JUDGMENT.- The dispute in this case relates to a strip of land about 7 links width north to south and 136 links east to west which the plaintiff claims to have purchased from the sons of one Dharmalingam Pillai under Exhibit A-l dated 15th January, 1955. The defendant claims title to the suit property under an oral sale decades ago by Dharmalingam Pillai to his deceased agnatic cousin Venugopala Pillai and the allotment of the site to him in partition. Immediately south of the disputed site, the defendant claimed another extent of about 16 links in width and this site abutted the public street. It has now been found finally in S.A. No. 650 of 1962 that this vacant site abutting the street belongs to the Government, and is poromboke. It may be stated that the defendant claimed title to the suit site as well as to the site immediately south under the same title and by adverse possession. The suit out of which the Second Appeal arises was preceded by the suit, O.S. No. 391 of 1955 on the file of the District Munsif, Chidambaram, by the defendant under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act alleging trespass by the plaintiff subsequent to proceedings for eviction taken by the Government on the poromboke site. The defendant lost that suit in the first Court and succeeded in revision in this Court in C.R.P. No. 247 of 1957. The plaintiff thereupon instituted the present suit for declaration of his title to the suit property and for an injunction against the defendant executing the decree he had obtained in the suit filed under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. In the alternative there was a claim for possession. There were various defences to the suit on the merits and on the maintainability of the suit. The Courts below have, on ample and relevant evidence, found that the plaintiff had title to the strip of land in question. They have also found plaintiff’s possession of the land within 12 years prior to the suit. The case of the defendant of oral purchase of the property by his brother was found against. These findings against the plaintiffs right to the suit property on the basis of title and adverse possession are findings of fact in this case and not open to reconsideration in Second Appeal. The case of the defendant of oral purchase of the property by his brother was found against. These findings against the plaintiffs right to the suit property on the basis of title and adverse possession are findings of fact in this case and not open to reconsideration in Second Appeal. But learned Counsel for the appellant attacks the decree of the Court below contending that the present suit is not maintainable, as the plaintiff had not surrendered possession of the property pursuant to the decree in the suit instituted by the defendant under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act made on revision in this Court, before instituting his suit on the basis of title. In support of this position, learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Parma Nand v. Sm. Chimmawati1. It is seen from the facts of that case that there was a decree for possession in a prior suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and before surrendering possession a suit was filed for an injunction restraining the decree-holder in the suit tinder section 9 from executing his decree for possession. While confirming the dismissal of the suit by the Courts below, the learned Judge Brij Mohan Lall, J., observed: “ In my opinion also such a suit does not lie. The appellants must first surrender possession and thereafter they can set up any right they like on the basis of title. If they are granted an injunction restraining the respondent from executing her decree the very object and purpose of the suit under section 9, Specific Relief Act, will be defeated.” The vice of the latter suit in that case appears to be that it claimed only an injunction restraining the execution of the decree, and from the facts as set out in the report it appears that it was the only relief claimed in the latter suit. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act by itself imposes no specific bar to a suit by the defeated party in possession before surrendering possession. Section 9 of the old Act ran thus: “ If a person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Section 9 of the old Act ran thus: “ If a person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.” There is nothing in the language of the section to take away the remedies available to a person in possession of property as of right, and entitled to remain in possession. Of course it goes without saying that when there is a valid decree for possession against a plaintiff, he will not be granted an injunction from executing that decree. If the legality of the decree is not questioned, a decree-holder cannot be restrained from executing the decree as between the parties to the decree. In the Allahabad case as I see it the relief being only for injunction the suit had necessarily to be dismissed. Section 9 provides only a summary and speedy remedy to a person dispossessed. The title to the possession is outside the scope of the suit. When a suit on title questioning the order in the summary suit is filed, in one sense the decree or order for possession is impugned, and in manner provided by law as no appeal is competent. The object of the title suit is in substance to have the summary order for possession set aside on the basis of title and right to present possession. In such a suit if the plaintiff in possession has claimed declaration of his title, in my view it may properly be followed by the consequential relief of injunction: see Mori v. Santaya1. Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 will be no ban. In the present case the plaintiff has not only asked for declaration of his title but he has also prayed in the alternative for possession. As it happened in this case, in the interlocutory proceedings for injunction the matter went up in appeal and the appellate Court refused interim relief of injunction. It is noticed by the learned District Judge that the present plaintiff was willing to permit the defendant to take possession of the suit property. As it happened in this case, in the interlocutory proceedings for injunction the matter went up in appeal and the appellate Court refused interim relief of injunction. It is noticed by the learned District Judge that the present plaintiff was willing to permit the defendant to take possession of the suit property. Only he wanted a condition imposed that the compound wall which was erected by him during his possession pending the suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act should not be demolished by the defendant. In the circumstances of the present case the apprehension noticed in the Allahabad case assuming it applies has no application. Without a claim for injunction the present suit could be maintained. The plaintiff has allowed the defendant to take possession, and has claimed with declaration, possession as consequential relief. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court (Leach, C.J. and Byers, J.) in Narasaya v. Subbayya2, a person without title in possession of property is only a trespasser. The learned Judges observed: “ The appellants were in possession as trespassers and the fact that they succeeded in the sui under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act did not make their trespass any the less. They remain: trespassers in spite of their decree.” This being the true legal position, I do not find any legal flaw in the frame of the suit that would vitiate the action. The Second Appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs. No leave. V.K. ---------- Appeal dismissed.