Natesa Pillai alias Dorairaja Pillai v. The Public Prosecutor, Pondicherry
1966-09-09
P.RAMAKRISHNAN
body1966
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT.- In the course of certain refere proceedings for urgent orders under the French Civil Law, the Court of First Instance, Karaikal, appointed on 24th October, 1941, one Amalu Pillai, as Receiver of certain properties. The present appellant, Natesan Pillai alias Dorairaja Pillai, was a party in the refere proceedings. It appears that Amalu Pillai had received, in the course of his duties as Receiver, income from the properties in his custody but he was able to account only for a part of it, and he failed to account for a fairly large sum, viz., Rs. 32,924. Subsequently the Receiver was discharged, and the Court appointed another person as Receiver. But Natesa Pillai alias Dorairaja Pillai was aggrieved against the conduct of the Receiver in not accounting for the above sum of money, and he moved the authorities for prosecution of the Receiver, and he also as partie civile claimed damages from the Receiver to be awarded by the Criminal Court. The matter was tried by the Court of First Instance at Karaikal as a correctional offence Under the French Criminal Law, involving the contravention of Articles 406 and 408 of the Code Penal (criminal breach of trust). The learned Judge of the Court of First Instance found the Receiver guilty under the aforesaid provisions and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of 200 frances. He also recognised the claim of Natesa Pillai as partie civile for the award of damages, and directed the accused to pay Rs. 24,924 as damages to be deposited in the Court of First Instance at Karaikal in accordance with the request of the partie civile. Against this decision the accused-receiver appealed, and the Cour Superieur D’Appel at Pondicherry in a short judgment acquitted him, making the following direction: “ Whereas it concerns a purely civil contract violation of which is of the jurisdiction of the civil Court; therefore, the accused is to be discharged both from the penal sentence and from that of damages pronounced by the first Judge against him.” Against this order the partie civile, Natesa Pillai has filed this appeal before this Court requesting it to exercise the powers of the Cour de Cassation, under the French law, conferred on this Court under Central Act XLIX of 1962.
It was represented before me by the Counsel for the respondent-accused as a preliminary objection, that in the circumstances of this case, the partie civile has no right to move this Court for relief by way of cassation. The relevant sections of the French law, in this connection, are Article 202, sub-section (2) and Article 216 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure (Coded’ Instruction Criminclle) Article 202 says that right of appeal will be conferred (1) to the accused party or the persons found liable; (2) to the partie civile, but it will be confined exclusively to his civil interest; (3) to the Forest Administration ; (4) to the Public Prosecutor; and (5) to the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals. Article 216 confers on the partie civile, the accused, the Public Prosecutor, and the persons made civilly responsible, the right to appeal in cassation against an order. It is clear that when the partie civile, under Article 216 above cited, appeals for relief by way of cassation it must be read with Article 202 above, and therefore the appeal must be confined exclusively to his civil interest. This restriction, however, has an exception. If the party who moves the Court of cassation in appeal is the Public Prosecutor, the entire decision can be at large, and the partie civile may also agitate his rights within the forum of such an appeal. But, if there is no appeal by the Public Prosecutor, the provision in Article 202, sub-section (2), restricting his right exclusively to his civil interest will apply. Thus, it has been held in regard to the right of appeal under Article 202. “ In default of appeal by the Public Prosecutor, the judgment of acquittal will acquire, as regards Action Publique (Prosecution), the finality of a matter decided (Chose Jugee); the partie civile will be able to raise in appeal only such matters as concern solely his civil interest, and the Court in such an appeal will not be able to award punishment to the accused acquitted by the First Court” (Crime 26 January, 1944 - Dalloz, Recueil Analytique de jurisprudence et de legislation (hebdomadaire), annee 1944 Jurisprudence, page 108). In this case there is no appeal by the Public Prosecutor. Therefore the partie civile cannot seek for reversal of the finding of acquittal.
In this case there is no appeal by the Public Prosecutor. Therefore the partie civile cannot seek for reversal of the finding of acquittal. As regards the contention about the civil liability of the Receiver, the Court of appeal at Pondicherry has found that even though the Receiver, is an officer of the Court, his relationship is governed by contract. This conclusion is well supported by authority. There is also the further question that in a case decided as a Correctionel matter, the acquittal of the accused will leave open to the partie civile a right to pursue his civil remedy in independent civil proceedings, unlike in the case of an acquittal by the Court of Assises of an accused, charged for a major crime. The Commentary of Pratique Criminelle by Faustin Helie at page 91 has this to say: “ It follows from Articles 191 and 212 of the Code d’ instruction Criminelle that the Tribunals Correctionel, ceasing to have jurisdiction to deal with the offence, When they declare that the facts do not constitute a Delit or contravention, are incompetent for deciding on the question of the damages claimed by the partie civile, because there is no provision of law which gives them a right to decide on the civil right separately from the Correctionel prosecution; therefore, the action in damages will remain intact for being carried before the civil jurisdiction.” This observation in the commentary is based upon the decision of the Court of cassation made on the 21st of April, 1904. In the light of the foregoing observations, I am of opinion that there is no justification to interfere with the order of acquittal, at the sole instance of the partie civile by this Court in the exercise of its power of Cassation. Adopting the reasoning mentioned in the Commentary of Faustin Helie above cited, the acquittal of the accused by the Correctionel Court will leave in tact the remedy of the partie civile against the Receiver for damages in the civil Court, and it will be for him to take appropriate steps as and when advised, for that purpose. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations. V.S. ------- Appeal dismissed.