Order.- This revision proceeding involves a point of considerable interest with regard to fixation of fair rent under section 4 (3) (b) of Madras Act XVIII of 1960. My attention has not been drawn to any precedent of this Court in which point has arisen for determination in the particular form with which we are now concerned. Briefly stated, the facts are that the revision petitioner (landlord) and the Union of India represented by the Superintendent of Post Offices, North Division Madras-6 (respondent) both went to the Rent Control Court for fixation of fair rent for premises No. 29, Kalamandapam Road, Royapuram. Actually the parties were content to have the matter of fair rent adjudicated, on admitted facts The front portion of this building is occupied by the Kalamandapam Post Office and the rear portion by the Postmaster for residential purposes. Admittedly the front portion has to be classified under the first class, with regard to the rules for determination of fair rent, as it is a new structure built for the very purpose of housing the Post Office. The point that now arises is whether the Courts below were justified in allowing for depreciation of this building in the assessment of fair rent when (1). the building was a new structure and (2) in the statement by the respondent no claim had been made under the head “ depreciation” as such. Under section 4 (3) (b) (i) of the Act, the cost of construction has to be calculated under the Rules “ less depreciation at such rates as may be prescribed” The formula for working out the fair rent is to be found under rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Act, read with Schedule II. Schedule II gives the standard rates of depreciation. Illustration A is to this effect: “ For a building of type I aged only 2 years - depreciation shall be 10 per cent. and not 2 per cent”. The Courts below, therefore, felt constrained to allow for the minimum depreciationof ten per cent. under the Act, the Rules and the Schedule, that I have referred to. The Courts were of the view that the fact that the Government did not refer to this head of allowance at all, in their statement, did not absolve the Courts from their duty of determining fair rent under the Act and Rules. under the Act, the Rules and the Schedule, that I have referred to. The Courts were of the view that the fact that the Government did not refer to this head of allowance at all, in their statement, did not absolve the Courts from their duty of determining fair rent under the Act and Rules. The learned Counsel for the landlord (revision petitioner) has pressed two arguments in the main. The first is that when section 4 (3) (b) (i) refers to ‘depreciation ‘, the Statute implies that depreciation must have actually occurred; it has no reference to any depreciation that has not taken place at all Hence’ the rule and Schedule II are not in accordance with the Act, and are in conflict with the intendment of the Legislature in enacting section 4 (3) (b) (i), when the formula of the Schedule provides for a minimum depreciation of ten per cent even with respect to a building only two years old. This is the main and important argument The subsidiary argument is practically an argument of estoppel When the State did not claim any depreciation in its statement, the Courts were in error in making allowances under this head. I shall deal with the first argument immediately, for that seems to me to he the interesting point, on which I must confess that no authorities would appear to be available. The word ‘depreciation ‘is to be be found annotated or defined in a number of technical works, but I have been able to come across only two definitions that are at all helpful to the present context. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 26-A, page 492, the content of the word is expressed as follows: “The word depreciation means loss or decline in value which occurs gradually over the useful life of material thing, due to physical wear, tear and decay.” The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines depreciation simply, as ‘lowering of value ‘. It will thus be seen that ‘depreciation ‘has two aspects. A material object might already have suffered depreciation, depending on its age; that degree of depreciation is relevant, when assessing the minimum marketable value of the article. But it is also subject to future depreciation, and this would be relevant where a value is fixed which is to prevail in future also. A material object might already have suffered depreciation, depending on its age; that degree of depreciation is relevant, when assessing the minimum marketable value of the article. But it is also subject to future depreciation, and this would be relevant where a value is fixed which is to prevail in future also. It is not disputed that, under the scheme of the Act, the fair rent once fixed will continue to govern the relationship between the parties under the Act, only subject to changes as allowed for under section 5 of the Act. Hence, it appears to me to be entirely justified and further a scientific procedure to allow for depreciation even with regard to a brand new building. I am unable to hold that the rule and Schedule II are in conflict with the intendment of the Act, or that the expression is limited in its connotation to the lowering of value already suffered by the building. The second point or ground of objection is a short one, and can be immediately disposed of. No doubt it would have been better if the State had amended its claim statement by introducing some such words as “ in accordance with the rules and the formula of Schedule II under the Act etc.” But the State did claim a fair rent which was definitely below the rent determined by the first Court, which was increased on appeal by the tenant. Hence the argument has no substance that the discount with regard to the depreciation embodied in the formula ought not to have been allowed, because there is no reference to this item in the statement filed by the respondent. There is a final argument of some interest, submitted by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner. This is to the effect that the formula, as it stands, is substantially inequitable; it can be shown that if this formula is applied over a period of years, using the mathematical mode specified, a building that may be worth a few lakhs in the year of construction, may be worth almost a nominal amount by virtue of the mere factor of depreciation, if a sufficiently long period is taken into consideration. But it must be remembered that the Rent Control Act itself is a temporary Act, which the Legislature extends from time to time; it is not intended as a permanent contribution to the corpus of the law. Presumably, this was kept in mind when this formula was devised. This revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. R.M. ------------ Revision petition dismissed.