Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1966 DIGILAW 265 (ALL)

Syed Shamshad Husain v. State of U. P.

1966-07-21

B.N.NIGAM

body1966
JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Syed Shamshad Husain and his brother have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated August 26, 1964, copy being Annexure 3. 2. In the petition I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. The petitioners state that they are bhumidhars of plot No. 113 in village Kheoli. Pargana Dewa, Tahsil Nawabganj, District Barabanki, Their names were entered in the basic record for consolidation purposes. Opposite party No. 3 preferred an objection claiming exclusive rights. The Consolidation Officer rejected this claim. Opposite party No. 3 preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Thereafter opposite party No. 3 preferred a revision under Section 48. Ti e Deputy Director of Consolidation opposite party No. 2 who heard the revision allowed it by impugned order. 4. The proceedings in this case commenced prior to the amending Act, U.P. Act 8 of 1963. In the circumstances a second appeal should have been filed. In view of the decision of the Supremo Court in the case of Lekhraj Sethramdas Lalvani v. H.M. Shah, Dy. Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 334 , I would have been inclined to uphold this order as an order passed in a second appeal but I find from the affidavit of Lakshman Singh Chaudhry which has not been contradicted by either party, that the revision application was filed before the Joint Director of Consolidation at Barabanki. It is accepted that a second appeal should have been filed in the Court of the District Deputy Director of Consolidation. Thus, if it was intended to file a second appeal it could not have filed before the Joint Director of Consolidation. The Joint Director could not have taken cognizance of a second appeal and, therefore, the institution before the Joint Director could not be considered to be the institution of a second appeal. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the revision application could not legally be considered as a second appeal. No revision was competent as under the old law a revision could be filed against an order passed by a Deputy Director. Thus, the impugned order is without jurisdiction and has to e quashed. 5. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the revision application could not legally be considered as a second appeal. No revision was competent as under the old law a revision could be filed against an order passed by a Deputy Director. Thus, the impugned order is without jurisdiction and has to e quashed. 5. It will now be open to the parties if they so desire to file a second appeal, if necessary, with an application for condonation of delay. With that I have no concern. 6. The petition is allowed with costs