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1966 DIGILAW 324 (KER)

NARAYANA PILLAI v. BALAKRISHNA PILLAI

1966-11-18

M.MADHAVAN NAIR

body1966
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by defendants 1 to 4, 6, 8 to 13 and 15 to 23. The suit is for partition of a Nayar tarwad of two branches, one branch comprising defendants 1 to 23 and the other the plaintiff and defendants 24 to 83. The plaintiff claimed 1/84 share of all the properties. The main contest was by the 21st defendant, who contended that his branch became separated from the tarwad on the execution of Ex. D-2, in 1053 when some of the suit properties were given to them absolutely by the rest of the tarwad, that items 32 to 41, which belonged to Chamakkala tarwad, bad been given to his branch by its last survivor, that item No. 29 had been acquired by him and the 22nd defendant for themselves as a Puthuval registry in 1116 and that the rest of the suit properties are acquisitions of Neelakantan Kesavan of his branch. The Munsiff accepted the defence and dismissed the suit. On appeal by plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge found that Ex. D-2 was neither a partition nor an absolute transfer, that the tarwad continued undivided and that all the suit properties belong to the tarwad, and decreed the suit in regard to items 3 to 41 only, as items 1 and 2 have been lost to the tarwad by virtue of a court-sale. Hence this Second Appeal. 2. The properties involved in Ex. D-2 admittedly belonged to the common tarwad. Its executants represented the tarwad excepting the branch of defendants 1 to 23 who were the executees thereof. It recites that the properties are given to the branch for their routine expenses, to be enjoyed by them subject to the directions of the karnavan: It is very difficult to construe the document otherwise than as the Subordinate Judge has done. It is only an allotment of properties to a particular branch to be enjoyed by them for their maintenance and subject to control of the karnavan. No provision for permanency of the arrangement finds a place in the deed, nor is it stated that the properties will belong to the allottees in absolute rights. It follows that by virtue of Ex. No provision for permanency of the arrangement finds a place in the deed, nor is it stated that the properties will belong to the allottees in absolute rights. It follows that by virtue of Ex. D-2 the branch of defendants 1 to 23 did not separate from the tarwad, nor got the properties involved therein as their absolute properties; The finding to the above effect of the Subordinate Judge is therefore accepted. As regards items 32 to 41, the gift or settlement alleged to have been made by Cha-makkala tarwad is not in proof here. Chamakkala tarwad was a distant kindred of both branches. The Subordinate judge was therefore right in finding the properties to belong to the entire tarwad of plaintiff and defendants. 3. As regards acquisitions of Neelakantan Kesavan, the evidence is that he was in possession of tarwad properties allotted to his branch under Ex. D-2, and had no other source of income. His acquisitions must have come out of savings made from the income of properties allotted to his branch under Ex. D-2. The finding of the Subordinate Judge is also to that effect. Counsel for appellant contended that the income of properties allotted to a member or a branch for their maintenance belongs to them absolutely and. therefore, any acquisition of landed property made with the aid thereof must also belong to them absolutely and not to the tarwad. Counsel read Sundra Iyer's "Malabar and Aliyasantha Law" (Page 180): "A member of the family making improvements on the family property, or raising crops on the family property, cannot of course claim them. They will be regarded as accretions to the family property; it would be otherwise if the lands were held on lease from the family. Acquisitions out of maintenance allowances or out of the income of the family allotted for that purpose should be similarly treated as self-acquisitions." and also Aiyappan Pillai v. Bhagavathi Pillai (AIR. 1952 TC. 471) where it is observed: "The income derived by the component thavazhis or sub-thavazhis from the tarwad properties in their possession would be their own. Any saving made therefrom or any extra profit arising thereout would be their own, as they are not accountable to the tarwad." I regret my inability to agree with the aforesaid proposition. 1952 TC. 471) where it is observed: "The income derived by the component thavazhis or sub-thavazhis from the tarwad properties in their possession would be their own. Any saving made therefrom or any extra profit arising thereout would be their own, as they are not accountable to the tarwad." I regret my inability to agree with the aforesaid proposition. As has been observed by a Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kunjunni Pillai v. Bhaskara Pillai (1954 KLT. 340 FB), "the allottee of tarwad properties for purposes of maintenance, whether a member or a branch, is in possession of the properties allotted as a member or members of the tarwad." It then follows that, in spite of allotment to a branch for its maintenance, the property continues to be tarwad property in the possession of members of the tarwad, qua members. Its yield must then be income of the tarwad and therefore part of the tarwad's funds in their hands. The maintenance of members of a tarwad is a tarwad necessity and a tarwad purpose. So the income of a maintenance allotment is tarwad fund in the hands of members of the tarwad for meeting a tarwad purpose. In their hands it is a tarwad fund; until it is spent out it remains so. At no moment of time does it change its character. When it is allowed to accumulate in their hands and subsequently converted into landed property, the property must be found to have been acquired by junior members, the allottees, with tarwad funds, and on that score to be tarwad property. The acquisitions of Neelakantan Kesavan, with the funds he was able to save out of the income of maintenance allotments of tarwad properties given to his branch, must therefore enure to the tarwad. The finding of the Subordinate Judge to that effect is upheld. 4. As regards suit item No. 29, it is an acquisition by Puthuval registry by defendants 21 and 22 in the year 1115 (1940- 41). The plaintiff contends that the property had all along been in the possession of the tarwad, though the registry was taken by those junior members surreptitiously in the year 1116, and therefore must be held to belong to the tarwad. Reliance is had on the chitta, Ex. The plaintiff contends that the property had all along been in the possession of the tarwad, though the registry was taken by those junior members surreptitiously in the year 1116, and therefore must be held to belong to the tarwad. Reliance is had on the chitta, Ex. P-2, where the 'Areekal Purayidom' that is also the name of the suit item No. 29 is shown to have been registered in the name of the tarwad. Nothing much turns on the name given to a property. The property covered by the chitta is shown therein as S. No. 436/5. Suit item No. 29 is S. No. 436/1/12. The settlement register shows that S. No. 436/1 was a'Tharisu land' and unregistered. The fact that S. Nos. 436/1 and 436/5 bear the same name is of little consequence. What the tarwad had before 1116 was only S. No. 436/6. S. No 436/1/12 was unregistered land till 1116, and when it was registered, it was registered to defendants 21 and 22. The investment for the registry is not much. The normal presumption of acquisition of junior members is of separate property in them. It is for one who alleges the acquisition to have been made with the aid of tarwad funds to prove it. There is no such proof in this case. Suit item No. 29 has therefore to be held to belong to defendants 21 and 22 as their separate property. To that extent the decree of the court below has to be and is set aside. 5. In the result, the second appeal is allowed as regards suit item No. 29, which is declared hereby to belong to the acquirers, defendants 21 and 22, as their separate property. In regard to the rest the second appeal fails and is dismissed. I make no order as to costs here.