JUDGMENT : H.R. KRISHNAN, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff-applicant for dissolution of marriage raising two main points in controversy; firstly, whether in a case of this nature the delay by itself disqualifies the plaintiff (wife) to the relief of dissolution she would have been otherwise entitled to; secondly, whether the fact of her having lived in adultery is itself the result of the husband's domestic cruelty and as such not countable against her as her own wrong. All the other elements in this case are either common ground or have been found in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The facts in brief are the following: The wife-plaintiff and the respondent-husband had married according to Hindu rites many years before the initiation of these proceedings in 1963; it was at least 15 years earlier, possibly near 20 years. Soon after the marriage there were differences and the wife went away to her parent's house. At the first instance she did no other act that can be called improper; but the husband married another woman,-or at any rate began to keep the other woman named Ganga as his wife. He has by now got a few children by her. The wife in her turn threw herself in the mercy of a fellow-villager called Bhura by whom she had got three children at the time of the application. Shortly before the application there were some allegations by the parties, in particular, one by the wife that the husband-respondent was trying to take her away by force. This, however, has not been proved. Similarly, the husband's earlier allegation that while going away some years ago the woman took ornaments which really belong to the husband had not been believed. What we have therefore is a separation by the woman at the first instance possibly under some domestic difference, a failure on the part of the husband for years together to give her maintenance or other assistance, the marriage with, or the keeping of a second woman in his house by the husband, and following it the wife's throwing herself on another man and living in adultery with him. For nearly seven years since it became possible for the wife to apply for dissolution or judicial separation, she did not go to Court with a petition. 3. The husband's own defence was peculiar. For nearly seven years since it became possible for the wife to apply for dissolution or judicial separation, she did not go to Court with a petition. 3. The husband's own defence was peculiar. He admitted all these facts and in return to the wife's charge that he was living with another woman he has advanced the matching and the equally true charge that she in her turn was living in adultery with Bhura and has further alleged that this application is a device to avoid prosecution for adultery. In effect he made two points, namely, the delay and the wife's living in adultery, both of which have counted with the trial Court and have led to the dismissal of the application. 4. In what circumstances delay should lead to the un-suiting of an applicant under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been examined from time to time by the Courts. No general rule can be laid down for the very simple reason that the delay may be the result of different causes in different cases. Firstly, there is a delay which is intentional and which amounts to acquiescence. When that is the position the assistance should be refused straightway. Secondly, there is the delay or what one might call the delay of optimism, namely, the aggrieved party still hopes very often on a slender basis that things can be patched up and therefore avoids pushing matters to an issue. Where the indications are such, the delay should not in my opinion lead to the un-suiting of the party who after prolonged optimism is disillusioned and goes to seek the assistance of the Court. Then there is the delay of apathy, especially on the part of the women who generally speaking are more helpless than the men in the corresponding class. In such cases the party just lets things drift without really grasping the legal consequences and after some years suddenly realises the extremely precarious position to which it has brought itself and then stirs about so as to do something. Almost similar to it is the case of delay consequent on poverty and the difficulty the party experiences in saving money enough for the expenses necessary for initiating and continuing to prosecute the proceedings, as it often happens, in more than one Court. 5. Almost similar to it is the case of delay consequent on poverty and the difficulty the party experiences in saving money enough for the expenses necessary for initiating and continuing to prosecute the proceedings, as it often happens, in more than one Court. 5. To try to lay down a single rule for all these kinds of delays is certainly dangerous. Before un-suiting any applicant under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act or as for that matter under the corresponding section of the Indian Divorce Act we should ascertain what exactly the delay was due to and where it is the result of several causes, what is the predominant one. We should also remember that delay even when it raises the presumption of acquiescence is liable to explanation and the explanation whatever it is worth should be given due consideration. 6. In all these cases Courts should be guided to some extent by what one might call for want of a better term the "Humanitarian" principle. Even where there is unexplained delay we should weigh the consequences both to the parties and to the children, if any, of either or both the spouses against the possible injustice of permitting a party to reverse a position in which it might have acquiesced. Even in the English Courts where till the early teens of this century the view taken was strict and academic, what one might call the "humanitarian" principle has been gaining ground. In our Courts also there is an increasing tendency to apply this humanitarian standard. 7. In this case the delay as such has not been explained except that both the parties had been moving on their separate ways till either is now faced not only with a union with a third party that is not quite regular but also a number of children whose legitimacy itself is in question. The problem for our consideration is whether the delay and the adultery on the part of the wife are such as to justify our dooming the parties and the children to a position of anomalousness and special stigma. 8. As far as the wife is concerned, she did not at the first instance fall into an adulterous life till the husband burnt his boats by bringing another woman in his house and began to live with her as husband and wife. 8. As far as the wife is concerned, she did not at the first instance fall into an adulterous life till the husband burnt his boats by bringing another woman in his house and began to live with her as husband and wife. By that time the woman fell into the company of one Bhura whose price for this protection was adultery on the part of the protected woman. This kind of situation is by no means uncommon and broadly speaking the moral responsibility for it lies squarely on the husband. In such a case we should not visit on the wife who to some extent had been the victim of circumstances the consequence of refusal of the relief to which she would be otherwise entitled. In a sense of course it is her wrong; but it is a wrong of the second older brought about by the husband's own conduct. In this connection the remarks in Mrs. Caroline Foster v. Mr. Alfred Foster AIR 1937 Oudh 116, seem pertinent. It was a case under the Indian Divorce Act; but the principles are applicable to the instant case also, There are no rigid rules as to exercise of discretion in divorce proceedings. All relevant facts are to be considered as well as the welfare of the parties themselves and the principles of morality. But where the wife makes a full disclosure of the adultery at the outset and her adultery is proved to have been conducted by the willful neglect and misconduct of her husband.... discretion should be exercised in her favour and divorce should be granted to her. Possibly we would not go so far in the instant case, nor is it necessary for us to do so. But the same principle has been followed in another case also under the Indian Divorce Act reported in Gladys v. Richard Bourke A I R 1932 Sind 18: In dealing with divorce cases it should ever be remembered that the woman is the weaker vessel.... and that what may perhaps be excusable in the case of woman would not be excusable in the case of man. Where it is found that the woman has been guilty of adultery and that her adultery has resulted from the husband's conduct towards her, the Court should make allowance in treating her case with leniency. and that what may perhaps be excusable in the case of woman would not be excusable in the case of man. Where it is found that the woman has been guilty of adultery and that her adultery has resulted from the husband's conduct towards her, the Court should make allowance in treating her case with leniency. Similar is M. J. Nupent v. N. E. Nupent: AIR 1934 All. 782 , yet another case under the Indian Divorce Act:- There is one ground on which the discretion of the Court is invariably exercised and this is where the wilful neglect or misconduct of the respondent-husband has caused or has conduced to the wife's adultery. 9. Thus in the special circumstances of the case we would hold that for one thing, the delay is delay of apathy or poverty rather than one which indicates acquiescence. The wrong on the part of the applicant-wife is no doubt a wrong, but one that has to be treated with leniency as it had been brought about indirectly by the husband's own conduct. 10. The requirements of humanity and the welfare of the community also point to the exercise in this case of the discretion to grant dissolution. The parties have moved each in his own way and without collusion into positions from which there is altogether no return. In addition, they have involved other parties and have children by subsequent unions. To refuse divorce would be not only to continue them in this anomalous condition but also to doom the children of both the separate unions, to the stigma of illegitimacy. On the other hand, if dissolution is granted it is just possible that the present irregular unions might get regularised and again the children could be legitimized. At all events, there is a good possibility of this happening. We do not suggest that considerations of humanity will prevail over the letter of the law which is binding on us whether or not we find them human enough. But where the law allows a discretion we would feel called upon to exercise it in a manner conducive to the lessening of human unhappiness. 11. All things considered we feel that this appeal should be allowed. Accordingly we allow the appeal of the wife-applicant and pass a decree of dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent. But where the law allows a discretion we would feel called upon to exercise it in a manner conducive to the lessening of human unhappiness. 11. All things considered we feel that this appeal should be allowed. Accordingly we allow the appeal of the wife-applicant and pass a decree of dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent. The latter has not appeared to contest the appeal though given some separate dates. In the special circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.