Judgment :- 1. The appellant before us is a student of the Government Victoria College, Palghat. The main question raised before us is whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice in the procedure adopted in the petitioner being 'detained' in the First Year Degree Course. The learned judge who heard the writ application felt that because the petitioner did not reply to Ext. P-1 notice there was no obligation cast on the authorities to afford any further opportunity to the appellant and that there was no violation of any principles of natural justice. He accordingly dismissed the writ application. 2. A few facts may be stated. The petitioner received a memo, Ext. P-1 which is in these terms: "It has been reported that you have resorted to malpractice during the annual examinations. You are directed to explain in writing why disciplinary action shall not be taken against you. You should submit your explanation to the undersigned on or before 15 41966. If no written explanation is forthcoming, it will be presumed that you have no remarks to offer." This memo is dated 6 41966 and it is admitted that no explanation whatever was given by the petitioner to the Principal under whose signature the memo was issued. The reason for the silence is said to be that the nature of the memo was such that no intelligent explanation was possible. Counsel on behalf of the appellant pointed out that when it is said "that you have resorted to malpractice during the annual examination" it is not possible to give any valid explanation. The learned judge who heard the case felt that this memo was vague, indefinite and did not convey to the appellant any particular charge which could be explained. This is so. But we are definitely of the view that the appellant should have written for clarification. We cannot but state that the method adopted by the appellant of consulting a lawyer as to what should be done is extremely inappropriate. This is so. But we are definitely of the view that the appellant should have written for clarification. We cannot but state that the method adopted by the appellant of consulting a lawyer as to what should be done is extremely inappropriate. Even so, we have, to consider the question as to whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice untrammelled by the conduct of the appellant because we feel it is fundamental that actions on persons like the appellant whose career may be blighted by actions such as that which has been taken against the appellant and which would affect not only his reputation but his entire career must be taken only after complying strictly with the principles of natural justice. 3. That this memo is vague there can be no doubt and we agree with the learned judge who so observed. The mere non-participation of the appellant in the further proceedings if any, cannot preclude the appellant from contending that the conclusion has been reached without affording an opportunity to the appellant to state his case in regard to whatever be the misconduct that the authorities had in mind and which they thought that the appellant was guilty of. The principles in regard to this matter, we find, have been stated in a decision of the Supreme Court and it is not contended before us that that principle cannot be applied to the facts of this case. Reference may be made to the decision in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. Allahasad v. Ghanbhyam Das Gupta and others reported in AIR. 1962 SC. 1110. The relevant passage runs thus: "The effect of the decision of the Committee may in an extreme case blast the career of a young student for life and in any case will put a serious stigma on the examinee concerned which may damage him in later life. The nature of misconduct which the Committee has to find under R.1 (1) in some cases is of a serious nature, for example, impersonation, commission of fraud, and perjury; and the Committee's decision in matters of such seriousness may even lead in some cases to the prosecution of the examinee in courts. The nature of misconduct which the Committee has to find under R.1 (1) in some cases is of a serious nature, for example, impersonation, commission of fraud, and perjury; and the Committee's decision in matters of such seriousness may even lead in some cases to the prosecution of the examinee in courts. Considering therefore the serious effects following the decision of the Committee and the serious nature of the misconduct which may be found in some cases under R.1 (1) it seems to us that the Committee must be held to act judicially in circumstances as these. Though therefore there is nothing express one way or the other in the Act or the Regulations casting a duty on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of the disposal, based as it must be on materials placed before it, and the serious effects of the decision of the Committee on the examinee concerned, must lead to the conclusion that a duty is cast on the Committee to act judicially in this matter particularly as h has to decide objectively certain facts which may seriously affect the rights and careers of examinees, before it can take any action in the exercise of its power under R.1 (1): We are therefore of opinion that the Committee when it exercises its powers under R.1 (1) is acting quasi judicially and the principles of natural justice which require that the other party, (namely, the examinee in this case) must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the Committee." 4. If the appellant has therefore to be heard and the proceedings before the authorities were of a quasi-judicial nature, there can be no doubt that the appellant must be told in the first instance with what he is charged and this must be in clear and unambiguous terms. The proceedings in this case are vitiated in that this has not been done. This is a fundamental error and everything that followed however bona fide that may be, is equally vitiated because the appellant has been denied an opportunity to state his case regarding the charges against him. 5. On this short ground we allow this appeal and set aside the detention of the appellant. This will not stand in the way of fresh steps being taken in an appropriate manner and in accordance with law against the appellant, if so advised. 6. 5. On this short ground we allow this appeal and set aside the detention of the appellant. This will not stand in the way of fresh steps being taken in an appropriate manner and in accordance with law against the appellant, if so advised. 6. We cannot possibly postulate the outcome of any such proceedings, if any such proceeding is taken. In the meantime, we do not want the student to lose the benefit of one year. We therefore consider it imperative that the appellant must be permitted to attend the Second Year Course and continue his studies. We direct accordingly. We make it clear that such attendance of the appellant which we have permitted will not confer any right on the appellant in case it is found that he is guilty and liable to the punishment of 'detention'. 7. This Writ Appeal is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order regarding costs.