JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner was elected a member of the Municipal Board, Bisalpur, district Pilibhit in November, 1964. He received a notice dated April 6, 1966, from the Commissioner which reads thus: - "It has been reported to me that you absented yourself from the Board's meetings held on 22-10-1965, 26-11-1965, 7-12-65 and 15.1.66 (from October 1965 to January, 1966). i.e. for more than three consecutive months or three consecutive meetings, without obtaining prior sanction from the Board. Thus you have rendered yourself liable for action under Sec. 40(1) (a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Please explain within fifteen days from receipt of this notice as to why action under the aforesaid section should not be taken against you." 2. The petitioner submitted an explanation and the main ground given by him for his absence was that his wife had fallen seriously ill and was confined to hospital for about six months and, on account of this, the petitioner could not attend the meetings. He further stated that he had sent a note to the President of the Municipal Board, expressing his inability to attend the meetings and requesting sanction of the board for his absence. By order dated June 23, 1966, the Commissioner, without going into the reasons given by the petitioner for his absence, removed the petitioner from membership of the Municipal Board. This order of removal is challenged by the petitioner. 3. The Commissioner did not accept the petitioners statement that had sent a note to the President of the Municipal Board for sanctioning his absence. He observed that it was abundantly proved that the petitioner did not attend meetings of the board held on October 22, November 26 and December 7, 1965 on January, 15, 1966. He then went on to say: "The charge is amply proved that the member absented himself from the meetings of the Board for more than three consecutive months or three consecutive meetings which ever is longer period without obtaining the sanction from the Board and as such is liable for removal under Sec. 40(1) (a) of the Act." 4. He then went on to say: "The charge is amply proved that the member absented himself from the meetings of the Board for more than three consecutive months or three consecutive meetings which ever is longer period without obtaining the sanction from the Board and as such is liable for removal under Sec. 40(1) (a) of the Act." 4. Sec. 40(1) (a) stands thus: - "40(1) - The State Government, in the case of a city, or the prescribed Authority in any other case may remove a member of the Board on any of the following grounds: (a) that he has absented himself from the meetings of the Board for more than three consecutive months or three consecutive meetings whichever is the longer period, without obtaining sanction from the Board: Provided that the period during which the member was in jail as an under trial, detenu or ......as a political prisoner, shall not be taken into account." ......Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 40 provides that, before action is taken for the removal of a member, he shall be given an opportunity of explanation and, when action is taken, the reasons therefor shall be placed on record. Before a member can be removed from membership of a Municipal Board under Sec. 40(1) (a), three conditions have to be fulfilled, namely, (1) that he has absented himself from three consecutive meetings; (2) that the period of his absence is more than three consecutive months; and (3) that he has not obtained the sanction of the Board. 5. All the conditions must be fulfilled before any action under this provision can be taken. It is not denied in the present case that the petitioner was absent from three consecutive meetings of the board and that the first condition was satisfied. But it is contended that the second condition was not satisfied and that the petitioner was not, even on the findings of the Commissioner, absent for a period of more than three consecutive months. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the period of absence must be computed from the date of the meeting ait which member is first absent to the date of the last meeting at which he was absent. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the period of absence must be computed from the date of the meeting ait which member is first absent to the date of the last meeting at which he was absent. So computed, there is no manner of doubt that the petitioner, being absent from October 22, 1965 to January 13, 1966, was not absent for more than three consecutive months. In fact, the period of absence, on this calculation, falls short of three months. At first, learned counsel for the Commissioner contended that, in computing the period of absence, each entire month, in which a meeting was held and at which a member was absent, should be counted as absence. According to him, since the petitioner was absent at the meetings held in October, November, 1965 and January, 1966, he should be deemed to have been absent for four months; but, later, when it was pointed out that this method of computation would lead to absurd results, learned counsel did not press for the acceptance of this method of computation. One of the difficulties that arose was whether a month, in which two meetings were held, at one of which a member was present and he was absent at the other should be counted as absence or presence. Another difficulty was that, if after absence in two calendar months, no meeting was held in the third month and the member was again absent at a meeting held in the fourth month, it could not be said that he had been absent for more than three consecutive months. Learned, counsel then contended that the absence should be computed from the date of the first meeting, at which a member is absent, to the date of the meeting which he actually attends. According to this method, the absence of the petitioner has to be counted from October 22, 1965 to February 5, 1966, the date of the first meeting which he attended after his absence. This method of computation is also not the correct or legal method to compute the period of absence. One illustration will be sufficient to show this. Suppose there are three meetings in the month of January and a member is unable to attend them. This method of computation is also not the correct or legal method to compute the period of absence. One illustration will be sufficient to show this. Suppose there are three meetings in the month of January and a member is unable to attend them. If the fourth meeting is held by the President within three months of the first meeting, the member will not be liable to removal under Sec. 40(1) (a); but, if the fourth meeting is held by the President more than three months after the first meeting, the member will become liable to removal under this section. Therefore, the incurring of this liability will be dependent, not upon the actual absence of the member, but, upon the fixing of the date of the fourth meeting by the President. The Legislate could never have intended such result. Sec. 40(1) (a) is a penal provision. It provides for punishing members of the Board who absent themselves for the prescribed period. The provision has to be strictly construed. What can be punished is actual absence and not notional absence. And, the absence contemplated is absence from the meetings of the Board. The words of the section indicate that the absence to be taken into account is the period between the dates of the first and the last meeting not attended by the member. The period from the date of the last, meeting not attended and the next meeting attended cannot be counted. During this period the member cannot be said to have absented himself from any meeting of the Board. Similarly, the member cannot be deemed to have been absent from meetings of the Board during the period from the date of the first meeting not attended to the date of the last meeting attended before that. Therefore, the only method of computing the period of absence for purposes of Sec. 40(1) (a) is to count the actual period between the dates of the first and the last of the three or more consecutive meetings not attended by a member. On this computation, the petitioner was not absent for more than three consecutive months and the second condition was not. fulfilled in his case. He was, therefore, not liable to be removed from membership by the Commissioner. On this computation, the petitioner was not absent for more than three consecutive months and the second condition was not. fulfilled in his case. He was, therefore, not liable to be removed from membership by the Commissioner. The order of the Commissioner removing him from membership, when one of the conditions precedent for doing so was not satisfied, is illegal and liable to be quashed. 6. I accordingly allow this writ petition and quash the order of the Commissioner dated June 23, 1966, removing the petitioner from membership of the Municipal Board under Sec. 40(1) (a) of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs of this petition.