Order.- The Corporation of Madras, claiming to act under the statutory powers under section 349, clause (28) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, made the following by-law. " Prohibit the erection, exhibition, fixation, retention or display of all or any class of advertisements in any street, road, or public park or part thereof or in any place of public resort ; and regulate the erection, exhibition, fixation, retention or display of advertisements in any manner in non-prohibited areas. " Acting under this by-law, the Corporation issued a notification prohibiting advertisements on side walls embankments and railing of viaducts, overbridges, culverts and approaches thereto. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that this by-Jaw is bad because it is unreasonable. Clause (28) of section 349 relates to prohibition and regulation of advertisements. But the power taken under the by-law prohibits the erection or exhibition of all or any class of advertisements in any street or any place of public resort. Such a power is an unrestricted and absolute power. Such a power is likely to be abused. Such a by-law is likely to be a nuisance and an annoyance to the public especially to a particular class or community who carry on business. Such a by-law, under the guise of regulating advertisements, arbitrarily interferes with private business and imposes unreasonable and unnecessary restrictive regulations upon lawful occupation. Courts have power or jurisdiction to declare such a by-law as ultra vires, and there is nothing in the City Municipal Corporation Act which excludes that jurisdiction. Therefore the question reserved for consideration of this Court is whether the by-law in question is valid. In Bailey v. Williamson1 , Chief Justice Cockburn, while considering a by-law passed by a local authority, said: "I think it is quite clear that the regulation as to rules being made by one or other of those authorities, for the purpose of imposing conditions on the delivery of addresses in the park, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the ranger or the commissioners, as the case might be ; and that being so, we have no authority here to look into the rules to see whether they are reasonable and proper or not. " But this opinion was doubted in a leading case, which has now become a classical case on the validity of a by-law passed by local authority — Kruse v. Johnson2. " But this opinion was doubted in a leading case, which has now become a classical case on the validity of a by-law passed by local authority — Kruse v. Johnson2. Lord Rassell, C.J., said: " When the Court is called upon to consider the by-laws of public representative bodies clothed with the ample authority which I have described, and exercising that authority accompanied by the checks and safeguards which have been mentioned, I think the consideration of such by-laws ought to be approached from a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be as has been said ‘benevolently’ interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered........I think Courts of Justice ought to be slow to condemn as invalid any by-law......on the ground of supposed unreasonableness.......... I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which it would be the duty of the Court to condemn by-laws made under such authority as these were made, as invalid because unreasonable if for instance they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes if they were manifestly unjust: if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules ; they are unreasonable and ultra vires’." Applying the tests to the facts of the instant case, I do not think that the by-law is either unjust, unreasonable or Unsound. It is a notorious fact that persons who carry on advertisement business or indulge in advertisement exercise their rights vulgarly by exhibiting them on every conceivable place such as lanes, roads residential houses, bridges, hospitals and religious places, and thereby make the City ugly, unlovely, ghastly and horrible. Therefore it is but proper that the Corporation should frame a by-law under their statutory powers to provide for the prohibition and regulation of advertisements. I do not also agree that it would amount to a total prohibition or prevention of advertisement. Nor do I see that any discrimination is involved in this by-law. Therefore it is but proper that the Corporation should frame a by-law under their statutory powers to provide for the prohibition and regulation of advertisements. I do not also agree that it would amount to a total prohibition or prevention of advertisement. Nor do I see that any discrimination is involved in this by-law. It is for the Corporation to regulate restrict or prevent the exhibition of advertisements, if they are exhibited in such places and in such manner, and by such means, as to affect injuriously the life and face of the City. The Corporation must certainly have the power to regulate the methods of advertisements, with the object of safeguarding the public from dangerous, obstructive or ugly advertisements. It is a reasonable restriction. It is true that such a restriction, may cause nuisance to some and annoyance to some others. But it cannot, for that reason, be held that such a by-law is unreasonable or uncertain. Wright, J., observed in Simmons v. Mailing Rural Council1: "........ I do not think that a by-law should be held unreasonable on the ground that in a particular case inconvenient consequences might result from its enforcement ; it is the public interest as a whole which has to be considered. " In United Bill Pasting Co., Ltd. v. Somerset County Council2, the respondents made a by-law that no advertisements should be exhibited an any hoarding, stand, or other similar erection so as to be visible from any public highway (whether carriage way, bridgeway or footway), or from any public waterway (whether river, river tributary or canal), or from any railway and to disfigure the natural beauty of the landscape. Quoting the decision in Kruse v. Johnson3, their Lordships observed: "It is true that the Council might name specific places if it thought fit, but it is within its powers in saying: ‘you must not anywhere within the area which we have to administer erect advertisements which disfigure the natural beauty of a landscape ; and if you erect advertisements at all (except in boroughs and urban districts) you do so at your own risk if they are found to offend against this rule’." It is also worthwhile to quote the observations of Lord Russell, C.J., in Kruse v. Johnson3. "A by-law, of the class we are here considering, I take to be an ordinance affecting the public, or some portion of the public, imposed by some authority clothed with statutory powers ordering something to be done or not to be done, and accompanied by some sanction or penalty for its nonobservance. It necessarily involves restriction of liberty of action by persons who come under its . operation as to acts which, but for the by-law, they would be free to do or not to do as they pleased." In the circumstances of this case, the petitioner cannot complain that the by-law in question is either unjust or unreasonable. The Writ Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. V.K. ----------------- Petition dismissed.