ORDER D.P. Uniyal, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) confirming the order of the City Magistrate, Kanpur rejecting the objection of the accused-Applicant that proceedings initiated against her under Sections 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are void and illegal. 2. The main objection raised on behalf of the Applicant was that Sri M.C. Rawat, Deputy Superintendent of Police (City-I) was not a validly appointed Special Police Officer for dealing with offences under the said Act. The learned Counsel submitted that special police officer' as defined in Clause (i) of Section 2 was a police officer appointed by or on behalf of the State Government to be in charge of police duties within a specified area for the purposes of this Act. By Section 13 only such special police officer as had been appointed by the State Government to perform duties in specified areas under the Act would have power to deal with offences under the Act. It was said that Sri Rawat had not been appointed by name as special police officer nor was there any order of the State Government specifying the area in which he was to act as such police officer. The above contention was based on the language of Section 13(1) which reads: There snail be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that area. In exercise of the powers conferred u/s 13 above, the State Government issued a notification published in the U.P. Gazettee, Part I, dated August 27, 1960 and appointed the following police officers in the districts noted against each as "special police officers" for dealing with offences under the said Act in those areas: (1) ..... (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) Deputy Superintendent of police (City) I, II, III, Kanpur. It will be noticed that under the notification aforesaid the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) holding charge of Circle No. I was appointed special police officer for dealing with offences in that area. (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) Deputy Superintendent of police (City) I, II, III, Kanpur. It will be noticed that under the notification aforesaid the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) holding charge of Circle No. I was appointed special police officer for dealing with offences in that area. There is no denying the fact that the offence complained of was alleged to have been committed in the area within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) I Kanpur. Therefore the person holding charge as Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) I Kanpur at the relevant time would be the special officer empowered to deal with offences in that area. 3. The next contention advanced by the learned Counsel was that the appointment of special police officer had to be made by name and not by virtue of the office held by him. Reference in this connection was made to Emperor v. Udho Chandulal AIR 1943 Sind 107. That was a case in which the scope and meaning of Section 6(ii) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act came up for consideration. Under that section entry in gambling houses could be made, among other persons, by Taluka Magistrate or by an Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police specially empowered by the State Government. On a construction of the language used in Section 6 it was held that the appointment of the officer concerned was required to be made by name and merely by virtue of his office. There is no provision analogous to Section 6 of the Bombay Gambling Act in the present Act. 4. In Soni Bachu Lakhuman Vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1960 Guj 37 it was pointed out that the scheme of Section 6 of the Bombay Gambling Act is that although there may be several officers competent to make a search u/s 6(ii) it is only the officer who has been specially empowered by Government who can issue a warrant for the search. The words 'specially empowered' are not found in the definition of special police officer in Section 2(1) of the Act. There is, therefore, no warrant for the proposition that the Deputy Superintendent of Police empowered to deal with offences under the Act must be an officer appointed by name. I am of the opinion that the language of Section 13 does not yield to the interpretation sought to be given to it. 5. There is, therefore, no warrant for the proposition that the Deputy Superintendent of Police empowered to deal with offences under the Act must be an officer appointed by name. I am of the opinion that the language of Section 13 does not yield to the interpretation sought to be given to it. 5. I see no force in this revision and it is accordingly rejected. The stay order is vacated.