JUDGMENT.- This Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendants and arises out of a suit for contribution between alienees from the mortgagor after the satisfaction of the mortgage decree obtained by the mortgagee in O.S. No. 22 of 1958 on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram. Three items of properties belonged to one Rajamannar Ayyangar. He mortgaged them to one Ramalakshmi Ammal for a sum of Rs. 5,000. He himself made some payments towards the mortgage and on 16th September, 1953 under Exhibit A-l he sold one-half of item 1 in favour of the first defendant in the suit, out of which this Second Appeal arises, for a consideration of Rs. 1,000. He received Rs. 100 in cash and the balance of Rs. 900 was reserved with the vendee to be paid to the mortgagee in part payment. Similarly, on 23rd October, 1953, under Exhibit A-2, he sold the other half of the first item to defendants 2 and 3 jointly for a similar consideration and here also Rs. 900 was reserved with the vendee to be paid to the mortgagee in part payment. On 1st December, 1953 under Exhibit A-3, he sold the third item of property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 3,500. As on that date taking into account the payments to be made by defendants 1 to 3 of the amounts reserved with them, a sum of Rs. 1,270 was payable for full discharge of the mortgage the said amount of Rs. 1,270 was reserved with the plaintiff for payment to the mortgagee. The second item of the mortgaged property was retained by the mortgagor to be enjoyed by him free of encumbrance. As the defendants herein did not join with the plaintiff in discharging the encumbrance, the mortgagee filed the suit O.S. No. 22 of 1958, for the balance due to her. When execution was taken out by the mortgagee-decree-holder, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 jointly, on 24th November, 1958 paid a sum of Rs. 500 towards the mortgage decree. Again, on 24th September, 1959, a further sum of Rs. 500 was paid by them. When making these payments, the plaintiff and the defendants, as among themselves, shared the amounts paid in the following proportion. For every sum of Rs. 500, the plaintiff contributed Rs.200, the first defendant Rs. 500 towards the mortgage decree. Again, on 24th September, 1959, a further sum of Rs. 500 was paid by them. When making these payments, the plaintiff and the defendants, as among themselves, shared the amounts paid in the following proportion. For every sum of Rs. 500, the plaintiff contributed Rs.200, the first defendant Rs. 150 and defendants 2 and 3 jointly a sum of Rs. 150 Later, defendants 1 to 3 entered into some arrangement with the mortgagee-decreeholder and paid her Rs. 2,000 and got their properties exonerated. For the balance due under the mortgage, namely, Rs. 1,788-50, the mortgagee proceeded against the property purchased by the plaintiff. Having paid the mortgagee that amount, the plaintiff has come forward with the suit for contribution. The basis of his case was that as amongst themselves, the first defendant had to pay the mortgagee Rs. 900 and defendants 2 and 3 jointly Rs. 900 and himself (plaintiff) had to pay Rs. 1,271 in terms of the directions in their respective sale deeds. Approximately, in the proportion of 3: 3: 4 that proportion would govern the liability for contribution. On this basis, the plaintiff contended that giving credit for the payments made by the defendants, the first defendant would have to pay him a sum of Rs. 136-55 and defendants 2 and 3 on their part a sum of Rs. 136-55. But the trial Court held that the claim could be rested only under section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act that there was no contract to the contrary as contemplated in that section and there was no privity of contract between the various purchasers from the mortgagor. It found that if under the principle of section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act the market value of each item of property was taken into consideration, the defendants cannot be made liable to pay any amount to the plaintiff as on that basis they had already paid off the amount they would be liable to the mortgagee. In this view, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, in the view that section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable and that justice and equity demanded that the defendants must contribute in proportion to the liability undertaken by them as purchasers from the mortgagor, decreed the suit for contribution. In this view, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, in the view that section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable and that justice and equity demanded that the defendants must contribute in proportion to the liability undertaken by them as purchasers from the mortgagor, decreed the suit for contribution. In this appeal by the defendants the principal contention is that there is no legal basis for the decree given by the lower appellate Court. It is pointed out that there is no contract between the plaintiff and the defendants inter se obliging them to meet the liability to the mortgagee in any particular proportion. It must be noticed that the undertaking by each vendee was with the mortgagor severally. These individual undertakings cannot bind the mortgagee or the other purchasers. The trial Court finds that there is no privity of contract between the parties and it may be said that the lower appellate Court does not find any contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. No doubt, in the plaint it is vaguely stated that the parties had agreed to bear the liability for the mortgage in proportion to the amounts they had undertaken with the mortgagor to pay to the mortgagee. But there is nothing on record to infer the existence of any such contract. No issue even was raised on that. The only question, therefore, for consideration is, whether, in the absence of a contract between the contributories themselves, it is open to the Court, on some equitable principle, to rateably distribute the obligation for the mortgage debt amongst the parties, without reference to section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. What induced the lower appellate Court in this case to take this view is the fact that the defendants had been placed in possession of the properties purchased by them and had been in enjoyment of the same, while they had parted only with one-tenth of the consideration amount in cash to the mortgagor. The rest they had retained with themselves for discharge of the mortgage. If all the purchasers had joined together and paid off the mortgages on the day the plaintiff purchased his item of property, the mortgage would have been then and there discharged. The rest they had retained with themselves for discharge of the mortgage. If all the purchasers had joined together and paid off the mortgages on the day the plaintiff purchased his item of property, the mortgage would have been then and there discharged. It is the default on the part of defendants in not joining with the plaintiff in discharging the mortgage, that led up to the mortgage suit interest meanwhile swelling up. In view of this, the learned Subordinate Judge thought that, on equitable considerations, the defendants could be called upon to rateably contribute to the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff may not secure any amount from them if section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act was applied. Before the learned Subordinate Judge the decision of this Court in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Palamalai Pillai1, was cited. But while the learned Subordinate Judge’s attention was drawn to an observation in Bava Sahib v. Krishna Boyan2, that it is no longer good law, regrettably a latter Full Bench decision of this Court approving it does not appear to have been cited. It may be stated that the facts of the case in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Palamalai Pillai1, though not identical, are so similar to the present case that the principles derivable therefrom would directly apply. It is stated therein: “The liability to rateable contribution of properties mortgaged in the first instance and sold subsequently in lots to different persons is imposed by the Transfer of Property Act. The legislation may have been based on equitable grounds ; but its limits are prescribed by the statute.” In that case a mortgagor sold a portion of the mortgaged property to ‘A ‘and direced him to pay a part of the debt. Another portion of the property was sold to ‘B’ with a direction that he should also pay a part of the debt. The rest of the property was sold to ‘C’ with a similar direction. The last of the purchasers ‘C’ had to pay a much larger amount to the mortgagee. The purchasers failed to pay as agreed upon. It resulted in the mortgagee bringing a suit and obtaining a decree. The rest of the property was sold to ‘C’ with a similar direction. The last of the purchasers ‘C’ had to pay a much larger amount to the mortgagee. The purchasers failed to pay as agreed upon. It resulted in the mortgagee bringing a suit and obtaining a decree. ‘A’ and ‘B’ paid such portions of the debt as would, but for their undertakings, have been proportionately chargeable on the properties purchased by them, but less than what they had undertaken to pay C to avert the sale of his properties, had to pay the mortgagee considerably more than what he had agreed with the mortgagor to pay. Having paid the amount, he sued the other two persons for contribution and, it was in these circumstances, it was held that the claim was not sustainable under section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was pointed out in that decision that by the mere fact of subsequent purchase, the purchaser does not get an implied transfer of the undertaking given to the vendor by the earlier purchasers. This decision finds affirmance in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Damodarasami v. Govindarajulu3. The learned Judges observed therein that the correctness of the decision is not open to doubt from any point of view. They observed at p. 550: " The defendants had already paid what they were liable to pay under section 82 and there was no contract between the respective purchasers making them liable to pay more." At page 554 it is observed: " Obviously, there can be no objection to the mortgagors agreeing what their rights and liabilities with regard to contribution inter se shall be, but as such a contract will not run with the land, it cannot affect a third party, unless he agrees to be bound by it." It is pointed out that where the contract is between a mortgagee and his mortgagors, the position will be different, because such a contract will run with the land. As I feel bound by the decision in Kunchithapatham Filial v. Palamalai Pillai1, as directly applicable to this case, I do not think that any further discussion is called for. As I feel bound by the decision in Kunchithapatham Filial v. Palamalai Pillai1, as directly applicable to this case, I do not think that any further discussion is called for. I may, however, point out that that part of the decision in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Palamalai Pillai1, which relates to the consideration of the scope of the expression ‘bound by law to pay’ in section 69 of the Contract Act has been subsequently dissented from in Thirumalasubhu v. Smt. Rajammal2. The observations in that regard run counter to the decision of the Privy Council in Govindram v. Gondal State3. But so far as the decision goes in relation to section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act and its applicability to contribution between owners of properties subject to a mortgage, the observations of the Full Bench in Damodarasami v. Govindarajulu4, are there and are binding upon me. Learned Counsel for the respondent drew my attention to the decision of this Court in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Murugappa & Sons5, but I do not find anything in that decision which in any way detracts from the principles laid down in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Palamalai Pillai1, with reference to section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. In fact that was not a case of contribution between persons holding properties which had been covered by the same mortgage, and it was a case where section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act was held not applicable. In this connection I may refer to Kader Lal Seal v. Hari Lal Seal6, where it is observed: "In my opinion, the whole law of mortgage in India, including the law of contribution arising out of a transaction of mortgage, is now statutory and is embodied in the Transfer of Property Act read with the Civil Procedure Code. I am clear we cannot travel beyond these statutory provisions. Here in the instant case under section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff is not entitled to any remedy. The defendants have paid more than their proportionate share of the liability. It follows that the decision of the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained. The suit for contribution therefore fails and is dismissed. The Second Appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is restored. The parties will bear their respective costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. It follows that the decision of the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained. The suit for contribution therefore fails and is dismissed. The Second Appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is restored. The parties will bear their respective costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. V. K. ------- Appeal allowed.