JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - This appeal is by Defendant No. 2 who is a transferee pendente lite from Defendant No. 1 under lit deed of sale dated 9-9-1957. It is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19-10-1963 passed in appeal by Shri J.N. Patnaik, Third Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, affirming those of the trial Court dated 8-2-1963. 2. The suit was instituted on the allegation that the property in dispute is a debottar property given in gift to the deity Dadhibaban Jiew and that the same was sold without legal necessity, firstly by Hadibandhu Sahu in favour of Sadhu Charan Parida under the deed of sale dated 5-4-1944, thereafter by Sadhu Charan Parida in favour of Birendra Kumar Mukherji under the deed of sale dated 11-2-1946 and lastly by Birendra Kumar Mukherji in favour of Defendant No. 1 under the deed of sale dated 3-3-1955. All these deeds of sale, according to the Plaintiffs who are the sons of Hadibandhu Sahu, are void and illegal in law. Hence the suit for declaration of their title as sebayats or marfatdar and for recovery of possession. The suit, which has been contested mainly by Defendant No. 2, had been dismissed by both the Courts below. Therefore now Defendant No. 2 has come in Second Appeal. 3. In this Court, Mr. S. Mohanty appearing for the Defendant Appellant has challenged the three following findings given by the lower appellate Court: (1) The suit is therefore within less than 11/2 years of the alienation and the question of application of Article 134(b) does not arise. (2) The deity is not a nominal deity, but a real though private deity of which the suit properties are recorded as in Ext. F in the names of Hadi bandbu Sahu and B.K. Mukherji as marfatdars. (3) The suit is competent at the instance of Plaintiffs 1 to 5 who are the successors-in-interest of the predecessor marfatdar Hadibandbu Sahu. 4. The attack as against the first finding made by Mr. Mohanty is that the Court below should have held that the suit as constituted is barred by time under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. It appears that at the trial Court a controversy was raised whether the suit in the present case was governed under the law of Limitation by Article 134(B or Article 144 of the Limitation Act. The submission made by Mr. It appears that at the trial Court a controversy was raised whether the suit in the present case was governed under the law of Limitation by Article 134(B or Article 144 of the Limitation Act. The submission made by Mr. Mohanty is that the sales effected under the aforesaid deeds of sale dated 5-4-1944, 11-2-1946 and 3-3-1955 have been made by the successive transferors on the footing that the property conveyed thereunder was their private property and not a trust property, and as such in a case like this the Article under the Limitation Act which should be applied would be Article 144. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the decision in Hamanta Kumari v. Iswar Sridhar Jiu AIR 1916 Cal. 473. On principle there can be no controversy that once a trust property is transferred in negation of its being trust, or in other words on the assumption that it is not trust property, but a private property, the alienation made will be governed by the law of limitation as laid down in Article 144. But it is also equally well established that if a trust property is transferred by the transferor qua trustee, or in other words on the footing that it is a trust property, such a transfer is governed by Article 134(13) and not Article 144. The Court below has elaborately gone into the question and held that what has been conveyed under the aforesaid deeds of sale by the successive transferors is not the property itself which is in dispute here, but only the marfatdari interest of the vendors. In other words, the Court below has held that under the deeds of sale the transfers have been effected on the assumption that the property in suit was a trust property and the vendors were the trustees of the same and not that the property transferred thereunder was their personal property which they bad right to sell freely. In view of this finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court, the law of limitation which is attracted is one laid down in Article 134(B) and Article 144 of the Limitation Act. Therefore the submission made by Mr. Mohanty against the finding given by the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation has to be negatived as unfounded. 5. Therefore the submission made by Mr. Mohanty against the finding given by the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation has to be negatived as unfounded. 5. The second finding which has been very strongly attacked by Mr. Mohanty is the one relating to the question whether the trust in respect of the property in dispute was a nominal trust or a real but. Here also as a principle of law it has to be conceded that a gift, though prima facie standing in the name of deity, may be attacked on the ground that the deity is only a name lender of the beneficiary and that in substance of the beneficiary under the property is either the heir or successor or the donor or somebody else. But this question has to be decided essentially on the consideration of the gift actually made by the donor. If the gift as made by the donor is substantially effected in favour or the deity, that would undoubtedly in the eye of law be a real debottar. But if the purpose of the transfer made thereby is to benefit not the deity but some individuals, may be the heirs or strangers, in that case the gift will not be a real debottar, but one only in form and in substance a gift in favour of the donee, for whose benefit it was effected. In present case, in paragraph 2 of the written statement, as stated by the lower appellate Court, it has been unambiguously admitted that "the disputed property along with other properties were the properties of Dadhibaban Thakur", and therefore there is no substance left in the contention now raised that the gift in favour of the deity was a nominal gift and the real beneficiary under the gift was the heir or successor of the donor. The Court below has, in the course of its discussion on this point, considered the entire oral evidence on the record and also the relevant documentary evidence and bas finally found that "These documents fully establish that the deity in question is not a fictitious person, but a real deity worshipped by the sebait marfatdar Chintamani Tripathy and having properties of its own and entering into transactions like a lease as late as 1962 in respect of the very suit property". The point however raised boy Mr. The point however raised boy Mr. Mohanty against this finding is that in coming to it the Court below firstly has made error of law inasmuch as it has been influenced by the entry made in respect thereof in the current survey settlement papers, and secondly that it has erred in not taking into consideration some of the documents on record in relation thereto, like Exts. M, N, Q, R, and L as also certain admissions said to have been made by P. Es. 1 and 2. So far as the first submission made by Mr. C Mohanty in this regard is concerned, that is fully answered by the learned author of the Hindu law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Second Edition, at page 156, wherein it bas been stated, "Entries in Settlement records prepared under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Which is equivalent to Chapter XI of the Orissa Tenancy Act, have a greater evidentiary value; they carry a presumption of their correctness u/s 103(b) of the Act" So far as the second point raised by Mr. Mohanty is concerned, that is also, in my opinion, without substance. In paragraph 6 of the judgment under appeal, all those ..documents have been specifically dealt with in the course of discussion raised before it under point No 2 a formulated there in paragraph 4. On discussion it has been found therein that "It is not disputed that only the Marfatdary interest has been transferred, vide for instance Ext. -VI. of the year 1885 Ext. N. of the year 1899, Ext. P. of the year 1919, Ext. Q of the year 1929, Ext. R of the year 1930, Ext. 8 (a partition deed) referred to in para 3 of the plaint of the year 1938, Ext. L of the year 1939, Ext. A of the year 144, Ext. C of the year 1946, Ext. C/3 (a mutation order), Ext. C-l of the year 155, Ext. C.2 of the year 1957 (after the present suit), Ext. G and H Civil Court decree evicting temporary lessees and writ of delivery of possession and Ext. L of the year 1939, Ext. A of the year 144, Ext. C of the year 1946, Ext. C/3 (a mutation order), Ext. C-l of the year 155, Ext. C.2 of the year 1957 (after the present suit), Ext. G and H Civil Court decree evicting temporary lessees and writ of delivery of possession and Ext. D, the deed of exchange therefore apart from the fact that these documents have been taken notice of by the Court of appeal, it is also manifest from the discussion made by it that the transfers or the transactions made therein related to the marfatdari interest and not to the property in dispute itself. Looked at therefore from either point of view it cannot be said that the Court below in coming to its finding on the question that the trust is not a nominal trust, but a real trust, has erred in not taking into consideration the documents referred to above, or that it bas erred in relying on wrong rule of presumption. Likewise while dealing with the oral evidence on this question there is a discussion made regarding the evidence of p. ws. 1 and 2. Therefore as to their evidence also it cannot be asserted with any force that .there was any omission on the part of the lower appellate Court in coming to the aforesaid finding without considering as to what they stated at the trial. In these circumstances, the second contention raised by Mr. Mohanty must also fail. 6. The third and the last submission made by the learned Counsel is on the question of maintainability of the suit, it is the admitted case of the parties that the Plaintiffs in the case are only the sons of Hadibandhu Sabu, one of the admitted marfatdars. But the grievance made by Mr. Mohanty is that in a suit like this where relief has been sought on behalf of the deity by the marfatdars, all the marfatdars should have been made Plaintiffs, or if for some reason or other some of them refused to join as Plaintiffs they should have been impleaded at least as Defendants and reasons given in the plaint as to why they were impleaded as such. In law it is true that in a case of trust a suit for recovery of any trust property should, as a rule be brought by any on behalf of all the trustees, they constituting as a whole body representing the trust. But this rule is not without exceptions and the circumstances may vary from case to case where it may be possible for some of the Marfatdars alone to take action on behalf of the trust for the good and benefit of it. The same learned author of the Hindu law of Religious and Charitable 'Trust, Second Edition, at page 233 in dealing with this point had explained this part of the law these words, "The nature of the suit or the allegations made therein may also furnish Exceptions to the general rule that all the Shebaits must appear as Plaintiffs." In the present case it appears that originally the family of one Chintamani was the marfatdar. But subsequently in course of time the trust property came into different hands including one Hadibandhu Sahu. During the time of Hadibandhu Sahu the properties which were under his control were under certain arrangement Petitioner between the members of his family and in the course of that partition the property in dispute remained under the management and control of Hadibandhu Sahu. While he was in possession of this property as such, as already stated he sold it to Sadhu Charan Parida under the deed of sale dated 5-4-44 who in his turn sold it to Birendra Kumar Mukherji and the latter in his own turn to Defendant No. 1 under the deeds of sale already, referred to above. Further it appears that in the current settlement papers of the year 1931 the person who is recorded as the marfatdar in respect of the property in dispute is only Hadibandhu Sahu. By this time however it is admitted that Hadibandhu Sahu as also the successive transferees Sadhu Charan Parida and Birendra Kumar Mukherji are dead. Therefore in the circumstances of the present case it appears that formerly the only person who was looking after the present property in dispute as marfatdar and discharged the obligation under the trust was Hadibandhu Sahu alone. Therefore in the circumstances of the present case it appears that formerly the only person who was looking after the present property in dispute as marfatdar and discharged the obligation under the trust was Hadibandhu Sahu alone. So far as the other members of the family of Chintamani are concerned they have admittedly since long time back no concern left in the administration and management of this part of the true property. They are on the contrary looking after some other items of the trust. In these circumstances I think the Court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the suit cannot be held to be bad for the reason of non- joinder of the other marfatdars who represented the family of Chintamani. On merit therefore all the points as raised by Mr. Mohanty have to be negatived. 7. But there is one equitable consideration which cannot be ignored and that is obvious on the very face of it. The person who effected the sale impugned was originally nobody else than the father of the present Plaintiffs. It is therefore the family of the Plaintiffs which has been benefited by the consideration paid under the aforesaid deeds of sale by the successive transfers referred to above. So far as the sale deed dated 5-4-1944 is concerned the consideration covered thereunder is Rs. 2700/ -. But that was consideration not exclusively for the property in dispute alone, but it also covered some other properties. Likewise the second sale deed dated 11-2-1946 though executed for a sum of Rs. 1000/ - was in relation not only to the property in dispute but also in relation to many other items. The third sale deed however which is date 3-3-1955 was only in respect of the property in dispute. The consideration given thereunder is Rs. 1720/ -. But the claim made by the Plaintiffs is that in fact the value of the property is not more than Rs. 500/ - and it is for this amount that the suit giving rise to the appeal has been valued. At the trial the valuation as given by the Plaintiffs was not challenged. I therefore think that justice would be done if the Plaintiffs are directed to recover the property in suit on payment of Re. 1-110/ -. That amount is half of Rs. 600- plus Rs. 1720/ -. At the trial the valuation as given by the Plaintiffs was not challenged. I therefore think that justice would be done if the Plaintiffs are directed to recover the property in suit on payment of Re. 1-110/ -. That amount is half of Rs. 600- plus Rs. 1720/ -. It is true that this figure is not based on any exact calculation in respect of the value of the property. But in the circumstances of the case, I think, it may be treated as an equitable consideration sufficient to compensate the purchasers under the aforesaid deeds of sale this property in dispute for the wrong done by the father of the Plaintiffs. 8. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification that the Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover the property in dispute only on depositing Rs. 1110/ - in favour of Defendant No. 2 within a period of six months from today. In case of default the appeal would stand allowed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed