Judgment :- 1. The lower court has held that an application filed by the petitioners under S.15 of Act XXXI of 1958 is not maintainable. The first reason given by the lower court is that three individuals coming together as applicants cannot file such an application. For this the Subordinate Judge has relied on the decision of this Court in Mathai Kunju Naina v. Potha Eapen (1962 KLT. 773). That case arose under the Travancore Debt Relief Act of 1116, where the term used was 'individual', which naturally meant a single man or woman as contrasted from the species or body of which he or she was a member along with other individuals. The position under Act XXXI of 1958 is different. Under the present Act relief can be claimed by an agriculturist, which term is defined to mean a person who has an interest in any agricultural or horticultural land It is obvious that an individual is different from a person. Therefore, the decision relied on by the lower court cannot be pressed into service to hold that the petition is not maintainable under Act XXXI of 1958. 2. The next reason given by the Subordinate Judge is that the petitioners came to court as a partnership. This is also not correct, because the petitioners came as individual persons and not as a partnership or an incorporated company. Under S.2 (a) (iv) of the Act a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act or a company as defined under the Companies Act or a corporation formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any special Indian law is excluded from the definition of agriculturist. Since the petitioners did not seek relief as a partnership, the lower court was not right in holding that their petition was not maintainable. 3. The third matter pointed out is the observation of the Subordinate Judge that the petitioners did not unconditionally surrender the B schedule properties to the court. Here also the lower court is in error, because whatever right the petitioners had in the B schedule properties was surrendered unconditionally. The fact that the properties were then outstanding with a third party on the previous engagement is no reason to hold that what was done by the petitioners was not an unconditional surrender but only a surrender fettered with conditions. The fact that the properties were then outstanding with a third party on the previous engagement is no reason to hold that what was done by the petitioners was not an unconditional surrender but only a surrender fettered with conditions. The petitioners surrendered their entire right unconditionally. Therefore, this reasoning of the lower court is also wrong. 4. The civil revision petition is allowed; and the petition is remitted to the lower court. The lower court is directed to consider the petition on merits. No costs. Allowed.