Judgment.- This petition is to revise an order of the District Judge, Coimbatore, made under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The respondent who is the landlord applied for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the latter defaulted in payment of rents and that in any case the former required the premises bonafide for his own occupation. The first ground, which has been decided in favour of the petitioner, is no longer in issue. On the alternative ground,the respondent succeeded before the District Judge who reversed the order of the appellate Court and restored that of the Rent Controller. The District Judge considered that on the proved facts the proper conclusion to arrive at was that the landlord required the premises bonafide for his own occupation. The proved facts were that the landlord’s family was large, he had three sons and two grown up daughters; one of the sons was married and other two sons and two daughters were of marriageable age. The married son and daughter-in-law were working as teachers in Pollachi, where the premises in question is situate. The question whether the landlord requires his premises bona fide for his own occupation is in one sense one of fact. Normally a Court of revision is not to deal with the matter as in an appeal by appreciating the evidence over again and accepting or rejecting the evidence on re-evaluation. What is contended before me for the petitioner is that the District Judge, while acting under section 25, over-stepped his jurisdiction in revision and interfered with a factual finding of the appellate Court. Section 25 gives revisional jurisdiction and the scope of this jurisdiction is to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act by the lower authority for purposes of satisfying the revision Court as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and the revision Court may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. On more or less similar language Rajagopala Aiyengar, J. (as he then was) expressed an opinion the terms of which are found set out in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1. On more or less similar language Rajagopala Aiyengar, J. (as he then was) expressed an opinion the terms of which are found set out in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1. The learned Judge there stated that while a revisional authority can interfere with a question of law, it cannot normally interfere with a finding of fact unless “(a) there was no other materials on which such a finding could be based, or (b) the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter, or (c) it is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion or (d) the finding had been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter.” This view of the scope of the jurisdiction was apparently accepted by the then learned Chief Justice in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1 . Reliance is placed on this view of the jurisdiction and it is contended that before the District Judge in this case, none of the four conditions was present, and, therefore, he exceeded his jurisdiction in disturbing the factual finding. I do not understand the remarks of Rajagopala Aiyengar, J., or those in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1, as exhaustively defining the jurisdiction under section 25. With respect, I am in entire agreement that any of the four conditions referred to in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1, may attract the revisional jurisdiction. But I am inclined to think that those four conditions are not exhaustive. All that was meant while specifying the four conditions, as I think, was that the revision Court while acting under section 25 should not act as if it was sitting in appeal, appreciate the evidence, weigh the same and by that process come to a different conclusion and reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the appellate Court. Where the facts are all admitted or proved, the question whether the conclusion reached on those facts is proper is, in my view, within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction under section 25. It should be noted that the language which defines the jurisdiction is of fairly wide scope, for it is open in the exercise of such jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order. That means it is open to the revision authority under section 25 to scrutinise the propriety of a finding of fact. It should be noted that the language which defines the jurisdiction is of fairly wide scope, for it is open in the exercise of such jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order. That means it is open to the revision authority under section 25 to scrutinise the propriety of a finding of fact. The limit of such scrutiny is only that of appreciation and weighing of evidence and coming to a different conclusion, which appertains to appellate power as contra-distinguished from revisional power under section 25. The Supreme Court in Motiram v. Suralbhan2 was of the view: “The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under section 15 (5) is wider than that conferred by section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Under section 15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would cleary justify the •examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under section 13 (3) (a) (iii)”. In my view, the finding which is open to such examination will include a finding of fact, but only in revision, it cannot be dealt with as in an appeal. A conclusion, where it is perverse will undoubtedly, as was pointed out in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1, fall within the ambit of revisional jurisdiction under section 25. Likewise, though a finding may not be perverse in the sense that it is not supported by evidence, if the revision Court is of opinion that on the proved facts, the conclusion arrived at does not properly follow, then as an order which is not proper, it Is within the power of the revisional authority under section 25 to revise it. On that view of the matter, this petition is dismissed but with no costs. The petitioner will have three months from this date to vacate. V.K. ------------- Petition dismissed.