ORDER D.P. Uniyal, J. - This revision has been bled by Bhola Ram Agarwal Partner-cum-employer and Smt. Tara Devi described as occupier of Messers. Jakhodia Engineering Works, Jajmau Kanpur against their conviction and sentences of Rs. 75 each under Section 85 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, in default of payment of tine, to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. 2. Messrs. Jakhodia Engineering Works is a factory within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (herein, after referred to as the Act). By Section 44 (1) of the Act every principal and immediate employer is required to submit to The Corporation or its officers "such returns in such form and containing such particulars relating to persons employed by him or to any factory or establishment in respect of which he is The principal or immediate employer as may be specified in regulations made in this behalf." 3. Sub-section (3) of Section 44 lays down that every principal and immediate employer shall maintain such register or records in respect of his factory as may be required by regulations made in this behalf. The duty to inspect the registers or records of a fa story has been laid on The inspectors appointed by the Corporation in accordance with Section 45 of the Act. The prosecution ease was that the inspector of the Corporation had visited the applicants' factory first on the 5th and 6th September 1961, then on 27th November 1961 and lastly on 11th and 12th December 1961. It was said that on each of the above occasions the Inspector had called upon the applicants to produce for his inspection The registers and records of the factory but the applicants failed to comply with the directions of the Inspector. They were accordingly prosecuted for contravention of clause (e) of Section 85 of the Act. 4. The applicants denied that the inspector asked them to produce the registers or records of the factory. They further contended that the complaint in the instant case was barred by sub-section (8) of 8.85, it having been filed beyond time. 5. There is unchallenged testimony on the record that the inspector of the Corporation had visited The premises of the factory on several days and met the first applicant and called upon him to produce the documents relating to the factory. 5. There is unchallenged testimony on the record that the inspector of the Corporation had visited The premises of the factory on several days and met the first applicant and called upon him to produce the documents relating to the factory. It is further established that the first applicant had failed to produce the said documents before the inspector. Letter Ex. Kha 5, dated 11-10-1961 addressed by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation to the first applicant, disclosed that the inspector had demanded documents and records of the factory from the first applicant in the month of September 1961. The Manager of the factory sent a reply to the Corporation by letter Ex. Ka 4 on 12-12.1981 and stated that their Munim would produce 'be account books and registers of the factory in the office of the Corporation on the 26th December 1961. That this was a mere ruse to put off the inspector is clear from the contents of letter Ex. Ka. 7 dated 7th January 1962 addressed by The Corporation to the Manager of the factory. In that letter the Corporation complained that the factory was guilty of persistent default and wan ed that if the relevant registers or documents were not produced on 9th January 1962 in the office of the Corporation legal action would be taken against them. On the above facts there can be little doubt that the date on which default was last committed by the factory and its principal employer in not producing the documents before the inspector was 9.1.1962. Consequently the present complaint tiled on 23.8.1962 was well within six months of the date on which the offence is said to have been committed by the accused within the meaning of Section 83 (3) of the Act. The objection of the applicants that the complaint was time barred must, therefore fail. 6. The courts below held both the 'principal employer' and the 'occupier' of the factory guilty of contravening the provisions of Section 85. It seems to me that the conviction of the second applicant who was described as 'occupier' of The factory was not legally sustainable. Clause (17) (i) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'principal employer' as meaning the 'owner' or 'occupier' of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier. It seems to me that the conviction of the second applicant who was described as 'occupier' of The factory was not legally sustainable. Clause (17) (i) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'principal employer' as meaning the 'owner' or 'occupier' of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier. The duty of maintaining registers and records relating to the affairs of the factory has been placed on the principal employer by sub-section (8) of Section 44 which says that every principal and immediate employer "shall maintain such registers or records in respect of his factory or establishment as may be required by regulations made in this behalf." Under the Act 'occupier' has the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act. Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 defines 'occupier' as follow : - " 'Occupier' of a factory means a person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a managing agent, such agent shall be deemed to be the occupier of the factory." 7. The evidence in the present case disposed that the business of the factory was being managed by the principal employer, namely, The first applicant. It could not, therefore, be said that the second applicant was responsible for maintaining the registers of the factory. In this connection it may be noticed that in the definition of 'principal employer' as given in clause 17 (i) of Section 2, the disjunctive 'or' occurring after the word 'owner' and before the word 'occupier' denote that principal employer and occupier are two separate entities. Inasmuch as the management and control of the factory was under the charge of the first applicant he would be, to all intents and purposes, the 'occupier' of the factory and as such responsible for complying with the provisions of Section 85. The second applicant having no concern with the affairs of the factory could not be held vicariously liable for the offence and was wrongly convicted. 8. I, therefore, allow the revision in part and set aside the conviction and sentence of Smt. Tara Devi. The revision application of Bhola Earn is dismissed and his conviction and sentence are maintained.