Anantanarayanan, C.J.- These appeals are by the State of Madras from the Judgment of Kailasam, J., in W.P. Nos. 1789 and 1917 of 1966 before the learned Judge, in which he directed the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the appellant in G.O. Ms. No. 1643 (Rural Development and Local Administration), dated 2nd July, 1966. I may tersely state that, by virtue of this Order, Government purported to exercise the powers vested in them under section 41 (1) read with section 41 (1-A) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, and superseded the Tirunelveli Municipal Council for a period of two years from 2nd July, 1966. As the appeals were argued before us they traverse not merely the facts on the record but also a wide area of questions of law upon the nature and implications of this statutory power vested in Government, which do merit very careful consideration at our hands. At the outset itself, I think we should approach the problems involved in. these appeals from the perspective of first defining and delimiting the scope of the statutory power under sections 41 (1) and 41 (1-A) of the Act, as well as the implications of the exercise of that power. This is essential, for the simple reason that, otherwise, we are likely to be involved in issues of fact, without constantly bearing in mind the character of the judicial review that this Court might exercise in such an instance, under Article 226 of the Constitution. In brief, these are the questions involved: Is this power essentially an administrative power with the subjective satisfaction of Government as the determining factor for its exercise, or can objective tests be applied by the Court? Again, by virtue of section 41 (1-A), is it proper to interpret that section as bringing into the exercise of this essentially administrative power, a quasi-judicial process? If that is the proper view, can this Court assess the inadequacy of the material for the order of supersession, or should it confine itself to the bare relevance of that material, and to the observance of the quasi-judicial process and principles of natural justice? If that is the proper view, can this Court assess the inadequacy of the material for the order of supersession, or should it confine itself to the bare relevance of that material, and to the observance of the quasi-judicial process and principles of natural justice? Finally, there is the question, upon which the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) gave his conclusion in favour of the State, namely, whether the act of supersession is a mala fide or colourable exercise of power, for the reason that the largest single group in the Tirunelveli Municipal Council was of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which forms the opposition in the State to the Congress Government. Sections 41 (1) and 41 (1-A) of the District Municipalities Act are as follows: "41 (1). If in their opinion a council is not competent to perform or persistently makes default in performing the duties imposed on it by law, or exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government may by notification direct that the council be dissolved and reconstituted on such dates as the State Government may fix in that behalf or, they may, if they think necessary, supersede the council for a specified period not exceeding two years and the notification shall be laid before both Houses of the State Legislature: Provided as follows: (a) for the purpose of completing the elections to a council which has been dissolved the State Government may from time to time, extend the time fixed by them under this sub-section for its reconstitution. (b) the State Government shall not supersede a portion only of the municipal council. (1-A) Before publishing a notification under sub-section (1) the State Government shall communicate to the council concerned the grounds on which they propose to do so, fix a reasonable period for the council to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanation or objections if any: Provided that where a council has disobeyed an order issued under section 36 the State Government shall not be bound to follow the procedure laid down in this sub-section." A very brief outline of the situation may be desirable, at this stage, before we proceed to the legal arguments. G.O.Ms. No. 1376 (Rural Development and Local Administration), dated 27th May, 1966, is the notice to the Municipal Council to show cause, and it charges the council with ‘defaults in the performance of the council’s functions, as indicated. G.O.Ms. No. 1376 (Rural Development and Local Administration), dated 27th May, 1966, is the notice to the Municipal Council to show cause, and it charges the council with ‘defaults in the performance of the council’s functions, as indicated. There are nine heads of charge, containing specific allegations; the Order then proceeds to state that " there has been faction and confusion in the Council and consequent persistent default in performing the duties of the Council imposed on it by law." The explanation of the council to the charges is dated 16th June, 1966, and the Tamil text contains the detailed reply of the Council, after which the Council proceeds to accuse the Government of a political motive, in contemplating this action. The supersession was ordered by G.O. Ms. No. 1643, dated 2nd July, 1966. The findings are given by Government, with stated reasons, holding that the charges were proved, and paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Order make references to the inspection and other reports of the Collector, after which there is a notification to the effect that the Council was not competent to perform its duties, and has persistently defaulted in performing them, which justified the supersession. I may add here that, broadly stated, the heads of charge relate to convened meetings of the Council on various dates, which broke up in disorder and without the transaction of business, while one head of charge relates to an irregular appointment, and another to a meeting which was adjourned after the passing of a resolution recording sympathy with the victims of the Anti-Hindi agitation, a matter quite outside the purview and concern of the council. On the observance of the quasi-judicial process, enacted in section 41 (1-A), and the principles of natural justice, the arguments have resolved themselves into two main categories. On behalf of the superseded Council, it is firstly urged that extraneous matters, on which the Council had no opportunity to explain, have been taken into consideration in the promulgation of the Order, as revealed by paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Order ; the reference is to the inspection report of the Collector, another report dated 23rd March, 1966, of the Collector, and the comments of the Collector, which were not disclosed to the Municipal Council. The other argument is that there has been no failure in the performance of any of the statutory duties imposed on the Council, and that the fact that there are factions in the Council, which led to the break-up of seven or eight meetings in disorder, without the transaction of business, is not relevant for purposes of sections 41 (1) and. 41 (1-A). In other words, the argument is that, even if the adequacy of the material cannot be assessed, where material not relevant to the statutory power has been taken into account for its exercise, the Court must strike down the act of . Government. This is apart from the question of alleged mala fides, which has to be separately dealt with. There is a bewildering multiplicity of precedents, both of the United Kingdom and of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in this country, on the nature of an. administrative power, as distinguished from a judicial or quasi-judicial power, upon when an act of the exercise of the power is to be deemed to be quasi-judicial in character, what rights to the affected party flow from this character, and how far Courts, in judicial review, can re-assess the decision. From these precedents,. I have selected those which appear to me to be the most significant in the evolution of legal ideas on this aspect. At the outset itself, I may state that the perspective stressed by the learned Advocate-General for the State seems to me to be the proper one. The learned Advocate-General would make a significant distinction between a discretion which is to be exercised with regard to a Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution, and some other right afforded by statute: vide Pannalal Binjraj v.Union of India1. As he points out, a right to Local Self-Government, or the right of a Municipal Council to carry on its administration as such, cannot be termed as Fundamental Right. It is a right springing from the statute alone, and the status of the Council is derived entirely from the Act; for that reason, the Council can only function within the provisions of the Act, and the restrictions imposed by the statute apply to the Council. It is a right springing from the statute alone, and the status of the Council is derived entirely from the Act; for that reason, the Council can only function within the provisions of the Act, and the restrictions imposed by the statute apply to the Council. It might be a different matter, if the act of supersession of the Council violated any Fundamental Right, either of the citizens or of the members of the Council, but that is not the argument. Again, there can be no doubt whatever that, having regard to the language of the Legislature in enacting section 41, this is, essentially, an administrative power vested in the Executive, though a power which is to be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner, in the process of its exercise under section 41 (1-A). The learned Advocate-General stresses that section 41 (1) makes the subjective satisfaction of Government, with regard to the competency of the Council to perform its duties, or persistent default in the performance of its duties, or excess or abuse of its powers, the criterion for action, by the use of the words “ in their opinion” ; this provision has to be distinguished from other provisions in enactments of other statutes which do not contain these significant words. The difficulty here is, does the coupling of the quasi-judicial form or process of action, made obligatory under section 41 (1-A) read with section 41 (1), convert the administrative power into a judicial power, so that it is not merely incumbent on Government to record their reasons, but the very exercise of the power is amenable to objective tests, in judicial review ? With reference to the case-law, a brief history of its evolution is of interest and significance. After this, I shall devote greater attention and analysis to a few selected cases of the United Kingdom and of the Supreme Court. With reference to the case-law, a brief history of its evolution is of interest and significance. After this, I shall devote greater attention and analysis to a few selected cases of the United Kingdom and of the Supreme Court. Atkin, L.J., in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company2, laid down the dictum, now classic, of the test of a quasi-judicial process, amenable to writ jurisdiction: “ Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority,, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.” A gloss was put on these observations by Lord Heward, C.J. in Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly ex parte Haynes Smith3to the effect that it must appear not merely that the said body should have the legal authority. but also that it must further be required to act judicially ; this duty is an ingredient, which must be present from the test to be satisfied. In Nakkuda Ali v. M.F.D.E.S. Jayaratne4. the Privy Council dealt with an order of the Controller of Textiles in Ceylon, which empowered him to cancel a licence where the Controller had reasonable grounds to believe that a dealer was unfit to be such. The Privy Council held that this did not necessarily imply that the Controller must act judicially in exercise of the power, and if he is not so bound, his decision would not be amenable to judicial review. It was against this background of the development of the law that we have the leading decision of Ridge v. Bladwin5. This related to the powers of a Watch Committee to dismiss an officer on the ground of neglect of duty, or unfitness, under section 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. It was against this background of the development of the law that we have the leading decision of Ridge v. Bladwin5. This related to the powers of a Watch Committee to dismiss an officer on the ground of neglect of duty, or unfitness, under section 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. The decision is a landmark, for the observations of Lord Reid with regard to the gloss put upon the famous passage in the judgment of Atkin, L.J., in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co.2, by Lord Hewart, C.J. Lord Reid said: “ If Lord Hewart meant that it is never enough that a body simply has a duty to determine what the rights of an individual should be, but that there must always be something more to impose on it a duty to act judicially before it can be found to observe the principles of natural justice, then that appears to me impossible to reconcile with the earlier authorities.” A catena of decisions follows this passage. But the learned Advocate-General has devoted some time to an analysis of these precedents, and satisfied us that, in every one of these cases, it was a matter of the alleged infringement of a principle of natural justice. Lord Reid then said that both Atkin, L.J., and Bankes, L.J., “ inferered the judicial character of the duty from the nature of the duty itself”. Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne1, has been dissented from, on the statement of its principle. Considerable light is thrown upon this evolution, by a discussion which appears in the judgment of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Dwarka Nath v. The Income-tax Officer2 He referred to the dicta of Parker, J, in Rex v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee3and stressed that “ a ‘duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances, and it is not possible or advisable to lay down a hard and fast rule or an inflexble rule of guidance” . An administrative body, in ascertaining facts or law, may be under a duty to act judicially, notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of a Court of law. The evolution of the case-law has been discussed in considerable detail by Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Sharma and another4. An administrative body, in ascertaining facts or law, may be under a duty to act judicially, notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of a Court of law. The evolution of the case-law has been discussed in considerable detail by Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Sharma and another4. The judgment of the Supreme Court referred to the following authorities, apart from the English cases, which I have earlier noticed: (1) Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Adwani and others5; (2) Nagendranath Bora and another v. The Commissioners of Hill Division and Appeals, Assam and others6; (3) Shiviji Nathubhai v. The Union of India and others7; (4) The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., and the Bharat Bank Employees Union, Delhi8, (5) Messrs. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunghunwala and others9; (6) Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmichand and others10; (7) Engineering Mazdoor Sabha representing Workmen employed under the Hind Cycles Ltd., and another v. The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay11, and (8) Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta and others12. The principle was then tersely stated by the learned Chief Justice in this form, as crystallising the evolution of the case-law: “ It would thus be seen that the area where the principles of natural justice have to be followed and judicial approach has to be adopted, has become wider and consequently, the horizon of the writ jurisdiction has been extended in a corresponding measure.” Kailasam, J. relies on this very passage for his conclusion that the exercise of the power, in this particular case, could properly be the subject of judicial review, and lend itself to objective tests to be imposed by the Court, even apart from the problem whether the quasi-judicial process enacted in section 41 (1-A) has been duly observed, and the principles of natural justice have been adhered to. But this, in my view, proceeds really on a misconception. The evolution of the case-law makes clear one cardinal feature, apart from every thing else; the distinction between an essentially administrative power, and a quasi-judicial power, cannot be determined upon any abstract propositions of law. But this, in my view, proceeds really on a misconception. The evolution of the case-law makes clear one cardinal feature, apart from every thing else; the distinction between an essentially administrative power, and a quasi-judicial power, cannot be determined upon any abstract propositions of law. Though our Constitution proceeds on an apparent theory of the separation of powers, it is undeniable that there are zones of intermingling of those powers ; the Executive sometimes has functions analogous to judicial functions. Courts have administrative powers, and even the Legislature may have its own area of judicial or executive capacities. The matter has to be judged, solely and entirely, upon the particular enactment, its terms and intendment. For instance, a closely analogous case is Radheshyam v. State of Madhya Pradesh13The learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) has also referred to, and cited, this decision. But when we closely examine it, and particularly the terms of both sections 53-A and 57 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, we find a very vital distinction. Under both these sections, the State Government has power to act in the case of incompetence in the performance of duty, or persistent default in the performance of duty, by the concerned Committee ; but significant words, such as “ in the opinion of Government” , are not to be found ; in other words, thoug the power is administrative, its very exercise depends on the establishment of an objective fact, that is, the incompetency of the Committee, for which the subjective satisfaction of the concerned Authority may by no means be adequate. I shall refer to certain other precedents of this country, before proceeding to the leading cases relied on by the learned Advocate-General in the course of his arguments. In Glaxo Laboratories v. A. V, Venkateswara1, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held, with reference to an assessment under section 87 of the Sea Customs Act, that absence of reasons in the order of assessment was not fatal to an order, but that the grounds given in the affidavit filed could be looked into. This is on the aspect that, according to the learned Advocate-General, the bare notification superseding the Council (page 16 of the typed volume) would have been sufficient compliance with the law, though detailed reasons were actually given in the Annexure. This is on the aspect that, according to the learned Advocate-General, the bare notification superseding the Council (page 16 of the typed volume) would have been sufficient compliance with the law, though detailed reasons were actually given in the Annexure. Kailasam, J., quoted the observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India2, and also the observations in Govindrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh3. But we note that both those decisions have relevance to the exercise of a frankly judicial power. One instance of considerable interest on this aspect, is to be found in Kareli Municipality v. State4. Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was) held, with respect to charges framed against a Municipal Committee and the explanations submitted by that Committee, that it was too wide a proposition that the Court could not at all proceed into the adequacy of the material, and that, apart from mala fides, arbitrariness, absence of jurisdiction or violation of the principles of natural justice, there was the ground of quite insufficient evidence ; presumably, this would come under the kind of “ no evidence” rule, which is wellknown in the Administrative Law of England and the United States of America. The contention of the learned Advocate-General may, therefore, be expressed in this form. Where there is no question of the deprivation of a Fundamental right, but the status of the concerned body and its powers are both derived from a statute, and subject to the restrictions of that statute, we must look to the statute alone for the interpretation of function or power possessed by Government. Where the words, such as “in their opinion” are deliberately used, this is a subjective satisfaction, and essentially an administrative power ; in its exercise, a quasi-judicial form or process may well be engrafted on it, and the learned Advocate-General concedes that this is the effect of section 41 (1-A) of the Act. But his point is that, so long as relevant material was placed before Government, and the Government acted in bona fide exercise of the statutory power, and the quasi-judicial process was respected as well as the principles of natural justice, this Court ought not to interfere. It should not, in judicial review, constitute itself a judge of the adequacy of the facts on which Government acted, or the wisdom of the steps taken. It should not, in judicial review, constitute itself a judge of the adequacy of the facts on which Government acted, or the wisdom of the steps taken. Apart from the leading case of Ridge v. Baldwin5, the learned Advocate-Genera relies on (1) Johnson & Co. v. Minister of Health6, (2) the criteria laid down in Kesari Mal v. The State7; (3) Hubli Electricity Co. v. Province of Bombay8; (4) RossClunis v. Papadopoullos9; (5) The Queen v. The Bishop of London10, and (6) Board of Education v. Rice11. Of these cases, I might immediately refer to the facts in the The Queen v. The Bishop of London10, where the question related to the discretion of a Bishop under the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, and Lord Esher, M.R., observed that the nature of the discretion is judicial, but that if the Bishop honestly and fairly undertook to consider the circumstances, he was not bound to consider every one of them in the record of his decision, and that his action could not be impugned on that ground. Certain of the cases cited by the learned Advocate-General deserve special mention. One of them is Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos1, where the question related to an order under Regulation 3 by the Commissioner of Cyprus, imposing a collective fine on the assessable Greek-Cypriot inhabitants of the area. The case is important, because it laid down that the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner was the test ; and that unless it could be shown that there were no grounds on which the Commissioner could be satisfied, that the inhabitants of the area were given an adequate opportunity of making representations, the Court could not interfere. This is an instance of essentially an administrative power, which is, nevertheless, subject to a quasi-judicial form and to the observance of principles of natural justice. Another case of great interest and importance is Johnson’s case2, where the owners of land comprised in a compulsory purchase order, confirmed by the Ministry of Health, applied for quashing the order, on the ground that the Minister was bound to act in a quasi-judicial manner, and that he had failed in that duty in not making available to the objectors the contents of certain letters written to the Minister by the local authority, before the order was made. The discussion of relevant aspects in the judgment of Lord Greene, M.R., is of considerable significance, on certain aspects of the present controversy. The Court held that, though the functions were essentially administrative, “ there is super-imposed on his administrative character a character which is loosely described as ‘quasi-judicial‘.” The lis is a stage in the process of arriving at an administrative decision, and the administrative decision is purely of that character, “ based on his conceptions as to what public policy demands” . In the accompanying judgment of Cohen, L.J. an expression like ‘quasi- lis ‘is also to be found. We do not think that we would be justified in regarding the statutory power, in the present case, as on all fours with the kind of function that was canvassed in Johnson’s case.2There is, surely, one vital distinction, in that a question of policy cannot intrude into decisions under section 41 (1), which must be rightly confined to the subjective satisfaction of the State in respect of specified ingredients. But the decision is of significance, as shown when a lis may be properly said to commence, and how far it would extend, in the exercise of the power. For instance, in the present case, upon the aspect of extraneous considerations, which have been dealt with by the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) it is important to note that every one of these documents adverted to, namely, all of the inspection reports of the Collector and the Administration Reports of the Collector, had been received by Government before the Government promulgated the ‘show-cause ‘notice on charges culled from this material. Certain decisions have been cited before us, on the question whether the Municipal Council was entitled, as of right, to copies of this material. The learned Advocate-General relies on the judgment of Rajamannar, C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in D. Rajah v. Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, Madras3, for the view that Government need not have disclosed these earlier reports. But, the significant point is that the lis commenced only with the ‘show-cause ‘notice and it thereupon took the quasi-judicial character envisaged by section 41 (1-A). But, the significant point is that the lis commenced only with the ‘show-cause ‘notice and it thereupon took the quasi-judicial character envisaged by section 41 (1-A). The prior materials, which may include confidential reports, or notes by a Secretary to Government, upon which the lis commenced, are quite irrelevant to the proceeding • nor can the Municipal Council be said to have a proper concern with them, once the charges were formulated, with grounds for them made evident, in the ‘show-cause ‘notice. Reference may be conveniently made here to the decision in Hubli Electricity Co. v. Province of Bombay4. Lord Uthwatt was dealing with the provisions of section 4 (1) (a) of the Electricity Act, 1910, where the words ‘in the opinion of the Provincial Government ‘occurred both in sections 4 (1) (a) and 4 (1) (d). The Judicial Committee observed:- “ Their Lordships are unable to see that there is anything in the language of the sub-section or in the subject-matter to which it relates, upon which to found the suggestion that the opinion of the Government is to be subject to objective tests.” On a careful consideration of the entire case-law, and the select precedents from a wide range that I have earlier set forth, I think that the following propositions may be rightly inferred, upon the character of the statutory power in this case, with respect to the scheme of the entire Act, the language used in sections 41 (1) and 41 (1-A), and the indisputable fact that we are not here concerned with any "Fundamental Right under the Constitution, or its supposed infringement. (i) This is essentially an administrative power, in which the exercise of the power depends on the subjective satisfaction of Government that a Municipal Council is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by law, or that it persistently makes default in performing them, or exceeds or abuses its powers. Needless to say, such a satisfaction must be arrived at, in accordance with the quasi-judicial process enacted in section 41 (1-A) and it must be bona fide and not tainted by an ulterior object or colourable exercise of the power. (ii) This decision itself is subject to the quasi-judicial process made obligatory by section 41 (1-A), and to the principle of natural justice. (ii) This decision itself is subject to the quasi-judicial process made obligatory by section 41 (1-A), and to the principle of natural justice. Therefore, the grounds for the action proposed must be communicated to the Council, a reasonable period for the explanation of the Council must be given, the explanations or objections should be duly considered, and all the principles of natural justice should be adhered to. These hybrid functions, as pointed out in Johnson’s case1, frequently arise with reference to the complex organization of a modern State ; there is nothing surprising in them. Both the essentially administrative character of the ultimate decision, and the necessity to observe the quasi-judicial process, must be kept in mind by the Courts before which the matter is brought up in judicial review. (iii) If the quasi-judicial character of the process has not been adhered to, or any principle of natural justice has been violated, the Court will not hesitate to strike down the Order. The Court is not concerned with the materials upon which the Government might act, prior to the commencement of the lis. But once the lis or quasi-lis has commenced, extraneous matter or considerations should not intrude into the actual decision. (iv) Apart from this, there must be a reasonable nexus between the grounds upon which the Government purports to act, and the satisfaction which is enacted in section 41 (1) of the Act. The material must relate to the incompetency of the Council to perform its duties, or to persistent default in performing the duties imposed on it by law, or excess or abuse of power. If the material is extraneous to these considerations, the Court may proceed to strike down the exercise of power, upon the analogy of the ‘no evidence ‘rule. But the adequacy of the material, provided that it is relevant, and the wisdom or unwisdom of the actual exercise of power, do not concern the Court, for the Court cannot substitute its satisfaction or absence of satisfaction, for the satisfaction of Government that the ingredients were established (v) If the exercise of the power is mala fide, or it is a colourable exercise of power for some ulterior purpose’ the Courts will never hesitate to strike down the exercise of the power. It is in the light of these principles, or guiding criteria, that I feel that the entire matter has to be viewed and assessed. In this light, of the several grounds which have been adverted to by the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) in his judgment, some at least appear to me to intrude into the merits ; in other words, to make the satisfaction of this Court the determining factor, by substituting its judgment. Since I feel that that cannot be done, the objections to the exercise of the power in this case will have to be limited, on the facts, to the following categories: (1) Since, apart from one instance of an irregular appointment, the several charges relate exclusively to convened meetings, which broke up in disorder without transacting business, the question is whether there is any duty imposed on the Muni cipal Council, by law, to convene meetings and to transact business. This aspect is made more acute by the fact that the Amended Rules require only one meeting in a month, during the relevant period 1st August, 1964 to 5th February, 1966, while the Municipal Council actually met many more times. Another relevant aspect is the analysis of the statutory duties of the Council, with regard to the provisions of the Act, elaborately made by the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.). They could be classified as duties to maintain roads and channels of communication, duties to obtain revenues by taxes, duties of conservancy and sanitation, and the like ; the learned Judge stresses that, apart from the obligatory monthly meeting, the law did not impose a duty on the Council to meet and conduct business, so long as these functions were carried out. Hence, the failure to conduct seven of the meetings in an orderly manner, would not amount to incompetence or to persistent default. (2) With regard to the expression ‘persistent default ‘the learned Judge has held that this means contumacious continuance in some course, and neglect or breach of duty, against opposition or remonstrance. There is a power vested. in Government under section 39 of the Act to give the Municipal Council a locus penitentiae to perform the duty within a time fixed, and since there was no remonstrance or opposition in this case, the break-up of the seven meetings could not be said to constitute ‘persistent default‘. There is a power vested. in Government under section 39 of the Act to give the Municipal Council a locus penitentiae to perform the duty within a time fixed, and since there was no remonstrance or opposition in this case, the break-up of the seven meetings could not be said to constitute ‘persistent default‘. (3) Extraneous matter has intruded into the decision of Government, in that certain reports, remarks and comments of the Collector, many of which were not disclosed to the Council, appear to have formed the basis of the lis, or the drawing up of the charges. Even more importantly, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the grounds of supersession render it clear that these reports and remarks were relied on by Government, in reaching its decision. The Government have thus acted on material withheld from the Council and contravened the principles of natural justice. (4) There" is the question of mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. On this aspect, the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) has definitely found that no mala. fides or colourable exercise of power could at all be inferred, from the facts of the record. Since we are in agreement with him on this aspect, it is sufficient to be brief here, apart from referring to one or two authorities on the aspect of mala fides. Sri Gokulakrishnan for the respondent-Municipal Council, has strenuously contended that the learned Judge is right in his view that the law imposed no obligation on the Municipal Council to transact business at meetings convened, apart from the obligation to hold a minimum number of meetings. He points out that there is no charge that the Municipal Council has not carried out its statutory functions under other provisions, which have been elaborately analysed by the learned Judge, and, in his view that he advances, there will be a clash between the requirements of the Jaw and the Rules in the Municipal Manual, to which our attention has been drawn, if we infer a duty on the Municipal Council to transact business at the meetings convened. But, on a deeper scrutiny of the scheme of the Act and the Rules, and the requirements of the law, we are unable to agree. But, on a deeper scrutiny of the scheme of the Act and the Rules, and the requirements of the law, we are unable to agree. As the learned Advocate-General has rightly stressed, there appears to be some misconception in this regard, for the provisions elaborately analysed by the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.), no doubt relate to statutory obligations under the Act but they are really functions which have to be performed through the decision of the Municipal Council at its meetings by the Executive of the Municipal Council. In other words, the Municipal Council can only function by transacting business at its convened meetings, and there is no other mode by which this statutory body can function at all. Conceivably, all these functions could be perfectly carried out by the Executive. Officers of a Municipal Council, and the Council nevertheless may totally default in meeting and transacting business at its meetings. Can it then be pretended that such a Municipal Council is functioning at all under the scheme of the Act ? On the contrary, we regard section 25 read with Schedule III as clear and categorical, on this aspect. Under section 25 of the Act, the Municipal Council is bound to observe the rules in Schedule III, and the first rule of Schedule III is that the Council " shall meet..........for the transaction of business at least once in every month upon such days and at such times as it may arrange and also at other times as often as a meeting shall be called by the Chairman ". We may point out that rule 2 (2) empowers the Chairman to convene urgent meetings, and that the Municipal Council is bound to meet when it has been convened, because the business requires it, which may be urgent, and bound to transact business, except for good reasons. We can envisage a Municipal Council which is so torn by faction or disorder that it is unable to meet and transact business, even though it purports to meet the minimum number of times, or, may be, on more numerous occasions. It is difficult to see how such Municipal Council can be said to be functioning, as envisaged by the law. Sri Gokulakrishnan has placed reliance upon certain parts of the Municipal Manual, including rule 26 (b), which empowers the Chairman, in the case of disorder, to suspend the meeting. It is difficult to see how such Municipal Council can be said to be functioning, as envisaged by the law. Sri Gokulakrishnan has placed reliance upon certain parts of the Municipal Manual, including rule 26 (b), which empowers the Chairman, in the case of disorder, to suspend the meeting. We are unable to see any conflict between this power invested in the Chairman and, the statutory duty of a Council to meet as convened and to transact business at the meetings. No doubt, it is true that there is another group opposed to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam group, headed by a named individual, and that the disorder may well be due to some obstructive tactics on the part of this group, as alleged, but the order of supersession is aimed against the Council as a creature of the statute, and may be said to affect those members of the Council equally with the rest. The law admits of the plain inference that the obligation to meet and transact business at the meetings is essential to the very functioning of the Council, and that this cannot be merely limited to the minimum number of meetings specified in rule 1 of Schedule III. Even with regard to the resolution on the AntiHindi agitation, it could very well be argued that the mischief lay, not so much in the passing of a resolution upon a quite irrelevant matter, but in the adjournment of the Council immediately thereafter, without the transaction of any business. We are, therefore, unable to hold that these facts, with reference to the seven meetings which broke up in disorder without the transaction of business, are not. relevant to the ingredients mentioned in section 41 (1). Indisputably, the charge with regard to the irregular appointment, however minor in itself it might be, is also relevant, as well as the charge that the Municipal Council passed a resolution on some totally extraneous matter, conceivably tinged with a political complexion. It is impossible not to feel that, in a great part of the judgment, the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) was really assessing the adequacy of this material on an objective test. Certainly, we agree with him in thinking that, on this material, if an objective test were to be attempted, the impugned order of supersession could not be defended. It is impossible not to feel that, in a great part of the judgment, the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) was really assessing the adequacy of this material on an objective test. Certainly, we agree with him in thinking that, on this material, if an objective test were to be attempted, the impugned order of supersession could not be defended. The Municipal Council met sufficiently frequently, and transacted business at a number of meetings ; so that, objectively viewed, the break-up in disorder of these seven meetings may not be any justification for the drastic step of supersession. Admittedly, the other two charges are quite minor ones. Hence, if the satisfaction of the Court were relevant, the appeals would have to fail. But that is not the test. I must re-emphasise that, in the context of this power, as embodied in the statute, so long as the quasi-judicial process and the principles of natural justice are adhered to, the satisfaction of the Court cannot be substituted for the satisfaction of Government that the ingredients in section 41 (1) were established. The wisdom or unwisdom of such a measure does not concern the Court. Certainly, the supersession is a drastic step, and it could very well be argued that the material adduced hardly furnished a justification for such a procedure, which would interfere with the democratic process of Local Self-Government, for as long a period as two years. But that is a matter for the State, and it may even now be open to Government to reconsider whether this step is really justified, and essential in the public interest. Concerning the interpretation of the words " persistent default " certain very interesting arguments were adduced. I think it is sufficient for me to state that I find the definition in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary to be the most lucid and satisfactory one. The word ‘persist ‘comes from two roots, ‘per ‘and ‘sisters ‘, to stand. It implies " To continue firmly or obstinately in a state, opinion, purpose or course of action, especially against opposition " . I have also referred to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 70, page 686, to Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Vol. 32, page 282 and Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3, page 2166, (1953) Edition. It implies " To continue firmly or obstinately in a state, opinion, purpose or course of action, especially against opposition " . I have also referred to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 70, page 686, to Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Vol. 32, page 282 and Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3, page 2166, (1953) Edition. But, as far as I can gather, while contumacious perseverance, notwithstanding opposition or remonstrance, is the substance of the expression, nevertheless, it cannot be said that opposition or remonstrance is essential. Upon any question of the interpretation of a statute, I would certainly agree that the Court has a right to interfere, and that the order of Government cannot be conclusive: vide Navinitprasad v. Ahmedabad Municipality1. We can well conceive of a case where default is persistent, the consciousness of the obligation in respect of which the default occurs being taken for granted, and, nevertheless, the opposition or earlier remonstrance has not happened at all, and the power was validly exercised. Here again, I think that there is some confusion between the wisdom of the measure, particularly where there was no previous remonstrance, and the strict requirements of the law. Rex v. Turner2is an instance in which a Judge construed the word ‘persistent ‘, as applying to an offence committed immediately after a man obtained discharge from prison. In Promode Kumar v. Jaman3, Bose, J., held that persistent default connoted that the default should be successive or repetitive, in spite of warning or opposition. But I am unable to hold that warning or opposition must be essentially present, and that, without the presence of this element, ‘persistent default ‘could not be established. In this context, I may add that our attention has also been drawn to two interesting decisions of Banerjee, J., on the test of subjective satisfaction with regard to an essentially administrative power; they are N. C. Jute Mills v. Finance Ministry4 and Nani Gopal v. State of West Bengal5. But, with respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to agree that a distinction could be introduced with regard to the degree of subjective satisfaction, in the form of an opinion " which is lesser in degree than the self-confident opinion based on reasonable materials commonly known as objective opinion but is certainly greater in degree than the speculative view, which goes by the name of subjective satisfaction ". I must reiterate that, once it is conceded that relevant material was placed before Government, upon which Government came to the decision, the satisfaction of Government cannot be impugned on any objective criteria, or by substituting for it, the judgment of the Court. I must next deal with the very important point that the terms of the Government Order themselves show that extraneous matters or documents not disclosed to the Council, have not merely influenced the decision of Government, but have gone into the making of that decision. Certainly, if that were true, the decision would have to be struck down, as not in conformity with the quasi-judicial procedure of section 41 (1-A), and with principles of natural justice. But a close analysis of the record shows that the stand taken by Government in paragraph 17 of the counteraffidavit is perfectly justified. Actually, it was the Municipal Council that, in its reply, referred to the Inspection Report and the Administration Report, and claimed that there were no adverse comments therein on the working of the Council. The learned Advocate-General points out that, as the record shows, these Reports were communicated to the office of the Council. Though it may not be correct for Government to claim that the Municipal Council requested that Government may look into these Reports, the alleged absence of adverse comments in these Reports was relied on by the Municipal Council, and Government were, therefore, compelled in stating their grounds of supersession, to refer to the contents of these Reports, in paragraphs 10 and 11 of their Order. The observation of the Government " The, Collector’s remarks clearly bring out the fact that the charges have been proved " , •cannot be construed as an additional material upon which Government acted. That is to introduce a distinction between the Government and the Collector which as was pointed out by one of us during arguments, is quite illusory. ‘Government ‘is an impersonal agency or concept, and would include all its administrative and secretariat officers. The fact that Government had regard to reports of the Collector, means no more than that Government took counsel upon the formulated charges and the explanation of the Municipality, in the way that Government, thought best. ‘Government ‘is an impersonal agency or concept, and would include all its administrative and secretariat officers. The fact that Government had regard to reports of the Collector, means no more than that Government took counsel upon the formulated charges and the explanation of the Municipality, in the way that Government, thought best. Certainly, a Secretary might have made a confidential note on this file to the Minister, and that note might have influenced the Minister ; but that is no relevant consideration, either for the Municipal Council or for the Court. Actually, the order of the Government proceeds entirely on the formulated charges, the explanation thereto, and a recorded finding upon each charge that, in the Governments view, the charge was established. It is after this part of the order that we have paragraphs 10 and 11, and the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) himself was apparently not conscious of the distinction that I am making, when he observed that " the plea that the Government was not influenced by the remarks of the Collector cannot be accepted". Since the Collector is also a limb of the Government, this is, in effect, merely stating that the Government took counsel of all its concerned officers, and then came to the decision. There is nothing to show that the decision itself was based upon anything except the formulated charges, the explanation thereto, and the findings thereon. Actually, the record shows that certain averments against the Municipal Council existed in the Reports of the Collector made before the notice, but that Government eschewed them as not necessary. On this ground, the decision of the Government cannot be struck down. We are left with the aspect of mala fides, upon which the following citations may be briefly referred to - Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab1; C.S. Rowjee v. The State of Punjab2; Kesari Mal v. The State3and Venkatachalam Iyer v. State of Madras4. As their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out, mala fides would include colourable exercise of the power, that is, an exercise of power which is ostensibly so, " but which is really a pretext, with an ulterior objective or for achieving some other end. As their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out, mala fides would include colourable exercise of the power, that is, an exercise of power which is ostensibly so, " but which is really a pretext, with an ulterior objective or for achieving some other end. Certainly, the fact that the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party is the largest political group in this Municipal Council, might well have evoked a suspicion in the Chairman, or some of the persons affected, that the order of supersession had a political bias or motive. But it is for the party alleging mala fides to establish that element as a reasonable inference, on the facts and probabilities shown to exist ; a mere allegation of mala fides, as not entirely improbable, will not do, and Courts have to take notice of the increasing trend to allege this sometimes with little or no evident substance. In the present matter, we have carefully gone through the respective affidavits of the Home Minister and the Minister for Rural Development and Local Administration, as well as the facts of a particular controversy with regard to a licence for an Exhibition by the Women and Children Hospital Improvement Committee. It is clear that the alleged remarks of the Home Minister at the Tirunelveli Public Meeting, were made after the issue of the ‘show cause’ notice, and might merely have reflected his knowledge of the fact that such a notice has been issued, based on certain reports of maladministration. The affidavit of the other Minister is explicit to the effect that he did not ask for the approval of any Councillor or Councillors of the Municipal Council for its supersession, and further, that he did not consult them in this regard. With regard to the controversy about the Exhibition, we find that the Chairman (Writ Petitioner in W.P. No. 1917 of 1966) as well as a leading member of the opposite group, were both concerned, and hence that there could be no question of mala fides at all. In brief, there is nothing to sustain this charge, except a speculation, apparently founded on the presumed inadequacy of the facts relied on for the order of supersession. In brief, there is nothing to sustain this charge, except a speculation, apparently founded on the presumed inadequacy of the facts relied on for the order of supersession. The learned Advocate-General rightly stresses that in several Reports of the Collector, prior to the ‘show cause’ notice, this action had been suggested as desirable in the public interest, and hence that the element of political mala fides would seem to be excluded. We agree with the learned Judge on this aspect. Upon this analysis, I am unable to see how the Court could, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, strike down the order of supersession. I would consequently allow the appeals and discharge the rule. In conclusion, I must certainly reiterate my impression that the measure taken is drastic, in its possible repercussions affecting the democratic process of Local Self-Government in that area, for as long a period as two years ; further, the basis of facts relied on, in justification of the measure, would appear to be relatively slender and inadequate ; but it is entirely for the State to take such further action in this matter, as it deems fit, in the light of these impressions. No order as to costs. Ramakrishnan, J.- I had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. While agreeing with the conclusion set forth in that judgment I wish to add the following. The main points for our consideration in these appeals, arising from the findings of the learned Judge, are as follows:- 1. The failure to conduct seven of the meetings of the Council in an orderly manner (forming the subject-matter of 7 out of the 9 charges against the Municipal Council) would not be relevant material, for holding that the Municipal Council was not competent to perform or made persistent default in performing the duties imposed on it by law. The subject-matter of charges 4 and 7 relating to the appointment of an employee, without reference to the panel of names sent by the Employment Exchange, and the passing of. resolution expressing sympathy for the victims of the Anti-Hindi agitation, would not constitute evidence to show that the Municipality acted in excess or abuse of its powers. 2. The subject-matter of charges 4 and 7 relating to the appointment of an employee, without reference to the panel of names sent by the Employment Exchange, and the passing of. resolution expressing sympathy for the victims of the Anti-Hindi agitation, would not constitute evidence to show that the Municipality acted in excess or abuse of its powers. 2. The State Government in directing the supersession of the Municipality took into account the reports of the Collector, sent to the Government before the charges were framed, and the remarks of the Collector on the explanation submitted by the Municipality, after the charges were framed, did not give an opportunity to the Municipality to controvert the data thus supplied, and, therefore, there was a contravention of the principles of natural justice. 3. The plea that the State Government was actuated by mala fides in superseding the Council. The finding of the learned Judge was that there was no such mala fides. My Lord the Chief Justice, in his order has dealt with the third point at length, in considering the arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondent in the appeals before us, when he sought to support the order of the learned Judge, by inviting us to hold that there was mala fides. I fully concur in the views of my Lord the Chief Justice, and do not wish to add any remarks of my own. On the first and second points mentioned above, the learned Judge (Kailasam, J.) has held that the State Government, while exercising its powers under section 41 of the Madras District Municipalities Act ( V of 1920), will be acting judicially. He has also held that the satisfaction of the State Government, reflected by the words “ in their opinion” used in the language of section 41, must be construed in the light of well-known authorities, which it is not necessary to cite here, as the subjective satisfaction of the Government ; there has been no challenge before us by the learned Advocate-General for the appellant, against this conclusion. The learned Counsel for the respondent argued that the failure of the Municipal Council to transact business at 7 meetings mentioned in 7 out of the 9 charges, was due to the obstructive tactics adopted by a handful of members of the Municipal Council, and that there are ample powers given to the Municipal Council, for keeping order at such meetings (vide Regulation 26 (a) and Regulation 26 (b) which give power to deal with disorderly councillors). Reference was also made to the successful termination of a much larger number of meetings of the Municipal Council, wherein business was transacted during the relevant period. It was, therefore, reiterated before us, that these data are not material data for supporting the finding against the Municipal Council. While it may be possible to take a broader view of the matter, and treat the circumstances of 7 meetings of the Council proving infructuous because of disorderly conduct of some members, as a minor defect in the working of the Council it cannot be held by this Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, that it would not constitute relevant material at all on which the Government could act under section 41 of the Act. Equally, the irregular appointment referred to in charge 4, and the resolution on a collateral matter not pertaining to the business of the Council forming the subject-matter of charge 7, could be viewed in a different light, and treated as venial faults. But here again, it will not be appropriate to substitute the opinion of this Court in the place of the opinion of the State Government, when it is free from dispute that what is relevant is the subjective satisfaction of the Government and when we are upholding the finding of the trial Judge, about the absence of mala fides. Regarding point 2, the Municipality is a corporate body owing its existence to the statute, which also provides self-contained provisions for regulating its powers and duties as well as terminating its existence by supersession or dissolution. Therefore in addition to the statutory procedure enacted in section 41, the Municipality, as a corporate body, cannot claim any other fundamental right or common-law right, for the purpose of an enquiry which leads to its dissolution or supersession. Therefore in addition to the statutory procedure enacted in section 41, the Municipality, as a corporate body, cannot claim any other fundamental right or common-law right, for the purpose of an enquiry which leads to its dissolution or supersession. While dealing with a Municipality against whom allegations are made regarding incompetency to function or persistent failure to perform its duties, the State Government is acting as an administrative authority, on whom the statute has enjoined the obligation to adopt a procedure which is quasi-judicial in its nature, during a stage of the enquiry, commencing from the formulation of the grounds for supersession proceeding through the grant of a period of time to the Council to show cause, and ending with the consideration of the explanation or objections of the Council, if any. However, the statute provides no restrictions as to the manner in which the Government should be apprised of the data against the Council, before it commences to formulate the charges ; nor has the statute prescribed any restriction as to the manner in which the State Government should consider the objections of the Municipality after those objections have been received in answer to the show cause notice. On the other hand, if the duty to supersede or dissolve is cast by the statute upon an individual Minister, the statute may also provide that, in considering the objections the Minister should consult his own conscience without taking any extraneous counsel before giving his decision, putting himself on a par with a judicial officer, dealing with a criminal or a civil matter. But in the present case, the authority to deal with the objections, is the Government in the abstract, and for considering the objections it will be open to the Government to use its usual official machinery including the machinery of the Secretariat and the machinery of the local officer on the spot the Collector, for helping it to arrive at its conclusion. There is nothing in the order of supersession passed by the Government in this case, to show that, while it has consulted the Collector after the objections were received, it had travelled beyond the charges and the explanation to the charges, before taking the decision to supersede. There is nothing in the order of supersession passed by the Government in this case, to show that, while it has consulted the Collector after the objections were received, it had travelled beyond the charges and the explanation to the charges, before taking the decision to supersede. The Government notification in paragraph 11 contains the following remarks: “ The Government have obtained the comments of the Collector on the replies given by the Municipal Council to the show cause notice. The Collector’s remarks clearly bring out the fact that the charges have been proved and that the functioning of the Municipal Administration has not at all been satisfactory.” We observe that the language cannot be considered to be very happy. But it is not conclusive to show that the Government surrendered its judgment or the exercise of its discretion in dealing with the charges, to the Collector, because in the earlier portion of the notification, while dealing with the charges one by one a clear finding in respect of each of them has been arrived at by the Government and recorded. In view of this, the action of the Government in obtaining the comments of the Collector on the replies given by the Municipal Council, must be treated as part of the administrative process involved, when the Government, after receipt of the objections of the Council, proceeded to deal with it. In this connection, the learned Advocate-General Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam appearing for the State drew our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Johnson & Co. v. Minister of Health1. That case dealt with a compulsory purchase order by a local authority under the Housing Act of 1936 which gave the aggrieved owners of the land a right to approach the Minister for relief, and the Minister under the statute could cause a public local enquiry to be held, consider any objections not withdrawn, the report of the person who held the enquiry and may then confirm the order with or without modification. Lord Greene, M.R., observed at page 399 of the report: “ But his (Minister’s) functions are administrative functions subject only to the qualification that, at a particular stage and for a particular and limited purpose, there is superimposed on his administrative character a character which is loosely described as ‘quasi-judicial ‘............The (ultimate) decision must be an administrative decision, because it is not to be based purely on the view that he forms of the objections vis-a-vis the desires of the local authority, but is to be guided by his view as to the policy which in the circumstances he ought to pursue.” In the present case, however, the conclusion of the Government to supersede or not to supersede must be based purely on the subjective view that they take on the objections, and it will not be correct to draw a parallel from the English case above cited, for holding that the subsequent decision of the Government under section 41 of the Act should have no reference to the charges and the explanations, preceding it, but should be viewed only as a policy decision. Johnson’s case1, however, will provide an analogy, in the limited sense, for viewing the intermediate process of supplying the grounds and calling for objections, as amounting to a procedure of a quasi-judicial character, imposed by the statute on the Government as an administrative body, but giving it a certain freedom of discretion in the use of the appropriate official machinery for the purpose of taking its decision subjectively. From this point of view, we are inclined to accept the argument advanced by the learned AdvocateGeneral that there has been no violation of the obligatory requirements of the statute or contravention of the principles of natural justice in dealing with the objections of the Municipal Council to the charges. At the conclusion of the appeals it was submitted before us that, the period of two years for the supersession is the maximum period provided by section 41 of the Act, that the remaining life of the present Council, as constituted, will expire before that date, and that the order will amount in substance to the dissolution of the Municipal Council, which is a more drastic step than supersession, under the statute. It was urged that recent days have witnessed many an instance of democratic bodies in this country, at every level, finding themselves paralysed in their work by the obstructive tactics of a few members, and that such tactics have been dealt with by methods other than supersession, either because the law does not provide for that remedy, or because, where the statute has provided such a remedy the authorities had considered the fault to be venial. It was pressed on us that a remedy out of all proportion to the requirements of a given case is likely to lead to an unfavourable impression on the public mind, and even lead to allegations of mala fides, as has happened in this case. Our attention was also drawn to the provision in the statute itself, namely, section 41 (5), which gives the discretion to the Government to reconstitute a superseded Council even before the expiry of the period notified earlier by section 41 (1) of the Act. In our opinion, these submissions are relevant, and may be appropriately considered by the Government in due course, for mitigating the severity of the remedy now applied, seeing that the statute clearly gives them the discretion to do so. V.K. ------ Appeals allowed