Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant Colliery Company arises out of a suit for declaration of title and possession and for recovery of damages on the ground that the plaintiffs surface land had subsided on account of depillarisation in the coal mining area by the defendant. The suit was resisted mainly on the plea that the subsidence of the surface land had occurred about forty years back and not by the defendant extracting the coal or depillarising the underground area. The Courts below found in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit for damages. On the question of possession, they negatived the plea of limitation raised by the defendant company and held that the plaintiffs were in possession of the surface land till and before 1954, when the defendant Company depillarised the underground area and the surface land subsided. The quantum of damage, as decreed against the defendant Company, was calculated at the rate of sale price of the adjoining land, with reference to a registered deed of sale (Ex. 2) where the sale rate was Rs. 1,000 per bigha. The transaction of that sale bad taken place on 6-5-1938 and both the Courts adopted that as the standard to determine the measure of damage against the defendant. 2. Two points were raised by learned counsel in support of the appeal. He contended that there was no proper finding on the plaintiffs possession within 12 years preceding the suit. In absence of any proof or finding to that effect the plaintiffs suit for recovery of possession was bound to fail and his declaration of title and the award of damage in their favour would consequently fail. On referring to the trial Courts judgment, we find that on the point of possession, it accepted the evidence of P. W. 4 and concluded that prior to the alleged subsidence and pillar cutting in 1954 the plaintiffs were in possession. The title to the disputed land was taken to have been proved and prior to pillar cutting and subsidence there was no evidence that the defendant was in possession of the surface land. Admittedly the pillar cutting was in 1954-55 and on these materials the trial Court concluded in favour of the plaintiffs possession in 1954, that is, within 12 years before the suit which was instituted in 1955. Admittedly the pillar cutting was in 1954-55 and on these materials the trial Court concluded in favour of the plaintiffs possession in 1954, that is, within 12 years before the suit which was instituted in 1955. It will be noteworthy that before the institution of the suit the plaintiffs had served a registered notice on the defendant claiming damages for the subsidence caused to their surface land on account of the depillarisation done by the defendant Company, The lower appellate Court also agreed with the finding of the trial Court on the question of possession and held that the plaintiffs had proved their title to the disputed land and their possession over it within 12 years preceding the suit. In doing that, the evidence of P. W 4 was elaborately discussed by the lower appellate Court. It cannot, therefore, be said that either there is no clear finding by the Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs possession within 12 years preceding the suit, or that that finding was not based on any evidence. The first point raised by learned counsel thus fails. 3. The other point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was in regard to the award of damages. It was, at first contended that in a suit of this nature where the defendant Colliery Company worked the extraction of coal and also the depillarisation in the underground area within their own rights, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any damage whatsoever, even if they had suffered loss on account of the subsidence of the surface land. This proposition can hardly be accepted. It is well known that the owner of a surface land has the right of support of his surface land and the owner or the lessee of the underground mining area has no doubt the right of working the mines, but, all the same, he cannot deprive the surface owner of his right of support to his land. 4. Next it was contended that the measure of damage as given by the Courts below is excessive. It should not have been equated with the purchase value of the surface land. 4. Next it was contended that the measure of damage as given by the Courts below is excessive. It should not have been equated with the purchase value of the surface land. Learned counsels argument was that there were several mitigating circumstances which the Courts below should have taken into consideration, namely, lack of any evidence, of negligence in working the mine on the part of the defendant and want of expert evidence in regard to the extent of subsidence caused to the surface land on account of depillarisation by the defendant Company. In that view, he contended that the measure of damage should have been, at the most, nominal and much less than what has been decreed. Both the parties proceeded, as it appears from the evidence discussed in the two judgments of the Courts below, on the basis that the surface land had subsided completely in some portion of the suit land and partly in another portion where it has become very risky and the land had been cordoned off by a fence put by the defendant under the Mining Regulations. P. W. 4 in his evidence said that before the institution of the suit, the land had partly subsided, but during the suit and before he deposed in Court it had completely subsided. A pleader-commissioner was appointed by the trial Court who submitted an elaborate report with maps and mentioned the dimension of the goal area and the risky area separately. Thus, it is not a case in which there can be any doubt that part of the land involved in the suit had completely subsided and another part had also partly but sufficiently subsided so that it was risky to traverse on it and it had to be safeguarded against people coming over the land, by putting fence all round it. Different areas were indicated by the pleader-commissioner in his report and the Courts below also referred to them before they calculated damage to be awarded in favour of the plaintiffs. The subsided area is 1.64 acres and the risky area is .91. An area of .02 acre as found by the commissioner to have been encroached upon by the defendant by stacking coal, stones and other materials. The subsided area is 1.64 acres and the risky area is .91. An area of .02 acre as found by the commissioner to have been encroached upon by the defendant by stacking coal, stones and other materials. The Courts below thought that even this small bit of land of 2 decimals was in the immediate vicinity of the subsided area and, for all practical purposes, was proper to be included in the subsided area for the purpose of determining the quantum of damage for which the defendant will be liable. Learned counsel for the appellants contention that in the absence of any exact evidence in regard to measure of subsidence, the award of damage was arbitrary does not appear to be correct on the evidence and the materials on the record. If it is accepted, as it has been done by the two Courts below mostly on the basis of the evidence of P. W. 4 and the admission made by the defendants witness (D. W. 1) that the area had subsided and was cordoned off by a fence preventing people to come upon it, there cannot be any doubt that it is a proper case in which the plaintiffs were entitled to be compensated to the extent they suffered loss. When the surface land subsides it becomes completely useless and, in that sense the measure of damage can be equated reasonably with the difference between the price of the land, as it was before subsidence, and the price of the land after subsidence. In other words, it will be the previous value of the land, because after subsidence its price in the market will be almost nothing. D. W. 1 further admitted in his evience that the defendant had a working plan with him according to which the coals were extracted and the pillars were cut. It would have thrown much light on the question involved in the suit, namely, whether the subsidence was caused by depillarisation or not. The actual dates of depillarisation would have been available from the working plan and in that way the defendant was in a better position to show if or not the subsidence spoken about in the plaint as well as in the plaintiffs evidence was the immediate result of the depillarisation done by the defendant Colliery Co. in 1954. The actual dates of depillarisation would have been available from the working plan and in that way the defendant was in a better position to show if or not the subsidence spoken about in the plaint as well as in the plaintiffs evidence was the immediate result of the depillarisation done by the defendant Colliery Co. in 1954. Without producing that valuable document it will not be open to the defendant Company now to say that the plaintiffs have not proved satisfactorily that the subsidence of the surface land was due to the depillarisation done by the defendant Company. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied very much upon Ambalal Khora V/s. Bihar Hosiery Mills Ltd., AIR 1937 Pat 657, where, in almost similar circumstances, the measure of damage awarded was equivalent to the purchase price of the land and the house which was involved in the subsidence after the working of the coal mines underground. A few cases were cited before us by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, but, in our view, they do not have any relevance. In the case of Sundermull V/s. Ladhuram Kaluram, AIR 1924 Cal 240, it was observed that the measure of damages for trespass, whether the claim, is founded on contract or on tort, is not the value of the land, but the real damages sustained, which may be considerable or merely nominal. There the suit was by the landlord against a tenant for recovery of damages on account of his holding over the land after the termination of the tenancy. We do not think this case can be of any assistance to the appellant. It is not disputed that the measure of damages will always be, as far possible, commensurate with the loss suffered by the plaintiff. In the present case, the loss suffered by the plaintiffs is complete loss of the surface land and in that sense the value of the land can well be the measure of damages to be given in their favour. In the case of Nawagarh Coal Ltd. V/s. Behari Lal Trigunait, 1 Pat LJ 275: (AIR 1916 Pat 69), the zamindar granted lease of surface right only but retained his ownership of the subsoil right in mines and minerals. It was held that he could go over the surface land to work the mines in the underground area. In the case of Nawagarh Coal Ltd. V/s. Behari Lal Trigunait, 1 Pat LJ 275: (AIR 1916 Pat 69), the zamindar granted lease of surface right only but retained his ownership of the subsoil right in mines and minerals. It was held that he could go over the surface land to work the mines in the underground area. This case has nothing to do with the facts involved in the present case. The case of Welldon v. Butterley Co. Ltd., 1920 Ch 130, is equally besides the point. There it was observed that mitigating circumstances, such as, lawful work by the defendant within his own rights will be taken into account in measuring the damages against him. In our view, there has been no failure on that principle in the award of damage in the present case. The case of Bengal Provincial Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Rajani Kanta De, AIR 1936 Cal 564, is also not on the point. In that case, a Railway Company dug a pit on its own land which was adjacent to the plaintiffs land where a substantial structure had been put by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued for damages caused to their buildings by the digging of the pit by the defendant Railway Company. A nominal damage of Rs. 10 was awarded against the defendant. That was in consideration of the loss suffered by the plaintiffs. In the instant case before us, we have agreed with the finding of the Courts below that there has been complete loss of the surface land by its subsidence to large measure and by part subsidence in the rest of the land and, in that view, the measure of damage was determined rightly at the rate at which the land was purchased one year before the depillatisation at that place. 6. For the reasons given above we do not find any merit in the defendants appeal and, therefore, dismiss it with costs. S.N.P.Singh, J. 7 I agree.