BHANDARI, J.—Indersirgh respondent has been acquitted of the offence under sec. 302 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, and the State has filed this appeal. He was charged for having committed the murder of Abdul Salam, who resided at Jodhpur and carried on the business of purchasing and selling goats and sheep. For purchasing sheep and goats, he used to go outside Jodhpur to various villages where sheep and goats abound. It is alleged by the prosecution that on 10th April, 1963, he left Jodhpur with a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and went to several villages in Shergarh Tehsil. When he did not return after 7/8 days, as promised by him, his uncle Abbas (PW. 1) sent Abdul Razzaq (PW. 13) and Mustafa (PW. 2) in search of him to Shergarh and Shetrawa. They brought the information that Abdul Salam alias Sheroo had purchased two goats from Ranidan Singh (PW. 11) at village Asarlai but beyond that his whereabouts could not be traced. Another party consisting of Allahdin (PW. 10), Abdul Razzaq (PW.13), Mohammed (PW. 15) and Ismail was then sent to village Asarlai. 2. Abbas also submitted a written report at Jodhpur. This report was sent to Police Station, Dechu, where First Information Report was drawn up and an offence under sec. 364 I.P.C. was registered on 15-5-63 and investigation was started by Mehboob Khan (PW. 18) Station House Officer, Dechu Police Station. The four persons, who had been sent in search of Abdul Salam, informed him that Indersingh respondent had killed Abdul Salam Alias Sheroo and that thereafter, he had gone to village Bamanoo, but Indersingh could not be found, on 17-5-63. Mehboob Khan came to know that Indersingh had gone towards Jodhpur. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur, who had also visited Asarlai, came to know that Indersingh was at Jodhpur. He found him out and took him to village Asarlai where he was formally arrested on 18-5-63. On the same day, Indersingh furnished information which was recorded in a memorandum (Ex. P/2). The admissible portion of the information is that he had buried a dead |body in the Charbara near a khejri tree after digging a round pit. He also furnished details about the clothes which were on the corpse and also the articles which were buried with the corpse. P/2). The admissible portion of the information is that he had buried a dead |body in the Charbara near a khejri tree after digging a round pit. He also furnished details about the clothes which were on the corpse and also the articles which were buried with the corpse. Thereafter Indersingh took the investigating officer and motbirs Vijay Singh and Ranidansingh to his charbara which was enclosed with a thorn enclosure up to a mans height. It had a door which was closed. Then Indersingh went to a khejri tree and pointed out the place where he had buried the dead body of Abdul Salam alias Sheroo and the other articles mentioned in Ex. P/20. Indersingh then dug up the place to depth of about one cubit. Several articles (Exhibits 4 to 11) the details of which we shall give here after were then recovered. Beneath these articles there were the branches of Ak tree and then a dead body was found. On the dead body was a shirt (Ex. 1), salwar (Ex. 2) and banian (Ex. 3)- The dead body and these various articles were at once recognized by Allahdin and others to be of Abdul Salam deceased. All these articles were seized and the recovery memo. (Ex. P/9) prepared. 3. The investigating officer also prepared the site plan (Ex. P/15), furnishing the details about it in Ex. P/16. Information was sent to Dr. Bhimpuri, Medical Officer-in charge, Government Hospital, Phalodi, who was asked to go to village Asarlai to perform the post mortem examination. He reached Asarlai on 19-5-63 and performed the post mortem examination at 9 00 A. M. The dead body was practically decomposed and at places decomposed flesh was forming a mass and the bones were separate. The injuries in the soft tissues could not be traced out on account of decomposition, but there was a fracture of the mandible on the left side of the symphysis and of the right condylar process. On account of decomposition, the doctor could not give his opinion about the cause of death. The post mortem examination report is Ex. P/26. 4. On further interrogation, Indersingh is alleged to have informed Mehbo-obkhan (PW. 18) that he had given Rs. 200/- to his father Kalyansingh, Rs. 100/- to Kalusingh and Rs.100/- to Berisalsingh. This information was recorded in Ex. P/23. The investigating officer recovered various amounts from these persons. The post mortem examination report is Ex. P/26. 4. On further interrogation, Indersingh is alleged to have informed Mehbo-obkhan (PW. 18) that he had given Rs. 200/- to his father Kalyansingh, Rs. 100/- to Kalusingh and Rs.100/- to Berisalsingh. This information was recorded in Ex. P/23. The investigating officer recovered various amounts from these persons. On further interogation Indersingh gave information contained in Ex. P/13 that he had given Rs.30/- to Gokaldas and this amount was recovered from Gokaldas by the investigating officer. On 24-5 63, Indersingh gave further information that he had hidden a pair of scissors (Ex. 12) under a heap of grass in the charbara on the left side. The information was recorded in Ex. P/24 and the pair of scissors was recovered from under the heap of grass in the charbara. It is then alleged that Indersingh further furnished information on 25-5 1963 that he had put one kulhari in his jhoompa. This information was recorded in Ex. P/25. On that very day, Indersingh got recovered Kulhari (Ex. 13) in the presence of motbirs. The recovery memo. (Ex.P/13) was prepared and the kulhari was sealed. Proceedings for identification of the various articles recovered by the investigating officer were taken before Shri G. K. Goswami, Magistrate First Glass, Jodhpur, and they were identified by Abbas and Mustafa witnesses. The memo of identification proceedings is Ex. P/2. The various articles Exhibits 4 to 11 and Ex. Axe Ex. 13 were sent to the Chemical Examiner, Rajasthan, and his report is that all these articles were positive for blood. The Serologist however reported that on account of disintegration, the origin of blood could not be determined. 5. Indersingh was challaned before the Munsiff-Magistrate, First Glass, Jodhpur District, and in his statement before the committing magistrate, the accused denied the entire prosecution case. He was committed for trial and was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur. 6. Indersingh pleaded not guilty and denied the entire prosecution case. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that it was proved that Abdul Salam had gone out for the purpose of purchasing goats and sheep with an amount of Rs. 2,000/- as stated by the prosecution, and that sometime thereafter on 10-1-63 he had reached village Asarlai where he had purchased two goats from Moolsingh (P.W. 3). The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that it was proved that Abdul Salam had gone out for the purpose of purchasing goats and sheep with an amount of Rs. 2,000/- as stated by the prosecution, and that sometime thereafter on 10-1-63 he had reached village Asarlai where he had purchased two goats from Moolsingh (P.W. 3). Learned Additional Sessions Judge also came to the conclusion on the facts on record that Abdul Salam died or was killed sometime between 11-4-63 and 15-5-63 and that the dead body was found buried in the charbara of the accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also held that the dead body and the articles Exhibits 1 to 11 were recovered on the information furnished by the accused and at his instance. He also held that he had given various amounts of money mentioned above to Kalu Singh, Berisalsingh and Gokulads. He also observed that this much was certain that Abdul Salam did not die a natural death and that if he had died a natural death, dead body could not have been concealed in the manner in which it was buried, and that "the inference was that Abdul Salam was killed whether by greed for money or by accident or otherwise." The learned Judge then held that these circumstances were not sufficient to hold that it was Indersingh who had killed Abdul Salam. In his opinion, the recovery of the dead body and the various articles created a strong suspicion against the accused, but the chain of the established circumstances was not such as to lead to no other conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused, and that the circumstantial evidence in the case was not wholly incompatible with the innocence of the accused and that it did not lead to the irresistible conclusion that Abdul Salam was murdered by the accused. Taking this view of the case, he acquitted Inder Singh. The State has filed this appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 7. In this appeal, the learned Deputy Government Advocate has argued that the facts and circumstances found proved by the trial court establish beyond any manner of doubt that it was Indersingh respondent who had caused the death of Abdul Salam. The State has filed this appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 7. In this appeal, the learned Deputy Government Advocate has argued that the facts and circumstances found proved by the trial court establish beyond any manner of doubt that it was Indersingh respondent who had caused the death of Abdul Salam. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has further argued that the learned trial Judge has wrongly discarded the testimony of Sang Singh (P. W. 14) and Padamsingh (P. W. 16) who had seen Abdul Salam entering the Khera of Kalyan Singh father of Indersingh and heard the cries from the bara of Kalyansingh "Inder Singh mar mat, mar mat" which showed that it was Indersingh who was responsible for the murder of Abdul Salam. It is also urged that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly discarded the evidence of Moolsingh (P.W. 3) and Ranidansingh (P.W. 11) which proved that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. In the end, learned Deputy Government Advocate and Shri Mukat Bihari Lal Bhargave appearing for the complainant have argued that in any case Indersingh was guilty of an offence under Sec. (201 IPC. for having concealed the dead body of Abdul Salam after digging a pit knowing that he had been killed by somebody. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment of the trial court to the extent the findings are in his favour. He has further argued that it was not proved that the dead body said to have been recovered at the instance of the accused was that of Abdul Salam. He has also argued that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove that Abdul Salam died on account of violence and that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient to prove even this fact. It has been further argued that the mere recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused cannot make the respondent liable for an offence under Sec. 201 I.P.C. as it is not proved that Abdul Salam had been killed either by the respondent or by anybody else. Learned counsel for the respondent has also urged that in an appeal against acquittal, this Court should be slow to set aside the order of acquittal, unless there are compelling reasons to do so. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has also urged that in an appeal against acquittal, this Court should be slow to set aside the order of acquittal, unless there are compelling reasons to do so. 9. The law relating to appeals from an order of acquittal has been laid down authoritatively in a number of cases by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. See M.G. Agarwal & M.K. Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra (1), Radha Kishan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2) and Durgacharan Naik vs. State of Orissa (3). We have kept in View the observations made in these cases while deciding this case. In analysing the evidence in this appeal we have kept in view the findings of the trial court and have not disturbed them if they are in favour of the appellant unless we have found cogent reasons for doing so. 10. There is no serious dispute in this appeal that Abdul Salam left Jodhpur on 10-4-1963 with considerable money in order to make purchases of goats and sheep. The evidence of Ranidansingh (P.W. 11) is that Sheroo Khan beopari was at his bara about 20/25 days before his brother-in-law came to make enquiries about him. He had purchased two goats from his son Moolsingh (PW. 3) and had made a payment of Rs. 17/- which his son gave to him. The witness asked Sheroo-khan whether he had marked the goats and Sherookhan replied that he had done so. Then Indersingh accused, who had also come to his bera, started from the bera after filling a pitcher with water and Sherookhan accompanied Indersingh. Moolsingh (PW. 3) has also corroborated his father, but in cross-examination, he has stated that he did not know the person to whom he had sold the goats, from before either by name or by face. The trial court has held that when the statement of Moolsingh is read with the statement of Ranidansingh and other witnesses, no doubt is left that Sherookhan mentioned by Moolsingh was the same person who had left Jodhpur on 10-4-63 and that he had purchased the goats from Moolsingh. He, however, has doubted whether Abdul Salam went in the company of the accused. The reason given is that Mustafa did not state in the trial court that he was informed by Ranidansingh that Sheroo went with the accused. He, however, has doubted whether Abdul Salam went in the company of the accused. The reason given is that Mustafa did not state in the trial court that he was informed by Ranidansingh that Sheroo went with the accused. It appears, on scrutinizing the record, that Mustafa was neither asked by the prosecution nor by the defence whether any such information was conveyed to him either by Mool- singh or by Ranidansingh. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has also pointed out that this fact is not mentioned in the First Information Report, but the F.I.R. was drawn up on a written application presented by Abbas who entertained suspicion against Ranidansingh as stated by him, and it may be that he did not believe that Abdul Salam had left his bera. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also pointed out that there was no reason why Ranidansingh did not inform Mustafa about Abdul Salam going with the accused. Ranidansingh has not at all been cross-examined on behalf of the accused, and in the absence of the cross-examination, there is no reason to hold that the witness was telling a lie. We are inclined to hold, therefore, that some day, in the morning, after Abdul Salam had reached village Asarlai, he had gone to the bera of Ranidansingh and purchased two goats from Moolsingh and left the bera in the company of Indersingh. We, however, do not treat this circumstance to be of much consequence against the accused as the exact date on which this happened has not been brought on the record and it cannot be said that Abdul Salam died near about that date. 11. What happened to Abdul Salam thereafter is not proved by any direct evidence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has disbelieved the evidence of Sangsingh and Padamsingh that they had seen Sheroo Alias Abdul Salam entering the Khera of Kalyansingh and had heard the cries of mar mat mar mat" from the charbara of the accused. After carefully going through the evidence of these two witnesses, we find no reason to differ from the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of these two witnesses. 12. Then we come to the most significant circumstance in the case, and it is the recovery of the dead body on the information of, and at the instance of the accused. 12. Then we come to the most significant circumstance in the case, and it is the recovery of the dead body on the information of, and at the instance of the accused. As already mentioned, the accused was arrested on 18-5-1963 by Meh-boob Khan (PW.18). On interrogation, he gave the information contained in Ex. P/20 the same day. The admissible portion of the information has already been mentioned above. Mehboob Khan (PW. 18) has proved Ex. P/20. He has further proved that Indersingh respondent took him to his charbara which had a thorn enclosure of a mans height, with a door which was not locked. Indersingh opened the door and entered the bara. Then he went to a khejri tree and pointed out the place where he had buried the dead body. Then Inder Singh dug the place with a phaora (spade) about one cubit deep and the various articles, as mentioned above, were recovered. From beneath these articles, a dead body was recovered which was putting on a white baniyan, a white salvar and a shirt. Mehboob Khan prepared seizure memos. Ex.P/8 and Ex.P/9, Ex.P/8 of the various articles and Ex.P/9 of the dead body. Allahdin (Pw. 10) who was the uncle of Abdul Salam, was present at that time, and he identified the dead body to be of Abdul Salam. Mohammed (PW. 15), who resided at Jodhpur and new Abdul Salam alias Sheroo, also identified the dead body of Abdul Salam, Raidhan-khan (PW.9) who had been knowing Abdul Salam alias Sheroo for the last 10 years, recognized the dead body to be of Abdul Salam alias sheroo by seeing his features. Bijeysingh (PW. 5) of village Asarlai proved the recovery of the articless from the dead body and also the recovery memos. Abdul Razzaq (PW. 13) who was an uncle of Abdul Salam and who was present at the time of the recovery of various articles from the dead body, also identified the dead body to be of Abdul Salam alias Sheroo. Abbas (PW. 1), Mustafa (PW. 2) Allahdin (PW. 10) Abdul Razzaq (PW. 13) and Mohammed (PW. 15) identified the various recovered articles to be Abdul Salam alias Sheroo. Abbas (PW. 1) and Mustafa (PW. 2) have also stated that these articles were taken by Abdul Salam alias Sheroo when he left Jodhpur. Abbas (PW. 1), Mustafa (PW. 2) Allahdin (PW. 10) Abdul Razzaq (PW. 13) and Mohammed (PW. 15) identified the various recovered articles to be Abdul Salam alias Sheroo. Abbas (PW. 1) and Mustafa (PW. 2) have also stated that these articles were taken by Abdul Salam alias Sheroo when he left Jodhpur. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed that there was nothing to disbelieve the statements of these witnesses., and it was fully proved that the dead body and the articles mentioned above were of Abdul Salam and that the recovery of the dead body and the articles on the information of the accused contained in Ex. P/20 had been proved. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that it was not possible for the prosecution witnesses to have identified the dead body as it is mentioned in the recovery memo. (Ex. P/9) that the dead body had decomposed and putrefied and some of the bones were attached to the flesh and the others had no flesh. He has also pointed out that Dr. Bhimpuri (PW. 19) who conducted the post mortem examination on 19-5-1963 has stated that the body had practically decomposed and that at places the decomposed flesh was forming a mass and the bones were separate. He was not asked whether the body could be identified in spite of the decomposition. In the post-mortem examination report (Ex. P/26), the external appearance of the dead body has been noted as showing that all the soft parts were decomposed. We may accept the criticism of the learned counsel for the respondent that the body was in an un-identifiable condition on account of decomposition of the various parts of the body. 14. We may here point out that those in charge of investigation should have sent the bones for further examination to an expert who could say whether these bones belonged to a male or female and could further give opinion also on the age of the person whose bones they were, and it is to be regretted that this was not done, but from the other circumstances which were proved in this case, we are left in no manner of doubt that the dead body recovered was of Abdul Salam. 15. The dead body was wearing shirt (Ex. 1), Banian (Ex.3) and salvar (Ex.2). 15. The dead body was wearing shirt (Ex. 1), Banian (Ex.3) and salvar (Ex.2). All these articles have been identified to be of Abdul Salam by the prosecution witnesses. In the same pit from which the dead body was recovered, were found bag (ex. 4), cup (Ex. 5), bag for water (Ex. 6), bag for spices (Ex. 7), cap (Ex.8), pair of shoes (Ex.9), book (Ex. 10) and kuppi of ghee (Ex. 11), which were all proved to be of Abdul Salam alias Sheroo which he had taken with him when he had started from Jodhpur. The association of the dead body with these articles, leading to the inference in the circumstances of the case, that the dead body was of the person to whom these articles belonged. 16. We may refer in this connection to Guo Hassan vs. Emperor (4). The Punjab Chief Court took the view that the satisfactory proof that clothes found on the body of a murdered person belong to him and were worn by him immediately before disappearance is sufficient to find that the corpse is that of the person although too decomposed to be identified otherwise. We, therefore, hold in the circumstances of this case that the dead body was of Abdul Salam alias Sheroo and none else. 17. The prosecution case further is that the pair of scissor (Ex. 12) was recovered on 24th May, 1963 on the information given by the accused as recorded in Ex. P/24. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has stated that it could not be believed that when the accused had given out such an important information as that relating to the place where the dead body and other articles were found on 18-5-63, he would have withheld the information regarding the pair of scissors un-til 24-5-68. Learned additional Sessions Judge has, however, held that the pair of scissors was recovered from the place mentioned in the recovery memo, as proved by the statement of Vijaysingh (PW. 5) and Paneysingh (PW. 6), that is, from beneath the heap of the grass in that charbara. There is further the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, with regard to the recovery of kulhari (Ex. 13) from the jhoompa of the accused at the instance of the accused. The trial court did not believe that these articles were so recovered on the information supplied by the accused and at his instance. There is further the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, with regard to the recovery of kulhari (Ex. 13) from the jhoompa of the accused at the instance of the accused. The trial court did not believe that these articles were so recovered on the information supplied by the accused and at his instance. We accept these findings. Here we may mention that the pair of scissors (Ex. 12) is proved to be of Abdul Salam by the prosecution witnesses and Kulhari (Ex. 13) to be of the father of the accused. 18. The trial court has also believed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that Rs. 200/- were recovered from Kalyansingh, the father of the accused, Rs. 100/-from Kalusingh, Rs.100/- from Berisalsingh and Rs. 30/- from Gokaldas. Kalusingh (PW. 4) has stated that three or four months before the panchayat took place when the relations of the deceased came to make enquiries about the deceased, he had lent Rs. 100/- to the accused and the accused had returned that money sometime before Akha Teej, but he could not say how many days before Akha Teej. The witness is thus not definite as to when Rs. 100/- were paid by the accused to him. Berisalsingh (P.W. 8) has stated that some 12 months before, in the month of Chait, the accused borrowed Rs. 100/- from him which he had returned on the next day of the Akha Teej. It may be mentioned that Akha Teej in that year fell on 26th April, 1963. This witness has not been cross-examined and we may take it that the accused paid Rs. 100/- to Berisalsingh, who was his creditor on 27-4-1963 Gokuldas (PW.12) has stated that the accused used to purchase various articles from his shop and he paid Rs. 30/- on Bisakh Badi 3 or 4 in his account. The copy of the account on record shows that there is some interpolation in it and perhaps Sudi has been made Badi. We may thus ignore the statement of Gokuldas. The explanation of the accused is that he had paid his own money to these persons. From the evidence, we hold that the following circumstances have been fully established. 1. That Abdul Salam left Jodhpur on 10-4-63 with Rs. 2,000/- and Arts. to 12, promising to come back home, but he never returned from there . 2. The explanation of the accused is that he had paid his own money to these persons. From the evidence, we hold that the following circumstances have been fully established. 1. That Abdul Salam left Jodhpur on 10-4-63 with Rs. 2,000/- and Arts. to 12, promising to come back home, but he never returned from there . 2. That Abdulsalam went to village Asarlai sometime after 10/4/63 and there he purchased two goats from Mool Singh son of Ranidansingh and was seen on that day by Ranidansingh in the company of the accused; 3. That from the charbara of the accused, the dead body of Abdul Salam in the condition mentioned earlier, with clothes on it, and various articles Exhibits 4 to 11 belonging to him lying on it, was recovered in consequence of the information (Ex. P/20) supplied by the accused Indersingh and in that information he had stated that he had buried the dead body and the various articles in a pit in the charbara near the khejri tree; 4. That on post-mortem examination it was found that there was a fracture of the mandible on the left side of symphysis and of right condylar process, 5. That a pair of scissors Ex. 12 was recovered from the grass heap in the charbara of the accused on 24-5-1963. 6. That the axe (Ex. 13) which belonged to the father of the accused was recovered from the dhani of the accused and his father and that axe was found to be blood stained; 7. That the various Articles Ex.1 to 11 and Ex.13 were found to be stained with blood; 8. That Indersingh had paid Rs. 100/- to Beisalsingh to whom he owed that amount on 27th April 1963. 9. No part of the amount of Rs. 2,000/- which the deceased had taken with him from Jodhpur was found buried in the pit from which the dead body was recovered; 10. That the accused denied all these facts, except circumstance No. 6, in his statement when examined under sec. 342 Cr.P.C. of these circumstances, the most important circumstance is circumstance 3 which we shall consider first of all. 20. That the accused denied all these facts, except circumstance No. 6, in his statement when examined under sec. 342 Cr.P.C. of these circumstances, the most important circumstance is circumstance 3 which we shall consider first of all. 20. Concealment of a dead body has always been treated as a circumstance of a highly inculpatory nature against the accused: "An inference of guilt may be drawn from the defendant loss or destruction of records or concealment of letters or concealment or destruction of tangible objects which could be used as evidence against him. An inference of guilt may be drawn from the concealment or destruction of the corpse of the deceased." (Paras. 142 & 143 on Pages 266 & 267 of Whartos Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, 12th Edn. (Andersons book). 21. The following passage from wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 7th Edition, Page 148 may also be cited in this connection. "So also is the concealment of death by the destruction or attempted destruction of human remains (Rex vs. Gardella, (1761) 4 Celebrated Trials, 400; Rex vs. Cook, Leicester Ass.1834, p.355 infra Reg. vs. Good, (1842) 16 CCC Sess. Pap. 233, Reg. vs. Schneider; (1898) 129 CCC Sees. Pap. 101; p. 355 infra; Rex. vs. Crippen, pp. 467-479, infra; (See Vaithinatha Pillay vs. Emperor, 36 Mad. 501 PC) but in this case the presumption of criminality results from the act of concealment rather than from the nature of the means employed, however revolting, which must be regarded only as incidental to the fact of concealment and not as aggravating the character and tendency of the act itself." Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, relied on the observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kanbi Karsan Jadav vs. State of Gujarat(5): The mere fact that the dead body was pointed out by the appellant or was discovered as aresult of a statement made by him would not necessarily lead to the conclusion of the offence of murder." (Para 823/Para 9) We may, however, point out that in the instant case, there was not only the recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused, but there is also his confessional statement that he himself had buried the dead body at the place from where it had been recovered. That this part of the confessional statement is admissible in evidence is now a well-established proposition. That this part of the confessional statement is admissible in evidence is now a well-established proposition. There is a world of difference between a case in which there is recovery of the dead body of a person, who is said to have been murdered, at the instance of the accused, and a case in which he has further admitted that he had himself buried it. The recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused may be explained on the basis that the accused may have known the place from which the dead body was recovered, but he may not have a hand in placing the dead body there. Thus, the mere circumstance that the dead body was pointed out by the accused and was recovered as a result of his statement may not be deemed sufficient to hold the accused guilty of any offence. But we have a case in which the respondent himself buried the dead body in his own charbara. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that even in such a case, the accused cannot be convicted of the offence of murder unless there is proof that the deceased died as a result of injuries inflicted on him by the accused. He has relied on the following Supreme Court cases in this connection, Kashmira Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh(6), Palvinder Kaur vs. The State of Punjab(5) Rupsingh father of Jaspalsingh deceased ; Caveator(7) and The State Government, Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey(8). Let us proceed to examine each of these cases. In Kashmirasingh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh(6), the points established against the appellant were that(i) he had a motive and he said that he would be revenged ; (ii) he was absent from Gurudwara about the time of murder long enough to commit it and denied the fact; (iii) some 12 hours after the crime he assisted in removing the body from a place between half to three quarters of a mile distant from the scene of the crime and (4) at some unknown point of time he assisted in tying up the mouth of the gunny bag in which the body was eventually placed. Their Lordships acquitted the accused in that case, making the following observations: "In our opinion it would be unsafe to convict of murder on these facts. Their Lordships acquitted the accused in that case, making the following observations: "In our opinion it would be unsafe to convict of murder on these facts. A number of rulings were cited, including one of the Privy Council, and it was argued that in those cases persons were convicted of murder on similar facts. We do not intend to examine them because no decision can be a guide on facts. Each case has its own special circumstances and must be decided on its own facts. For example, in most of the cases cited the accused was associated with the disposal of the body very soon after the occurrence and at the scene of the crime. Here, twelve hours had elapsed and the first connection proved with the disposal is at a place over half a mile distant from where the body is said to have been murdered. Next, the points we have shown in favour of the appellant in this case were not present there." (Paras 17/18-page 165) Kashmira Singhs case thus is not a case in which the accused had admitted that he had himself buried the dead body and, as pointed out by their Lordships, no decision can be an authority on facts and that each case must be decided on its own facts. Kashmirasinghs case, is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 23. In Palvinder Kaur vs. The State of Punjab(7) Palvinder Kaur who was the appellant in that case, was convicted by the High Court of Punjab under sec. 201 I. P. C. for concealing the dead body of her husband Jaspal. The main point in that case which is relevant for the purposes of the instant case is that there was no evidence that the death of Jaspal, husband of Palvinder Kaur, was caused by administering him potassium cyanide as was the prosecution case. 201 I. P. C. for concealing the dead body of her husband Jaspal. The main point in that case which is relevant for the purposes of the instant case is that there was no evidence that the death of Jaspal, husband of Palvinder Kaur, was caused by administering him potassium cyanide as was the prosecution case. Their Lordships made the following observations in that case: "In order to establish the charge under sec, 201, Penal Code, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed,—mere suspicion that it has been committed is not sufficient— that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed and with the requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment causes the evidence thereof to disappear or gives false information respecting such offences knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false. It was essential in these circumstances for the prosecution to establish affirmatively that the death of Jaspal was caused by the administration of potassium cyanide by some person (the appellant having been acquitted of this charge) and that she had reason to believe that it was so caused and with that knowledge she took part in the concealment and disposal of the dead body. There is no evidence whatsoever on this point. The following facts, that Jaspal died, that his body was found in a trunk and was discovered from a well and that the appellant took part in the disposal of the body do not establish the cause of his death or the manner and circumstances in which it came about. As already stated, there is no direct evidence to prove that potassium cyanide was administered to him by any person. The best evidence on this question would have been that of the doctor who performed the post mortem examination. That evidence does not prove that Jaspal died as a result of administration of potassium cyanide. On the other hand, the doctor was of the opinion that there were no positive post mortem signs which could suggest poisoning. He stated that potassium cyanide being corrosive poison, would produce hypermia, softening and ulceration of the gastro-intestinal tract and that in this case he did not notice any such signs. On the other hand, the doctor was of the opinion that there were no positive post mortem signs which could suggest poisoning. He stated that potassium cyanide being corrosive poison, would produce hypermia, softening and ulceration of the gastro-intestinal tract and that in this case he did not notice any such signs. He further said that potassium cyanide corrodes the lips and the mouth, and none of these signs was on the body. This evidence therefore instead of proving that death was caused by administration of potassium cyanide, to the extent it does, negatives that fact." (Para 14/Page 356) Then, their Lordships examined the circumstantial evidence and came to the conclusion that there was no proof as to the cause of death, and then made the following concluding observations: "The result, therefore, is that we are constrained to hold that there is no material direct or indirect for the finding reached by the High Court that the death of Jaspal was caused by the administration of potassium cyanide. If we believe the defence version his death was the result of an accident. If that version is disbelieved, then there is no proof as to the cause of his death. The method and the manner in which the dead body of Jaspal was dealt with and disposed of raise some suspicion but from these facts a positive conclusion cannot be reached that he died an un-natural death necessarily. Cases are not unknown where death is accidental and the accused has acted in a peculiar manner regarding the disposal of the dead body for reasons best known to himsalf. One of them might well be that he was afraid of a false case being started against him. Life and liberty of persons cannot be put in jeopardy on mere suspicions, howsoever strong, and they can only be deprived of these on the basis of definite proof. One of them might well be that he was afraid of a false case being started against him. Life and liberty of persons cannot be put in jeopardy on mere suspicions, howsoever strong, and they can only be deprived of these on the basis of definite proof. In this case, as found by the High Court, not only were the Sub-Inspector of Police and police constables and other witnesses guilty of telling deliberate lies but the prosecution was blameworthy in introducing witnesses in the case to support their lies and that being so, we feel that it would be unsafe to convict the appellant on the material that is left after eliminating the perjured, false and inadmissible evidence." (Para 21/Page 358) Basing his arguments on this case, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove the cause of Abdul Salams death or the manner, or the circumstances, in which it came about and that simply because the respondent buried it in his charbara, it could not be held established that Abdul Salam was killed either by the appellant or even by some one else. He has urged that Abdul Salam might have committed suicide, or his death might have been accidental. In Palvinder Kaurs case (7) the allegation of the prosecution was that Jaspal died as a result of administration of potassium cyanide, but the medical evidence was to the contrary. Then the circumstantial evidence about the disposal of the body could be explained on the ground that it might be a case of accident and Palvinder Kaur might have acted due to fright. We shall presently show that the present case is distinguishable on facts. We have, however, kept in view the observations in Palvinder Kaurs case (7) that it is the duty of the prosecution in order to obtain a conviction under section 201 I.P.C. to prove that the deceased died an un-natural death and that this was in the knowledge of the respondent. 24. Learned counsel has further tried to reinforce his argument by relying on the case of the State Government, Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey & others (8), which is a case in which the dead body was found in the house of the deceased. 24. Learned counsel has further tried to reinforce his argument by relying on the case of the State Government, Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey & others (8), which is a case in which the dead body was found in the house of the deceased. In that case, Limsey was acquitted, though the dead body of the deceased Dattu Patel was recovered from a freshly constructed tomb of brick and cement on the third storey of the house of Limsey. Limseys defence was that he did not know how Dattu Patel died or his body came to be buried in his house and that the incident appeared to be a deliberate case of accidental death, and deliberate concealment by some other person during his absence. The High Court took the view that there was no proof of the use of violence. Hidaya-tullah A.C.J. as he then was of the Nagpur High Court, observed that the result of autopsy was inconclusive and whether this was due to putrefaction or some other cause was little to purpose and that the court could not speculate about the cause of death and cannot on the material furnished hold that the death of Dattu Patel was from violence. Taking this view of the case, the accused was acquitted by the High Court. This judgment was challenged in the Special Appeal under Art.136 of the Constitution on the ground of perversity. The Supreme Court observed that— "All that we can possibly say is that we might have been inclined to take a view different from that taken by the High Court if we were hearing the appeal there. It cannot, however, be positively said that the conclusion reached by the High Court is, in any way, perverse or improper, or that on the facts found the only conclusion that could possibly be reached in the case was that the crime had been committed by the accused. (Para 6/Page 22). It cannot, however, be positively said that the conclusion reached by the High Court is, in any way, perverse or improper, or that on the facts found the only conclusion that could possibly be reached in the case was that the crime had been committed by the accused. (Para 6/Page 22). The aforesaid observations of their Lordships point out that their Lordships were not inclined to take a different view of the evidence while hearing the appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, but the appeal before us is under Sec. 417 Cr.P.C. in which we can review the entire evidence, keeping in view the requirement that we should not set aside the finding of the trial court simply for the reason that a view against the accused on facts is possible and also keeping in view the presumption of innocence of the respondent is further reinforced by the judgment of the trial court in his favour. It would not be out of place for us to refer to the arguments of which the learned Advocate General for State in Limseys case are summarised in Para. 7 of the Supreme Court on them— "The learned Advocate General for the State contended that the High Court should have concluded from the circumstantial evidence that the death of Dattu was brought about by foul play and was not a natural one. He urged that Dattus body could not have been entombed in Limseys house without his consent or permission and as a matter of fact he must have been responsible for it, that in the absence of any satisfactory explanation as to why he took such an extraordinary step, it should have been concluded that he did so in order to destroy evidence of his criminal act, that if the death had been due to natural causes, his conduct would have been quite different; he would have informed the mother and wife of Dattu about this said affair and would have given his friend a proper cremation and would not have destroyed the best evidence of the body of Dattu in proof of his innocence and that his conduct in running away from Nagpur on the 11th was not compatible with his innocence. Lastly it was contended that Limsey had a motive for putting Dattu out of the way, the relations between them being strained, that he had an opportunity of achieving his object and that his conduct after the crime led to an irresistible presumption of his guilt and that being so, it should have been held that the charge of murder was proved against him." Their Lordships observed that there was considerable force in these contentions but their Lordships were unable to find that the High Court was necessarily in error in holding that the circumstantial evidence in the case was not wholly incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that there was no pre-conceived plan and maintained the order of acquittal on the ground that it was not difficult to visualize that Dattu died a natural death, but on account of sudden death and in a moment of panic and confusion Limsey conceived the idea of concealing his death by entombing him in his own house. 25. These two Supreme Court cases no doubt lay down the law that it is for the prosecution to prove that the deceased was killed either by the accused or some-body else and that unless there is proof that the deceased was killed, the accused cannot be convicted either under sec. 302 IPC. or under sec 201 IPC. These two cases further lay down that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove this by direct proof of death, or of the violence or of any other act of the accused which is alleged to have caused the death. The fact that the deceased was killed may be proved by circumstantial evidence as any other fact. 26. Here, we may refer to three English cases which are instructive on this point. The first is Mary Ann Nash (9). The appellant Mary Ann Nash was convicted before Lord Coleridge J. of the murder of her illegitimate son and sentenced to death. It was submitted in appeal that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury (i) of the identity of the body and (ii) of unlawful killing. The undisputed facts were that on the morning of the 27th of June, 1907 the appellant had left with the child saying that she was going to Mrs. It was submitted in appeal that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury (i) of the identity of the body and (ii) of unlawful killing. The undisputed facts were that on the morning of the 27th of June, 1907 the appellant had left with the child saying that she was going to Mrs. Hilliers, that she would pass near the well where the body was found and that a woman was seen there with a child on a day and about that time. The appeal was dismissed with the following observations— "Alone those facts might not be sufficient, but she left with the child in perfect health, and when she returned she said she had left it with Mrs. Hillier; she packed up its clothes and said she had sent them to her, and later she said that the child was well. All these statements were untrue. She had an object in getting rid of the child, and if it had been lost or met with an accidental death, she had every interest in saying so at once. It is said there is no evidence of violent death, but we cannot accept that. Mr. Goddard cannot have meant that there must be proof from the body itself of a violent death. His argument means that on the whole evidence the possibility is left so open that it was not safe to leave it to the jury. But the facts which were proved called for an explanation, and beyond the admittedly untrue statements, none was forthcoming. Mr. Goddard suggests that the evidence is consistent with the child having been given to gypsies or such like people, but the jury cannot assume such a hypothesis without evidence. The possibility of accident wasreferred to in the summing up, which has not" been attacked. In view of the facts that the child left home well and was afterwards found dead, that the appellant was last seen with it, and made untrue statement about it, this is not a case which could have been withdrawn from" the jury." 27. Another case is of Frederick Albert Robertson(10) The facts in that case were that on 24th June, the appellant, his wife and their three children, one of whom was the girl whose death was the subject of this charge, and other twins aged nine months, lived in a house with a Mr. Another case is of Frederick Albert Robertson(10) The facts in that case were that on 24th June, the appellant, his wife and their three children, one of whom was the girl whose death was the subject of this charge, and other twins aged nine months, lived in a house with a Mr. & Mrs. Smith. The appellants wife went to the infirmary. The children were looked after by Mrs. Smith. On Saturday, the 28th June, the appellant told Mrs. Smith that he would try to get the Salvation Army to take them. On the same night, the children were put to bed by Mrs. Smith and they appeared quite well then, and the appellant remained alone with the children. On the same night when asked by Mrs. Smith if the children had gone away, the appellant said that they had taken the girl and that they would be coming in the morning for the twins. Then in the morning they said that the twins had been taken by the Salvation Army. He told his wife that the children were being looked after by the Salvation Army and the same statement to another girl, but on the 12th July, he left the house, and ten days later, another person having taken the rooms, a sickenig odour was noticed. The police were called in and the bodies of the children were found under the floor. The bodies were undoubtedly in considerable state of decomposition, but identifi-action was not impossible. Medical evidence established that the condition of the bodies was quite consistent with their having been smothered in some way. It was argued in appeal that these facts do not amount to evidence on which a jury could convict, but this contention was over-ruled with the following observations— "It would be argued that on these facts no other verdict was possible. The only possible suggestion is a series of coincidences: the jury are reasonable men, and we have to exercise our common sense and must take into account what inferences reasonable men would draw from the evidence. There is only one other point. Mr. The only possible suggestion is a series of coincidences: the jury are reasonable men, and we have to exercise our common sense and must take into account what inferences reasonable men would draw from the evidence. There is only one other point. Mr. Purchase, making the most of the fact that the doctors were not able to say definitely that the children had been smothered, argued that the evidence might only point to a misdemeanour, and says that the judge ought to have called the specific attention of the jury to this argument, and that his failure to do so amounted to misdirection. We think it was an admirable summing up, and that everything was said that could be said in favour of the appellant. We are impressed by the great care with which every possible point in favour of the defence was put forward." 28. The third case is In Regina vs. Onufrejczyk (11) in which there was no trace of the victims body or direct evidence of the death or of the way in which he had died, and no confession or admission of the death by the accused. But the conviction of the accused for the murder of his partner who had disappeared was maintained. It was pointed out by Lord Goddard C. J. that— "There wasevidence on which the jury could infer that he (Sykut Pole) did meet his death, and that he was dead and if he was dead, the circumstances of the case point to the fact that his death was not a natural one." 29. In Wigmore on Evidence, 7th Vol., 3rd Edn. Page 422 the law has been stated — The attempt has often been made to establish a rule that, for proving the corpus delicti the fact of death, on a charge of homicide, or of abstraction of goods on a charge of larcenythere must be direct or testimonial evidence, i.e. a witness who has seen the lifeless body of the person, or the vacant place where the goods were. (Page 417) In the United States, it has been generally conceded that no such rule exists; i.e. circumstantial evidence of a proper degree of strength is sufficient to prove the death of the person,) loss of the goods, or other injury forming the corpus delicti, and testimony by eye-witnesses of the dead done, or at least of the persons dead body, or of the vacant place where the goods were, is not required. In these jurisdictions, however, such a rule has been enacted by statutes; one of which, at least, seems to be, in Mr. Justice Storys phrase, "In condonation of all murders" in which the murderer has successfully destroyed his victimss body." (Pages 422-423) We need not pursue this matter any further because in India their Lordships of the Supreme Court have accepted the position that death by violence could be proved by circumstantial evidence in the aforesaid cases. We may also refer in this connection to the case of Anant Chintaman Lagu vs. The State of Bombay (15), in which the case law on the subject has been reviewed at length. 30. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that Abdul Salams death may have been due to suicide or may be altogether accidental. Abdul Salam had gone hale and hearty from Jodhpur to make purchases of goats and sheep. He had considerable money with him. There was no reason whatsoever for him to have committed suicide and that too in the charbara of the deceased. It has been stated in Whartons Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, on Page 194— "There is no presumption as to whether a person who has disappeared has committed suicide. Moreover, it is presumed that a person known to be dead did not die by suicide. This presumption is rebuttable and yields to any inferences to be drawn from the facts of the particular case." Nothing has been brought on the record in this case from which it his possible for us to draw any inference that Abdul Salam may have committed suicide. On the other hand he had definitely told his uncle that after making purchases he would come back to Jodhpur before Id which in that year fell on 5th May 1963. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the suggestion of suicide is too fantastic for us to accept. 31. On the other hand he had definitely told his uncle that after making purchases he would come back to Jodhpur before Id which in that year fell on 5th May 1963. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the suggestion of suicide is too fantastic for us to accept. 31. Now we examine the theory whether Abdul Salam died a natural death by accident. The first question is, where did he die? If he did not die in the charbara of the respondent Indersingh, there was no conceivable reason for Indersingh to have brought his dead body to his charbara. If Abdul Salam had died a natural death in his charbara, the natural course for Indersingh was to bring his death to the notice of the villagers and then to arrange for a funeral if he had some element of humanity in him. But instead of doing so, he buried him along with all his belongings. It cannot be presumed that Abdul Salam, who had gone from Jodhpur with as big a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, was altogether bereft of the money. Assuming that he had spent enough on purchases, he must have kept at least so much amount as would have been necessary for his return to Jodhpur. Why was he buried? where has all his money gone ? These are obvious questions which call for an explanation from the accused but no explanation is forthcoming. 32. It is urged that the appellant might have buried the body on account of fright or foolishness. There may be cases in which an innocent man may dispose of a dead body on account of fright; lest he might he involved in the murder Such cases occur when a person entertains a sort of feeling that a false accusation is roost likely to be brought against him and he takes it in his head to dispose of the dead body to avoid any suspicion falling on him. For example, if a man dies at the house of an enemy, the latter may act in fright in disposing of the dead body or, again, an un-chaste wife may dispose of the dead body of her husband to prevent any suspicion falling on her. For example, if a man dies at the house of an enemy, the latter may act in fright in disposing of the dead body or, again, an un-chaste wife may dispose of the dead body of her husband to prevent any suspicion falling on her. But here we have got a case in which there could be no fear in the mind of the respondent that there was any likelihood of his false implication for causing the death of Abdul Salam, had he died accidentally. He cannot be said to have buried the dead body in this manner out of fright or for any such other reason. He could not have acted with more foolishness as he was a young man of 25 years. 33. Further, though the doctor, who performed the post-mortem examination and examined the bones of Abdul Salam has stated that he could not give the cause of the death, yet at the same time he has said that there was fracture of mandible on the left side of symphysis and of right condylar process. There was no cross-examination of this witness on behalf of the accused. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, argued that these fractures may be post-mortem, that is, the fractures may have occurred when the dead body was buried. To cause such fractures, there must have been some use of force. Such fractures, could not have been caused merely in the process of burial of the dead body in a round and deep pit without causing injury to the skull. In all probability, the fractures were ante-mortem. There is evidence that when Abdul Salam left Jodhpur, he was quite hale and hearty. He could not have have been in a position to purchase goats from Moolsingh had he such fractures at that time. Thus the fractures on the mandible occurred some time afterwards. 34. Then, there is the circumstance that various Arts. 1 to 11 were found stained with blood. These Articles belonged to Abdul Salam. Articles 1 to 3 are clothes he was wearing and the other articles were with him. It was of course not proved that these articles were stained with human blood but the fact that everything with Abdul Salam was stained with blood is a circumstance showing that a good deal of blood came out of his body. Articles 1 to 3 are clothes he was wearing and the other articles were with him. It was of course not proved that these articles were stained with human blood but the fact that everything with Abdul Salam was stained with blood is a circumstance showing that a good deal of blood came out of his body. All these circumstances conclusively show that Abdul Salam died of violence committed on him by somebody. 35. The question now arises whether it was the respondent who did the act of killing. Here, again there is no direct evidence, and it is urged that merely because the respondent buried the deceased Abdul Salam, it cannot be taken that he had killed him as the burial had taken place in the charbara which belonged as much to the father of the respondent as to Inder Singh. 36. There are of course two further circumstances which cast a grave suspicion that it was the accused who had murdered Abdul Salam. One is that he came in possession of money during those days. It is the evidence of Berissal Singh that the respondent had given one hundred rupees to him the next day of Akha Tij day which he had borrowed one year before. Then there is the fact that blood stained axe (Ex. 30) was recovered from the dhani of the accused and his father and one of the prosecution witnesses stated that the axe was of his father. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that Abdul Salam might as well have been killed by the father of the respondent or by someone else and the respondent had merely buried the corpse. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the benefit of doubt on any point should be given to the accused and even this extreme contention of the learned counsel may be accepted. But in the circumstances of the case, there is absolutely no room for doubt that he buried Abdul Salam knowing that he had been murdered. The learned trial Judge has not examined the evidence from the point of view of sec. But in the circumstances of the case, there is absolutely no room for doubt that he buried Abdul Salam knowing that he had been murdered. The learned trial Judge has not examined the evidence from the point of view of sec. 201 I.P.C. On the other hand, in his view Abdul Salam had not died a natural death because the learned Judge has himself said that had he died a natural death, his dead body would not have been buried in concealment in the way it was buried and that the inference was that Abdul Salam was killed either for greed of money, or by accident, or otherwise. We fail to follow the learned trial Judge when he says that Abdul Salam was killed by accident. There is no justification at all for such an observation in this case. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that it has not been proved that whosoever killed Abdul Salam committed an offence under sec. 302 IPC, and, therefore, Indersingh cannot be convicted for having committed on offence under sec. 201 IPC. on the basis that he knew or had reason to believe that murder of Abdul Salam had been committed. His argument is that there was room for holding that only the offence of culpable homicide and not of murder was committed and Inder Singh respondent could be convicted of an offence under sec. 201 IPC on that basis. Now it was for the respondent to show the circumstances which could mitigate the character of the offence and show that it was not murder but culpable homicide. In this connection we may refer to Taylor on Evidence, 12th Edn., Vol. I, Page 108: "When it appears that one persons death has been occasioned by the hand of another there is a presumption that the killing amounts to murder, and it lies upon the person charged with the offence to show by evidence or by inference from the circumstances of the case, that the offence is of a mitigated character." We may also refer to the case of Babu Singh vs. State of Punjab (13), wherein the charge under sec. 201 I.P.C. against Babusingh was held established substantially because of the recovery of the dead body from his house. 39. 201 I.P.C. against Babusingh was held established substantially because of the recovery of the dead body from his house. 39. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on In re Antappa, accused appellant (14), and has urged that precisely in a similar case, the Mysore High Court refused to convict the accused for an offence under sec. 201 IPC. for the reason that the fracture of the law in that case may not have been the result of an ante-mortem injury. In that case, however, it was rot found that the dead body was that of the person who was said to have been murdered, and there is no discussion whether from other circumstances it could be inferred that the deceased had been murdered. There was also not even circumstantial evidence showing that the injury on the jaw was ante-mortem. We, therefore, cannot draw any support from that case in favour! of the respondent. 40. In our opinion, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not at all applied his mind to the provisions of sec. 201 I.P.C. and has not examined the question from the stand point whether respondent Indersingh could be held liable under sec. 201 I.P.C. While we may take the view that the order of acquittal under sec. 302 I.P.C. need not be interfered with by us in this appeal from acquittal, the respondent Indersingh is no doubt liable under sec. 201 I.P.C. for concealing the dead body of Abdul Salam knowing that he was murdered. 41. We, therefore, partly accept the appeal and convict Indersingh respondent under sec. 201 I.P.C. as aforesaid and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years.