A. N. Grover ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging a notification dated 15th March 1962 issued by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, in the matter of acquisition of certain land which was stated to be required for the construction of Sultanpur Dabas Drain. ( 2 ) THE last paragraph of the notification is as follows :- "the Chief Commissioner being of the opinion that provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said Act (Land Acquisition Act) are applicable to this land, is further pleased, under sub-section (4) of the said section, to direct that the provisions of section 5a shall not apply. "the petition says that previously also a notification was issued on 4th June 1960 but on the representations made by the petitioner and other affected persons it was withdrawn. According to the petitioner, the now notification by which the land of the petitioner measuring about 222 feet in length and about 25 feet in width would be acquired for the purposes of a drain, has been issued owing to the machination of the rival group of villagers. The main attack on the impugned notification is directed towards fhe portion extracted above, the case of the petitioner being that the land in question is neither waste nor arable and that no urgency is stated in the notification. ( 3 ) MR. S. S. Chadha for the petitioner has raised the following points:- (1) The direction made in the notification under section 17 (4) that the provisions of section 5a of the Land Aquisition Act shall - not apply, is illegal and invalid. The land is not waste or arable and further nothing emergent or urgent has been stated in the notification which on its face does not fulfil the requirements of the statute. (2) The notification is the result of mala fides on the part of the authorities concerned. ( 4 ) THE second point call be disposed of on the short ground that : the allegations about malafides made in the petition have been denied and the facts have been disputed. It is not expedient or desirable, therefore, to go into that matter in these proceedings and Mr. Chadha has very properly not laid much stress on this aspect of the matter. ( 5 ) ON the first point Mr. It is not expedient or desirable, therefore, to go into that matter in these proceedings and Mr. Chadha has very properly not laid much stress on this aspect of the matter. ( 5 ) ON the first point Mr. Chadha has relied on the language of section 17 (i) which provides that in cases of urgency whenever the appropriate Government so directs the Collector may take possession of any waste or arable land etc. It is pointed out that no ground of urgency is given in the notification and it is not even staled that any urgency exists. In arecent Full Bench decision in Murari Lal Gupta v. The State of Punjab it has been held that the question whether an urgency as contemplated under section 17 (1) of the land Acquisition Act exists or not is a malter solely for determination of the Government and depends on its subjective satisfaction and is not justiciable by the Court. Their Lordships in He: Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar (Writ Petition No. 79 of 1965 decided on 7th September 1965) have dwelt on the matter of justiciability in cases at detention under the Defence of India Rules and have observed that where an order is based on subjective satisfaction of the Government a Court cannot enquire whether grounds existed which would have created that satisfaction on which alone the order could have been made in the mind of a reasunuble person and that when an order is on the face of it not in terms of the rule, a Court cannot equally enter into an investigation whether the order of detention was in fact, irrespective of what is staled in it, in terms ot the rule. in other words, in such a case the Slate cannot be heard to say or prove that the order was in fact made, for example, to prevent acts preju decial to public order which would bring it within the rule though the order does not say so. Mr. Chadha, therefore, says that one is confined only to the nitification of the Government which is based on its subjective satisfaction for finding whether it is in terms of the statute. Mr. Chadha, therefore, says that one is confined only to the nitification of the Government which is based on its subjective satisfaction for finding whether it is in terms of the statute. In the preseat case he says there is nothing in the notification which could -indicate thai the acquisition of the land in dispute was considered to be one of urgency which would have justified the excercise of powers under section 17 in respect of which a direction under section 17 (4) could be made. Mr. Parkash Narain points out that the notication expressly i efers to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17 and says that the provisions contained therein are applicable to the land. This would attractered impost the provisions contained in section 17 (1) with the result that by necessary implication the recital with regard to urgency will have to be read in the notification. This seen s to be the correct position to me and I cannot see how Mr. Chadha can get over the effect of the statements with regard to applicability to section 17 (1) which are contained in the notification itself. After all what has to bs seen is not the form but the substance of the matter and it is quite clear that the Chief Commissioner was of the opinion that all the conditions, which were required for applying sectior 17 (1) were in existence. In the result this petition fails and it is dismissed but no order as to costs.