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1966 DIGILAW 270 (KER)

GOPALAN v. MICHLE THRESIA alias ACHAMMA

1966-10-06

P.GOVINDA NAIR

body1966
Judgment :- 1. A tenant against whom an order for eviction was passed on 22nd July 1963 under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 is the writ applicant. On 2nd August 1953, the writ applicant deposited Rs. 200. On the basis of this deposit he contended before the learned Munsiff who was executing the order passed under S.11 for eviction that execution cannot be taken. According to the petitioner, he is entitled to the benefits of S.11 (2) (b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. This Act has now been replaced by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. But there is a similar provision in S.11 (2) (c). 2. The learned Munsiff has expressed the view that he has only jurisdiction to execute the order. Having said so, he proceeded to consider the contention of the petitioner on the merits. The contention is that the order for eviction ought to be vacated in view of the deposit which according to the petitioner is a valid deposit as required by the statute. 3. I do not think that the learned Munsiff before whom the application was moved has any jurisdiction to deal with the matter. S.14 which enables the Munsiff to execute the order under S.11 is in these terms: "Every order made under S.11 or S.13 or S.19 or S.33 and every order passed on appeal under S.18 or on revision under S.20 shall, after the expiry of the time allowed therein be executed by the Munsiff or if there are more than one Munsiff, by the Principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as it if were a decree passed by him." The proviso is unimportant for the purpose of this case. 4. It is clear from the above that the Munsiff has only power to execute as if the order for eviction is a decree passed by the Munsiff. The power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of S.11 to vacate the order for eviction can be if at all exercised only by the Rent Controller. The petitioner must therefore approach the Rent Controller for relief if he is so advised. If the Rent Controller is approached, he should deal with the matter untrammelled by anything said by the execution court in the order impugned in this writ application. The petitioner must therefore approach the Rent Controller for relief if he is so advised. If the Rent Controller is approached, he should deal with the matter untrammelled by anything said by the execution court in the order impugned in this writ application. Subject to the above direction, I dismiss the writ application. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.