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Allahabad High Court · body

1966 DIGILAW 288 (ALL)

Sarup Singh v. Board of Revenue

1966-08-04

S.N.SINGH

body1966
JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - These two writ petitions arise out of two suits instituted by the petitioners of the respective cases claiming to represent the Panch Khaikars of village Pipna for the cancellation of two sale deeds executed in favour of the contesting opposite parties. 2. Village Pipna is a Pucca Khaikari village. The executants of the two sale deeds are Pucca Khaikars. The case of the petitioners is that in a Pucca Khaikari village Khaikari right is heritable but not transferable. As the executants of the two sale deeds have made the two impugned transfers illegally they should be cancelled. 3. The two suits were contested by the defendants vendees who pleaded that the sale deeds were valid as they were also Khaikars in the village. The trial court in one case accepted the claim of the plaintiffs decreed the suit whereas in the other case the trial court dismissed it accepting the defence contention. 4. Two appeals were preferred. The first appellate court accepted the petitioners case in both the cases with the result that both the suits for cancellation were decreed. Two second appeals were filed against the above two decisions. The second appellate court reversed the judgment of the first appellate court and dismissed the two suits on the finding that although both the transfers were voidable but no valid reason had been shown for the cancellation of the two sale deeds as such they could not be cancelled and directed dismissal of the two suits. 5. The petitioners of the respective cases preferred two revisions before the Board of Revenue but both the revisions were dismissed; hence the two writ petitions before this Court. 6. It is admitted by both the parties that the Pucca Khaikari right is heritable. The petitioners assert that a Pucca Khaiker had no right of transfer in any case. Whereas the contention of the defendants vendees is that a transfer amongst the Khaikers is permissible, that is, if a Khaiker wants to transfer his Khaikari right he can transfer the same in favour of another Khaikar but he cannot transfer it to anyone else and in support of this assertion of theirs they averred in paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit to the writ petition No. 2995 of 1961 that the petitioners of that case themselves purchased Khaikari rights from other Khaikars and the same was never challenged. In rejoinder affidavit the petitioners emphatically denied to have obtained any sale as alleged in paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit. In view of this contradictory statements the vendees were directed to produce the alleged sale deed and in persuance of the order they have produced the registered sale deed before this Court which does show that two of the petitioners Swarup Singh and Bhajan Singh purchased Khaikari rights from other Khaikars of the village. 7. There is no statutory law so far as these hilly districts are concerned. The law in respect to heritability and transferability has developed only by custom. Pucca Khaikars are just like under proprietors. On a Pucca Khaikar dying heirless the property reverts to the Khaikari body. It does not lapse and cannot be taken over by Hissedars (Proprietors). A transfer by Pucca Khaikar is not void but is voidable at the option of the Khaikari body as stated to in Stowell's Manual. In what circumstance should such a transfer be not recognised is not to be found anywhere. The subordinate courts look in this respect on the decision of the Board. Mr. Stowell in his Manual at p. 92 doubted the correctness of the view that in pucca Khaikari village a Khaikar could not transfer the holding by sale or gift. In his view Pucca Khaikar's right to transfer should be recognised. In absence of any clear law on the point the Board of Revenue have been deciding cases according to their own notion of law. equity and justice in such matters. In the year 1930 a case came before the Board of Revenue where in a minor plaintiff who was a Khaikar challenged a transfer made by his mother and in that case it was held as follows: - "From this it follows that the only person entitled to challenge a transfer of this nature is the Khaikari body as a whole. The minor plaintiff is also entitled to challenge it if he can show that it was made contrary to his interest. This as already shown is in no way established." 8. Having held as above the learned Members refused to cancel the sale deed, vide Petition No. 13 of 1929-30 decided by the order of the Board dated June 27/July 9, 1930 by Members M/s. J. C. Smith and R. Oakden. This as already shown is in no way established." 8. Having held as above the learned Members refused to cancel the sale deed, vide Petition No. 13 of 1929-30 decided by the order of the Board dated June 27/July 9, 1930 by Members M/s. J. C. Smith and R. Oakden. The above decision shows that a transfer by a Khaikar is voidable at the option of the Khaikari body as a whole. If there is a transfer by one Khaikar in favour of another Khaikar then one could safely say that the Khaikari body as a whole cannot exercise the option of getting the sale cancelled, for some of the members of the Khaikari body themselves are parties to the transaction. In such a case it will not be unreasonable to hold that a transfer by one Khaikar in favour of another should be recognised permissible on the principles of Sec. 33 of Act XVII of 1939. A transfer by a Khaikar to a stranger may not be permitted but the same can safely be permitted amongst Khaikars themselves so that the Khaikari land may not go out of the Khaikari body. The Board of Revenue and the Commissioner in second appeal in my opinion have in effect accepted this view. In accepting that it cannot be said that they have committed any manifest error of law when as a matter of fact there is no such statutory law. Some of the petitioners themselves having taken transfer from other Khaikars clearly shows that transfer of Khaikari right amongst themselves have been permitted in the locality to which they belonged. 9. I am not satisfied that, the petitioners have made out any case for interference in these cases there is no question of jurisdiction involved nor any apparent mistake of law has been established. Accordingly these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.