the required documents, to deliver them to him. Under S.523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, property seized by the police on suspicion and produced before a Magistrate has to be returned to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Normally, when no offence is found by the Magistrate, the person entitled may be the person from whom the property was seized. But if the Enforcement Officer is entitled to seize the property immediately from such person, he may be the person entitled to the present possession thereof. It would be an empty formality, in the face of the application moved by the Enforcement Officer, to have the property delivered to the petitioners under S.523 Crl. P. C. and then seized by the Enforcement Officer from the hands of the petitioners at the gate of the Magistrate's Court. In Smt. Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra AIR. 1964 S. C. 1128 the appellants were detained by an order dated November 7,1962, of the Commissioner of Police under the Preventive Detention Act. On November 10, that order was revoked and another order for their detention was made by the Government under the Defence of India Rules and served on the appellants in jail. The Supreme Court observed: "In these circumstances, it would be in our opinion an empty formality to allow the appellant to go out of jail on the revocation of the order of November 7 and to serve them with the order dated November 10, 1962, as soon as they were out of jail" and upheld the continued detention of the appellants as lawful. The principle in that dictum applies well to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Instead of enacting a mere farce without any purpose to anybody, to hand over the documents to the petitioners and then to have them seized immediately by the Enforcement Officer, the Magistrate directed delivery of the documents straight to the Enforcement Officer. I find he was quite right in doing so the delivery to the Officer being considered in law as a delivery to the petitioners under S.523 Crl. I find he was quite right in doing so the delivery to the Officer being considered in law as a delivery to the petitioners under S.523 Crl. P. C. followed by immediate seizure from the petitioners by the Enforcement Officer under S.19D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 6. Counsel for petitioners urged that there is no ground in these cases to suspect any violation of the Foreign Exchange law by the petitioners. The learned Advocate General, on behalf of the Enforcement Officer, assures me that the investigation in the matter is not yet over. I am afraid that the adequacy or sufficiency of grounds to suspect violations of Foreign Exchange law by the petitioners cannot be gone into in these motions. The Sub Magistrate has observed that the petitioners have not made any attempt before him to explain how they came into possession of the large amounts seized from them. It is too early now to have any opinion on the matter which is only in the stage of a preliminary investigation by the statutory authorities. 7. It is next contended that no investigation in a case of suspected violation of the Act is contemplated or provided for in the Act and that therefore the Enforcement Officer cannot seek the custody of the documents in question to facilitate an investigation of an offence under the Act. The Act contains express provisions for arrest of suspected persons, and for search and seizure of documents in their possession (Vide S.19A and 19D): they necessarily connote an investigation in cases of suspected violations of the provisions of the Act. 8. Lastly, it is contended by counsel that S.19D empowers the Enforcement Officer only to seize the documents and not to retain them in his custody and that therefore his possession of the documents for any length of time would be unlawful. The argument appears to me desperate. A provision for seizure of suspected articles necessarily implies power in the seizing officer to retain them for a reasonable time to facilitate the purpose for which their seizure has been made. The provisions of S.19G which relates to custody of documents would be attracted only at a later stage of the proceeding, not immediately on seizure under S.19D. A provision for seizure of suspected articles necessarily implies power in the seizing officer to retain them for a reasonable time to facilitate the purpose for which their seizure has been made. The provisions of S.19G which relates to custody of documents would be attracted only at a later stage of the proceeding, not immediately on seizure under S.19D. It is only after a preliminary investigation, the Enforcement Officer who seizes the documents can be expected to pass the result of his investigation to the Director of Enforcement, when the latter may exercise his powers under S.19G. The length of time that may be considered reasonable for the Enforcement Officer to retain the documents in his custody to facilitate his investigations under the Act does not arise now, in these proceedings. 9. All the grounds urged by counsel in these motions are thus found to be without merit. The motions fail and are dismissed hereby. Dismissed.