Order:- These related revision proceedings involve a question of considerable interest, in the context of a proceeding by the landlord under section 14 (1) (b) of Madras Act XVIII of 1960 for recovery of possession of the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction. The facts themselves are not now in controversy, though they were in dispute in the Courts below. We may now take it as established that the landlord (here respondent) required this structure or entire building, consisting of several door numbers or distinct tenements, for demolition and reconstruction, so that he could therein house his own commercial undertaking, which is a radio business. The Courts have found that the landlord was serious about his intention in this regard, that there is an approved plan (Exhibit A-l), and that this is a bona fide proposal by the landlord, who is now conducting the radio business in rented premises, to shift here after reconstruction of his own building. The Courts have specifically found that this building, which relates to the application under section 14 (1) (b), is situate in an important business locality, and that, judged from the point of view of finance, preliminary steps, approval of concerned authorities etc. the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. A ground of maintainability was urged in this form. Though there are separate door numbers or tenements, as I have already indicated, the landlord filed a single application in respect of the entire structure, under section 14 (1) (b) of the Act. It was urged that this was unauthorised and illegal, and that there should have been distinct applications for each distinct door number or tenement, which is the subject-matter of a separate tenancy. It has further been urged before me that distinct defences might be put forward by the concerned tenants, and that conceivably, one such tenancy may be saved by the operation of section 14, subsection (5), and not otherwise. Further, it is conceivable that other unrelated grounds, such as a ground of wilful default ‘in payment of rent, might be included within the scope of one such tenement, but not another. Per contra the learned Revisional Authority pointed out the anomaly or absurdity that might ensue, “ if eviction was ordered only in respect of one or two door numbers,” which may happen, if independent petitions had been filed against each tenant on behalf of the landlord. Per contra the learned Revisional Authority pointed out the anomaly or absurdity that might ensue, “ if eviction was ordered only in respect of one or two door numbers,” which may happen, if independent petitions had been filed against each tenant on behalf of the landlord. The point here is that the word ‘building ‘has two distinct connotations. One is the connotation in the ordinary usage of the English language, to which I shallpresently refer. The other is a connotation derived from section 2 (2) of Madras Act XVIII of 1960, which is a definition. By virtue of this definition, ‘building ‘will mean or include a part of a building ‘let or to be let separately ‘. In other words, the Statute embodies a technical definition, which makes ‘building ‘equivalent to tenement, as ordinarily understood in law. But this is not the connotation in the usage of English, apart from a technical context. In Stevens v. Gourley1 , the learned Judge said: “ I may venture to suggest, that, by a ‘building’ is usually understood a structure of considerable-size, and intended to be permanent, or at least to endure for a considerable time.” In other words, it is the unity of the structure and its permanence, which are normal factors in the connotation, according to English usage. Also see the commentary in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume I, page 347, under the caption “Building.” In Moir v. Williams2, Esher, M. R., said that this is always a question of degree and circumstances, but that the “ordinary and usual meaning is, a block of brick or stone work, covered in by a roof”. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word has been defined as ‘a structure, or edifice.‘ As observed earlier the connotation derived from the usage of the language appears to involve the factors of a permanent structure and the unity of that structure. In that sense, there can be no doubt that this was a single building though there are separate door numbers and distinct tenements for distinct tenancies. But, since the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to substitute a technical definition for purposes of the Act, for the connotation derived from ordinary usage, I. am clear that the landlord must file separate applications for each building or tenement as defined in the Act for purposes of section 14 (1) (b) of the Act. . But, since the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to substitute a technical definition for purposes of the Act, for the connotation derived from ordinary usage, I. am clear that the landlord must file separate applications for each building or tenement as defined in the Act for purposes of section 14 (1) (b) of the Act. . When they relate to the composite structure or edifice, though with distinct tenements, it will be proper to treat such applications together, and to dispose of them by means of a common judgment. But the point is not this. The point is whether, in the present case, assuming: that separate applications ought to have been filed, the fact that the landlord filed a comprehensive or composite application, has worked any prejudice to the tenants (revision petitioners). I am unable to see any prejudice whatever. As laid down by the Supreme Court in R. B. Sugar Co. v. Rampur Municipality,3 even the question whether a word like “ shall” used in a Statute is mandatory or merely directory,has to be determined after taking into account the factor of inconvenience or prejudice. I therefore hold that there is no justification for interference in revision in these cases, though I must equally make it explicit that, in my view, where a landlord makes an application under section 14 (1) (b) in respect of a ‘building’ as defined in the Act, he must make a separate application in each such instance, though all these ‘buildings ‘may be within one structure. The proceedings are dismissed. However, in view of the great hardship that revision petitioners are bound to sustain, in the matter of finding alternative accommodation for non-residential business purposes, in a congested urban area, I direct that they shall have time for nine months from this date for vacating the premises. The order will be enforced only if they do not shift elsewhere by that period. No costs. R.M. ------------- Proceedings dismissed..