Judgment :- 1. These second appeals arise out of the same suit. The first case is by the first defendant; and the second one is by plaintiffs 2 and 3. There is a memorandum of cross-objections in the first case by the same plaintiffs 2 and 3, so that the memorandum of cross-objections and the second of these cases involve the same questions. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but decreed by the lower appellate court in part. 2. The suit properties originally belonged to the father of the second defendant, who was the grandfather of the first plaintiff. The third defendant is the wife of the second defendant. The grandfather executed Ex. P1 in 1114, a gift deed, by which the suit properties were given to the second defendant, the first plaintiff, who was then a minor, and the children to be born thereafter to the second defendant. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the children subsequently born to the second defendant. I may also mention at this stage that the parties are Nairs. The donor reserved a life interest with him; and after his death the second defendant for himself and the third defendant as guardian of the first plaintiff, who was still a minor, executed Ex. P2 in 1117 selling the properties to the first defendant. The suit was filed by the three plaintiffs to set aside the alienation and to recover possession of the properties from the alienee, the first defendant. The trial court, as already stated, dismissed the suit, while the lower appellate court held that since the gift was to two living persons and also to other unborn persons, the gift in favour of the unborn persons was invalid and the gift enured only for the benefit of the two living persons, namely, the second defendant and the first plaintiff. The lower appellate court further held that they held the entire properties as tenants-in-common, so that under Ex. P2 the second defendant's half share passed to the first defendant and the half share of the first plaintiff did not pass, as he was not represented by his legal guardian. It is against this decision of the lower appellate court that both the second appeals have been filed. 3. P2 the second defendant's half share passed to the first defendant and the half share of the first plaintiff did not pass, as he was not represented by his legal guardian. It is against this decision of the lower appellate court that both the second appeals have been filed. 3. The counsel of the appellant in the first of these cases argues that the lower appellate court should have considered the effect of the fact that the second defendant, the father of the first plaintiff, was also a party to Ex. P2, though not as the guardian of the first plaintiff. The counsel also argues that the lower appellate court should have considered whether there was binding consideration and necessity for the sale. 4. In Ex. P2 the consideration shown is Rs. 285/-, of which a sum of Rs. 30/- is said to be the the arrears of karom due to the jenmi. Another sum of Rs. 21/- is said to have been taken to meet the expenses of the obsequies of the donor; and the balance is reserved with the alienee for purchasing properties in the future for the vendors. (There is controversy regarding the said reserved amount. According to the appellant, the said amount was utilised for making four purchases in the name of the vendors: but, according to the first plaintiff, he is not in possession of any of the properties alleged to have been purchased. I may state that it is not established that the first plaintiff is in possession of any of the said properties. I may also point out that even if the case of the alienee is accepted, still, three of the four purchases were only of mortgage rights. Ex. P2 does not mention anything about the existence of the Otti evidenced by Ex. D2 said to have been executed by the donor in favour of the alienee, under which the alienee was directed to pay a previous Otti evidenced by Ex. D1 to a Kesavan. The alienee has however produced evidence to show that he discharged Kesavan's Otti. Ex. D2 recites that the properties were with tenants and that Kesavan was directed to recover possession from them, which he failed to do. Still, Ex. P2 recites that at the time of the document the properties were in the direct possession of the second defendant. Again, Ex. Ex. D2 recites that the properties were with tenants and that Kesavan was directed to recover possession from them, which he failed to do. Still, Ex. P2 recites that at the time of the document the properties were in the direct possession of the second defendant. Again, Ex. P1 shows the value of the properties as Rs. 400/-, which must be an under-valuation, because the document was only a gift deed. Ex. P2 shows that the consideration paid thereunder was only Rs. 285/-. It is also not established, as already stated, that the alienee discharged any liability other than the mortgage debt of Kesavan. I may also point out that the properties are one acre and 32 cents of garden land, two buildings thereon and 57 cents of paddy land, though the right was only leasehold. The irresistible conclusion from these facts and circumstances is that the value of the properties shown in Ext. P2 is inadequate, with the result that the consideration paid thereunder is also inadequate. This fact and the false recitals in Ext. P-2 induce me to look at Ex. P2 with considerable suspicion. Still, since the second defendant, who was entitled to a half of the properties, sold his share, the alienee will be entitled to get that half; but, he will not be entitled to get the other half, now will he be entitled to have a further adjudication of the question of the payment of consideration, its binding nature, etc., especially in view of the fact that the second defendant, the de jure guardian of the first plaintiff, did not act as his guardian. Therefore, this second appeal has to be dismissed. 5. The memorandum of cross-objections in this second appeal and the next second appeal involve the same questions; and the result of the memorandum of cross-objections will follow the result of the next second appeal, which I shall hereinafter consider. 6. In the next second appeal the counsel of the appellants (plaintiffs 2 and 3) urges that the appellants must be given their share in the properties. In other words, the argument amounts to that the appellants have also right in the properties. The contention is that the gift under Ex. P1 was a gift to a group consisting of the second defendant, the first plaintiff and the children to be born to the second defendant in the future. In other words, the argument amounts to that the appellants have also right in the properties. The contention is that the gift under Ex. P1 was a gift to a group consisting of the second defendant, the first plaintiff and the children to be born to the second defendant in the future. Both the parties agree before me that though the Transfer of Property Act, as such, does not apply to this case, the principles embodied in the Act apply. Therefore, I proceed to consider this question in the light of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. The counsel of the appellants draws my attention to the decision of the Mysore High Court in Konahally Vasanthappa v. Konahally Channabasappa (AIR. 1962 Mys. 98). Somnath Iyer J. has considered therein S.13 and 20 of the Transfer of Property Act and has held that S.13 does not control S.20. The relevant facts of the case are that the maternal grandfather of the first plaintiff and the second defendant in that suit made a transfer of property. The transfer purported to be one, in the first instance, in favour of the second defendant: but, the donor proceeded further to create an interest for the benefit of the first plaintiff as well, who was not yet born at the time of the gift. Subsequently, the first plaintiff was born; and he filed a suit for partition and separate possession of a half in the property. The question was whether the first plaintiff, who was not in existence at the time of the gift, could have obtained a half share in the property. 8. In considering that question Somnath Iyer J. has relied on S.20 and has held that the first plaintiff was entitled to a half share. With due respect to the learned Judge I venture to disagree with the view expressed by him. The reasoning of the learned judge that S.13 of the Transfer of Property Act does not control S.20, I am afraid, does not appear to be happy. With due respect to the learned Judge I venture to disagree with the view expressed by him. The reasoning of the learned judge that S.13 of the Transfer of Property Act does not control S.20, I am afraid, does not appear to be happy. S.13 reads: "Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property." S. 20 reads: "Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not then living, he acquires upon his birth, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer, a vested interest, although he may not be entitled to the enjoyment thereof immediately on his birth." The transfer of property under the Transfer of Property Act is a transfer inter vivos, so that no transfer can be made to an unborn person. But, S.13 says that a transfer can be effected to an unborn person as contemplated by that section. The section contemplates the creation of a trust, because the words used are "for the benefit of". The section speaks of the creation of a prior interest which must be in the name of a living person, and the creation of a subsequent interest in the name of an unborn person, subject to the prior interest: and such subsequent interest must extend to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property. This means that the prior interest created in favour of the living person is a smaller interest carved out of the full interest of the transferor; and that the subsequent interest given to the unborn person must be the entire remaining interest after carving out the prior interest. This again means that what is given to the living person is a limited interest and the entire absolute remainder must go to the unborn person. 9. There are two possibilities under S.13. One is to create a trust vesting the property in a living person as trustee and giving the beneficial interest to the unborn person. This again means that what is given to the living person is a limited interest and the entire absolute remainder must go to the unborn person. 9. There are two possibilities under S.13. One is to create a trust vesting the property in a living person as trustee and giving the beneficial interest to the unborn person. Again, a definite share in the transferred property, say a half, a third or a fourth, may be given absolutely to the living person and the rest may vest in him as trustee for the unborn person. Even in such a case, regarding the share given to the unborn person, the living person is only a trustee for the unborn person, who has the beneficial interest. The second possibility, which falls more directly under S.13, is the creation of a limited or a smaller prior estate in favour of a living person and the creation of an absolute remainder in favour of the unborn person. In this case also, if a definite share like a half or a third is given to the living person absolutely, he will take that in full right; and regarding the balance a limited estate like a life estate can be carved out in favour of the living person giving the absolute remainder thereof to the unborn person. 10. S.20 does not deal with the creation of any interest in favour of an unborn person. What it does is to indicate or to fix the time when the property will vest in the unborn person. What the section says is that where an interest is validly created in favour of an unborn person, the property will vest in him on his birth, unless there is a contrary intention in the document of transfer. It is well known that property must vest in somebody; and in the case of a transfer to an unborn person, during the period after the transfer and before the birth of the person, the property must vest in a living person, who has to be in the position of a trustee for the unborn person. The validity or otherwise of a transfer to an unborn person has to be tested under S.13; and the time of vesting alone has to be decided under S.20. In other words, what is not valid under S.13 will not be valid under S.20. The validity or otherwise of a transfer to an unborn person has to be tested under S.13; and the time of vesting alone has to be decided under S.20. In other words, what is not valid under S.13 will not be valid under S.20. In that manner S.13 controls S.20; and, with due respect to Somnath Iyer J., I disagree with him. 11. Applying the principles discussed above to the facts of the present case the position resolves itself to this. It is not the case of the appellants that the living persons, the second defendant and the first plaintiff, did not get any absolute interest in the properties. If they got absolute interest in the properties on the date of the gift, what was the quantum of their right at that moment? It had necessarily to be the absolute right in the entirety of the properties, because there is no indication in the document of gift that they were to hold only a definite share like a half or a third in the absolute interest and regarding the rest they were to hold as trustees for the Unborn person. There is also no indication that what the living persons, the second defendant and the first plaintiff, got was only a life interest or a smaller interest than the absolute interest and regarding the absolute remainder they were trustees for the unborn persons. Therefore, the only conclusion possible from the provisions of the gift deed is that the properties were given in absolute right to two living persons along with other unborn persons. I may, at this stage, remind that the second defendant, the first plaintiff and the unborn persons do not constitute a tavazhi under the Nayar Act, so that the gift could not have been to a tavazhi either. The result is that the gift enured for the benefit of the living persons and it failed regarding the unborn persons. In other words, the entire properties vested in the second defendant and the first plaintiff as tenants-common each of them obtaining a moiety thereof. Thus, this second appeal has also to be dismissed. 12. Both the second appeals are dismissed; and the memorandum of cross-objections in the first case is also dismissed. The parties will suffer their respective costs in the second appeals and in the memorandum of cross-objections.