JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - The sole question for consideration in this application in revision is whether the plaintiffs are workers within the meaning of Sec. 2(1) of the Factories Act of 1948, hereinafter called the Act. 2. The plaintiffs are employed in the Jhansi Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi. They are Time Keepers, who prepare the pay sheet of the workshop staff, maintain leave accounts, dispose of settlement cases and maintain records for statistical purposes. Fourteen of the applicants-appellants detailed in annexure-B of the affidavit are admittedly both Time Keepers who maintain attendance of the staff, job card particulars of the various jobs under operation, time sheets of the staff working on various shops dealing with the production of railway spare parts, repairs etc. Four of the applicants/appellants detailed in annexure-C of the affidavit are Head Time Keepers, working in supervision of the applicants-appellants of the two other annexures." 3. Sec. 2(1) of the Act is as follows:- " "Worker" means a person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of manufacturing, process;" Under the Factories Act of 1934 the definition of the expression "Worker" further said:- "But does not include any person solely employed in a clerical capacity in any room or place were no manufacturing process is being carried on;" 4. In the definition of the expression "Worker" in the Act of 1948, the aforesaid clause referring to persons employed in clerical capacity was deleted. The court below has held that the plaintiff-opposite parties are "workers" within the meaning of Sec. 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948. 5. Learned counsel strenuously contended that since the plaintiff-opposite parties are not persons who are employed in any manufacturing process and their work is that of a clerical nature they do not come within the ambit of the definition of "worker" under the Act. He further argued that in the Act of 1934 the words in the definition were "or in any other kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with manufacturing." The word whatso-ever does not find a place in the definition of "Workers" under the Act of 1948. 6. He further argued that in the Act of 1934 the words in the definition were "or in any other kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with manufacturing." The word whatso-ever does not find a place in the definition of "Workers" under the Act of 1948. 6. Learned counsel contended that only those persons whose work could be described as falling within the expression "manufacturing process" could properly be called workers. He further argued that the expression "in any other kind of work" must also relate to work connected with manufacturing process and therefore since the work of the plaintiffs was neither incidental to nor connected with any manufacturing process they could not be properly described as "Worker", within the meaning of the Act. Learned counsel referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramlanshan Jageshar v. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 184, and decision of the Supreme Court in B. P. Hira, Works Manager, Central Railway, Parel Bombay, etc. v. C. M. Pradhan etc., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1226. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court did not give any decision on the question whether persons employed as Time Keeper were workers within the meaning of the Act. The question was left open. In the Bombay case a person who was employed by a Gas Manufacturing Works as a Quli for excavating and digging trenches outside the factory for laying pipes for transporting gas to consumers was not held to be a worker within the meaning of Sec 2(1) of the Act. The circumstances of the aforesaid Ramlanshan's case, A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 184, were somewhat different. The courts however, held that the person concerned was not employed "in connection with gas while it is still in the stage of production," and, therefore he could not be held to be a worker within the meaning of Sec. 2 (1) of the Act. The court considered the nature of the work of the person concerned. It expressed the view that his work was required to be done in order to supply to the consumers gas which had been produced and had no connection at all with the manufacturing process. The court considered the nature of the work of the person concerned. It expressed the view that his work was required to be done in order to supply to the consumers gas which had been produced and had no connection at all with the manufacturing process. The court appears to have taken the view that only those persons could be treated as workers who were engaged in the manufacturing process of gas and those persons who were employed in distributing it to the consumers would not fail within the ambit of the definition of workers under the Act. As mentioned above the circumstances in the present case are different and it could not be said that the plaintiff-opposite parties before me are persons who are engaged in the type of work which begins after the work which could be treated as "manufacturing process" is finished and the work of distribution of what had been manufactured starts. I, therefore, need not say more with regard to the aforesaid Bombay decision. 7. In the present case it is true that the plaintiff-opposite parties are not persons who had a direct hand in handling the machinery which is used in the workshop. They are, however, persons whose work could be said to be "incidental to or collected with the manufacturing process." The manufacturing work is one by persons who work in the workshop. Such work also requires persons who have to supervise the work of persons engaged directly in he manufacturing work. The time and duties performed by such persons has to be noted because that is necessary not only for the supervision of the work but for the payment of wages to such persons, Therefore, persons whose duty con-sisters in working in the manner as done by the plaintiff-opposite parties in the present case could properly be said to be persons whose work is incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process. The nature of the work has to be taken as a whole. The work of persons who are actually engaged in handling machines could not be done properly if there is lack of the necessary arrangements and regulations of their duties. The nature of the work has to be taken as a whole. The work of persons who are actually engaged in handling machines could not be done properly if there is lack of the necessary arrangements and regulations of their duties. Therefore, those persons who have to look after such supervisory work and to keep information regarding the work done by such persons would also be persons who would fall within the ambit of the definition of "Worker" under the Act. In Abdul Latif v. Karamat Ali, LLJ Vol. 2, 1961 page 385. Mr. Justice Mithanlal had to consider whether a person who was employed as a Munim in a Glass Works could be said to be a worker within the meaning of the Act. It was observed:- "The definition of "Worker" in Factories Act not only includes a person employed in the manufacturing process but also includes a person employed in any other kind of work incidental to manufacturing process. Keeping of accounts of a factory is a work incidental to the manufacturing process and so the "Munim" is definitely covered by the definition of the word worker. 8. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Mr. Justice Mithanlal in the aforesaid case. The court below rightly held that the work of the plaintiff-opposite parties is incidental to or connected with the manufacturing work of the workshop. I see no reason to interfere with the aforesaid decision of the court below. 9. The application in revision is rejected summarily. Application rejected.