MODI, J.—This civil regular second appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur, affirming the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur, dated the 23rd December, 1961, in a suit for possession of certain immovable property. 2. This is an unfortunate litigation between parties who are closely related to each other. The person who originally filed this suit in the trial court was Sohan Lai. He died during the pendency of the suit on the 13th May, 1947, and is now represented solely by his third son Gopal Lal by virtue of a will executed by the former in his favour on the 2nd June, 1940. The defendants in this suit originally were Phoolchand, plaintiffs second son, aged 56 years, his wife Mst. Gulab Bai aged 75, Mst. Suja Bai widow of Gokalchand, aged 45, who was Sohan Lals eldest son, and Rajmal a minor, 11 years of age, natural born son of Phoolchand but adopted to Gokalchand. Mst. Gulab Bai also having died on the 22nd Nov., 1947, during the pendency of the suit and having transferred all her rights in the family property to her son Phoolchand by a sale-deed dated 19th October, 1947, is now represented by the latter. 3. The dispute between the parties relates to certain apartments in a four-storeyed house situated in Chowkari Visheshwarji Johari Bazar, Katla Purohitji in the city of Jaipur, more fully described in paragraph one of the plaint. According to the plaintiff, the defendants who are respectively (1) his son, (2) his widow, (3) his sons widow and (4) his grand-son have been living in certain apartments of the said house with his consent. It is further alleged that in a previous suit for partition which was commenced by Phoolchand on the 7th January, 1937, against his father Sohanlal (plaintiff here), his mother Gulab Bai, his brother Gopilal and his natural born son Rajmal who was adopted to Gokalchand, the house containing the apartments in dispute in the present suit was held to be the self-acquired property of Sohanlal and consequently not capable of being partitioned. (See the decision of the Mehkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur (dated the 1st August, 1942), which was the highest court of appeal in that State at the relevant time (Ex. 8). It may be mentioned at this place that Mst. (See the decision of the Mehkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur (dated the 1st August, 1942), which was the highest court of appeal in that State at the relevant time (Ex. 8). It may be mentioned at this place that Mst. Suja Bai was not herself a party to that suit though she acted as the guardian of her minor son Rajmal therein, who, as already stated, was a defendant in the suit brought by Phoolchand for partition of the entire family property. Owing to the death of Sohanlal and his wife Mst. Gulab Bai, during the pendency of the suit, and the former having dis- posed of all his rights under a will to Gopal Lal, and the latter by a sale-deed to the other son Phoolchand, the trial court felt called upon to re-determine their shares in the light of these supervening circumstances and an appeal against that decision was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by its judgment dated the 29th April, 1964, to which I was a party, and I am informed, an appeal against that decision is pending before the Supreme Court. 4. Be that as it may, the present suit was brought by Sohanlal on the 5th December, 1944, in the court of the Sub-Judge, Jaipur City, for possession of certain apartments in the house in question on the ground that the said house had been held to be his self-acquired property in the previous suit brought by Phoolchand against him and certain other members of the family and that though he had called upon the defendants by a notice dated the 28th October, 1944, to vacate the apartments wherein they had been living with his consent or permission, they declined to do so, and, therefore, he had no alternative but to bring the present suit. The disputed apartments so far as the present suit is concerned are briefly as follows— (a) In the second storey : 5 Almiries—one in one room, two in another and two in the verandah in front of a room ; and a Kotha facing north, which are respectively marked as A, B, C, D, E and F in the plan Ex. 1. (b) In the third storey : 3 rooms which are respectively marked as G, H and I, and a Bhakhari which is marked as J in the same plan. 1. (b) In the third storey : 3 rooms which are respectively marked as G, H and I, and a Bhakhari which is marked as J in the same plan. (c) In the fourth storey; one kitchen covered by corrugated iron-sheets which is marked as K in the said plan. (d) It has been further alleged that a room in the second storey, situated in the north-eastern corner, which is facing south, was under the lock of the plaintiff, being in his possession, and the defendants have put their lock on it which is marked as L in the aforesaid plan. 5. According to this plan, there are in all some 33 apartments in the house in question of which 21 are in the second storey, 9 in the third and 3 in the fourth. 6. The plaintiffs case further is that the defendants are in collusion with each other and have conspired against the plaintiff and so they change their occupation of the aforesaid apartments whenever they like, and, therefore, it was not possible to say who of them was or were in separate possession of which of the aforesaid apartments. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed that a decree be passed against the defendants directing them to hand over possession of the apartments mentioned under the heads (a), (b) and (c) above and also to remove their lock from the room mentioned under item (d) above. 7. Defendants Phoolchand and Gulab Bai filed separate written statements though their line of defence is more or less the same. The minor Rajmal filed his Jawabdava through his court-guardian one Maliram Agrawal who denied the plaintiffs suit saying that he had received no instructions either from the minor or from his uncle Phoolchand. Mst. Gulabbai wife of the plaintiff allowed the suit to proceed ex-parte against herself. Phoolchand in his written-statement which seems to me to be remarkable for its vagueness and obscurity denied that the house in question was the self-acquired property of his father Sohanlal and he also denied that he had been living therein with his consent and claimed that he was in possession of it by virtue of his own right with respect to it. He, however, accepted the plaintiffs contention that the Almaries and the apartments in suit as referred to above were in his possession and that of the other defendants. He, however, accepted the plaintiffs contention that the Almaries and the apartments in suit as referred to above were in his possession and that of the other defendants. He further contended that so far as the plaintiff was concerned, he was in possession of only two Kothas or rooms in the second storey and further two rooms or Kothas in the third storey and that as for the rest of the apartments in the house in question, both the plaintiff and the defendants were in joint possession. (See paragraph 5 of the written statement). In his additional pleas, he claimed that the defendants had remained in possession of the property in dispute claiming themselves to be the joint owners thereof for a period of 12 years or more and that their possession was adverse to the plaintiff. He further contended that the plaintiff was out of possession of the properties in dispute for more than 12 years, and, therefore, his suit was barred by time. Mst. Suja Bais defence is just the same as that of Phoolchand and need not be repeated at length except for the fact that in the very opening paragraph of her written statement, she contends that the house in question was the joint property of the parties and they were living in joint possession therein. 8. The trial court framed the following issues on the aforesaid pleadings— (1) Whether by the judgment of the Mehkma Khas dated 1.8.42 Ex. 8, the house in suit was held to be the exclusive property of the plaintiff and that judgment operates as res judicata against the defendants? (2) In the event of the decision of issue No. 1 being against the plaintiff, whether the disputed house or the various apartments therein are of the exclusive ownership of the plaintiff? (3) Whether the defendants are living in the house in dispute with the consent or permission of the plaintiff? (4) Is the suit barred by time? (5) Whether the property in dispute was built by jointly funds? (6) Whether the principle of estoppel applies in this case? (7) Whether the defendants are in adverse possession over the apartments in suit for 12 years and more? (8) Whether Gopallal alone had no right to continue this suit after the death of Sohanlal? (9) Whether Sohanlal deceased had a right to make a will in respect of the house in dispute? (7) Whether the defendants are in adverse possession over the apartments in suit for 12 years and more? (8) Whether Gopallal alone had no right to continue this suit after the death of Sohanlal? (9) Whether Sohanlal deceased had a right to make a will in respect of the house in dispute? (10) Whether the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City, dated the 12th July, 1961, has the force of res-judicata? Note : This order relates to the finding of the trial court in the partition suit that the will executed by Sohanlal in favour of Gopallal was not proved.) (11) What relief? 9. Both courts below have decreed the plaintiffs suit. Hence the present appeal. 10. Now, before I deal with the contentions raised before me in this appeal, I think it would be useful to give a brief summary of the findings of the two courts below. 11. Both courts below have held that the judgment of the Mahkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur dated the 1st August, 1942, Ex. 8, by which it was held that the suit property was the self-acquired property of the plaintiff Sohanlal and was not joint family property of Sohanlal and his sons operated as res judicata in the present suit. (Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 5). The trial court found that the defendants were living in the suit house with the implied permission of the plaintiff and that no express permission was necessary having regard to the close relationship which subsisted between the parties. It further found that Sohanlal was in possession of the property in dispute within 12 years of the filing of the present suit, and, therefore, the theory of adverse possession set up by the defendants was baseless. From these findings the learned trial Judge went on to hold mat the plaintiffs claim for possession was not barred either under Art. 142 or under Article 144 of the Limitation Act (Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 7). For some reason which it is not easy to comprehend, the learned Judge in the court of first appeal below has not given any explicit finding that the possession of the defendants in the property in dispute was permissive. 3, 4 and 7). For some reason which it is not easy to comprehend, the learned Judge in the court of first appeal below has not given any explicit finding that the possession of the defendants in the property in dispute was permissive. It was indeed desirable that the learned Judge should have directed his attention to this aspect of the case also, and it he had done so, much of the time that was taken during the course of arguments in this case before me would have been easily avoided. Be that as it may, the learned Judge entertained the view that the suit was governed by Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and it was for the defendants to prove that their possession had become adverse to the plaintiff in which attempt they had clearly failed. The plea of estoppel was rejected by the trial court and does not appear to have been agitated before the court of first appeal, and, therefore, nothing more need be said about this. (Issue No. 6). As for the will executed by Sohanlal in favour of Gopallal both courts below have held it to be genuine and valid in law (Issues Nos. 8, 9 and 10. Furthermore, I may point out that it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party, in the appeal in the partition suit (D.B. Regular First Appeal No. 118 of 1961, decided on the 29th April, 1964) that the will was a genuine one and Sohanlal had a right to make it, the property being his self-acquired one, and, therefore, this part of the case which was raised on behalf of the defendants in the courts below was not pressed before me, and, in my opinion, quite rightly. The position, therefore, boils down to this that the will executed by Sohanlal was a genuine one, and that he had right to make it and the finding of the Division Bench in the partition suit operates as res judicata in this suit and in any case it is binding upon me and is not open to any further challenge (Issues Nos. 8, 9 and 10). 12. 8, 9 and 10). 12. In this appeal, learned counsel raised the following contentions before me : (1) The property in suit was the joint family property of the parties and not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff Sohanlal alone. Under this head, it was further contended that the finding of the courts below that this issue was barred by the rule of res judicata was not well-founded, the reason being that Mst. Suja Bai, widow of Gokal Chand, the eldest son of the plaintiff, and the adoptive mother of defendant Rajmal was not a party to that suit and consequently she could not be held to be bound by the decision in that suit. (2) The defendants possession over the suit apartments was not proved to have been permissive and the plaintiffs case in this respect must fail. That being so, the suit was and would be governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 144, and the plaintiff having been out of possession of the disputed property for more than 12 years, he must be non-suited on that ground alone. (3) In any case, the defendants had successful proved that even if they were not in exclusive adverse possession of the suit apartments by themselves, they were in such joint possession along with the plaintiff and consequently their joint possession had become adverse to the separate estate claimed by the plaintiff, and, therefore, the plaintiffs suit for dispossession of the defendants should have been dismissed or disposed of on that footing. (4) As a result of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, having come into force, defendant Suja Bai must be held to have become absolute owner of the apartments in suit, which were in her possession because she had a right of maintenance and residence with respect thereto, and reliance was placed in this connection on sec. 14 of the said Act. 13. I now proceed to deal with these points in the order in which I have set them out above. 14. As to the question whether the finding of the Mehkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur in its judgment dated the 1st August, 1942. 14 of the said Act. 13. I now proceed to deal with these points in the order in which I have set them out above. 14. As to the question whether the finding of the Mehkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur in its judgment dated the 1st August, 1942. holding that the house in question was the self-acquired property of the plaintiff Sohanlal operates as res judicata in the present suit, I have no hesitation in concurring with the finding of the two courts below that it does so operate. The parties to both the suits are common except that Mst. Suja Bai was not a party-defendant therein. The subject-matter of the present suit was included in the earlier suit as well, inasmuch as Phoolchand claimed that this was also a part of the joint family property. It was held by the highest court in the former State of Jaipur that it was not. Suja-Bai apart, all the parties in the present suit who were also parties to the previous suit would be bound by this finding without any doubt. The only question is whether Suja Bai would also be so bound even though she was not a party to that suit. 15. Now that was a suit which was brought by Phoolchand for partition of the family properties which according to him were held as joint tenants by himself his father Sohanlal and his brothers Gokalchand and Gopal Lal. Rajmal was made a party-defendant to that suit, his father having died long ago (some time in 1912). Gokalchands rights in the alleged family property, if any, were represented by his adopted son Rajmal so that Gopalchands estate was fully represented therein. The right claimed by Suja Bai with respect to this property is clearly by virtue of her being the widow of one of the joint owners namely Gokalchand and no more. As already stated, her husbands interest was fully represented in that suit by Rajmal, and, therefore, any decision which was come to in the previous suit must be held to be binding between the parties to the present suit including Mst. Suja Bai, no matter that she was not hereself a party to the suit. As already stated, her husbands interest was fully represented in that suit by Rajmal, and, therefore, any decision which was come to in the previous suit must be held to be binding between the parties to the present suit including Mst. Suja Bai, no matter that she was not hereself a party to the suit. Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly lays down that a decision of a previous suit or an issue therein by a court competent within the meaning of that section wherein the matter directly and substantially in issue in a later suit has been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and has been heard and finally decided would be binding not only between the same parties but also between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title. Suja Bais right in the present case, if at all, is derived from that of her husband Gokal Chand, which after his death devolved on his adopted son Rajmal and as the decision in the previous suit was given in the presence of Rajmal who, it may incidentally be pointed out, was represented by Suja Bai herself in that suit as guardian of her minor son she cannot be heard to complain that that decision is not binding on her by virtue of Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This point, therefore, fails and it must be held that the finding of the Mehkma Khas of the former State of Jaipur that the suit property was the self-acquired property of the plaintiff Sohanlal must stand in tact beyond any possibility of challenge in the present litigation. 16. The next question that falls for consideration is whether the defendants possession over the suit apartments was of a permissive character or not and if not whether the plaintiffs suit is barred by time and/or whether the defendants have successfully proved their exclusive adverse possession in relation thereto. 17. 16. The next question that falls for consideration is whether the defendants possession over the suit apartments was of a permissive character or not and if not whether the plaintiffs suit is barred by time and/or whether the defendants have successfully proved their exclusive adverse possession in relation thereto. 17. As already stated, the trial court came to a categorical finding that the possession of the defendants over the suit apartments was permissive and in coming to this conclusion it took into account the close relationship in which the parties stood with each other and was inclined to hold the view that no express permission would be required from the owner of the house in a case like this where one of the defendants was his own wife, another was his son and the third a grandson and the fourth a daughter-in-law. It also took into consideration the averment made by Phoolchand as plaintiff in the previous suit for partition in paragraph four of his plaint that it was only four years prior to the institution of that suit (which was brought on the 29fh September, 1937) that on account of differences having arisen between the women-folk of the family he had started messing separately but the joint status continued and the parties were in joint possession of all the family properties. In other words, the parties were, according to Phoolchand, in joint possession even upto 1937, and he had started messing separately from his father only four years prior to that, that is, some time in 1933. In these circumstances, that court came to the conclusion that the possession of the defendants over the suit apartments could not but have been permissive to start with and that they continued to live in the same state at least until 1933 and no idea of disruption of the joint family status had entered the mind of Phoolchand until 1937. The present suit was brought some time in 1944. Consequently there was no question of the defendants possession having become adverse against the plaintiff nor could it be said that the defendant was out of possession of any part of the suit properties. The present suit was brought some time in 1944. Consequently there was no question of the defendants possession having become adverse against the plaintiff nor could it be said that the defendant was out of possession of any part of the suit properties. As already stated unfortunately enough, the court of first appeal did not address itself to this question specifically as it should have done, and, therefore, it has devolved on this Court to canvass this question as a Court of fact in the present appeal. 18. It has been hotly contested before me that the possession of the defendants over the suit house or the apartments therein was at no time permissive and strong reliance is placed in support of this submission on the concluding part of the cross-examination of the plaintiff Sohanlal where in answer to certain questions put to him by counsel on behalf of Suja Bai and Rajmal he stated as follows :— ^^eSaus lwtk ckbZ jktey dks dc btktr jgus dks nh ;kn ugha gSA eSus btktr nh Fkh ;k ugha] ;kn ughaA exj ogka cSBksa] xzquks] i<+ks] fy[kh ;g btktr gSA lwtk ckbZ jktey bl edku esa [kqkh ls gh vk x;s tcfd eSaus >xM+k djds budks ?kkV njoktk edku ls fudky fn;k FkkA mldks 20 lky gks x;sA esjk gd 20 lky ls og ugha ekursA Translated in free English, this passage would read as under :— "I do not remember when I gave permission to Suja Bai and Rajmal to live in this house. I also do not remember whether I gave such permission or not. But the permission was that they could live, work and read and write. Suja Bai and Rajmal came to this house willingly, when I had turned them out of our Ghat Darwaza house after quarrelling with them. This happened twenty years ago. They do not admit my right from the last 20 years." (This statement was given by Sohanlal on the 13th December, 1946). 19. Learned counsel for the defendants has based his whole case for adverse possession on this part of the plaintiffs statement. It may be pointed out, however, that earlier in his examination-in-chief the plaintiff had stated that the defendants were his close relations, and, therefore,they were living in the house in question with his consent. 19. Learned counsel for the defendants has based his whole case for adverse possession on this part of the plaintiffs statement. It may be pointed out, however, that earlier in his examination-in-chief the plaintiff had stated that the defendants were his close relations, and, therefore,they were living in the house in question with his consent. The kind of statement which Sohanlal happened to make in the last few lines of his cross-examination by counsel for Suja Bai and Rajmal has been the spring-board for a, very forceful argument on the side of the defendants that the plaintiff was out of possession of the suit properties or of the house in question for more than twelve years and that in any case the possession of the defendants was adverse. 20. The argument is plausible but on a closer consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, I have not felt persuaded to accept that this establishes the dispossession or discontinuance of the plaintiffs possession with respect to the suit house or the suit apartments. I have already referred to the statement by Phoolchand in his plaint in the previous suit Ex. P-2 wherein he clearly stated that the parties in the suit including the present plaintiff were in joint possession of all the family properties and according to Phoolchand the house in which the disputed apartments happened to be, was also a joint family property. Even in his written statement filed in this Court, Phoolchand has clearly admitted that apart from certain apartments which were in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff and certain other apartments which were likewise in the exclusive possession of the defendants as a whole, the bulk of the apartments in the house with which we are concerned in this case were in the joint possession of the parties. Mst. Sujabai also in her written statement unequivocally admitted in the very first paragraph thereof that the Haveli under reference in this suit was the joint property of the parties and was in their joint possession. The statement of Sohanlal. therefore, that the defendants were repudiating his right for the last 20 years should not be read too literally. Mst. Sujabai also in her written statement unequivocally admitted in the very first paragraph thereof that the Haveli under reference in this suit was the joint property of the parties and was in their joint possession. The statement of Sohanlal. therefore, that the defendants were repudiating his right for the last 20 years should not be read too literally. Indeed, it seems to me that it would be wholly wrong to do so, and this would be transparently clear when it is further noticed that there is evidence on the record that Rajmal was only 11 years old when the present suit was brought in 1944, which means that he was born some time in 1933 and in 1926 the period from when Rajmal and his adoptive mother Suja Bai stated by Sohanlal to have repudiated his title, he was not born at all. Even Suja Bai from the material which appears from the record should have been about 25 years of age at that time. When Suja Bai was examined in court on the 26th September, 1961, she gave her age as 60 years which means that she was born some time in 1901 (and there is evidence that her husband had died just after a year or two of her marriage in 1912) and so she would be no more than 25 years of age in 1926. Again in her statement given in the partition suit on the 16th January, 1938, Suja Bai had stated in her examination-in-chief that during her husbands life-time, her husband and her inlaws were living together and that she had started living separately some four years prior to her statement. She further stated that talks of partition were going on for the last four years but no partition had taken place till then. She further stated in her cross-examination that usually the members of the family maintained a common mess and that Sohanlal (plaintiff) did not give her any trouble after her husbands death. He some times gave her pocket-money but some times he did not. There is no doubt, therefore, that there was no serious trouble between the parties up to 1933 or 1934. He some times gave her pocket-money but some times he did not. There is no doubt, therefore, that there was no serious trouble between the parties up to 1933 or 1934. There is also evidence on the record to show that the parties earlier lived together in their family house situated in the Chokri Ghat Darwaza and they shifted to the house in question some time in Smt. 1979 (equal to 1922 A.D.). For a period of about 11 to 12 years, things went on more or less smoothly and differences appear to have arisen between the parties in a somewhat accentuated shape at the earliest about 1933-34 which culminated in the plaintiffs suit for partition instituted in the year 1937. It may be worthwhile pointing out also in this connection that Sohanlal was 78 years of age at the time he gave his statement in court and it clearly seems to me that in making the kind of statement that he did, his memory was playing tricks with him. In these circumstances, it cannot be accepted on an over all appraisement of evidence on the record in this behalf that Suja Bai had been turned out of the joint family house in Chowkri Ghat Darwaza in 1926 or that serious differences had arisen between the parties as early as that. There is evidence emanating from both Phoolchand and Suja Bai which there is no reason to doubt that differences arose between the parties for the first time several years later, that is, about 1934. I hold accordingly. 21. Now, it is not difficult to conceive that in a house where members of a joint Hindu family live, both men and women, married and unmarried, they will occupy certain apartments in the house so that they will be in their sole residence or occupation or possession, call it what you like, and it may even be that other members of the family will not be allowed to enter into such apartments so long as they are in the occupation of the other members of the family under their lock and key or even otherwise. But from this, can it be legitimately inferred (1) that the possession of the other members of the family over such apartments is discontinued or that they are dispossessed thereof or (2) that the possession of such members becomes adverse qua others, My answer to both these questions is in the negative. 22. At this stage, I should like to recapitulate the correct legal position in this behalf as deductible from decided cases. 23. Adverse possession necessarily implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. There ought to be nothing equivocal or ambiguous about possession which is relied upon as a bar. Therefore, possession cannot be adverse unless the owner is, in denial of his title, definitely excluded from enjoyment. Again, as a rule, possession cannot and should not be considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. Furthermore, in deciding the question of adverse possession, the nature of the rights exercised by the parties and the relationship in which they stand towards each other must enter into the verdict in order to see whether the acts relied on to support the theory of adverse possession would or would not be permissible or natural in the normal course of human life. Thus, as between members of the same family who would normally be expected to live in the same house and in doing so who may well be in exclusive possession of various apartments therein, even uninterrupted and sole possession thereof by one member will not amount to dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the others or be sufficient to consti-tute adverse possession. It must however be taken note of that while this is the general rule, it must not be forgotten that this rule is not universal that in no case permissive possession may be converted into an adverse one. It may. But in order to establish it, there must be cogent evidence of an actual, open assertion of a hostile title by one of the co-owners to exclude the others to the knowledge of the latter so that it unmistakably amounts to an ouster of the other co-sharers. It may. But in order to establish it, there must be cogent evidence of an actual, open assertion of a hostile title by one of the co-owners to exclude the others to the knowledge of the latter so that it unmistakably amounts to an ouster of the other co-sharers. It follows that in order to succeed on the ground of ouster, the person setting up such a position is bound to show that he did set up an adverse or independent title during the period which was beyond the statutory period of 12 years. There is also abundant authority for the view that where a special relationship exists between the parties as joint tenants or tenants-in-common or as members of an undivided family, the court will presume the possession held by one as possession held on behalf of all the co-owners or the members of the family, and, therefore, it will be for the possessor to prove that he held the exclusive possession to the knowledge of those whose rights he intends to adversely affect by his possession. See Muthurakkoo Thevan vs. R. G. Orr(l), Abdul Shakur Khan vs. Muhammad Ali Khan(2), Jagadamba Singh vs. Azmat Ullah(3), Nirmal Chandra Das vs. Mohitosh Das(4), Fardosjahan Begum vs. Shafiuddin(5), Thomas vs. Thomas(6) Corea vs. Appuhamy(7) and Hardit Singh vs. Gurumukh Singh(8). 24. Bearing these principles in mind and applying them to the case before me, I am on the whole definitely disposed to agree with the finding of the trial court that possession of the defendants in this case over the suit apartments was, to start with, nothing but permissive, though such permission may not have been express but implied. I am further inclined to hold that this state of things continued as such for a number of years until unfortunately dissensions overtook this family and they got divided into two groups, Sohanlal the husband favouring one of the sons and his wife Mst. Gulab Bai siding with their other son Phool Chand against the wishes of her husband and Mst. Suja Bai naturally threw her lot with this group as one of Phoolchands sons had been taken in adoption by Suja Bai to her husband Gokal Chand. Gulab Bai siding with their other son Phool Chand against the wishes of her husband and Mst. Suja Bai naturally threw her lot with this group as one of Phoolchands sons had been taken in adoption by Suja Bai to her husband Gokal Chand. The principle is indeed well established that if possession even if sole and uninterrupted between members of a joint Hindu family can be referred to a lawful title, it should not be regarded as an assertion of a right to hold it adversely against the other members of the family. Phoolchand then started his suit for partition in 1937 and that is the first litigation between the parties which has not still come to an end, and there is evidence on the record that he filed a criminal complaint against his father Sohanlal in 1941. 25. At this juncture, I should like to refer in particular to the reply of Phool Chand to a question in his cross-examination, as to since how long the plaintiff had been trying to oust the defendants from the house in question, and he and other members of his group were determined to remain in occupation thereof. His reply was that he had started a criminal litigation against his father because the latter had put his locks on some of his apartments which earlier were in his use and that this had been done in Smt. 1979. Now it is important to point out that the year as recorded in this reply as 1979 is a mistake for 1997, and this is unquestionably clear from what Phoolchand stated in the next sentence to the effect that he had produced the plan Ex. A-7 in that litigation. The plan Ex. A-7 is, it was admitted before me, dated the 26th April, 1941, which would correspond to some time in 1997. In Smt. 1979, Phoolchand himself, there is material on the record to show, was only 22 years of age. A-7 in that litigation. The plan Ex. A-7 is, it was admitted before me, dated the 26th April, 1941, which would correspond to some time in 1997. In Smt. 1979, Phoolchand himself, there is material on the record to show, was only 22 years of age. From all this evidence, the utmost that can legitimately be inferred is that relations had been greatly strained between the parties in 1941 and Phoolchand claimed the house in question to be a joint family property openly for the first time in 1937 when he filed the suit for partition treating it as joint family property and it may even be accepted that some 3 or 4 years before that Phoolchand and Suja Bai having made a common cause started messing separately round about 1934. But there is no evidence worth the name of any hostility between the parties prior to 1933 or 1934 at the earliest. In these circumstances, the utmost that may legitimately be concluded in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff is that the former asserted a hostile title against the plaintiff round about 1933, but in no case prior to that. That being so, it is entirely unnecessary to enter into the controversy whether Art. 142 applies to the present case or Art. 144 (although I may mention in passing that I am disposed to think that the correct article which should apply to a case like the present is Art. 144 and not Art. 142, having regard to the principles applicable to the question of the establishment of adverse possession between co-owners or co-tenants or members of the same family to which I have referred above) and whether one article applies or the other, the plaintiffs suit is within limitation, and the defendants have failed to establish their title by adverse possession for a period of 12 years or over. 26. Before concluding my discussion on this aspect of the case, I cannot help pointing out that it is a strange case where inter alia adverse possession is claimed with respect to certain Almaries existing in certain rooms or in a verandah in front of one or more of them while the rooms and the verandah by themselves are accepted to be in joint possession of the parties. That to my mind completely exposes the hollowness of the hostile or adverse possession set up by the defendants to a part of the plaintiffs claim and constitutes one more strong factor to fortify me in my finding that the plea of adverse possession is a futile one in all the circumstances of the case. I hold accordingly. 27. As for the third contention raised on behalf of the defendants that if this Court is not prepared to hold that they are in exclusive adverse possession of the apartments in suit, it should be held in any case that they are entitled to a joint estate by adverse possession with respect to the suit property as against the separate estate claimed by the plaintiff. Reliance is placed in support of this submission on Babaji vs. Jivaji(9), Lachhmi Narain vs. Kalyan(l0), Jageshwar vs. Pandurang(ll) and Rameshwar Rao vs. Govind Rao(12). The proposition which these cases establish is that there can be adverse possession of a limited interest in property as well as of the full title as owner. With that proposition, there need be no quarrel whatever. There is, however, a two-fold answer to this aspect of the case. The first is that although a plea like this may be spelled out from the written statement of the defendants Phoolchand and Suja Bai, which, as I have already pointed out, was of a most rambling character and obscure at that, there was no specific issue raised on that point, nor does it appear to have been argued before the trial court or the lower appellate court. I do not think, therefore, that a question like this which is a mixed question of law and fact should be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court and a surprise sprung on the plaintiff. In the second place, even if this point were allowed to be raised then on the findings of fact which I have arrived at above to the effect that the possession of the defendants with respect to the house in question and the apartments in suit therein, to start with, was in all probability a permissive one and that the first assertion of a hostile title whether of a separate or a joint character fell to be made by or on behalf of the defendants in 1937, and in no case earlier than 1933 or 1934. I have no doubt that even for such a title to mature 12 years adverse possession of the limited right claimed would be necessary. The plaintiff, however, filed his suit within the period of 12 years whether we count it from 1937 or from 1933. This plea, therefore, must also fail. 28. This leaves us with the last point which is this. It is contended that as Mst. Suja Bai had a right of maintenance and residence with respect to the apartments in suit, she was entitled to the benefit of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that the property possessed by her in this behalf devolves on her as full owner. This question is directly governed by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mst. Mohari vs. Mst. Chukli(13) to which I was a party in which it was held that a mere right of maintenance or residence without more claimed or held by a woman does not fall within the benefit of sec. 14 of the Act as being acquisition of any property as such. This decision is binding on me and, therefore, this contention must also fail. 29. The result is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.