Research › Browse › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

1966 DIGILAW 3 (DEL)

K. C. AGGARWAL v. STATE OF DELHI

1966-01-07

S.K.KAPUR

body1966
S. K. Kapur J. ( 1 ) K. C. Aggarwal applicant was convicted under section 420 read with section 511 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5000. 00. In default of payment of fine, he was ordered undergo further rigorous inprisonment for one-and a half months. The applicant s appeal in this Court also failed. He has now made an application under sections 3 and 4 read with section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958, with a prayer that the applicant should be released under section 3, or in the alternative undersection 4, of the said Act. ( 2 ) SO far as sections 3 and 4 are concerned, there appears to be serious difficulty in applying the said provisions. Both those sections lay down that the Court may, instead of sentencing an accused person to any punishment, deal with him in accordance with the said sections. It appears from the language used that the power can be exercised only when the Court has found a person guilty and is deciding upon the punishment to be awarded. That seems to follow from. the use of the word "instead" in both sections 3 and 4. Once a person has been convicted and sentenced, I do not think that the Court can exercise discretion under the said sections. More or less on the same lines is the language of section 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, while interpreting that provision, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Re Adapa Honumantha Rao took the view indicated by me above. Mr. Khanna, learned counsel for the applicant, says that by adopting this construction I would be defeating the very object of the legislation and thus creating a hole in an Act, intended to be a social reform measure. True, that in the field of statutory construction the intent of the legislature is of supreme importance. But since the legislature must manifest its intent by a written statute, that intent- must primarily be ascertained from the language used in the statute itself and not from conjectures aliunde. True, that in the field of statutory construction the intent of the legislature is of supreme importance. But since the legislature must manifest its intent by a written statute, that intent- must primarily be ascertained from the language used in the statute itself and not from conjectures aliunde. Before the Courts can resort to any other source for assistance, it must first seek to find the legislative intention -from the words and sentences which make up the statute subject to construction if the mening of language of the statute is plain then according to the rule announced in innumerable cases no need for construction really arises, as the intention stansa revealed by the apparent meaning It is said that -a deflection from the letter of the law is called for in a. statute like the present. I am afraid I cannot call a coach and fou,r anything but a vehicle. Having regard to the language, I find it impossible to accede to the contention of the applicant. Mr. Khanna sought to overcome this difficulty by resort to the language of section He says that sub-section (1) of section II clearly confers jurisdiction on the High Court to pass any order under this Act at any stage and even after an accused man has been convicted and sentenced. His main emphasis is on the words and also by the High Court" in sub-section (1) of section II. It is said that the words "when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision" do not go with the words "by the High Court" but only with the words "or any other Court", and in that view the High Court should be held competent to pass an order under this Act irrespective of the fact whether any appeall or revision is pending before it. Reference is made to Rat/an Lal v. The State of Punjab, In that case, an accused was convicted on 31-5-1962 under sections 451 and 354. Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six month s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs, 200. 00. The Probation of Offenders Act was extended to the place, of which the accused was resident on 1-9-1962. His appeal before the Sessions Judge and revision before the High Court were dismissed on 22-9-19 2. and 27-9-1962 respectively. Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six month s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs, 200. 00. The Probation of Offenders Act was extended to the place, of which the accused was resident on 1-9-1962. His appeal before the Sessions Judge and revision before the High Court were dismissed on 22-9-19 2. and 27-9-1962 respectively. The point of the application of the Probation of Offenders Act was not raised before the petition, an application was made requesting the High Court to excercise its jurisidiction under section II of the said Act and to pass ciders under sections 3, 4, or 6 thereof. This application was also dismissed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court, in revision, could exercise the power conferred under section II of the Act and remand the case to the lower Court for an appropriate order under the said Act. This judgment is relied on to show that the power can be exercised even after the matter has been disposed of by the High Court in appellate or revisional jurisidiction. The case before the Supreme Court was of an accused person of the age of sixteen years. Consequently, the provisions of section 6 were attracted Under section 6, the Court is obliged not to sentence the accused to imprisonment, unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is not desirable to deal with him under sections 3 or 4. In view of the imperative language of section 6, it was not open to the High Court to sentence the accused to imprisonment, unless the conditions set out in the section were satisfied. The position is not the same under sections 3 or 4. There, a discretion is given to the Court to apply the said provisions, if satisfied having regard to the factors mentioned therein, instead of sentencing the accused to any punishment. At the time of the arguments in appeal, the question of applying this Act was never raised. At no stage of the proeedings was it shown to the Court that the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and particularly the character of the offender, justified treatment sections3and 4. At the time of the arguments in appeal, the question of applying this Act was never raised. At no stage of the proeedings was it shown to the Court that the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and particularly the character of the offender, justified treatment sections3and 4. If therefore, the limitation for exercise of power after a person has been sentenced obtains, in cannot be open now to reagitate the matter by a subsequet application. Reverting again to the arguments fonded on section II (1) I am of the opinion that the High Court can exercise that power only when the case comes up before it on appeal or in revision. It is in accord with reality that every statute must be subjected to interpretation, its meanings ascertained and then the same applied to the case at hand. The legislative history and the asssstance from other sections of the Act, namely, sections 3 and 4 lead me to the irresistible conclusion that the words "when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision" go also with the words "by the High Court" -. In Rattan Lal s case also some observations made by the Spureme Court lend support to the interpretation convassed on behalf of the respondent. It is said, "the phraseolgy used therein sub-section (1} of section 11 is wide enough to enable the appelate Court or the High Court, when the case comes before it, to make such an order. " Apart from that, there is yet another difficulty. Sub-section (1) of section 11 entitles a Court to make an order under this Act. " To make an order under section 4, therefore, I must go back to section 4 and see how and when that order can be made. if the language of section 4 does not permit that order being made after awarding the sentence I see no provision under which I can do so. In the result this application fails and is dismissed.