D. K. Kapoor, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS petition was heard after a show cause notice was issued to respondents. On considering the reply we found that the petition could be disposed of without any further pleadings or affidavits. We accordingly heard both the learned counsel. We also found that the disposal of the petition could not be delayed. ( 2 ) WE issue Rule D. B. and proceed to deal with the short point involved in the petition. The petitioner has challanged an order passed U/s 131 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 op 23. 9. 82. The operative part of the order is that certain documents are retained in exercise of powers U/s 131. The documents are : "journal Vouchers---Bank Voucher---" ( 3 ) THE order was passed over three years ago. The poipt for decision is whether these documents can indefinitely be retained or whether there is a time limit. It is also claimed that the documents could have been retained only for 15 days without obtaining prior approval of the Commissioner of I. T. Yet another contention is that these vouchers pertain to sales and purchases made by the petitioner Company from and to suppliers and customers and these documents are required for reference. A parallel was also drawn with S. 132 of the Act and the judgment of Supreme Court in C. I. T. vs Oriental Rubber Works ( 1984 ) 145 TR 477 where conditions for retaining the seized documents were considered. ( 4 ) IN the affidavit filed in reply to the petition, it was contended that the petition was very much belated as almost 3 years had passed without any challenge to the relention of the documents. It was further claimed on the merits, that the case was before an Inspecting Asstt. Comm. of, I. T. and hence the proviso to S. 131 was not applicable. It was further claimed that a further retention of documents was absolutely necessary in this case. One of the reasons for retaining the documents was that a criminal procecution had been launched and penalty proceedings were also pending. Those documents were required for completing the proceedings. One fact which was mentioned was that the Additional Chief M. M. had already ordered filing of these documents. One of the reasons for retaining the documents was that a criminal procecution had been launched and penalty proceedings were also pending. Those documents were required for completing the proceedings. One fact which was mentioned was that the Additional Chief M. M. had already ordered filing of these documents. It was claimed that filing of this writ petition was misconceived and an abuse of the process of law designed only to get the documents back and thus keep them from the criminal court or for being used in the penalty case. ( 5 ) ONE other point was taken, namely, that it was not necessary to record any reasons for retaining the documents or communicate the same to the petitioner. This would frustrate the very object of retaining the documents. ( 6 ) NOW, turning to the points involved in this case, we think we need not go into the question that the documents are required by the I. T. Authority but have to confine ourselves to to the interpretation of S. 131 of the Income- tax Act. [ S. 131 is theh reproduced ] ( 7 ) IT will be seen that the sub-section (I) of S. 131 gives to the Income Tax Officer. and other authorities the same power as are vested in any court for compelling the production of books of accounts and other documents and for discovery and inspection etc. Therefore, as far as this Section is concerned, we may treat the Income Tax Officer. as a kind of Court. Naturally, when books of account and other documents are produced in Court it will be necesssary for the Court to have power to use these documents for the purpose of recording evidence and so on. There is a procedure for retaining copies and returning the original. We feel that the normol procedure would to be followed for retaining a copy and returning the original. The relevant provision regarding retention of the original appears to be contained in sub-section (3) of this Section and that is the provision relied upon by the respondents. This provision is that the Income Tax Officer. may impound and retain in custody any beoks of account or other documents which may be produced before him. Thus, the order under this provision would have to be one to impound the document and to retain it. This provision is that the Income Tax Officer. may impound and retain in custody any beoks of account or other documents which may be produced before him. Thus, the order under this provision would have to be one to impound the document and to retain it. It would not involve the question of returning the original and retaining the copy. Then we have the provision which is to the effect that the I. T. O. can not impound any books of account or other document without recording his reasons for his so doing and subsequently he can not retain the documents in his custody for a period exceding 15 days without the Commissioner s approval. ( 8 ) IT is now necessary again to see whether the order U/s 131 is in accordance with law. The opening words of the order are as follows : "the following documents produced before me in connection with the assesment proceedings for the assessment years 1982-3 by Sarvashri K. L. Seth, C. A. and P. K. Shungloo, Accountant of the company are retained in exercise of my power U/s 131 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. " ( 9 ) BELOW this follows the list of documents which has been reproduced earlier. It is impossible to hold that these are reasons. There is a total absence of reasons. The provision to Section 131 is in very definite terms which is : ( 10 ) THIS provision shows that if the ITO or the Assistant Director of Inspection wants to retain any document he must first record his reasons and after impounding the documents he can retain the same only for 15 days unless he obtains the approval of the Commissioner. In the present case, there is no order impoun- ding the documents. There is no order giving any reasons. In fact, the stand taken by the respondant is that reasons have not to be disclosed and there is no Approval of the Commissioner for retaining the books after 15 days. The order is contrary to law- In Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal vs. Oriental Rubber Works etc. (1984) 145 IIR 477, it was held that reasons recorded by an Officer and approved by the Commissioner should be communicated expeditiously to the assessee. This was in relation to S. 132, where books are retained beyond a period of 180 days. The order is contrary to law- In Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal vs. Oriental Rubber Works etc. (1984) 145 IIR 477, it was held that reasons recorded by an Officer and approved by the Commissioner should be communicated expeditiously to the assessee. This was in relation to S. 132, where books are retained beyond a period of 180 days. We can find no difference between the intention of S. 132 and the intention of S. 131. Here also, the reasons have to be recorded and if retention is beyond 15 days then approval has to be obtained. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that, reasons arc to be kept secret. This defeats the Section altogether. This is no compliance of the Section if reasons are not recorded and not communicated. Similarly; the approval of the commissioner for retention beyond 15 days has also to be communicated. Learned counsel for the Department has relied on a judgment of a Single Judge of Punjab in Ramji Dass Om Parkash vs. Income Tax Officer. (1970) II 1010. According to this judgment it is only necessary for the I. T. 0. to record the reasons but he need not disclose the same to assessec. In that case the operative part was that: "i hereby impound and retain in my custody following books of account which are produced before me during the assessment proceedings. " It was further stated in the judgment as follows :- "the only point for determination is whether respondent No. 1 had recorded the reasons in support of his order impounding the account-books. I have seen the original order sheet and have no doubt that the order in which reasons were recorded was passed on October 3, 1969, in the presence of shri R. K. Goel. It may be the reasons were not communicated to them which led the petitioner-firm and its counsel to believe that no reasons were recorded as the order delivered to them did not contain any reasons. " ( 11 ) WE regret that this reasoning does not appeal to us. If the order was recorded in the presence of the counsel, we fail to understand how they could not have heard the reasons. In any case, the solitary object of the provision is to make a departure from the normal practice of production of documents. " ( 11 ) WE regret that this reasoning does not appeal to us. If the order was recorded in the presence of the counsel, we fail to understand how they could not have heard the reasons. In any case, the solitary object of the provision is to make a departure from the normal practice of production of documents. It is absolutely necessary that this statute should be complied with It cannot be left to the Income Tax Officer. to record reasons if he wants to and not as he wishes. That would be against law enacted by the parliament. We think with respect that the judgment of the Punjab High Court is not well founded. The learned single Judge did not follow the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kanodia Brothers vs. S. S. Seth, ITO (1960) 39 ITR 228. The provision under examination was Section 37 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 which, as far as we can see, is exactly the same as Section 131 (3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Allahabad High Court held that a valid exercise of power u/s 131 involves compliance with the conditions mentioned in the proviso to the Section it was therefore necessary that the ITO had to record the reasons in writing for impounding the books and had also to get the permission of the Commissioner for retention for a period beyond 15 days. It was held in that case that retention was illegal and the petitioner was entitled to have the books returned. ( 12 ) WE concur with the judgment of Allahabad High Court. We also hold that (a) there is no order for impounding the documents, and (b) the ITO appears to have misread the provision of Section 131 and therefore the order has to be struck down as being invalid. As far as the Petitioner is concerned, we think that the party concerned had a right to move the court because the continuance of the illegality over a period of time cannot possibly legalise the same. ( 13 ) BEFORE concluding this case, we may say that we have reserved the judgment to enable the authorities concerned to make relevant copies of the vouchers if so required and also to get suitable orders from the criminal Courts for production of these documents. ( 13 ) BEFORE concluding this case, we may say that we have reserved the judgment to enable the authorities concerned to make relevant copies of the vouchers if so required and also to get suitable orders from the criminal Courts for production of these documents. We did so because we did not want this petition to be used as a means of doing away with evidence that might be necessary in a criminal trial. With these remarks we grant the writ and direct the return of the vouchers mentioned in the order u/s 131 forthwith, unless there is an order to the contrary by any criminal or other Court. Due to the delay in the institution of the writ petition we refrain from passing any order regarding costs in favour of the petitioner.