JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. This is an application by a landlord within the meaning of that term as defined in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The prayers are to quash two orders Exts. P-1 and P-2 produced along with the affidavit in support of the petition. Ext. P-1 is an order passed by the Accommodation Controller, the third respondent to this writ application, allotting the building of the petitioner to the second respondent. Ext. P-2 is an order passed by the appellate authority in proceedings initiated by the petitioner for eviction of the second respondent. The application for eviction which was based on two grounds; arrears of rent and sub-letting without permission of the landlord, was dismissed by the Rent Control Court. The appeal shared the same fate as is seen from Ext. P-2. This order as well as the order of allotment passed by the Accommodation Controller, Ext. P-1 as already indicated, are challenged in this petition. 2. In order to understand the grounds taken in this writ application, a few facts are necessary. The building was admittedly leased by the petitioner to the first respondent. The first respondent was a student and apparently required the building only for the duration of his stay in Cannanore where the building is situate for the purpose of his studies. Apprehending that when the necessity for the 1st respondent to continue to stay in Cannanore ceased the first respondent will give possession of the building to somebody else, the writ applicant wrote to the first respondent on the 11th June, 1961 intimating the first respondent that the building should not be given to anybody else. The reaction of the first respondent to this appears to have been to approach the Accommodation Controller which the first respondent did with an application on the 13th July, 1961 stating that the building is falling vacant. On the same day, the second respondent also approached the Accommodation Controller and prayed that the building may be allotted to him. This, the Accommodation Controller did by Ext. P-1 order on the 7th August, 1961. 3.
On the same day, the second respondent also approached the Accommodation Controller and prayed that the building may be allotted to him. This, the Accommodation Controller did by Ext. P-1 order on the 7th August, 1961. 3. The Subordinate Judge who is the appellate authority in eviction proceedings dealing with the question of the procedure adopted by the Accommodation Controller said: True it is that there is absolutely no evidence to establish that in the matter of such an allotment, the Accommodation Controller made any reference whatever to the appellant landlord. 4. The communication addressed by the writ applicant to the first respondent on the 11th June, 1961 has been produced as Ext. A-5 and the applications moved by the first and second respondents before the Accommodation Controller are Exts. A-7 and A-8 respectively. 5. It was found by the Rent Control Court that there was no arrears of rent. It was also found that there was no sub-letting. I may incidentally mention that the story put forward by the second respondent that pursuant to the order Ext. P-1 passed by the Accommodation Controller, the first respondent surrendered possession of the building to the landlord and that it was from the landlord that the second respondent obtained the keys of the building has been found against by the Rent Control Court. The finding has been confirmed by the appellate authority. He also found that the order of the Accommodation Controller was obtained behind the back of the landlord. 6. In view of the finding that there were no arrears and that there was no sub-letting the application for eviction was dismissed and I think rightly dismissed. 7. A further contention had been raised before the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate authority that the order passed by the Accommodation Controller should either be set aside or ignored. This of course, the authority said could not be done in proceedings for eviction on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to sit in appeal against the decision of the Accommodation Controller. Before me, counsel for the petitioner has not stressed or even argued that I should interfere with the order passed by the Rent Court or the appellate authority though there is a prayer in the writ application to quash the order passed by them.
Before me, counsel for the petitioner has not stressed or even argued that I should interfere with the order passed by the Rent Court or the appellate authority though there is a prayer in the writ application to quash the order passed by them. He however strenuously challenged the order passed by the Accommodation Controller on various grounds ranging from malafides to violation of the principles of natural justice. 8. I find that the case can be disposed of on a very narrow point. It is sufficient to proceed on the basis of the findings recorded by the Subordinate Judge in Ext. P-2 which I have already read particularly that pertaining to the fact that there was nothing whatever to indicate that the landlord had any notice of the proceedings before the allotment order was passed by the Accommodation Controller. There is controversy relating to the question whether the landlord was aware of the allotment order that has been passed. The authorities have not entered any specific finding in this matter and the reliance by counsel for the second respondent on the money order coupon and the entries contained therein, it is suggested by counsel for the petitioner, is not conclusive because the money order was refused by the petitioner. I should not deal with these controversies relating to questions of fact. But it appears to me that before an order can be passed under section 4 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it is necessary that notice of the proceedings should be given to the opposite side. On a perusal of section 4 it is clear that notice of vacancy can be given either by the landlord or by the tenant. It is in the interests of the tenant that notice of vacancy reported by the landlord should be given to the tenant and similarly it is in the interests of the landlord that notice of vacancy reported by the tenant should be given to the landlord. That should be so normally even in the absence of any specific provision in the section or the rules for an order passed under the section can affect one or the other or both and it is only fair that they should be heard before such an order is passed. Various questions can arise which may have to be considered before an allotment is made.
Various questions can arise which may have to be considered before an allotment is made. A reference to the Supreme Court decision in S. P. Jinadathappa v. R. P. Sharma, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1523 makes this clear. I have ventured to suggest in the decision in Thankappan v. Accommodation Controller and Tahsildar, Alleppey, 1965 K.L.T. 489 that the question whether the landlord required the building for his own occupation should also be a matter to be considered by the Accommodation Controller before an order of allotment is made. I would have had therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that an order passed behind the back of one or the other is not warranted. It is however unnecessary to proceed with this reasoning for there is specific provision made by the rules framed under the Act and a reference to rule 12 (13) which contains three sub-clauses puts the matter beyond any doubt. 1 shall read sub-rule (13) of rule 12 which is in these terms: (13) (i) When an application under the Act is presented to the Accommodation Controller, or the Rent Control Court, they shall fix the date on which and the place at which the enquiry in respect of the application will be held and send notice thereof to the applicant or applicants and the respondent or respondents mentioned in the application and shall also send a copy of the application along with the notice to the respondent or respondents. (ii) The Accommodation Controller shall give to the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their case. He shall also record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses, if any, examined on either side and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence which may be produced by the parties, pass orders on the application.
He shall also record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses, if any, examined on either side and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence which may be produced by the parties, pass orders on the application. (iii) In any case in which an order is passed ex-parte against a tenant or a landlord he may, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order apply to the Accommodation Controller or the Rent Control Court as the case may be, by whom the order was passed for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the Accommodation Controller that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the application was called on for hearing, the Accommodation Controller shall make an order setting aside the order passed against the tenant or landlord, as the case may be, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the application. 9. There has been a clear violation of these rules in passing the order Ext. P-1 by the Accommodation Controller. It also involves the violation of the principles of natural justice which is fundamental. The order passed by the Accommodation Controller Ext. P-1 must therefore go. 10. On behalf of the second respondent an earnest attempt has been made to persuade me not to interfere at this distance of time with an order that has been passed in the year 1961. Two specific periods of delay have been put forward. One is the delay that transpired between the date of passing the order Ext. P-1 and the approach made to the Rent Control Court in the year 1963, sometime in July, and the other the period that transpired after the receipt of the order of the appellate authority Ext. P-2. 11. In the circumstances of the case that have been detailed in the order passed by the appellate authority, I am not in a position to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was aware of the order passed by the Accommodation Controller before the order was produced before the Rent Control Court. I am not impressed by the reliance by the second respondent on the money order coupon and the entries contained in that.
I am not impressed by the reliance by the second respondent on the money order coupon and the entries contained in that. It is not suggested that the time taken by the proceedings which culminated in the order Ext. P-2 should also not be reduced in counting the delay. As far as the delay after granting the order Ext. P-2 is concerned, it has to be remembered that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was not in force when the order was received in March 1965 by the petitioner. This writ application has been filed on the 27th July, 1965. Considering the interests involved and the manner in which the order Ext. P-2 was passed, I think that this is a fit case in which the jurisdiction of this Court should be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution. I therefore quash Ext. P-1 order and allow this writ application. There will be no order as to costs.