MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v. BADRI — 1966 DIGILAW 31 (DEL)

S. B. Kapoor ( 1 ) THE principal question which arises for decision in these four civil revision petitions Nos. 408-D of 1960, 409-D of 1960, 421-D of 1963 and 422-D of 1963 is as to the interpretation of section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Contral Act, 1952 (Act No. 38 of 1952-hereafter to be REFERRED TO as the Act.) The plaintiff in the four suits giving rise to these revision petitions was the Delhi Municipal Committee (now succeeded by the Delhi Municipal Corporation) and the defendants in each case were persons whom the plaintiff claimed to be its tenants. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 were respectively Badri and Murari Lal, who occupied different portions of a property situated in Mohalla Punjabi, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, and the plaintiff claimed that it required the premises for running a child welfare centre. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 were respectively Mohammad Arab and Manzoor Elahi. who occupied different portions of premises No. 2414, Baradari Sher Afghan Khan, Bazar Ballimaran, Delhi, and the case of the plaintiff was that the premises were required for an object of public utility, viz. , starting aschool. All the four suits were decreed by the trial Courts and eviction of the defendants ordered but the lower appellate Court, viz, Shri Udham Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, to whom the tenants Badri and Murari Lal had appealed, held that the Delhi Municipal Committee was not a public institution within the meaning of section 17 of the Act and was not, therefore, entitled to evict the defendants. Hence the appeals of Badri and Murari Lal were allowed and the suits of the Delhi Municipal Committee against them dismissed. In the other two cases, the lower appellate Court, viz. , Shri G. R. Luthra, Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, upheld the decision of the trial Court and held that the plaintiff as a public institution was en titled to take advantage of section 17 of the Act. In view of these conflicting decisions, the learned Single Judge, before whom these revision petitions came originally, directed that they be disposed of by a larger Bench. In view of these conflicting decisions, the learned Single Judge, before whom these revision petitions came originally, directed that they be disposed of by a larger Bench. Section 17 of the Act is as follows :- "where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority, or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such Landlord or in the case of public institution, for the furtherance of its activites then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 13, the Court may, on an application of such landlord, place him in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Court is satisfied- (a) that the tenant, to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment, or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises: or (e) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises: or (d) that the premises are bona fide required by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation :- For the purpose of this section, public institution includes any education institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary. " i ( 2 ) THERE can be no manner of doubt that the Delhi Municipal Committee under section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act No. 3 of 1911), which was applied to the Delhi Municipal Committee also, was a body corporate. Similarly, by section 3 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act No. 66 of 1957) the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was also a body corporate. Equally, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff was a local authority as defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897 ). The plaintiff, there. fore came within the second and third categories as mentioned in the opening words of section 17 and it is not disputed that it could take advantage of section 17 if it required the premises for the use of its emplooees. The plaintiff, there. fore came within the second and third categories as mentioned in the opening words of section 17 and it is not disputed that it could take advantage of section 17 if it required the premises for the use of its emplooees. If, however the plaintiff is to get advantage of clause (d) of section 17, viz. , that the premises were bona fide required by it for the furtherance of its activities, it had in. addition to show that it was a public institution. According to Corpus Juris at pages 942 and 943 of the 32nd Volume, the term "institution" may embrace every person except private individuals or natural persons. The term is sometimes used as descriptive of the establishment or place where the business or operation of a society or association are carried on, at other times it is used to designate the organized body, and sometimes it is used in both of these senses. "institution" may include not only its property, but also all of its legitimate activites that are consistent with, and in the furtherance of, the purposes for which it was organized. The plaintiff is obviously an institution in the sense that it is an organized body created by a statute. As stated in Corpus Juris, the term "public institution" connotes any organized activity created or established by law or public autority, and as distinguished from a "private institution" carries with it used in its ordinary and well understood meaning, at least prima facie the idea of some public service or use which it is designed to set up. The learned counsel for the defendants did not, in fact, content that the plaintiff, with its wide spread public functions, was not a public institution in ordinary paralance. What was strongly urged on behalf of the defendants was that as the plaintiff fell into two of the preceding categories, viz. , "body corporate and local authority, it must, on the principles of interpretation of statutes, be excluded from the ambit of the term "public institution" where that term was first used in section 17, and, in that event, the same term viz. , "public institution" -where it is used for the second time must be presumed to have the same meaning, that is, excluding local authority or body corporate . , "public institution" -where it is used for the second time must be presumed to have the same meaning, that is, excluding local authority or body corporate . As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at pages 311 and 312 of the Eleventh Edition, it is reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of this argument, however, we have first to see whether it is possible to restrict, in the sense urged on behalf of the defendants, the term "public institution" where it is first used in the section. Reliance in this connection is placed on certain observations in Maxwell at page 320. It is stated there that when two words or expressions are copied together, one of which generally includes the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. It was, therefore, argued that the public institutions, which can take anvantage of clause (d) of section 17, cannot be those which fall within the previous three categories, viz. , "company body corporate, or local authority". Inother words, the term public institution" is to be read disjunctively with the other three categories, which precede the use of that term in the section. By way of illustration of this principle learned counsel for the defendants cited Thursby v. Churchwardens and Co. , of Briercliffe with Extwistle. The point in that appeal was whether under the lighting and watching Act (3 and 4 Wm. 4c. 90) section 38, a coal mint is to be rated at the higher rate provided for by that section or at the lower rate. The section provides "that owners and occupiers of houses, buildings, and property (other than land) rateable to the relief of the poor in any such parish shall be rated at and pay a rate in the pound three times greater than that at which the owners aud occupiers of land shall be rated at and pay for the purposes of this Act. " The contention of the appellants was that a coal mine was land, and therefore, falls to be rated at the lower rate. " The contention of the appellants was that a coal mine was land, and therefore, falls to be rated at the lower rate. The contention of the respondents, which had been given effect to by the Court below, was that a coal mine was not land within the meaning of that provision, and therefore was to be rated at the higher rate. In considering this question assistance was derived from the use of the term "land" in the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c. 2) because the earlier part of the section had laid down that the overseers "shall proceed in the same manner" as for levying money for the relief of the poor". Now the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c. 2), section I imposed a poor rate on the occupiers of "lands", houses, tithes and "coal mines". A question was raised whether mines other than coal mines were rateable and it was held that they were not, on account of the specific mention of coal mines as a subject of rating, even though the word "lands" was large enough to cover all mines. It was in this context that in the case cited it was held that the category of "lands" would not include coal mines and hence such mines would be assessable at the higher rate. Learned counsel for the defendants also relied on another illustration as given in Maxwell, which is as follows :- "in the same way, although the word person , in the abstract, includes artificial persons, that is, corporations, the Statute of Uses (27 Hen, 8. c. 10) which enacted, that when a person stood seized of tenants to the use of another person or body corporations, the latter person or body should be deemed to be seized of them has understood as using the word person in the former part of the sentence as not including a body corporate. Consequently, the statute did not apply where the legal seisin was in a corporation". ( 4 ) I do not, however, consider, that the above rule of interpretation can, having regard to the various terms used in section 17 and its underlying object, apply to this section. It cannot be said that category of "public institution" includes the other three categories, viz. , "company, body corporate or local authority". ( 4 ) I do not, however, consider, that the above rule of interpretation can, having regard to the various terms used in section 17 and its underlying object, apply to this section. It cannot be said that category of "public institution" includes the other three categories, viz. , "company, body corporate or local authority". For instance, a company need not be, and usually is not, a public institution and there are numerous bodies corporate which do not come within the definition of local authorities. The various categories used in section 17 are to some extent overlapping or intersecting. As stated in Maxwell at page 316 the presumption of a change of intention from a change of language (of no great weight in the construction of any documents) seems entitled to less weight in the construction of a statute then in any other case, for the variation is sometimes to be accounted for by a mere desire to avoid the repeated use of the same words, sometimes by the circumstance that the Act has be;n complied from different sources, and sometimes by the alternations and additions from various hands which Acts undergo in their progress through Parliament. " ( 5 ) IF the term "public institution" is to be interpreted as excluding local authorities, absurd results would follow. According to the explanation, Public institution includes any educational institution, library, "public institution" hospital and charitable dispensary If, therefore, a body of private individuals to running any such institution for the use of the public and requires the premises in the possession of its tenants for the purpose of expanding the institution, advantage could be taken of section 17 to secure the tenants eviction, but a local authority, such as the plaintiff, which is perhaps running hundreds eductional institutions, would not be able to have recourse to that section. That could never have been the intention of the Legislature. As observed in B. Udeypal Singh v. Lakshmi Chand following King v. Vasey and. Lally," King v. Ettridge and Saison v. Dancdmbe the manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language and it becomes a duty of the Court to ignore the words which have the effect of making the enactment an absurd one. Lally," King v. Ettridge and Saison v. Dancdmbe the manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language and it becomes a duty of the Court to ignore the words which have the effect of making the enactment an absurd one. ( 6 ) ACTUALLY, so far as the plain words and the tenor of section 17 go, the result appears to be the contrary to what is maintained on behalf of the defendants. The explanation, which uses the word "includes", does not give exhaustively the connotation of "public institution". As observed by a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Darbari Laland others v. Smt. Dharan Vati, the word include" is very liberally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is so used these words, or phrases must beconsidered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also these things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. It seems that the term "public institution" as first occuring in section 17 of the Act refers to a public institution as an organized activity created or established by law or public or authority, while when it is used for the second time as well as in the explanation it may be taken to include also the property such as a college or library etc. belonging to the institution. As stated at page 312 of Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, the presumption that the same meaning is implied by the legislature by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act is not of much weight and the same word may beused indifferent senses in the same statute and even in the same section ( 7 ) I cannot, therefore, see any conceivable reason why local authority, which runs educational and other insitutions, doesnot come within the purview of the explanation, or why the plaintiff, which itself is indisputably a public institution in ordinary parlance, should be debarred from obtaining eviction of its tenants from the premises which are bona fide required for the expansion of the services it renders to the public by way of opening a child welfare centre, as in revision petitions Nos. 401-D, 408-D and 409-D of 1960, and by starting a new school, as in revision petitions Nos-421-D and 422. D of 1963. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the interpretation sought to be placed by learned counsel for the defendants on section 17 of the Act is repelled. ( 9 ) SO far as the suits, out of which revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 have arisen, are concerned, it appears that the property in dispute was gifted to the plaintiff by its owners, Om Parkash and Jiwan Lal, by a gift deed dated 26th of July, 1951, and thereafter the defendants in these suits had attorned to the plain. iff. In the other two cases, one Ram Lal Khemka executed a deed of gift dated 3rd of September, 1954, of the property vide deed Exhibit P. 1. Annexed to the gift deed asschedule b is a copy of the resolution of the plaintiff-Committee whereby the gift stated inter alia that the donee as a public body was running and managing various Municipal Schools for children of the citizens of Delhi and the donor had great love and interest for promoting the cause of their education. The donee was to have and to hold the building in question for ever subject to the various conditions, one of which was that the said building would be used for a school or for other works of public utility, and the other that the donee would not be able to sell it. One of the pleas raised by these defendants was that Ram Lal Khemka was not the owner of the property, but, at the same time, in a subsequent paragraph of their written-statements they admitted that they Were the tenants of Ram Lal of various portions. So, quite rightly, the Courts below did not enter into the question whether Ram Lal was the owner of the property or not. ( 10 ) A further plea on behalf of these two defendants was that they never attorned to the plaintiff and since Ram Lal could not have availed of the ground of eviction mentioned in clause (d) of section 17 of the Act, the plaintiff-donee also could not avail of that ground. ( 10 ) A further plea on behalf of these two defendants was that they never attorned to the plaintiff and since Ram Lal could not have availed of the ground of eviction mentioned in clause (d) of section 17 of the Act, the plaintiff-donee also could not avail of that ground. This argument does not require serious consideration because once the property was gifted by Ram Lal to the plaintiff the latter, as landlord, automatically got all the rights of ownership which Ram Lal had, and, in addition, the further rights which were conferred on the plaintiff as a public institution by section 17 of the Act. ( 11 ) THE last contention on behalf of these defendants was that by the gift deed. Exhibit P. 1. a trust was created, the object of which was that the property to which the trust pertained be used. "for a school. or for other works of public utility", and such a trust was had on account of uncertainty. Vide section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882," a trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out. of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the. owner. " In view of this definition, it was alleged that the gift deed created a trust, and then reliance was places on a number of authorities in which it had been held that if the purpose of the trust was vague and uncertain the trust would be unenforceable. The first case is Blair v. Dunoan and another". In that case the testatrix by codicil in her own handwriting directed her trustee that in the events which happenedone-half of the residue of her estate should be applied for "such charitable or public purposes as my trustee thinks proper. " It was held that the direction was void for uncertainty, and it is argued that on the same reasoning the purpose in the two cases giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963-viz. , that the building would be used" for a school or for other works of public utility "was also void on the ground of uncertainty. The other cases cited are-Narain Das and another v, Brij Lal and another, and 5hadi Ram and another v. Ram kishan ond others. 421-D and 422-D of 1963-viz. , that the building would be used" for a school or for other works of public utility "was also void on the ground of uncertainty. The other cases cited are-Narain Das and another v, Brij Lal and another, and 5hadi Ram and another v. Ram kishan ond others. ( 12 ) ASSUMING, however, that the object of the trust is vague and uncertain, I do not see how the defendants can derive any advantage from that circumstance. In the law of Trusts by Keeton at pages 83 to 94 of the Sixth Edition, it is stated on the basis of Knight v. Knight, that for a trust to be validly created three things were necessary, (1) The woldsemployed must be so couched that, taken as a whole, they could be deemed to be imperative: (2) the subject-matter of the trust must be certain. (3) the objects, or persons intended to be benefited must also be certain. At pages 93 and 94 the effect of uncertainty is stated as follows:- "it is important to notice that the effect of uncertainty in respeet of one ot the three essentials of trust is not always the same. Whwre the words of a trust are too uncertain, then no intention to create a trust at all has been established, and the donee, therefore, takes the property beneficiaty. Similarly, the donee takes beneficially where the trust fails for uncertainty of property, since although it may have been clear in this case that there was an intention to create a "trust, there is no property to which it can be annexed. In the third caw, however, assuming that the other two requisites are fulfilled, the donee holds on trust for the settler, residuary legatee or devisee, or intestate successor. " ( 13 ) IN neither of these cases can a stranger to the trust derive any advantage. Section 83 of the Indian Trust, 1882, videillustration (a) lays down that where a trust is too vague to be executed the trustee hold the land for the benefit of the author of the trust or his legal representatives. There is nothing whatever to show that the creators of the trust in question had at any time challenged the validity of the trust and the defendants in revision petitions Nos. There is nothing whatever to show that the creators of the trust in question had at any time challenged the validity of the trust and the defendants in revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1953 would appear to have no locus standi to resist eviction on account of the supposed uncertainty in the object of the trust. As held by the Privy Council in Patel Chhotabhai and others v. Janan Chandra Basak and othert, "the intention to create a trust must be indicated by words or acts with reasonable certainty. The purpose of the trust, the trust property, and the beneficiaries must be indicated and in such a way that the trust could be administered by the Court if the occassions arose. Ii there is no such certainty in the object the only consequence would be that there would be no trust and not that the tenants in the property would, merely on the ground of uncertainty of the object of the trust, be entitled to resist eviction. To meet this argument reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants on a Bench decision of this Court in Messrs J. N. Singh and Co. v. Sardari Mal, Etc, (Civil Revision No. 413 of 1903 decided on 2nd of December, 1905. In that case the plaintiffs had created a trust, namely, "sardari Mal Rattan Lal Jain I rust" and sought eviction of the tenants on the ground that the premises in dispute were required for a Jain Boarding House. The trust was created for the purposes of Jain Dharamshala or for the construction of a Digambar Jain Boarding House. It was held by the learned judges that a Digamber Jain Boarding House was not a public institution within the meaning of section 17 of the Act and tha is why the suit of the plain tiffs was dismissed. The case cited, therefore, is of no assistance for the decision of the present case where there can be no doubt as to the plaintiff being a public institution. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to section 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Act. VI of 1890), " Charitable purpose includes relief of the poor, education. . medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility, but does not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching or worship. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to section 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Act. VI of 1890), " Charitable purpose includes relief of the poor, education. . medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility, but does not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching or worship. " It has been argued on the basis of this. definition by Mr. K. K. Raizada, learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the gift does not become void merely by reference in one of the conditions of the gift to the building being used for "other works of public utility". It is therefore submitted that the ratio in Shadi Ram v. Ram kishan viz, that trust in order to be valid must be of such a nature that its execution and administration could be controlled by the Court, would not apply to make the trust void in the present case. However, inview of what has been stated above, it is unnecessary to consider this argument. ( 15 ) AS a result of the above discussion, revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 are allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. The plaintiff shall have its costs throughout. Revisions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 are dismissed with costs. ( 16 ) I agree.