ORDER Mahesh Chandra, J. - This is an application for revision against the conviction of the Applicants by both the courts below. 2. The case for the prosecution was that on 8-3-1963 at about 3 p.m. all the Applicants acting together had dug a 3' wide channel on Narsan Iqbalpur PWD road. The defence was that the breach had been created on the road because of the flow of the water. Two witnesses, Raghubir Singh (DW1) and Raja Ram (DW 2), were examined in defence. 3. The courts below after considering the evidence on behalf of the prosecution and the defence in detail believed the prosecution witnesses, Devi Chand, Dharam Singh and Manglu (PWs. 1 to 3), who stated that they actually saw the four Applicants digging this 3' wide channel on Narsan Iqbalpur PWD road and disbelieved DWs. 1 and 2 when they stated that the road had been dug by the PWD men themselves. The very statement of DWs. 1 and 2 that the road has been dug by the PWD men shows that the defence allegation that the breach had been caused by natural overflow of water was false. The conclusion of both the courts below on the basis of the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 that the breach was actually caused by the four Applicants is not unjustified or incorrect. 4. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicants is that no offence was committed because the Applicants had no alternative but to create a breach on the road in view of the fact that water had accumulated in their fields. For this contention he relied on Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 81 runs as follows: Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith for the purposes of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property. 5. It will be evident from the wordings of the section that it applies only to those acts which are offences merely by reason of their being done with the knowledge that they are likely to cause harm. The offence, with which the Applicants were charged is not an act of this, nature being an offence covered by Section 431 IPC. It will be evident from the wordings of the section that it applies only to those acts which are offences merely by reason of their being done with the knowledge that they are likely to cause harm. The offence, with which the Applicants were charged is not an act of this, nature being an offence covered by Section 431 IPC. This section runs as follows: Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which he knows to be likely to render any public road, bridge, navigable river or navigable channel, natural or artificial, impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. 6. Clearly, this section provides that any act amounting to mischief rendering a public road less safe for travelling will be an offence punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both 7. Mischief has been defined in Section 425 IPC. It runs as follows: Whoever, with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction, of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits "mischief". Explanation 1--... ... ... .. Explanation 2--... ... ... ... 8. It will be evident from the wordings of this section that for an offence of mischief the act must be done either (1) with intent to cause wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, or (2) knowing that he is likely to cause such loss or damage. Section 81 IPC would cover only the second eventuality where an offence is done only with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm. In fact Section 81 expressly says "if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm". This shows clearly that the first eventuality contemplated in the definition of mischief, i.e., the intention to cause harm, is not covered by Section 81 IPC. 9. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicants that in the present case there was no intention to cause harm. This contention is without force. This shows clearly that the first eventuality contemplated in the definition of mischief, i.e., the intention to cause harm, is not covered by Section 81 IPC. 9. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicants that in the present case there was no intention to cause harm. This contention is without force. If a man knows that a certain consequence will follow from his act it must be presumed in law that he intended that consequence to take place although he may have had some quite different ulterior motive for performing the act vide Mir Chitten v. Emperor 1936 AWR 1024. That was case in which this Court held that the person had a right to kill the cow, but if he wanted to kill it in a public place he should have done it in a manner so as not to injure the feelings of others. Applying this, principle that a man intends the consequence to take place when he knows that a certain consequence will follow from his act, this Court upheld the conviction although this Court held that the person had a legal right ten kill the cow. Under no circumstances can a person be justified in intentionally causing harm. The justification is only in a case where he has merely, the knowledge that his act is likely to injure others or cause harm. The difference is between the knowledge that it is a mere likelihood and the knowledge that the consequence must necessarily follows. 10. In the present case when the Applicants dug the road there was no question of there being a mere livelihood of causing damage to td public property. The road which was public property was being damaged by the act, itself. It was, therefore, an act done with that intent in law and not merely with the knowledge that it would cause harm. Section 81 IPC cannot, therefore, help the Applicants in the present case. 11. They had, therefore, clearly committed an offence u/s 431 IPC by cutting the public road and making it impossible or at any rate less safe for travelling or conveying property. The conviction cannot, therefore, be said to be unjustified. 12. In view of the fact, however, that the fields of the Applicants were also likely to be damaged by heavy rains and the accumulation of water. The conviction cannot, therefore, be said to be unjustified. 12. In view of the fact, however, that the fields of the Applicants were also likely to be damaged by heavy rains and the accumulation of water. I consider it proper to reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. 13. The revision is accordingly dismissed except for the modification that the period of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. The Applicants are on bail. They need not surrender to their bail. Their bail bonds are discharged.