Judgment :- 1. These second appeals arise out of two suits for redeeming the same mortgage by two sets of heirs of the mortgagor. S. A. No. 511 of 1961 arises out of O. S. No. 118 of 1954; and S. A. No. 880 of 1961 arises out of O. S. No. 535 of 1953. In the former suit the trial court granted a decree for redemption, while in the latter the trial court granted a declaration that the plaintiffs therein had also right in the equity of redemption, but dismissed the suit, as all the necessary parties were not impleaded. In both the suits the contesting defendants filed appeals before the lower appellate court; and the lower appellate court has allowed both the appeals. Against those decisions the second appeals have been brought by some of the plaintiffs in the respective suits. 2. The property originally belonged to a Syed Meeravu Rowther; and he and one of his sons by name Syed executed the suit mortgage, Ex. P-1, in 1079 to third parties. Syed Meeravu died; and Syed sold the equity of redemption to the mortgagees in 1087. In 1097 five plaintiffs, the heirs of Syed Meeravu, filed O. S. No. 517 of 1097 for setting aside the sale. In that suit the first plaintiff in O. S. No. 118 of 1954 was the fifth plaintiff; and he was then a minor. He was represented by the third plaintiff therein, the son of Syed, as next friend. The suit was subsequently compromised under Ex. P.3 in 1102, which provided that the sale be set aside, that the plaintiffs therein redeem the property on payment of Rs. 1,050/- to the mortgagees towards mortgage money and value of improvements on or before 10th Kanni 1103, and that in default, the mortgagees be entitled to execute the decree against the hypotheca and realise the amount. The amount was not paid; and in 1112 the mortgagees started proceedings in execution, brought the property to sale and purchased it themselves. In Edavom 1112 they obtained delivery of possession as well. The present suits have been brought to redeem the mortgage ignoring the compromise decree and the sale in execution thereof. 3. It may be noted that there is no case that the decree and execution proceedings in O. S. No. 517 of 1097 were tainted by fraud or collusion. In Edavom 1112 they obtained delivery of possession as well. The present suits have been brought to redeem the mortgage ignoring the compromise decree and the sale in execution thereof. 3. It may be noted that there is no case that the decree and execution proceedings in O. S. No. 517 of 1097 were tainted by fraud or collusion. The case is only that the said decree was null and void, because the first plaintiff (the fifth plaintiff therein) was not properly represented and that the compromise went beyond the scope of the suit. The third plaintiff in that suit was the next friend of the minor. Some attempt has been made before me to show that the interest of the next friend was adverse to that of the minor. It is clear that the next friend had no interest adverse to that of the minor in the subject-matter of that suit, whatever might be the position otherwise. In that suit the next friend, the minor and the other plaintiffs were all having the same case that the sale deed by Syed in favour of the mortgagees must be set aside. Therefore, there is no substance in the plea that the interest of the next friend was adverse to that of the minor so that the decree with the said next friend on record was not binding on the minor. 4. The next question is whether the compromise decree went beyond the scope of that suit. The suit was, as already stated, for setting aside the sale by Syed. By the compromise the sale was set aside; but the compromise decree further provided that the mortgagors should pay the mortgage money and value of improvements (Rs. 1, 050/-) within about a year of the decree; and that if they failed, the mortgagees could execute and recover the amount from the hypotheca. It cannot be said that this provision was beyond the scope of the suit: as rightly held by the lower appellate court, it was only within the scops of the suit. Therefore, for that reason also the compromise decree cannot be impugned. Moreover, the mortgagees waited for about nine years after the date fixed, when alone they started Proceedings in execution and brought the hypotheca to sale. Ultimately, in Edavom 1112 they obtained delivery of possession as well. 5. There is yet another aspect. Therefore, for that reason also the compromise decree cannot be impugned. Moreover, the mortgagees waited for about nine years after the date fixed, when alone they started Proceedings in execution and brought the hypotheca to sale. Ultimately, in Edavom 1112 they obtained delivery of possession as well. 5. There is yet another aspect. The present suits were brought over 16 or 17 years after the delivery in 1112. Even when the mortgagees executed the decree in 1112, the first plaintiff was a major; so that, the suits came more than three years after he attained majority. Thus, in any view of the matter, the suits are barred by limitation. But, Mr. C. K. Sivasankara Panicker, on behalf of the appellants, draws my attention to 0.32, R.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He argues that the effect of R.12 is that if the minor, on attaining majority, does not elect whether he will or will not proceed with the suit or application, the decision in the suit or application will not bind him. I am surprised at the way this provision is sought to be interpreted. The provision casts a responsibility on the minor, who attains majority, to elect, on attaining majority, to proceed with the suit or application or not to proceed with it. Evidently, if he does not elect and the suit or application proceeds with his guardian or next friend on record, the decision in the suit or application will certainly bind him. Therefore, this provision cannot be pressed into service in the manner in which the counsel does. 6. Mr. Sivasankara Panicker then cites a sentence from the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar J. in the decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani (AIR. 1963 SC. 70). The passage is: "It is not disputed that when a person gets into possession of properties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act or declaration of his prescribe for a title by adverse possession against the mortgagor, because in law his possession is that of the mortgagor." The counsel argues that adverse possession cannot be the basis of any unilateral act. According to him, it must be the result of a bilateral act or a contract. According to him, it must be the result of a bilateral act or a contract. I have even put a question to him whether, in a case where a party entered into possession on permission subsequently sent a notice to the owner that he would be holding the property thereafter adversely to the owner, there would be adverse possession after such notice. The counsel, surprisingly enough, has answered that there would not be adverse possession. Adverse possession is always a unilateral act the person entering into possession holding the property openly as owner against the whole world including the real owner. There is no question of a contract or an agreement giving rise to adverse possession. In the case of permissive possession becoming adverse subsequently, the only legal requirement is that the party in possession must hold in such open or notorious manner that it may be presumed that the real owner had notice of the person in possession holding adversely to the whole world including the real owner. In the Supreme Court case adverse possession was sought to be based on an agreement or a transaction, which later on was found to be ineffective. The effect of the Supreme Court decision is that if a conversion of permissive possession into possession of an owner is claimed as the result of an agreement of parties and if one of the agreeing parties was a minor, the conversion would not have effect, because the minor's consent or agreement was in law no consent or agreement which could change the nature of the possession. In such a case what remained would be only the unilateral act of one side and was not a bilateral agreement of both the sides, which converted the permissive possession into possession of an owner. Therefore, the principle, that if a real owner and a person in permissive possession enter into a transaction under which the latter is to hold the property thereafter as owner that would be sufficient to start adverse possession against the real owner if the transaction is for any reason inoperative under the law, will not apply to such a case. Therefore, the principle, that if a real owner and a person in permissive possession enter into a transaction under which the latter is to hold the property thereafter as owner that would be sufficient to start adverse possession against the real owner if the transaction is for any reason inoperative under the law, will not apply to such a case. In the case before me the minor was properly represented in the suit: he did not, in spite of his becoming a major, get himself impleaded in the execution proceedings: he did not impugn either the decree or the execution proceedings for more than the statutory period. Clearly, his rights, if any, are barred by adverse possession. 7. Thus the second appeals have no substance; and they are dismissed. In S. A. No. 511 of 1961, the appellants will pay the costs of respondents 1 to 4; and in S. A. No. 880 of 1961, the legal representatives of the appellant will pay the costs of respondents 1 and 2. Dismissed.