Shrimati Natho v. Board of Revenue — 1966 DIGILAW 33 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - By this petition under Article 226 for the Constitution the petitioners challenge the judgments of the Assistant Collector, 1st class decreeing the suit of opposite party No. 4 against the petitioners for a declaration that opposite party No. 4 is the Sirdar of one plot, and the Bhumidhar of remaining disputed plots mentioned in the plaint and directing ejectment of the petitioners from that land as well as the judgments of the Additional Commissioner Meerut and the Board of Revenue dismissing first and second appeals presented by the petitioners against that judgment of the Assistant Collector. The disputed land admittedly belonged once upon a time to Bakhtawar. Bakhtawar died and, when the question of succession to him arose the village in which the disputed land is situate was under consolidation. Consequently, proceedings for mutation of names in place of Bakhtawar were taken before the consolidation authorities. In those proceedings Harpal, opposite party No. 4, claimed to be entitled to succeed as the legal representative of Bakhtawar on the ground that he was the adopted son of Bakhtawar. That plea was ultimately rejected by the senior most authority which passed the final effective order in that proceeding. Subsequently, after the issue off the notification under Sec. 52 of the Consolidation off Holdings Act, Harpal instituted a suit for a declaration of his rights in the land and for ejectment of the petitioners from it though Harpal's claim had not been accepted by the consolidation authorities in the mutation proceedings. In the suit two main questions were raised by the petitioners, one was that the proceedings under the Consolidation of holdings Act were a bar to this suit by Harpal and the other was that Harpal had not proved that he was the adopted son of Bakhtawar and was, consequently, not entitled to succeed. The suit was decreed and the decree upheld by the appellate courts. 2. This case has been referred to the Division Bench by a learned Single Judge of this Court, mainly, for the decision of the first question as to whether the suit filed by Harpal, which has been decreed by the revenue courts, was competent or whether it was barred by provisions of Sec. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of holdings Act. This case has been referred to the Division Bench by a learned Single Judge of this Court, mainly, for the decision of the first question as to whether the suit filed by Harpal, which has been decreed by the revenue courts, was competent or whether it was barred by provisions of Sec. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of holdings Act. In this connection, the first point to be kept in view is that Bakhtawar admittedly died at the stage when the statement off proposals had already been confirmed under Sec. 23 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and only proceedings under sections subsequent to that were going on before the Consolidation authorities. The cause for action to Harpal, therefore, accrued after the statement of proposals had been confirmed under Sec. 23 of the Act and had already become final. There was no earlier cause off action on the basis of which Harpal could have instituted the suit or claimed any relief even from the consolidation authorities. 3. Sec. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation for the Holdings Act is as follows:- "Bar to Civil jurisdiction - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which, a declaration has been issued under Sec. 4, or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." 4. In interpreting this section, particular attention is to be paid to the fact that this section only lays down that the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders is to be done in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the bar to a proceeding in civil or revenue courts has been applied only with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Consequently, Sec. 49 will only come into play if either there had been proceedings relating to declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of the disputed land or if a proceeding for such declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of the land could or ought to have been taken under the Consolidation for Holdings Act. In the present case, the proceedings that were taken before the Consolidation authorities on the death of Bakhtawar were admittedly for mutation for names in the revenue records. We need not cite any ruling for the well settled principle that proceedings for mutation for names in revenue courts do not decide any rights or title of tenure-holders, so that those mutation proceedings were not proceedings in which there could be any declaration or adjudication of rights of these parties by the Consolidation authorities. All that the consolidation authorities could do was to enter the name of the person found entitled in place of Bakhtawar without adjudicating upon or declaring the rights of any of the parties to the land to which the proceedings for mutation related. At the stage at which Bakhtawar died, no proceeding could have been taken before the Consolidation authorities for the purposes of having the rights declared or adjudicated upon. The powers for consolidation authorities to adjudicate upon rights of tenure-holders are confined to proceedings taken under Sec. 9 or Sec. 20 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act or subsequent proceedings arising out of those proceedings itself, such as appeals or revisions. Once the proceedings up to the stage of Sec. 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act have been completed and the statement of proposals under Sec. 23 have been confirmed, the statement of proposals becomes final and the effect of finality is that all adjudications already made up to that date became final. The further effect is that, thereafter, there is no provision empowering the consolidation authorities to go into new questions of title or rights, which may arise as a result of new causes of action which may arise after the statement of proposals have been confirmed. The jurisdiction conferred on the consolidation authorities to be exercised thereafter is confined to giving effect to the consolidation scheme and to maintenance of records etc. No power at all is conferred at that later stage to declare or adjudicate upon the rights of tenure-holders. The jurisdiction conferred on the consolidation authorities to be exercised thereafter is confined to giving effect to the consolidation scheme and to maintenance of records etc. No power at all is conferred at that later stage to declare or adjudicate upon the rights of tenure-holders. The effect of this is that if a cause of action relating to a declaration or adjudication of rights happened to arise at a stage when the proceedings could have been taken under Sec. 20 or earlier sections, the jurisdiction to decide such questions would be exclusively exercisable by the consolidation authorities and their decisions would not be open to question in civil or revenue courts. Further, even if such questions are not raised, though the cause of action had arisen at a stage when they could have been raised before the consolidation authorities, there will be a bar to a claim on the basis of such cause of action, because off the later portion of Sec. 49. On the other hand, if a cause off action in respect of a declaration or rights arose after the proceedings up to the stage of Sec. 22 had been completed, the consolidation authorities would have no jurisdiction to entertain disputes relating to such rights, with the result that there would be no declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure-holders based on such causes of action by them, nor would any proceeding be entertainable by them in respect of such causes of action. In the present case, the cause of action admittedly arose after the statement of proposals were confirmed, when Bakhtawar died, so that it arose at a stage when the consolidation authorities had no power at all to declare or adjudicate upon the rights off tenure-holders. All that they were charged with was to maintain the records and in that connection to entertain proceedings for mutation. Any orders made in those proceedings for mutation would not be declaration and adjudication of rights and would, therefore, not attract the provisions of Sec. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. We may, of course, make it clear that, even the mutation proceedings would be proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, though the power of the Assistant Collector under the Land Revenue Act is exercised by the Consolidation authorities by virtue of Sec. 5-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. We may, of course, make it clear that, even the mutation proceedings would be proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, though the power of the Assistant Collector under the Land Revenue Act is exercised by the Consolidation authorities by virtue of Sec. 5-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The mutation proceedings in the present case, therefore, have only the same value as mutation proceedings before an Assistant Collector under the Land Revenue Act, so that they do not decide any rights and do not result in declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure-holders. 5. This view expressed by us is fully supported by a decision of a Division Bench off this Court in Thakur Sant Bux Singh v. S.C. Singh, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow, 1965 ALJ 516. The decision of another Division Bench in the case of Smt. Am-zadi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow, 1963 R.D. 62 is also in line with the view expressed by us above. In the order off reference made by the learned Single Judge there is a mention of another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kaushar v. Ahmad Khan, 1962 ALJ 564 Learned Single Judge thought that there is a conflict between this decision and the decision of the Division Bench in the case off Smt. Amzadi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow, 1963 R.D. 62 but we do not think that there is really any such conflict and that in fact, the decision in the case of Kaushar v. Ahmad Khan, 1962 ALJ 564 is also fully in line with the views we have expressed above. The proceedings that were taken before the consolidation authorities which came up for consideration in the latter case were under Secs. 9. 10 and 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. That was a stage at which all questions of title as well as all questions relating to declaration and adjudication of rights could have been gone into by the consolidation authorities and, consequently, decisions given by the consolidation authorities would not be open to challenge by subsequent suits in the civil or the revenue courts. That was a stage at which all questions of title as well as all questions relating to declaration and adjudication of rights could have been gone into by the consolidation authorities and, consequently, decisions given by the consolidation authorities would not be open to challenge by subsequent suits in the civil or the revenue courts. Further, even if no actual disputes were raised inviting decision from the consolidation authorities, subsequent suits would be barred on the ground that the causes of action having already arisen, appropriate proceedings could have been taken before the consolidation authorities for having the rights declared and adjudicated upon. In such cases, clearly the provisions of Sec. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would be attracted. On the other hand, the case before us as well as the other two cases mentioned by us above, relate to proceedings in which, the causes of action arose after the consolidation authorities had already exhausted their jurisdiction to take cognizance of proceedings relating to declaration or adjudication of rights, so that the provisions of Sec. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act could not be attracted at all. 6. The second point in this case about the adoption is a question of fact. The first appellate court on the evidence before it held that the adoption of Harpal, opposite party No. 4 by Bakhtawar was properly proved. We are unable to find any error of law in that decision much less an error that may be desert as manifest as well as apparent on the face of the record. 7. It the circumstances, the petition has no force and is dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order ps to costs. Petition dismissed.