Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the petitioner in O. P. No. 1186 of 1963. The appeal challenges the conclusion in the judgment under appeal that S 110(1)(b) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, is in force, and that the levy of a tax under that provision in respect of the income of the appellant from investments for the two half-years of 1962-63 the half-year ended on the 31st September 1962 and the half-year ended on the 31st March 1963 by the municipality of Ernakulam is valid, and binding on the appellant. 2. The Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, replaced the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 (M. E.). It came into force on the 1st September 1961. 3. The relevant portion of S.110 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, provides that if a municipal council by a resolution determines that a profession tax shall be levied, every person, who, after the date specified in the notification in that behalf, in any half-year resides in the municipality for not less than sixty days in the aggregate and is in receipt of any pension or income from investments shall pay a half-yearly tax assessed in accordance with the rules in Schedule II to the Act. S.150 of the Act provides that the rules and tables embodied in Schedule II to the Act shall be read as part of Chapter VI of the Act, the Chapter that deals with the subject of taxation and finance. 4. Schedule II consists of two parts. The first part consisting of R.1 to 40 embodies the Taxation Rules and the second part consisting of R.41 to 66 embodies the Finance Rules. R.19 of the Taxation Rules specifies the classes into which persons shall, for the purposes of assessment to the profession tax, be divided and the maximum half-yearly tax leviable on each class. 5. There is a proviso to R.19. It reads as follows: "Provided that if in the financial year immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution of India any municipality was imposing profession tax at a rate higher than two hundred and fifty rupees per annum and continued to levy the tax at such higher rate immediately before the commencement of this Act, such municipality may continue to levy profession tax at such rate." The validity of the proviso is not in dispute before us. 6. 6. S.111 (1)(b) of the Madras City Municipal Act, 1919 provides for the levy of a similar tax on persons in receipt of any pensioner income from investments. That provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Rajagopalachari v. Corporation of Madras AIR. 1964 SC. 1172. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the tax concerned was really a tax on income, and not a tax on anything else. It said: "The tax on the receipt of pensioner on the income from investments which is referred to in the last part of S.111(1) is in truth and substance a tax on income." 7. Taxes on income other than agricultural income is an entry entry 82 in List I, the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Taxes on income other than agricultural income, therefore, is within the exclusive domain of Parliamentary legislation. Art.277 of the Constitution, however, saved existing levies until such time as 'provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law'. That article reads as follows: "Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the State, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law." 8. At the time the Constitution came into force there were two enactments in force in the area with which we are concerned, the Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), and the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 (M. E.). It is not disputed that as a result of Art.277 the tax by the Ernakulam Municipality on pensions or income from investments could continue to be levied until provision to the contrary is mads by Parliament by law. 9. The Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 (M. E.), as already stated, has been replaced by the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, with effect from the 1st September 1961. 9. The Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 (M. E.), as already stated, has been replaced by the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, with effect from the 1st September 1961. The Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), has been replaced by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, by S.13 of the Finance Act, 1950, with effect from the 1st April 1950, and subsequently, the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, has been replaced by the Income-tax Act, 1961, with effect from the 1st April 1962. The only question for consideration is whether either the replacement of the Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the replacement of the latter by the Income-tax Act, 1961, amounts to a provision to the contrary made by Parliament by law within the meaning of that expression as used in Art.277 of the Constitution. 10. There is no express repeal of the provision enabling municipalities to levy a tax on pensions and income from investments either in the Finance Act of 1950 or the Income-tax Acts of 1922 and 1961. Apart from this there is the significant fact that income taxation under the Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), and income taxation under S.86 (1)(b) of the Cochin Municipal Act. XVIII of 1113 (M. E.), continued to co-exist by virtue of Art.277 of the Constitution. A provision to the contrary, in circumstances like this, will have to be something more than a mere replacement of the Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the replacement of the latter by the Income-tax Act, 1961; it will have to be a provision which by apt words or apposite implication disrupts the co-existence of income taxation by the State and the municipalities and inhibits the continuance of a municipal levy on pensions or income from investments. We look in vain for such a provision in the Finance Act of 1950 and the Income-tax Acts of 1922 and 1961. 11. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to M.B. S. Oushadhalaya v. Union of India AIR. 1963 SC. 622. In that case there was no co-existence of two State enactments permitting income taxation as a result of Art.277 of the Constitution. 11. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to M.B. S. Oushadhalaya v. Union of India AIR. 1963 SC. 622. In that case there was no co-existence of two State enactments permitting income taxation as a result of Art.277 of the Constitution. The controversy was only as regards certain provisions of certain abkari enactments in force in the States concerned at the time the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, was passed by Parliament. It has also to be noted that S.21 of that Act embodied an express repeal in the following terms: "If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any law corresponding to this Act, that law is hereby repealed: Provided that all rules made, notifications issued, licences or permits granted, powers conferred under any law hereby repealed shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, have the same force and effect as if they had been respectively made, issued, granted or conferred under this Act and by the authority empowered hereby in that behalf." 12. In these circumstances the Supreme Court referred to Art.277 of the Constitution and said: "Therefore, so long as Parliament did not make any law relating to medicinal and toilet preparations, the position under the Government of India Act would continue and the States would have the power to continue levying duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations to the same extent to which they were levying them immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. In 1955, Parliament passed the Act for levy of duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations. This Act was brought into force from April 1, 1957, and the consequence of this enactment was that the power of the States to levy duties any further on medicinal and toilet preparations came to an end in view of Art.277 of the Constitution. There can in our opinion be no doubt that Art.277 which saved the power of the States to levy duties of excise etc., which came in the Union List on the passing of the Constitution is no longer applicable as soon as Parliament makes a provision to the contrary. There can in our opinion be no doubt that Art.277 which saved the power of the States to levy duties of excise etc., which came in the Union List on the passing of the Constitution is no longer applicable as soon as Parliament makes a provision to the contrary. Once therefore a provision to the contrary is made, the saving provided in Art.277 comes to an end and thereafter the State Governments cannot continue to levy any duty which they might have been levying by virtue of Art.277 till provision to the contrary was made. Further, this conclusion which follows from Art.277 is made perfectly clear by S.21 of the Act, which provides that 'if immediately before the commencement of the Act there is in force in any State any law corresponding to this Act, that law is hereby repealed.' The effect of this repeal is that the Excise Acts of the various States under which duty being levied on medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol must be deemed to have been repealed, in so far as they apply to such medicinal and toilet preparations. It is not necessary that the State should have had a separate law for levy of duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations, for the repeal in S.21 of the Act to come into effect. The Excise Acts of the various States were undoubtedly law under which duty was being levied on medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol and those Excise Acts must be deemed to correspond to the Act for the purposes of levy of duty on medicinal and toilet preparations and must be held to have been repealed by S.21 so far as medicinal and toilet preparations were concerned." 13. To the same effect is H. C. & P. Works Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR. 1964 SC. 1870. In that case the Supreme Court said: "In view of this provision Article 277 of the Constitution all duties and charges levied by the State before the coming into force of the Constitution on. the manufacture of medicinal preparations could continue to be levied until law was made by Parliament otherwise. 1964 SC. 1870. In that case the Supreme Court said: "In view of this provision Article 277 of the Constitution all duties and charges levied by the State before the coming into force of the Constitution on. the manufacture of medicinal preparations could continue to be levied until law was made by Parliament otherwise. It is not in dispute that the Act came into force from April 1, 1957 and is a law made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of Art.277, and therefore duties and other charges levied by the State in connection with medicinal preparations could no longer be levied by it. Further the Act specifically provides in S.21 that'if, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any law corresponding to this Act, that law is hereby repealed'. It is true that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general law which was concerned with liquor and intoxicating drugs generally; it thus applied to alcohol also (treating it as liquor), used for manufacturing medicinal preparation. The effect of S.21 therefore is that so far as the Hyderabad Abkari Act applied to the use of alcohol, treating it to be liquor, in the manufacture of medicinal and toilet preparations, the Hyderabad Abkari Act must be deemed to have been repealed to that extent only by S.M." 14. We do not consider the two decisions mentioned above as in any way supporting the appellant's contention that in the circumstances of the case before us we should hold that the replacement of the Cochin Income-tax Act, VI of 1117 (M. E.), by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the replacement of the latter by the Income-tax Act, 1961, would amount to a provision to the contrary made by Parliament by law within the meaning of that expression as used in Art.277 of the Constitution. It follows that this writ appeal should fail and has to be dismissed. We do so; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Dismissed.