ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - This is an appeal by the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board of Mathura against the following order of acquittal, dated 5-5-1964, passed by a Magistrate: The case was called many a time. Nobody is present from complainant side. The accused is present with his counsel. Hence, the case is dismissed u/s 247 Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused is acquitted. His personal bond is cancelled. It appears that, on the same day, one of the two counsel engaged on behalf of the complainant Executive Officer filed an application before the learned Magistrate which ran as follows: Sir, In this case an application on behalf of the complainant E.O. Vrindaban was given along with the complaint for excusing the personal attendance of the complainant. Two witnesses for prosecution have been examined on the last hearing and the court had no time to examine the third witness. Today's date was fixed for the examination of the third witness who is present today. When the case was called Budhi Jamadar appeared before your honour and submitted that the witness Sanitary Inspector is present in C.M.'s court in case M.Bd. v. Pannai u/s 7/16 P.F. Act and time may be given to call the witness. The Jamadar went to the court of C.M. and brought the witness, but this Court had, by that time, acquitted the accused u/s 247 Code of Criminal Procedure. The order of acquittal is illegal and is a nullity. Your honour can proceed with the case after cancelling the illegal order. The application of the complainant was there for excusing the personal attendance. Secondly, two witnesses were examined and the evidence was enough, at the utmost the prosecution case could have been closed and the accused examined u/s 342 and defence taken and judgment should have been given on merits. The dismissal of the case was not warranted. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the order of dismissal which is a nullity be ignored and the case proceeded with. On this application, the learned Magistrate passed an order directing that the application be put upon 11-5-1964. On 12-5-1964, the learned Magistrate passed the following order: The application has no force. Rejected. 2. It has been vehemently contended by Mr. On this application, the learned Magistrate passed an order directing that the application be put upon 11-5-1964. On 12-5-1964, the learned Magistrate passed the following order: The application has no force. Rejected. 2. It has been vehemently contended by Mr. R.K. Srivastava, on behalf of the Executive Officer, that the acquittal of the Respondent was illegal and that the above mentioned order passed by the learned Magistrate was not justified by the provisions of Section 247 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was pointed out on behalf of the Appellant that an application had been made on 1-10-1963 for exemption from personal attendance of the complainant Executive Officer. No order had been passed on this application dated 1-10-1963. A glance at the order sheet shows that the prosecution of the Respondent for alleged disobedience of a notice had proceeded without the personal attendance of the Executive Officer and evidence of some prosecution witnesses had been taken but more was to be taken. It was at this stage that the above mentioned dismissal took place for non-appearance of anybody on behalf of the complainant. 3. Reliance was placed on two authorities of this Court on behalf of the Appellant Executive Officer. The first is P.N. Khanna v. Chief Inspector 1963 AWR 757 where it was held: The mere fact that in proper cases the Magistrate does not insist upon personal appearance of the complainant and chooses to proceed with the case from day to day without him can be taken to mean that he has exempted him from personal attendance. The next authority relied on is: Bhagwat Sahai v. Smt. Bina Jha 1964 AWR 699 where reliance was placed upon a passage quoted from P.N. Khanna's case (supra): Where a complaint has been filed by a particular public servant, technically the signatory to the complaint will be that public servant, as required by law, but his role may be only of a formal nature and even though he signs the complaint he may know nothing personally about the facts of the case. His presence, therefore, on the hearings of the case is wholly unnecessary and would lead to waste of public time and money. The dismissal of the complaint and acquittal of the accused merely on the ground of non-appearance of the complainant would defeat the very ends of justice. His presence, therefore, on the hearings of the case is wholly unnecessary and would lead to waste of public time and money. The dismissal of the complaint and acquittal of the accused merely on the ground of non-appearance of the complainant would defeat the very ends of justice. In order to avoid this unjust result, the latter part of Section 247 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the Magistrate, instead of acquitting the accused, may adjourn the case to another date for reasons which he thinks proper. The proviso to the section vests in the Magistrate a still wider discretion that in proper cases where he thinks the presence of the complainant to be unnecessary, he may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. The above mentioned authorities were relied upon by Mr. R.K. Srivastava to contend that the acquittal of the Respondent for mere non-appearance of the complainant is illegal. I am unable to interpret the passage relied upon by the learned Counsel as laying down anything different from what Section 247 Code of Criminal Procedure itself provides. That provision makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to acquit the accused for nonappearance of the complainant upon the date fixed for the appearance of the accused or on any subsequent date to which the hearing may have been adjourned, unless the Magistrate thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date for "some reason". "Some reason" obviously means a reason which the learned Magistrate thinks proper. In other words, the learned Magistrate has to proceed to acquit the accused unless, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, there is a reason which can justify adjournment of the hearing of the case to another date. After this, the proviso clarifies that the Magistrate can dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant when the learned Magistrate is of the opinion that such personal attendance is not necessary. Obviously, the proviso deals only with the question of personal attendance of the complainant. It does not deal with a case in which there is no appearance on behalf of the complainant at all. In the present case, the order of the learned Magistrate shows that nobody appeared inspite of the fact that the case was called out several times. Obviously, the proviso deals only with the question of personal attendance of the complainant. It does not deal with a case in which there is no appearance on behalf of the complainant at all. In the present case, the order of the learned Magistrate shows that nobody appeared inspite of the fact that the case was called out several times. Even if the personal attendance of the Executive Officer may be deemed to have been dispensed with, the requirement that somebody should appear on behalf of the complainant is certainly not dispensed with by the provisions of Section 247 Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that the fact that the Jamadar of the Municipal Board of Mathura appeared before the learned Magistrate and submitted that the Sanitary Inspector is present in the City Magistrate's court and that time may be given to call the witness whom he went to fetch, provided the Magistrate with sufficient reason to wait until the witness had come. It is significant that the application filed by the Appellant's counsel subsequently on the same date mentions nothing about fetching the counsel for the Executive Officer. Even if the Executive Officer was exempted from personal attendance, the Complainant was bound to appear through counsel. I find, from the record that two counsel had been engaged on behalf of the Executive Officer, Municipal Board. Neither the Executive Officer nor any of these two counsel appeared when the case was called up. No body mentioned anything about the appearance of the complainant or his counsel. Obviously, the Jamadar or the Sanitary Inspector could not take upon themselves the duty to prosecute. That duty could be performed either by the complainant--prosecutor or by a counsel duly authorised. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was quite correct in observing that nobody was present from the complainant's side. 5. The application given subsequently on 5-5-1964 gives no reason why the counsel for the complainant did not appear. The Applicant, rather audaciously and impertinently, alleged that the order passed by the Magistrate was a nullity. It does not, however, mention either the time taken by the Jamadar to fetch the witness or when the counsel appeared. It does not mention whether the application was made immediately after the learned Magistrate had dictated the order, or even whether it was made in the early part of the day. It does not, however, mention either the time taken by the Jamadar to fetch the witness or when the counsel appeared. It does not mention whether the application was made immediately after the learned Magistrate had dictated the order, or even whether it was made in the early part of the day. There is nothing on the record which' can justify the conclusion that the learned Magistrate was in haste and took an opportunity to acquit the Respondent merely because the complainant's counsel was not present at the time when the case was called out. No affidavit was filed either before the learned Magistrate or in this Court to justify the inference that the learned Magistrate acted with undue haste or with the desire to acquit the accused as soon as aft opportunity presented itself to do so. It cannot, therefore, be possibly contended that the order was a nullity on the ground that it was not a bona fide order. Such a suggestion would, in my opinion, be improper when the application made by the learned Counsel for the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board does not even set out a reason for the non-appearance of the counsel engaged by the Executive Officer. Mr. R.K. Srivastava, very properly, conceded that he could not urge that the order of acquittal was not a bonafide order. 6. The order passed by the learned Magistrate was, on the face of it, a bonafide, reasonable and judicially correct order made after due application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The view taken by me in the Town Area Committee v. Kashi Nath Tiwari 1965 AWR 705 was based on the finding given, on the particular facts of that case that the order of acquittal passed there by a learned Magistrate was illegal because the learned Magistrate had not applied his mind to facts relevant in that case. Obviously, that is not the position in this case. 7. It has been held in Ram Cooinar v. Ramjee and Ors. Calcutta Weekly Notes page 26 and in Devarakonda Lakshminarasimham Vs. Nalluri Bapanna and Others, AIR 1927 Mad 473 that there is no provision for the revival of a case after an acquittal. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, justified in dismissing the application made subsequently on 5-5-1964. 7. It has been held in Ram Cooinar v. Ramjee and Ors. Calcutta Weekly Notes page 26 and in Devarakonda Lakshminarasimham Vs. Nalluri Bapanna and Others, AIR 1927 Mad 473 that there is no provision for the revival of a case after an acquittal. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, justified in dismissing the application made subsequently on 5-5-1964. That application does not indicate that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate, after the case had been called many times, was a nullity. The correctness of facts stated in the order of the learned Magistrate has not been assailed. It can, therefore, be presumed that the learned Magistrate did wait for a reasonable time and that he did not act with undue haste. In the circumstances of the case, the order of acquittal was quite legal and proper. The correctness of the order could not be questioned merely because the real cause of the acquittal was, as it may be, the negligence of the counsel for the complainant in the trial court. 8. This appeal is hereby dismissed.