JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. The question in dispute in this appeal is confined to narrow bounds; and that is whether Kesava Pillai, the father of the plaintiff-appellant, was divided in status by virtue of his written statement (Ext. P-6) in O.S. No. 77 of 1105, which divided status continued even after Ext. D-3, the subsequent settlement compromising the said suit for partition filed by Eswara Pillai, the uncle of Kesava Pillai. The counsel of the appellant brings to my notice the decision of the Madras High Court in Kurapati Radhakrishna v. Kurapati Satyanarayana, A.I.R. 1949 Madras 173, the Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Velu Pillai Lekshmi Pillai v. Kanaku Raman Narayanan, 1956 K.L.T. 54 and the decision of Gopalan Nambiyar, J. in Palpan Kunjukrishnan v. Ayyappan Krishnan, S.A. No. 1121 of 1961. The legal position has been fully reviewed in the Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court by Iyengar, J.; and I do not think it is necessary for me to traverse the ground over again. I remain content by extracting one passage from the judgment of Iyengar, J., which, in my opinion, slates the legal position correctly and beyond doubt. Iyengar, J. states: "It would appear therefore that the fact of withdrawal of the suit may not by itself destroy altogether the effect of the unequivocal declaration of intention to separate, expressed by the plaintiff by his institution of the suit or by the defendant by his filing the written statement. The withdrawal of the suit must, to have that effect, be in pursuance to the desire not to separate and to effectuate the same. Prima facie the withdrawal of a suit for partition may indicate a desire not to sever the joint status but, if the circumstances attending the withdrawal make it clear that the idea of the parties concerned is not to fall back into the jointness but to affirm, as in this case, that they have already effectively carried out their intention to separate as evidenced by their pleadings, there is no reason why we should ascribe to the fact of the withdrawal an effect in law which in fact it had not." The last sentence in this extract states the correct position in law regarding the effect of the withdrawal of a suit. Prima facie the withdrawal indicates the desire of the plaintiff not to sever the jointness: but, if the other circumstances indicate that, in spite of the withdrawal, the plaintiff wants to continue the severance, then alone the court will be justified in holding that the severance in status brought about by the filing of the plaint continues even after the withdrawal of the suit. This, I think, is what has been laid down by the Madras Division Bench ruling as well and has been followed by both Iyengar, J. and Gopalan Nambiyar, J. If the Madras decision has laid down anything different, as contended by the counsel of the appellant, I do not agree with that decision; and I agree with the Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. With this principle in mind if Ext. D-3 is scrutinised what is the result? Easwara Pillai, the uncle of Kesava Pillai and his sister, Narayani Amma brought the suit for partition; and it was that suit that was settled by executing Ext.D-3. Easwara Pillai share in his tarwad properties was surrendered to the tarwad; and the properties claimed by him as his self-acquisition were given to his personal heirs. Kesava Pillai, his sister and her children were allotted their share as a group. The question is whether this group got the said properties as a tavazhi or whether, by virtue of the division in status brought about by Ext. P-6, Kesava Pillai took his share separately under Ext. D-3 as a tenant-in-common. The only circumstance which can be urged in favour of the contention of the appellant counsel is the recital in Ext. D-3 that mutation should be effected in the names of all the members of that group including the minors therein. I do not think that this recital is sufficient to persuade me to hold that, in spite of Ext. D-3, Kesava Pillai wanted to continue the division in status brought about by Ext. P-6. It cannot also be said that the provision for mutation in the names of the minors as well indicates that the minors also took as tenants-in-common and not as a tavazhi with their mother. I may, in addition, point out that after the death of Kesava Pillai two partition deeds, Ext. D-2 of 1119 and Ext. P-6. It cannot also be said that the provision for mutation in the names of the minors as well indicates that the minors also took as tenants-in-common and not as a tavazhi with their mother. I may, in addition, point out that after the death of Kesava Pillai two partition deeds, Ext. D-2 of 1119 and Ext. P-2 of 1122, were also executed on the basis that what was allotted to Kesava Pillai and his sister and children was only their share as a tavazhi and not as tenants-in-common. Therefore, I agree with the view of the lower court on this question. The appeal is dismissed; and the appellant will pay one set of costs to be shared between the contesting respondents.